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CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

RELATING TO

THE CURRENT WORLD CRISIS

FIRST INSTALLMENT: 2 - 22 OCTOBER 1956

HISTORICAL SECTION
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
28 November 1956

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
HISTORICAL SECTION

FOREWORD

This chronology, with its supplement, has been prepared by the Historical Section, Joint Chiefs of Staff, by direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Further installments will follow in due course.

The study assembles in chronological order of their occurrence the significant events relating to the current world crisis, beginning with the first reports of an impending overturn in the government of Poland. It therefore takes up the account of the Suez Crisis, which began earlier, in midstream. Owing to the fact that many of the events described are known as yet only imperfectly through fragmentary and contradictory reports, the reports are frequently treated as "events" in themselves. Months, if not years, will pass before historians will be able to determine exactly what has happened in Central Europe and the Middle East during the past weeks.

All items contain, as a part of the footnote, the time at which the information was received in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Where State Department cables are referenced the times at which they were received in the State Department are also given. In cases where no time of receipt could be determined the entry "NO TIME" has been made. All times are given in "Z", or Greenwich Mean Time. Attention is called to the fact that the Washington area changed from Daylight Time to Standard Time at 0600Z hours on 28 October.

The time cited for receipt of items from the New York Times is that of the beginning of normal duty hours in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. From a historiographical standpoint, the political reporting of New York Times correspondents during the current crisis in Central Europe has been outstanding for completeness, accuracy, and speed of transmission. Not infrequently the New York Times provides the earliest and best information on foreign political events available to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Concerning items taken from the Associated Press Wire Service, a problem has emerged in that no files of the nighttime dispatches are kept in the Pentagon or even in the Washington Bureau of the Associated Press, to which researchers of the Historical Section had access. The wire service machine in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was ordered on twenty-four hour service on 17 October. For the period between that date and 14 November, when the Historical Section began receiving a full copy of the night dispatches, no record of AP material received after duty hours is available. A request was made for access to the Joint Staff Watch Officer's Log in the expectation that important material received from the AP Wire Service at night might have been entered. The request was withdrawn, however, when Captain Samuel B. Frankel, USN, Assistant Director, JIQ, stated that not only did the Log contain no matter pertaining to this project, but that it contained special category material for which members of the Historical Section were not cleared.

The Historical Section, Joint Chiefs of Staff wishes to express its gratitude to the following persons who have given assistance in the preparation of this study: Colonel J. J. Hausman,

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USAF, Chief of the Current Intelligence Unit, Joint Intelligence Group; Mr. Paul M. Kearney, Administrative Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Mr. Morley R. Day, Head of the Coordination and Evaluation Section, Joint Secretariat.

This study is a collaborative effort of the Historical Section, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The following members of the Historical Section have contributed to the completion of this project: Historians - Mr. Vernon E. Davis, Mr. Ernest H. Giusti, Mr. Wilber W. Hoare, Jr., Mr. Robert M. Utley, Mr. Ellmore A. Champie, and Mr. Stanley L. Falk; Researcher - Mr. Rowland P. Gill; Clerical Assistants - Mrs. Pauline S. Butler, Mrs. Janet W. Ball, and Mrs. Jane O. Phillips.

Joseph Dasher
JOSEPH DASHER
Colonel, USAF
Chief

28 November 1956

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2 Oct (u) SecState Dulles said in his news conference that a difference of approach toward the Suez issue existed between the US and its European allies; that it was connected with fundamental matters, and that in questions of colonialism the US must play an "independent role." Two hours later, however, Dulles took the rare step of amending the official transcript of the conference, but not before news of the original version had gone out.

AP Wire Service, 2 Oct 56. Received JCS 021555Z & 021806Z.

2 Oct Ambassador Dillon took sharp issue with the intelligence estimate, in SNIE 30-4-56, of the French reaction to any US opposition to military action in the Suez controversy. Ambassador Dillon stated that US opposition would do more than cause considerable temporary strain in Franco-American relations; it would cause "very severe strain . . . for an indefinite period with seriously adverse effects on NATO and Western Alliance." Initially, there would be a very violent French reaction, followed by a prolonged period of deep bitterness and serious re-evaluation of basic French foreign policy. The Suez issue, he stressed, had united non-Communist opinion in France as rarely before.

(12) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 1558, 2 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 042050Z. Received JCS 051617Z Oct 56.

2 Oct (u) The Paris paper Le Monde reported a telephone conversation with its Warsaw correspondent, who said a desperate struggle for Communist party leadership was under way in Poland. One faction, led by Rokossovsky, wanted to go back to Stalinist techniques. A liberal group, led by Cyrankiewicz and Foreign Minister Rapacki, wanted to carry the democratization policy further.

AP Wire Service, 2 Oct 56. Not received in JCS.

3 Oct (u) In Paris and London, official irritation was evident over SecState Dulles' 2 October statement disassociating the US from "colonial powers" in the Suez crisis, despite his later amendment of the record. Besides feeling that the Suez question and the issue of colonialism were wholly separate, the French found the statement objectionable on three counts: 1) It came only two days after Premier Guy Mollet had assured the French public that "the responsible men of the United States are profoundly in accord with us." 2) It advertised differences among the Western Big Three just before the UN Security Council meeting, where they were expected to stand together. 3) SecState's comments were regarded as playing into the hands of Egyptian and Communist propagandists, and as being useful to the Algerian rebels. Within the British Government the Dulles remarks also aroused resentment, particularly since they revealed US-British differences at a time when Selwyn Lloyd was saying in New York that there were no differences.

NYT, 4 Oct 56, 1:7. Received JCS 041230Z Oct 56.

3 Oct (u) Israel announced on 3 October her intention to boycott further meetings of the Israeli-Jordanian Mixed Armistice Commissions. The announcement was made by a Foreign Ministry spokesman who decried the failure of the UN Truce Supervision Organization to draw a distinction between attacker and attacked. The official statement accused the Arab states of disregarding the

armistice agreements and embarking on a policy of aggression against Israel. (First intimation of Israeli withdrawal from the Commissions received in JCS over AP wire service 031502Z)

NYT, 4 Oct 56, 5:1. Received JCS 041230Z Oct 56.

3 Oct The US Embassy in Warsaw reported rumors that the Polish United Workers' Party (i.e. Polish Communist Party) plenum was scheduled to meet shortly after 15 October to consider election laws and provide for a speech-making appearance of Gomulka to indicate his active reappearance in political life. According to the rumors, the reason for Gomulka's appearance was that the regime needed his popular appeal to cope with the dissatisfaction arising out of "relaxation."
(S) Msg, Warsaw (Jacobs) to SecState, 380, 3 Oct 56, DA IN 257663 C (4 Oct 56). Received State 031622Z Oct 56. Received JCS 042200Z Oct 56.

3 Oct (U) According to "reliable information," the talks on Iraqi military aid to Jordan had broken down. Jordan's Cabinet had met with King Hussein on 3 October to hear a report from Foreign Minister Abdul Hadi, who had returned on 2 October from Baghdad. However, an expected communique on the results of the talks had not been issued. Disagreement over military cooperation was said to be based on two points: 1) Iraq had refused to put her troops under Jordanian command if they entered Jordan to reinforce the Arab Legion. 2) The Iraqis had insisted on the withdrawal of the Jordanian National Guard from the armistice line with Israel, since they felt that the presence of these green troops on the frontier might touch off shooting incidents.
NYT, 4 Oct 56, 1:1. Received JCS 041230Z Oct 56.

4 Oct The U.S. Army attache in Tel Aviv reported that a Haifa-Jerusalem railway train had been subjected to rifle and machine-gun fire from the Jordanian side at Tulkarm at 1600Z on 3 October. The Army attache thought that Israeli retaliation for this incident was doubtful, unless further attacks on the railroad occurred.
(S) Msg, USARMA Tel Aviv to DEPTAR, CX 340 040700Z Oct 56, DA IN 257765 (4 Oct 56). Received JCS 050126Z Oct 56.

4 Oct (U) Israel announced that five civilians had been killed and at least one other wounded in a new Jordanian border incident on the night of 4 October. Israeli authorities charged Jordanian Army infiltrators had set an ambush six miles south of Sodom near the Dead Sea.
NYT, 5 Oct 56, 3:1. Received JCS 051230Z Oct 56.

4 Oct The US Embassy in Belgrade submitted a report on Yugoslavia, in view of continuing suggestions from official and press sources that the USSR might be trying to re-create some form of international control mechanism to take the place of the Cominform. The Embassy reported that Yugoslavia was firmly on record as calling for the dissolution of the Cominform. With reference to Hungary, the Embassy reported that the Yugoslav press insisted on the full rehabilitation of Nagy and was less than satisfied with Gero.
(S) Msg, Belgrade (Riddleberger) to SecState, 450, 4 Oct 56. CJCS files. Received State 042152Z Oct 56. Received JCS 051611Z Oct 56.

4 Oct An Iraqi-Jordanian communique issued on 4 October stated that high-level talks on Iraqi military assistance to

Jordan had been held in Baghdad between 26 September and 1 October, during which Iraq had reaffirmed its adherence to the defense treaty between the two countries. Military representatives were continuing the discussions at the technical level.

(S) Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 309, DA IN 258147 C, 5 Oct 56. Received State 051534Z Oct 56. Received JCS 060736Z Oct 56.

5 Oct US Ambassador Aldrich, in London, called attention to a 3 October London Times editorial attacking the US "wavering course over Suez issue." The editorial also stated that SecState Dulles' remark, on 2 October, about colonialism would be "deeply and bitterly resented by America's friends." The Ambassador reported that this editorial reflected the sentiments of a growing number of government supporters and Tory Party members, and that this irritation with the US had particular significance since it came from British elements traditionally pro-US. Moreover, Conservatives were aware that domestic repercussions of a British diplomatic defeat over Suez might eventually entail resignation of Eden, a split of the Tory Party, and defeat in the next general election. The feeling of frustration over Suez, reported Aldrich, led Conservatives to seek a scapegoat, the US.

(S) Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 1874, 5 Oct 56. Received State 051433Z Oct 56. Received JCS 061722Z Oct 56.

5 Oct (u) In London six nations were named as members of the Executive Group that would run the Suez Canal Users Association (SCUA) and chart ways for a peaceful settlement of the Suez crisis with Egypt. They were the US, UK, France, Italy, Norway, and Iran.

AP Wire Service, 5 Oct 56. Received JCS 051419Z Oct 56.

5 Oct The US Embassy reported that Tito had returned to Belgrade (from Yalta) that afternoon but that no communique had been issued by the Yugoslav Govt as yet.

(S) Msg, Belgrade (Riddleberger) to SecState, 456, 5 Oct 56. Received State 051657Z Oct 56. Received JCS 061722Z Oct 56.

5 Oct [] reported the Jordanian [] denial of Israeli charges that the five civilians ambushed and killed on the Beersheba-Sodom road on 4 October were victims of a Jordanian foray. He also reported that, in anticipation of Israeli retaliation, the Jordanian Army and Air Force had been placed on alert status.

(S) Received JCS 060142Z Oct 56.

5 Oct The US Ambassador at Cairo was given "blanket authorization," to be used when he determined to evacuate himself, US Foreign Service Officers, employees, and families whose salaries were payable from appropriation 1970113 from Port Said, Alexandria, and Cairo to places of residence in US.

(S) Msg, State to AmEmbassy, CAIRO, 1045, 052339Z Oct 56. Received JCS 061724Z Oct 56.

5 Oct The UK and France introduced a resolution calling on the UN Security Council to endorse the 18-nation proposals adopted at the London Conference as a suitable

basis for settlement of the Suez Canal question. The resolution asked the Security Council to recommend that Egypt cooperate in negotiating a system of operation of the canal on this basis and that, pending outcome of such negotiations, Egypt cooperate with the Suez Canal Users Association. SecState Dulles supported the resolution in a brief preliminary statement. (The first incomplete reports of this action were received in the JCS over the AP wire service at 051645Z and 051930Z Oct.) The Security Council invited Egypt to attend the meeting, but the council postponed indefinitely its consideration of a request by Israel and seven Arab states to participate on the same basis as Egypt.

(Official Use Only) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 310, DA IN 258337, 6 Oct 56. Received State 060652Z Oct 56. Received JCS 062047Z Oct 56. NYT, 6 Oct 56. 1:8, 3:2. Received JCS 061230Z Oct 56.

6 Oct

Ambassador Lawson conveyed US views on Iraqi troop movement into Jordan to Ben-Gurion on 5 October. Ben-Gurion raised no objection in principle, but his cooperation was based on assurances that Iraqi troops would be limited to a few hundred men, that they were being sent for the sole purpose of stabilizing Jordan against Egypt and Communism, that the movement was not the initial action in an Iraqi take-over of Jordan that would place Iraqi troops permanently on Israel's frontier, and that they would remain well in the east of Jordan and not be armed with any of the modern British equipment stockpiled in Jordan. Ben-Gurion would not feel himself morally bound if these conditions were not strictly adhered to. However, Lawson had received information that Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri's plans called for dispatch of two brigades to Jordan, with a third held close to the border;

(S) Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 330, 061500Z Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 062040Z Oct 56. Received JCS 082106Z Oct 56.

6 Oct

V. K. Krishna Menon, Indian Foreign Minister, ended his talks with President Nasser on the Suez issue and left for London to try to get the West to sit down with Egypt and work out their differences over the Canal. His move reflected a growing belief that the UN Security Council could not solve the problem. Egyptian officials made it clear Egypt would spurn the Western proposal, introduced at the UN, for international control of the Canal.

Krishna Menon conferred twice with Nasser on the 6th and also talked with Ahmad Shukairy [sic], Deputy Secretary General of the Arab League, and with British Ambassador Sir Humphrey Trevelyan.

(On 7 October, CIA reported,

had been worked out during a meeting between President Nasser and Menon.

President Nasser now declared that the compromise plan was his final position, not subject to further negotiation. (Received in JCS 080257Z Oct 56.)

NYT, 7 Oct 56, 5:1. Received JCS 071230Z. (S) Msg, CIA to JCS et al,

Received JCS 080257Z Oct 56.

6 Oct The US Ambassador in Baghdad reported a statement of Iraqi plans received from Nuri the morning of 6 October: A battalion of Iraqi troops was to be based at the pumping station H-3, within the borders of Iraq; Nuri hoped to be able to begin moving supplies and guards, equipped with defensive weapons only, into Jordan by 16 October; stockpiling was to take place at two pumping stations (H-4 and H-5) and at Mafrag, within Jordan; one battalion was to be distributed among these last three points as stationary guards; a patrol of battalion strength, with one armored car equipped with anti-aircraft guns, was to move between H-4 and Mafrag.

In the same talk with the ambassador, Nuri had also revealed that, in addition to 1000 rifles and a million rounds of ammunition already sent to Jordan, he was now sending another 1000 rifles and one-half million rounds of ammunition.

(S) Msg, Baghdad (Gallman) to SecState, 576, 061249Z Oct 56, DA IN 258265 (6 Oct 56). Received State No Time. Received JCS 061614Z Oct 56.

6 Oct (v) Approximately 200,000 Hungarians marched before the coffins of Laszlo Rajk and three other top-ranking Communists who were executed seven years earlier for allegedly having plotted with Tito and having been on the payroll of a US intelligence agency. Declared innocent and "rehabilitated" earlier in 1956, the four were being given honorary reburial. The parade differed from similar demonstrations of recent years in its spontaneity. There were few organized groups and most of the people came individually. Members of the Hungarian Government were present. Speaking for the party and the Government, Deputy Premier Antal Apro assailed the "personality cult, Stalinist blunders and their imitation in Hungary."

NYT, 7 Oct 56, 1:7. Received JCS 071230Z Oct 56.

7 Oct (v) Pravda, organ of the Soviet Communist party, broke Soviet press silence on the recent talks between President Tito and Soviet leaders with an article expressing satisfaction at their outcome. The Soviet people were told they could expect "sincere, close and friendly cooperation" between Yugoslavia and Soviet-bloc countries on the basis of equality and noninterference in internal affairs. At the same time Pravda made it clear that the doctrine of individual evolution toward communism did not mean the Soviet Union would relinquish its leading role in guiding the destinies of the other members of its bloc.

NYT, 8 Oct 56, 8:3. Received JCS 081230Z Oct 56.

7 Oct (v) The Soviet press indicated that Foreign Minister Dmitri T. Shepilov would vigorously oppose in the United Nations the British-French plan for international control of the Suez Canal. Press accounts noted that the Soviet Union was committed to defend Egypt's rights in the Suez dispute. Tass, the Government news agency, and other official voices stated that the demand of the Western powers for international administration of the important waterway was "incompatible with the Sovereign rights of Egypt."

NYT, 8 Oct 56, 4:5. Received JCS 081230Z Oct 56.

7 Oct (v) In an interview with a London Times correspondent, Iraq Prime Minister Nuri stated that he believed an urgent settlement of the Palestine dispute on the basis of the 1947 UN Palestine proposals was necessary to create peace and tranquility in the Middle East. (See item of 8 October.)

The Times (London), 8 Oct 56, 6:3. Not received in JCS.

8 Oct (v) At the United Nations, Egypt rejected the British-French Suez proposal, but suggested the creation of a negotiating body to seek settlement of the dispute. Addressing the UN Security Council, the Foreign Ministers of both Egypt and the USSR rejected international operation of the Suez Canal, but, at the same time indicated that there was room for negotiation on the question of international participation in the operation of the waterway. While diplomatic observers believed that the Russo-Egyptian statements offered some encouragement, they counter-balanced this feeling with notice of the harsh anti-Western character of the statements made to the Security Council by the Russian and Egyptian Foreign Ministers.

AP Wire Service, 8 Oct 56. Received JCS 081452Z Oct 56. NYT, 9 Oct 56, 1:8. Received JCS 091230Z Oct 56.

8 Oct

Reported that an Israeli infantry brigade, unidentified but probably the Fourth, had been mobilized during the night hours of 4 and 5 October; also, that an unidentified antitank battalion, probably from the Fourth Brigade, had left an Israeli camp on the evening of 7 October for an unknown destination. He estimated that Israeli forces were in the initial stage of a substantial mobilization, preparatory to an overt hostile act against Jordan or Egypt or both. He further reported that at Haifa late on 28 September a French ship had unloaded 20 AMX tanks and a number of French 75-mm. guns, which had been moved south by rail on 29 September.

Received JCS 081634Z Oct 56.

8 Oct (v)

Great Britain renewed its eleven-month-old offer to mediate compromise settlement in the Arab-Israeli dispute. While Arab and Egyptian leaders reacted favorably to the offer, the Israelis declared that Britain was disqualified as an impartial arbitrator and that any proposals for settlement along the lines of the 1947 UN agreement would mean a net loss of territory for their country.

The British offer grew out of British Foreign Office comment on a Times (London) interview with Premier Nuri of Iraq. The Premier had pointed out that the Palestine problem was the key to Arab unrest and had called for settlement on the basis of the 1947 UN Palestine proposals.

NYT, 9 Oct 56, 12:3. Received JCS 091230Z Oct 56.

8 Oct

The US Embassy in Warsaw forwarded reports that Gomulka would soon be admitted to the Politburo and that he was scheduled to speak at the meeting of the Plenum for 15 October. The Polish Communist Party leadership was believed to be sharply split between liberals and those favoring a "hard" policy.

New York Times correspondent Sydney Gruson reported from Poznan, Poland, that on the night of 8 October he had learned that Wladyslaw Gomulka was expected to be restored to leadership of the Polish United Workers Party when the party's Central Committee met, two months earlier than scheduled, on 15 October. According to Gruson, Gomulka was to be reinstated on the ground that his expulsion in 1948 was illegal because it was ordered without the approval of a party congress.

Msg, Warsaw (Jacobs) to SecState, 402, 8 Oct 56, DA IN 258816 (9 Oct 56). Received State 081834Z Oct 56. Received JCS 100348Z Oct 56. NYT, 9 Oct 56, 1:6. Received JCS 091230Z Oct 56.

8 Oct US Embassy in Tel Aviv stated that no Israeli retaliatory action had followed the last Jordanian raid, "but many private Israelis have impression some 'new departure' of more radical nature may be under consideration." An officially inspired editorial in the 7 October Jerusalem Post had charged that Jordanian attacks were being carried out at Egypt's order. It warned that if Israeli counter-action caused the Kingdom of Jordan to crumble, Israel would not allow Egypt to inherit the remains.

(S) Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 334, 8 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 081958Z Oct 56. Received JCS 091526Z Oct 56.

8 Oct The State Dept instructed the American Ambassador in

(S) Msg, State Dept to AmEmbassy 082310Z Oct 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 091535Z Oct 56.

9 Oct (U) The Foreign Ministers of Britain, France, and Egypt met at the UN in an attempt to reach a compromise settlement of the Suez question after the "Private" meetings of the UN Security Council on the subject had collapsed. The Security Council was not to hold another meeting until Thursday afternoon, thus allowing some forty-eight hours for talks by the three principal countries concerned in the problem.

NYT, 10 Oct 56, 1:5. Received JCS 101230Z Oct 56.

9 Oct (U) Warsaw radio reported on the night of 9 October that Hilary Minc had resigned as First Deputy Premier and member of the Politburo of the Polish United Workers Party. Although the official explanation was ill health, Times correspondent Sydney Gruson wrote that Minc and Gomulka had been bitter enemies and Gomulka was believed to have demanded Minc's resignation as one of the conditions for his return to power.

NYT, 10 Oct 56, 1:3. Received JCS 101230Z Oct 56.

9 Oct The American Embassy in Algiers reported information indicating that the French were no longer contemplating use of force at Suez. Orders alerting the General Massu parachute division for possible immediate transfer to that area had been cancelled and that some merchant shipping requisitioned for army use was being released.

(S) Msg, Algiers (Clark) to SecState, 92, 9 Oct 56, DA IN 258993. Received State 091646Z Oct 56. Received JCS 102341Z Oct 56.

9 Oct

reported that a partial Israeli mobilization had apparently been completed on the night of 8-9 October. He believed the mobilized units were on a stand-by status awaiting a policy decision by the Cabinet, with immediate hostile action unlikely.

Received JCS 091657Z Oct 56.

10 Oct The US Embassy reported that an Israeli Foreign Ministry official described an attack on Israeli civilians as obviously carried out by Fedayeen either on direct orders of the Jordanian Army or at least with the Army's knowledge. The Embassy stated that Israel might make prompt and sharp retaliation, but, if it did not, this might indicate Israeli leaders had decided that orthodox punitive measures no longer provided security and they were considering other, more drastic measures.
Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 345, 10 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 101447Z Oct 56. Received JCS 111210Z Oct 56.

10 Oct (u) The British, French and Egyptian Foreign Ministers met again at the UN in an attempt to reach agreement on the Suez problem, and were to meet for a third time on 11 October. Egypt appeared adamant against permitting any international body to order sanctions in the event of discrimination against any user of the canal; the British on the other hand had said that they would accept no plan which provided less. Unless agreement could be reached in the private talks to be held on 11 October, the British and French were expected to press for UN adoption of their resolution calling for international operation of the canal and calling upon Egypt to negotiate on that basis.

NYT, 11 Oct 56, 1:8. Received JCS 111230Z Oct 56.

10 Oct (u) Moshe Leshem, a spokesman for the Israeli Foreign Office, rejected as a "declaration that a peace settlement should be imposed upon Israel" the Iraqi Prime Minister's recent British approved suggestion that an attempt should be made to bring peace to Palestine on the basis of the 1947 UN approved peace proposals.

NYT, 11 Oct 56, 18:1. Received JCS 111230Z Oct 56.

10 Oct SECRET Ambassador Lawson forwarded Israeli Foreign Minister Meir's strong representations that her country would not be satisfied with any general formula covering the international use of the Suez Canal that did not specifically mention the special case of Israel.
Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 347, 10 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 111155Z Oct 56. Received JCS 121612Z Oct 56.

10 Oct (u) "Diplomatic sources" in Washington disclosed on 10 October that, to forestall a governmental collapse in Jordan that might bring Egyptian and Syrian troops into the country, the US and UK would approve movement of Iraqi troops into Jordan. Washington and London had assured Israel that, if the move were made, Iraqi troops would not go near Israeli borders. At the same time, Israel was reported on the night of 10 October to have launched a new attack on the Jordanian frontier in reprisal for the slaying of two Israelis on 9 October.

NYT, 11 Oct 56, 1:6. Received JCS 111230Z Oct 56.

10 Oct Ambassador Riddleberger reported from Belgrade on the Yalta meetings with Krushchev to the US. The Yalta talks had been private and informal, and no definitive solutions had been reached. Nevertheless, Tito believed further cooperation with the Soviets to be possible, particularly in the economic field. The Soviet attempt to steer the satellites away from Titoist proclivities had also been discussed, and Tito felt that at least part of the Soviet leadership regretted this attempt.

emphasized that Yugoslav foreign policy remained unchanged. Tito was still determined to maintain good relations with both East and West. The Ambassador believed that Tito and Krushchev had decided to play down differences, postpone decisions, and continue "cooperation." If it were not for the necessity for Presidential determination on further aid to Yugoslavia, he thought the best thing to do was to see how this "cooperation" developed. He urged postponing determination if possible, and suggested several alternate courses of action if this were impossible and determination turned out to be negative.

(U) Msg, Belgrade (Riddleberger) to SecState, 468, 10 Oct 56; 469, 11 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State (468) 111131Z; (469) 111333Z Oct 56. Received JCS (468) 121612Z; (469) 121612Z Oct 56.

10 Oct

US Embassy in Warsaw reported the newspaper publication on 10 October of a Politburo communique announcing that Hilary Minc would resign from the Politburo because of ill health. The Embassy stated it continued to hear rumors that Gomulka would soon be elected a member of the Politburo, speak at the 15 October Plenum, and regain his position in the central committee through the annulment of his previous "illegal" expulsion.

(S) Msg, Warsaw (Jacobs) to SecState, 414, 10 Oct 56, DA IN 259237 (11 Oct 56). Received State 101717Z Oct 56. Received JCS 111536Z Oct 56.

10 Oct

The Israelis attacked Jordanian positions in the Galdilya area, beginning about 102400Z October.

(S) Msg, USAmb Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 352, DA IN 259216, 110532Z Oct 56. Received State No Time. Received JCS 110748Z Oct 56. (S)
Received JCS 140300Z Oct 56.

11 Oct (U)

A UN cease-fire brought an end to a six hour border flareup in which Israeli troops destroyed a Jordan police station as reprisal for recent slaying of two Israeli farmhands.

AP Wire Service, 11 Oct 56. Received JCS 111306Z Oct 56.

11 Oct (U)

British Foreign Office official Anthony Nutting served notice at a Conservative Party conference that Britain would take action outside the UN, if necessary, to insure that "unfettered control of the Suez Canal does not remain in the hands of one man."

AP Wire Service, 11 Oct 56. Received JCS 111510Z Oct 56.

11 Oct

US Embassy, London, reported that

(S) Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 2003, 11 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 120302Z Oct 56. Received JCS 121612Z Oct 56.

11 Oct US Ambassador Mallory, in Amman, reported that Iraqi troops had not yet entered Jordan but that they might in a few days. He stated that the

Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 325, 11 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 111309Z Oct 56. Received JCS 111858Z Oct 56.

11 Oct Nuri, the Prime Minister of Iraq, informed US Ambassador Gallman on 11 October that Iraqi troops would begin crossing the frontier into Jordan on 15 October; the plan would be the same as reported by ambassador on 6 October. Nuri wanted Israel informed that he guaranteed these troops would not engage in any aggressive act and would stay east of the Jordan River, "away from the frontier," but he requested that no reference whatever be made to the size of the Iraqi force.

Msg, Baghdad (Gallman) to SecState, 604, 11 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 111239Z Oct 56. Received JCS 111855Z Oct 56.

12 Oct US UN Ambassador Lodge reported that the UN had made public the text of six principles agreed to by the UK, French, and Egyptian Foreign Ministers concerning the Suez Canal. These were: 1) Free and open transit without discrimination. 2) Egypt's sovereignty to be respected. 3) The operation of the canal to be insulated from the politics of any country. 4) The manner of fixing tolls and charges to be decided by agreement between Egypt and the users. 5) A fair proportion of the dues to be allotted to development. 6) In case of dispute, unresolved affairs between the Suez Canal Company and Egypt to be settled by arbitration.

Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 342, 12 Oct 56, DA IN 260013 (13 Oct 56). Received State 130736Z Oct 56. Received JCS 140001Z Oct 56.

(U) While Britain, France, and Egypt agreed on the principles to govern the operation of the Canal, the two western powers held firm on their original proposal of last August, which contained provision for automatic sanctions against any nation discriminating against another in the use of the canal.

NYT, 13 Oct 56, 1:8. Received JCS 131230Z Oct 56.

12 Oct The US Embassy in Amman reported

Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 331, 12 Oct 56, DA IN 259805 (13 Oct 56). Received State 121904Z Oct 56. Received JCS 130351Z Oct 56.

12 Oct [] no indications [] of the gradual Israeli build-up or mobilization but doubted if such would take place before any large scale operations, since

it would be a tip-off and the Israelis could, in fact, mobilize on a large scale at short notice. The report noted that the Israelis, after withdrawing from the Mixed Armistice Commission, had refused to permit UN observers to investigate alleged incidents in their territory.

Msg, CIA to DEPTAR, [] DA IN 259770 and -S, 122014Z Oct 56. Received JCS 130810Z Oct 56.

12 Oct (u) The Israeli Foreign Ministry at 1030Z, 12 Oct, issued a statement pointing out that Iraq had not concluded an armistice with Israel; hence the entry of Iraqi forces into Jordan now would undermine the Israel-Jordan armistice agreement. Such action, said the Foreign Office, would be a direct threat to the security of Israel and would jeopardize the status quo in the area.

Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 364, 12 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 121716Z Oct 56. Received JCS 131117Z Oct 56.

12 Oct (u) The UK warned Israel and reassured Jordan that, the UK would adhere to the 1948 Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Defense. The warning was a result of the 10 Oct Israeli raid on Qalqilya.

NYT, 13 Oct 56, 1:7. Received JCS 131230Z Oct 56.

12 Oct (u) The Hungarian Minister of Justice declared in Budapest that "Stalinist" officials who had played a "provocative" role in the life of the country over the past few years must be removed. Further, the Minister continued, Vladimir Farkas, recently arrested former security officer and son of the deposed Defense Minister Mihaly Farkas, was to be tried.

NYT, 13 Oct 56, 1:5. Received JCS 131230Z Oct 56.

12 Oct US Embassy in London reported

STATE

Msg, London (Barbour) to SecState, 2032, 12 Oct 56. Received State 130730Z Oct 56. Received JCS 151548Z Oct 56.

13 Oct US UN Ambassador Lodge reported that at a night meeting on 13 October, the Security Council adopted unanimously the six principles for settlement of the Suez problem previously agreed upon by the Foreign Ministers of UK, France, and Egypt in private meetings. However, USSR had vetoed a resolution calling for Egypt, France, and UK "to continue their interchanges" and urging cooperation of the Egyptians with the Users Association pending a definitive settlement. (This story published NYT 14 Oct.)

Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 348, 14 Oct 56, DA IN 260240 (15 Oct 56). Received State 150533Z Oct 56. Received JCS 152159Z Oct 56.

- 13 Oct (u) Speaking to the annual rally of the Conservative Party, Sir Anthony Eden rejected the idea of peace in the Suez at any price. Sir Anthony said that his government had not pledged that under no circumstances would it use force in the settlement of the Suez issue. No responsible government could so state, he said.
 NYT, 14 Oct 56, 1:6. Received JCS 141230Z Oct 56.
- 13 Oct (u) According to the New York Times correspondent in Vienna, articles published in the official organ of the Hungarian Communist Party indicated that a thoroughgoing downgrading of Stalinist had gotten under way in Hungary. Former Premier Imre Nagy had been readmitted to the party, and there were hints that he might be returned to power.
 NYT, 14 Oct 56, 1:5. Received JCS 141230Z Oct 56.
- 13 Oct Discussing the 3-day visit of Jordanian Foreign Minister Abdul Hadi to Cairo, just completed, the US Embassy stated that the local press had reported he bore a message from the Jordanian King to Nasser demanding aid. The press assumed Hadi had requested arms and ammunition, and one report said he had made a plea for one Egyptian division. The Embassy was informed that Egypt flatly turned down the request for Egyptian forces, and it was generally believed Egypt would not deliver significant amounts of additional equipment.
 (u) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1075, 13 Oct 56, DA IN 260074 (14 Oct 56). Received State 131912Z Oct 56. Received JCS 132251Z Oct 56.
- 13 Oct The US Ambassador at Amman, reported that the Jordanian press had frontpaged the statement by the Israeli Foreign Minister that the entry of Iraqi forces into Jordan would be a direct threat to the security of Israel and jeopardize the status quo in the area. A spokesman for the Jordan Foreign Office commented on this statement by saying that the arrival in Jordan of any Arab forces would be for defense only. He denied Iraqi troops had already entered Jordan. The Ambassador noted that as seen from Amman, the statement by the Israeli Foreign Minister was the next thing to an advance notice of a declaration of war.
 (u) Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 333, 13 Oct 56, DA IN 260125 (14 Oct 56). Received State 141250Z Oct 56. Received JCS 141348Z Oct 56.
- 13 Oct US Ambassador to Jordan reported that the advantage taken by Israel of western and Egyptian preoccupation over Suez to launch even larger attacks against Jordan not only was further turning Jordanians against the West but also had brought substantially closer the danger of Soviet entry. The Jordanians were particularly annoyed over British refusal to provide air support of Jordan west of the Jordan River, after the Israelis allegedly used jets in their raid on Qalqilya.
 (u) Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 335, 13 Oct 56. Received State 141230Z Oct 56. Received JCS 151548Z Oct 56.
- 13 Oct US Embassy in Baghdad reported receiving a message from the Iraqi Prime Minister stating that Iraqi troops would not move into Jordan on 15 October. Rather, on 14 October the Iraqi Crown Prince, with other military and political officials, would go to Amman for talks on "coordinating defensive military steps." New date for Iraqi entry would depend on outcome.
 (u) Msg, Baghdad (Gallman) to SecState, 619, 131300Z Oct 56. Received State 140612Z Oct 56. Received JCS 151548Z Oct 56.

13 Oct

Egyptian Government spokesman Gohar told an Embassy officer that, concerning current reports that Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan would join in submitting to the Security Council a complaint of the latest Israeli attack, the Egyptian Government would resist any moves that would require action by the Security Council at this time when the Suez issue was under consideration. Gohar said it was obvious that the question of moving Iraqi troops into Jordan had little relation to the problem of the military defense of Jordan. Gohar thought the whole thing was a British plot along following lines: At UK urging Iraqi troops would enter Jordan. The British would give private assurances to the Israelis, who would make a big public show by protesting loudly. If elections were favorable to the British, a modus vivendi would be worked out with the Israelis. If not, other steps (Gohar implied partition of Jordan between Iraq and Israel) would be taken. When the Jordan situation was clarified, the Israelis would be free, with British encouragement, to turn on Egypt.

(S) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1076, 131600Z Oct 56. Received State 140900Z Oct 56. Received JCS 151547Z Oct 56.

13 Oct

A Jordanian communique issued the evening of 13 October said the Jordanian Cabinet had concluded Israel was trying to exploit the tense international situation and was planning a large scale attack against Jordan. The communique stated that Jordan had started making contact with her sister countries to present a united front against the expected attack.

(S) Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 338, 14 Oct 56. Received State 141706Z Oct 56. Received JCS 151840Z Oct 56.

14 Oct (U)

Israeli Foreign Minister Meir at 0800Z, 14 October, stated that Israel on 12 October had been informed by the British of the Iraqi move into Jordan. This, coupled with Nuri's statement on 8 October that a settlement of the Arab-Israeli issue should be imposed on Israel, on a basis that would imperil Israel's very existence, made it clear that the movement of Iraqi troops into Jordan was part of a scheme to serve the territorial ambitions of Iraq. It represented a direct threat to Israel and Israel was determined to meet it.

(S) Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 368, 14 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 141712Z Oct 56. Received JCS 151158Z Oct 56.

14 Oct (U)

According to the Times correspondent in Vienna the official newspaper of the Hungarian Communist Party on 14 October made clear that Hungary not only wanted better political relations with Yugoslavia but also was considering adopting the Yugoslav system of economic decentralization. The paper also printed a letter, dated 4 October, from Imre Nagy to the party's Central Committee asking for reinstatement. In its answer, the Central Committee re-admitted Nagy and blamed Matyas Rakosi for Nagy's expulsion.
NYT, 15 Oct 56, 2:3. Received JCS 151230Z Oct 56.

The US Legation reported on 15 October that Budapest papers of 14 October carried the Hungarian Communist Party resolution restoring Nagy to party rights, together with Nagy's letter of 4 October requesting his restoration. The Legation predicted that Nagy would soon accept party and government posts and that an intra-party struggle over adoption of his policies would then ensue.

(S) Msg, Budapest (Barnes) to SecState, 137, 15 Oct 56. Received State 150111Z Oct 56. Received JCS 161537Z Oct 56.

15 Oct (U) The New York Times correspondent in Warsaw reported that he had learned that Mao Tse-tung had advised Edward Ochab, First Secretary of the Polish United Workers [Communist] Party, that he disapproved of Soviet efforts to impose a single course of action on the development of national "Socialist systems." According to the newsman's sources in the Polish capital, Mao told the Polish official that he thought the Poles should continue their efforts to obtain internal independence and to develop their own social system as the Yugoslavs had done.
NYT, 16 Oct 56, 1:2. Received JCS 161230Z Oct 56.

15 Oct In a letter to British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, SecState Dulles commented on the continuing Anglo-American difference of opinion on the payment of Suez Canal tolls. The US view was that the SCUA should pay Egypt appropriate compensation from the tolls collected, while the UK apparently saw the SCUA as a means of bringing pressure to bear on Egypt by withholding payments to her. Dulles concluded by urging that the UK and US make an effort to think together along the lines of the US view.
(S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy London, 2753, 16 Oct 56. Received JCS 171529Z Oct 56.

15 Oct [redacted] reported that on 14 October an Israeli patrol had killed two Egyptian Fedayeen and captured two others who had infiltrated from North Sinai. Describing a small movement of tools and materiel to North Israel on 13-14 October, the attache stated that the Israelis had changed their mobilization procedure, making observation more difficult.

Msg, USARMA Tel Aviv to DEPTAR, CX 363, DA IN 260297, 150620Z Oct 56. Received JCS 160030Z Oct 56.

15 Oct [redacted] Received JCS between 151540Z & 151920Z Oct 56.

15 Oct US Embassy in Tel Aviv reported that the Israelis had used Piper Cub spotter planes during the attack on Qalqilya on 10 October, rather than jets, as the Jordanians had charged.
(S) Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 372, DA IN 260288, 15 Oct 56. Received State 151401Z Oct 56. Received JCS 152230Z Oct 56.

15 Oct
STATE

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56. ~~(S)~~ Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 1761, 15 Oct
Received State 151516Z Oct 56. Received JCS 161536Z
Oct 56.

15 Oct [

(S) Msg, London (Barbour) to SecState, 2023, 12 Oct
56. Received State 130826Z Oct 56. Received JCS
151547Z Oct 56.

15 Oct [

(S) Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 342, 15 Oct
56, CJCS files. Received State 151854Z Oct 56. Re-
ceived JCS 161537Z Oct 56.

15 Oct [

believed Jordan
would be forced into war if Israeli attacks continued,
and that Syria would send one brigade, Iraq one division,
and Egypt probably nothing.

Received JCS 161829Z Oct 56.

15 Oct

US UN Ambassador Lodge reported that the Jordanian
representative had submitted a letter to the Security
Council President on 15 October describing the Israeli
attacks on Qalqilya on 10-11 October and on Husan on
25-26 September and requesting a meeting of the Security
Council as early as possible to take action.

(S) Msg, USUN New York (Lodge) to SecState, 350,
15 Oct 56, DA IN 260349 (16 Oct 56). Received State
151757Z Oct 56. Received JCS 160502Z Oct 56. NYT,
16 Oct 56, 1:1. Received JCS 161230Z Oct 56.

15 Oct

US UN Ambassador Lodge reported that the Egyptian
Foreign Minister had said in a letter to Security
Council members that continued bellicose statements and
military and economic measures by UK and France were

having extremely damaging effects on the freedom of the proposed Suez negotiations. Lodge also reported that, in a written presentation of its views on free passage, Israel had demanded specific guarantees for its rights in any new Suez agreement and invited the Security Council to consider the "grave implications" that would arise if abuses against Israel were permitted to endure. (C) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 356, 15 Oct 56, DA IN 260505 (16 Oct 56). Received State 160708Z Oct 56. Received JCS 162340Z Oct 56.

15 Oct (U) A closer Hungarian-Yugoslav relationship appeared to be forming, following the general satisfaction among Yugoslav officials over the readmission of Nagy to the Hungarian Communist Party. Visiting Belgrade for reconciliation talks, Hungarian Communist official Erno Gero praised the Yugoslav type of "independent Communism" and looked forward to settlement of differences between the two countries "in a spirit of national independence and non-interference."

NYT, 16 Oct 56, 5:3. Received JCS 161230Z Oct 56.

15 Oct Premier David Ben-Gurion, according to a New York Times report, told the Israeli parliament that his government would reserve freedom of action should Iraqi troops move into Jordan, since any such military excursion into Jordan must be regarded as a threat to Israel. He again made it clear that Israel would not acquiesce in the Egyptian blockade of Israeli shipping in the Suez Canal and the Red Sea straits. Ben-Gurion denounced the recent statements by the Premier of Iraq and the British Foreign Office, which he said were "designed to force a peace settlement on the basis of the 1947 partition plan." The account received later from the US Embassy added Ben-Gurion's statement that the two great achievements of his government during the year had been 1) the maintenance of peace in spite of terrible provocation and internal pressure for preventive war, and 2) the substantial improvement of Israel's armaments position.

NYT, 16 Oct 56, 8:3. Received JCS 161230Z Oct 56.

(C) Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 378, 16 Oct 56, DA IN 260769 (17 Oct 56). Received State 162346Z Oct 56. Received JCS 171405Z Oct 56.

15 Oct (U) A Jordanian Government spokesman said that the Iraqi-Jordanian defense talks had ended on a note of "full agreement." He stated that Iraqi troops and aircraft would be placed at strategic points near the Jordanian border, "ready to make the fastest possible approach" to aid Jordan in case of an attack, but for the present they would not move into that country.

NYT, 16 Oct 56, 8:4. Received JCS 161230Z Oct 56.

16 Oct The first open demands for withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary were voiced at a public meeting at Gyor on 16 October. Attended by some 1,000 people, the meeting also heard speeches praising the independent course being followed by Yugoslavia, Poland, and China.

(C) Msg, Budapest (Barnes) to SecState, 151, 23 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 232059Z Oct 56. Received JCS 241156Z Oct 56.

16 Oct (U) Secretary of State Dulles emphatically reasserted that the US would give aid within constitutional limits to any victim of aggression in the Middle East.

AP Wire Service, 16 Oct 56. Received JCS 161546Z Oct 56.

- 16 Oct Yemen, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, in written statements on Suez to the UN Security Council, affirmed their solidarity with Egypt.
(S) New York (Wadsworth) to SecState, 363, 16 Oct 56, DA IN 260815 (17 Oct 56). Received State 170634Z Oct 56. Received JCS 171752Z Oct 56.
- 16 Oct (U) Prime Minister Eden and Foreign Secretary Lloyd flew to Paris for talks with French leaders on the Middle East. Foreign Minister Pineau told the National Assembly that the Anglo-French talks would cover not only the Suez problem but also relations with Israel, Jordan, and Iraq. In his speech, Pineau alluded to Secretary Dulles' remarks on "colonialism" at his press conference on 2 October, and cautioned that, although it was frequently difficult to understand American foreign policy, the differences between Anglo-French policy and American policy should not be equated with the end of the Atlantic alliance.
NYT, 17 Oct 56, 1:2. Received JCS 171230Z Oct 56.
- 16 Oct (U) A new Indian plan for operating the Suez Canal, submitted to the British and Egyptian foreign ministers a few days previously, was disclosed at the UN. According to this plan, Egypt would cooperate with an association of canal users and the UN would settle disputes on tolls or discrimination against users. The plan still did not meet minimum British requirements for automatic sanctions against Egypt if Nasser misused his authority over the canal.
NYT, 17 Oct 56, 1:3. Received JCS 171230Z Oct 56.
- 16 Oct
STATE
[REDACTED]
- (S) Msg, Jidda (Wadsworth) to SecState, 190, 16 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 162031Z Oct 56. Received JCS 181549Z Oct 56.
- 16 Oct
CIA
[REDACTED]
- Received JCS 170939Z Oct 56.
- 16 Oct (U) New York Times correspondent Sydney Gruson, citing "reliable sources," reported from Warsaw that Gomulka had expressed the view that the time had come for evacuation of Soviet troops from Poland and withdrawal of Soviet officers from the Polish Army.
NYT, 17 Oct 56, 1:3. Received JCS 171230Z Oct 56.
- 16 Oct The US Embassy in Amman expressed the view that the Jordanian elections, scheduled for 21 October, would be held, and that serious incidents were unlikely. It reported further that all party platforms explicitly or implicitly were against Western ties and for abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty.
(S) Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 345, 16 Oct 56. Received State 161724Z Oct 56. Received JCS 171529Z Oct 56.

17 Oct (u) In a statement published by a Cairo newspaper, an Egyptian Government spokesman said Egypt was supplying Jordan with arms and money. He stated categorically that "any invasion or occupation of any Arab state, specifically including Jordan, will be considered by Egypt as a clearcut invasion of Egyptian territory and . . . Egyptian armed forces will in such event intervene with all of might and force they possess."

(S) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1103, 17 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 171643Z Oct 56. Received JCS 181150Z Oct 56.

17 Oct In an interview with the American Ambassador, Nasser expressed his concern that the British were trying to isolate him from the Arab world. In support of this contention, he cited the severe Israeli reprisals against Jordan (which he believed were instigated by the British), the projected movement of Iraqi troops into Jordan, and the stepped-up activities of clandestine British radios.

(S) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1104, 17 Oct 56. Received State 171726Z Oct 56. Received JCS 181548Z Oct 56.

17 Oct (u) French Ambassador Alphand, in a speech before the National Press Club, stated that the Suez controversy could only be settled through international operation unless the Egyptians could offer an equally efficient system. To be acceptable, he said, any system had to provide a means of applying the six principles agreed to in London and the UN, and provision had to be made for automatic sanctions for any violation of these principles.

NYT, 18 Oct 56, 13:1. Received JCS 181230Z Oct 56.

17 Oct US Ambassador Mallory, reporting from Amman on Iraqi-Jordanian talks, said substantial agreement had been reached on some points of military cooperation. The size of Iraqi forces to be stationed in Jordan, on Jordanian request, was set at one division, but Iraq was reluctant to put troops in Jordan because of the command problem. He stated further that Syria had begun sending arms to Jordan, including about ten Sherman tanks and possibly some Bren gun carriers.

(S) Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 352, 17 Oct 56. Received State 171610Z Oct 56. Received JCS 181546Z Oct 56.

17 Oct [redacted] stated that he had received reports confirming the belief that a "fairly substantial" mobilization of individuals and units had taken place in the past few days. He had also received reports of the movement of artillery and armor to the Jordan border and Negev area and had noted extensive re-equipment of units with new or rebuilt motor vehicles during the past weeks. He further reported the forward displacement of units in the southern area and the fact that the Southern Command headquarters appeared to be more active than usual.

(S) [redacted] Received JCS 181008Z Oct 56.

17 Oct

(S) Msg, Belgrade (Riddieberger) to SecState, 494, 17 Oct 56, DA IN 261067 (18 Oct 46). Received State 180448Z Oct 56. Received JCS 181202Z Oct 56.

17 Oct Addressing Parliament, Israeli Premier Ben-Gurion labeled Nasser a dictator who ruled Egypt by force and violence and who aspired to dominate the Arab world. Nasser, he said, was bent on the destruction of Israel. In the legislative activities following the speech, Parliament defeated one motion calling for an Israeli offensive to block the entry of Iraqi or other troops into Jordan, and another calling on the Government to stop border reprisals and refrain from threatening to use force to break the Egyptian blockade of Israeli shipping. The legislators then gave Ben-Gurion a 76 to 13 vote of confidence on his statement of foreign policy.

NYT, 18 Oct 56, 1:7. Received JCS 181230Z Oct 56.
(C) Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 386, 18 Oct 56, DA IN 261283 (19 Oct). Received State 181732Z Oct 56. Received JCS 190642Z Oct 56.

17 Oct (U) In response to a Jordanian complaint of 15 October, Israel submitted to the UN Security Council a complaint charging Jordan with persistent violation of the 1949 armistice agreement. The two complaints were scheduled for debate in the Security Council on 19 October.

NYT, 18 Oct 56, 10:3. Received JCS 181230Z Oct 56.

17 Oct (U) The New York Times correspondent in Amman reported that, according to competent British sources, the British would soon bring in some of their latest jets to reinforce the RAF squadron already in Jordan.

NYT, 18 Oct 56, 1:8. Received JCS 181230Z Oct 56.

18 Oct

Received JCS 192040Z Oct 56.

18 Oct The American Ambassador to Syria reported that he had been "reliably informed" that the United Kingdom had requested permission to fly military planes over Syria from Cyprus in response to a request from Jordan for air support and that the Syrian government had "recently assented but with bad grace."

(C) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 869, 18 Oct 56, DA IN 261269 (19 Oct 56). Received State 181953Z Oct 56. Received JCS 190608Z Oct 56.

18 Oct

(S) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 1816, 18 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 182148Z Oct 56. Received JCS 191553Z Oct 56.

18 Oct

Ambassador Aldrich reported from London that at the first session of the second meeting of the SCUA Council on 18 October tentative agreement was reached on appointing the Danish Consul General at New York, Eyvind Bartels, as SCUA administrator. Also, Chairman Lloyd, reporting on New York meetings with the Egyptians, noted that Egypt appeared to accept in principle that canal users had a right to join together and that a collective body representing the users would be a useful instrument to reach agreement. However, he said

there was no indication Egypt formally recognized SCUA as that instrument. At the second session on 19 October final agreement was reached on the appointment of Bartels, making it unanimous.

(C) London (Aldrich) to SecState, 2137, 18 Oct 56.
(D) London (Aldrich) to SecState, 2169, 19 Oct 56. Received State {2137} 182118Z; {2169} 192119Z Oct 56. Received JCS {2137} 191554Z; {2169} 201627Z Oct 56.

18 Oct The American Ambassador in Amman reported that Jordan had received from Syria 12 Sherman tanks, would possibly receive 12 more, and had Bren gun carriers still to come in a number mentioned as high as 90, possibly originating in Egypt. Iraqi troops would remain outside of Jordan, but the establishment of communications and supply arrangements by Iraqis in civilian clothes was intended. Although senior members of the Jordanian government and army were happy concerning arrangements with Iraq, mutual distrust between Jordan and Iraq was evident, with the former refusing to disclose to the latter the terms of the military agreement between Syria and Jordan.

(D) Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 354, 18 Oct 56, DA IN 261341 (19 Oct 56). Received State 182148Z Oct 56. Received JCS 191158Z Oct 56.

18 Oct

Received JCS 182006Z Oct 56.

18 Oct (U) The nine-nation Arab League, meeting in Cairo, reaffirmed its support of Egypt in the Suez Canal dispute. NYT, 19 Oct 56, 2:3. Received JCS 191230Z Oct 56.

18 Oct

[redacted] the Israelis were thought to be convinced Nasser would soon attack them regardless of the outcome of the Suez Canal issue; if he had to back down on Suez, he would attack Israel to maintain his "dynamic posture" as the leader of the Arab Liberation Movement, and if he won on Suez, he would attack Israel anyway.

Received JCS 241359Z Oct 56.

19 Oct (U) New York Times correspondent John MacCormac reported from Budapest that a situation was developing in Hungary closely paralleling that in Poland. The terror of the Stalinist era had almost ceased and many of the terrorists themselves had been arrested. The student press had openly branded former political police chief Mihaly Farkas "Stalin's best pupil" and was demanding that he be prosecuted.

NYT, 19 Oct 56, 5:1. Received JCS 191230Z Oct 56.

19 Oct

Commenting to Ambassador Hare on his 17 October account of his interview with Nasser, the State Dept expressed the view that the Israeli reprisals against Jordan resulted from purely Israeli policy decisions. State had reason

to believe that the clandestine radio attacks that Nasser found so offensive were coming chiefly from two stations located in Metropolitan France.

Msg, State Dept to AmEmbassy Cairo, 1193, 19 Oct 56. Received JCS 201631Z Oct 56.

19 Oct (U) Jordan warned in the UN that it would take matters into its own hands unless the UN Security Council stopped alleged Israeli aggression immediately. The Jordanian Ambassador to the UN called for stringent UN sanctions short of military action.

AP Wire Service, 19 Oct 56. Received JCS 191548Z Oct 56.

19 Oct

Received JCS 192055Z Oct 56.

19 Oct (U) V. K. Krishna Menon, in Cairo for the fourth of his attempts to aid in solving the Suez Canal problem, was reported to have urged Nasser to agree to cooperate with an advisory board of Canal users.

NYT, 20 Oct 56, 8:1. Received JCS 201230Z Oct 56.

19 Oct The Associated Press reported from Warsaw that Gomulka and three of his close associates had been restored to membership on the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party at the election held by the Committee. Three hours later the AP, quoting a "responsible source," said that Khrushchev had arrived in Warsaw just as Gomulka was being restored to power. An additional report, received four hours after the second, said Khrushchev, together with Zhukov, Konev, and Antonov, had arrived suddenly and unheralded in Warsaw in utmost secrecy, apparently to apply brakes to Poland's advance toward independent Communism. A cable from the Embassy in Warsaw, received at the State Department shortly before the third AP dispatch, contained information similar to that released by AP. Rumors of Khrushchev's departure for Warsaw, confirmed by "authoritative" sources, were cabled to the State Department by Ambassador Bohlen in Moscow on the night of 19 October. In a dispatch from Warsaw dated 20 October, Times correspondent Sydney Gruson gave a much fuller account. Quoting "Polish sources," he reported that Gomulka had been reinstated to the Central Committee on the morning of 19 October. At the same time Khrushchev, together with Zhukov, Molotov, Mikoyan, and Kaganovich, had arrived in Warsaw to demand that the old pro-Soviet Politburo be restored intact. Six hours of bitter negotiation had followed.

AP Wire Service, 19 Oct 56. Received JCS 191301Z, 191616Z, 192050Z Oct 56. (U) Msg, Warsaw (Barber) to SecState, 470, 19 Oct 56, DA IN 261561. Received State 191800Z Oct 56. Received JCS 200711Z Oct 56. NYT, 20 Oct 56, 1:8. Received JCS 201230Z Oct 56. (U) Msg, Moscow (Bohlen) to SecState, 873, 19 Oct 56, DA IN 261748 (20 Oct 56). Received State 200628Z Oct 56. Received JCS 202313Z Oct 56.

- 20 Oct (U) The AP reported from Warsaw that on this date Khrushchev and other top Soviet leaders had departed after secret talks apparently aimed at trying to stem Poland's rush toward independent Communism. Despite the Soviet visit, Gomulka was continuing his "comeback."
AP Wire Service, 20 Oct 56. Received JCS 201144Z Oct 56.
- 20 Oct (U) The AP carried a New York Times report from Polish sources that Khrushchev had ordered Soviet troops to ring Warsaw to back up his demand that pro-Soviet members be retained on the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party.
AP Wire Service, 20 Oct 56. Received JCS 201250Z Oct 56.
- 20 Oct (U) The AP reported from Warsaw that Gomulka, "reportedly," had taken an active part in the talks with the Russians. He was pictured as angered at Khrushchev's unexpected visit. According to the AP, Warsaw newspapers reported a wave of demonstrations in favor of continued democratization.
AP Wire Service, 20 Oct 56. Received JCS 201308Z Oct 56.
- 20 Oct (U) From Vienna the AP reported that, according to Radio Budapest, more than 3,000 Hungarian students had "passed resolutions demanding freedom."
AP Wire Service, 20 Oct 56. Received JCS 201334Z Oct 56.
- 20 Oct (U) The AP in London reported that, according to Moscow radio, Khrushchev and delegation had returned to Moscow.
AP Wire Service, 20 Oct 56. Received JCS 201515Z Oct 56.
- 20 Oct
SECRET The US Embassy in Warsaw reported that Trybuna on 20 October announced that at the Central Committee meeting Gomulka and others had become members of the committee and participated in its sessions. The paper also reported that on the 19th a delegation of Soviet leaders, including Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, and Molotov, had arrived to discuss problems of interest to both sides. Trybuna also stated that the discussions were carried on in a friendly atmosphere, and that in the near future a Polish delegation would go to Moscow to discuss deepening the political and economic cooperation between Poland and the USSR. Polish radio on 20 October said that four Soviet civilian visitors departed for Moscow at 0500Z.
(Official Hungary) Msg, Warsaw (Barber) to SecState, 471, 20 Oct 56, DA IN 261740. Received State 201119Z Oct 56. Received JCS 202357Z Oct 56.
- 20 Oct
SECRET Soviet troops from East Germany had moved into a Warsaw suburb as well as into other areas of Poland. Unusual activity.
Received JCS 221424Z Oct 56.
- 20 Oct
SECRET The US Embassy in Warsaw stated that the only information established so far was that Khrushchev and his party colleagues had met with the Polish Politburo on 19 October and that Gomulka and three others had been placed on the Central Committee. However, the Embassy believed that news reports reaching the West, particularly by

Gruson of the New York Times, were reasonably accurate in their accounts of threats by Khrushchev, defiance by the Polish leaders, and subsequent Soviet acquiescence in Gomulka's return to power. The Embassy had been unable to confirm reports of unusual Soviet troop movements in Poland or Warsaw.

(S) Msg, Warsaw (Barber) to SecState, 473, 20 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 211040Z Oct 56. Received JCS 221150Z Oct 56.

20 Oct (U) According to a New York Times report, nationalistic, anti-Russian, and liberal political agitation in Poland was spreading, as a feeling of solidarity behind the government and Gomulka manifested itself. Agitation by students and factory workers clearly indicated that hundreds of thousands wished to express their discontent.

A student meeting at the Polytechnic Institute had called for openness in political affairs and demanded an end to Stalinism, and, after passing resolutions to this effect, had appointed a committee to present them to the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party.

NYT, 21 Oct 56, 1:7. Received JCS 211230Z Oct 56.

20 Oct The Ambassador in Poland cabled reports from the party organ Trybuna recounting popular reactions to recent events. Nationalist and Titoist sentiments of the people were clear. Gomulka's statement to the Central Committee had criticized in detail the past administration of Polish affairs. He had promised Polish cooperation with the Soviet bloc but reserved the right "to seek socialism in our own way."

(S) Msg, Warsaw (Barber) to SecState, 474, 20 Oct 56, DA IN 261879. Received State 211131Z Oct 56. Received JCS 211446Z Oct 56.

20 Oct The local newspapers in Casablanca, Morocco, were printing reports that the French Navy had seized the minesweeper Athos, carrying 70 tons of arms and ammunition, off the Algerian coast. The vessel carried no flag and had no registry papers. According to the press reports, French police interrogation of the crew had revealed that the Athos was owned by the Egyptian Government, that it had been loaded at Alexandria under supervision of the Egyptian Navy, and that the vessel had carried arms to Algeria on three previous voyages.

(S) Msg, Asst Naval Attache Casablanca to CNO, 1593, 201830Z Oct 56, "Atlantic-Europe-Middle East Message Book," JCS C&E Sec. Received Navy 212003Z Oct 56. Received JCS 221759Z Oct 56.

20 Oct (U) The New York Times stated, on 21 October, that Polish frontier troops were reported to have "barred with gunfire" an attempt by Soviet troops to move into Poland from East Germany. It also appeared that Polish and Soviet troops had clashed in two additional incidents.

The Central Committee was still in session considering the Soviet demands of the 19th.

Although Khrushchev had returned to Moscow with his principal political aides, the military men who had accompanied them were still in Poland.

As a consequence of the mass resignation of the Polish Politburo just prior to the Soviet-Polish talks, the country was technically without a Politburo and Secretariat, but Gomulka was clearly the leader of the party.

Before departing Warsaw on 20 October the Russian leaders had met with the old deposed Politburo, but the results of their talks had not been announced. It was

said, however, that the Central Committee remained firm in its opposition to reinstating Marshal Rokossovsky.

According to Polish sources, the list of members for the new Politburo had been satisfactory to the Russians; the Poles had agreed to go to Moscow for discussions soon.

Despite this seemingly friendly agreement, on the morning of 20 October the proposal had been made in the Politburo that Marshal Rokossovsky's name be added to the new Politburo membership.

NYT, 21 Oct 56, 1:8. Received JCS 211230Z Oct 56.

20 Oct Gomulka's speech of 20 October, dealing with Soviet-Polish relations, stressed the idea of "many roads to socialism"; criticized the cult of the individual; recited errors of Stalin; and expressed gratitude to Soviet leaders for exposing the fallacies of the Stalinist cult. Gomulka emphasized the necessity for cooperation and friendship between Poland and the USSR.
(C) Msg, Warsaw (Jacobs) to SecState, 497, DA IN 262302, 22 Oct 56. Received State 222159Z Oct 56. Received JCS 232359Z Oct 56.

20 Oct (U) According to a New York Times report, a high Egyptian official stated that preliminary talks between Egypt, France, and Great Britain, would begin in Geneva on 29 October. The forthcoming talks were expected to be an extension of the secret talks conducted in the office of UN SecGen Hammarskjold during the UN debate of a little more than a week earlier. The talks would be based on the six principles adopted by the UN.
NYT, 21 Oct 56, 3:3. Received JCS 211230Z Oct 56.

20 Oct (U) According to a New York Times report, British sources denied categorically the reports issuing from Cairo that negotiations on the use of the canal would begin in Geneva on the 29th of October.
NYT, 21 Oct 56, 4:2. Received JCS 211230Z Oct 56.

20 Oct (U) After conferring via transcontinental telephone with SecState Dulles, President Eisenhower said in Denver that "our hearts go out" to the people of Poland in their struggle to win freedom from Soviet domination.
NYT, 21 Oct 56, 1:5. Received JCS 211230Z Oct 56.

21 Oct The Embassy in Tel Aviv reported that the killing of 3 Israeli soldiers and the wounding of 27 others by mines laid in the demilitarized zone would permit Israel to shift the focus of its military attention to Egypt. Retaliation was likely, but not in predictable terms of time and place since recent casualties were attributed largely to loss of the surprise factor.

On 22 October the Consul General in Jerusalem reported a statement from the Israeli Foreign Ministry accusing Egypt of an act of aggression in mining a road in the demilitarized zone. Israelis refused to permit investigation by UN truce supervisors.

(C) Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 391, 21 Oct 56, DA IN 261924 (22 Oct 56). Received State 211337Z Oct 56. Received JCS 221129Z. (Offl Use Only)
(C) Msg, Jerusalem (Cole) to SecState, 120, 22 Oct 56, DA IN 262066. Received State 221250Z Oct 56. Received JCS 230305Z Oct 56.

21 Oct ✓ CINCUSAREUR reported from Heidelberg that, although there was no evidence of actual border crossings, large-scale movement of Soviet mechanized units was in progress near the German-Polish border.
(C) Msg, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR Paris . . . DEPTAR, SX 2625, DA IN 261845, 210242Z Oct 56. Received JCS 211559Z Oct 56.

21 Oct

Msg, CIA to CSUSA, JCS, et al,
210919Z Oct 56, DA IN 261838. Received JCS 211235Z Oct
56.

21 Oct Reporting large-scale movement of Soviet armor along the German-Polish frontier between 18 and 20 October, CINC-USAREUR stated that the speed, confusion, and apparent disorganization of the move tended to indicate a show of force or relocation of units to facilitate transfer to Poland if required to support Soviet policy in that country.

Msg, CINCUSAREUR to DEPTAR, SX 2627, 211305Z
Oct 56, DA IN 261852. Received JCS 211950Z Oct 56.

21 Oct

The CIA reported

that stories of Soviet troop movements in Poland were pure rumor. The Central Committee was being addressed by Gomulka, who would be elected party first secretary on 21 October and go to Moscow about 23 October. Ochab and Rokossovsky had been removed from the Politburo and would go to Moscow within a few days. Rokossovsky would be replaced as Defense Minister by Gen Spychalski. Cyrankiewicz would remain premier. Gomulka was outlining a program for Poland as a Socialist state whose relations with Moscow would be similar to those of Yugoslavia under Tito.

Msg, CIA to CSUSA, JCS, et al,
211751Z Oct 56, DA IN 261892. Received JCS 220109Z Oct
56.

21 Oct (U) The AP reported from Warsaw that the Polish Central Committee met "today" to elect a new Politburo. There was continued discussion of the speech by Gomulka, who "last night" had presented Poland a virtual declaration of independence from the Soviet Union. The reception accorded Gomulka's speech and the publicity it had received in Warsaw papers left no doubt that he was now free to take any position in the party he might desire.

AP Wire Service, 21 Oct 56. Received JCS 211910Z
Oct 56.

21 Oct (U) From Warsaw the AP reported that unconfirmed reports, quoted in Communist circles, said Polish troops had fired on a Soviet regiment trying to enter Poland from East Germany at a point on the Oder 15 miles south of Stettin. Allegedly, Rokossovsky had been closely questioned about troop movements by the Central Committee. Rokossovsky's name was not listed among the proposed new members of the Politburo, up for election by the Central Committee.

AP Wire Service, 21 Oct 56. Received JCS 211924Z
Oct 56.

21 Oct (U) The AP reported from Warsaw that Khrushchev had arrived in Warsaw on 19 October in an aggressive mood. He had left next morning apparently convinced that any attempt to suppress the current trend would result in a national

uprising. The Government had demanded that all Soviet troop movements be suspended during the Central Committee's sessions. Tension had relaxed on the morning of 20 October after Khrushchev's departure, and the Government had announced that a delegation of Polish Politburo would visit Moscow for further talks aimed at strengthening Soviet-Polish friendship. Warsaw papers had given prominent publicity to dispatches from Budapest reporting Hungarian support of the Polish position. Polish circles were convinced that a similar move would soon follow in Hungary, and probably result in the restoration of Nagy.

AP Wire Service, 21 Oct 56. Received JCS 211938Z Oct 56.

21 Oct (U) The AP reported from Budapest that thousands of Hungarian students had issued an ultimatum to the Communists "today." They intended to conduct street demonstrations unless their demands for more freedom and better living conditions for the whole country were met within 14 days. Communist control organizations did not appear to be opposing rebel demands.

AP Wire Service, 21 Oct 56. Received JCS 211949Z Oct 56.

21 Oct (U) From Warsaw the AP reported that Polish Communist Party had swept the Stalinists from the Politburo and restored Gomulka to the key post of party secretary on 21 October. The voting had ended in a nearly unanimous victory for Gomulka and his supporters, pledged to a policy of Socialism independent of Moscow control.

AP Wire Service, 21 Oct 56. Received JCS 212131Z Oct 56.

21 Oct The Embassy in Warsaw reported that conditions in the city appeared normal. The Soviet delegation had returned to Moscow. Although ferment and unrest were undoubtedly at work subsurface, there was nothing to confirm the stories in the West of uprisings, troop movements (Polish or Russian), seizure of the Polish Radio, or the departure of Rokossovsky and Nowak for Moscow.

(Official Use Only) Msg, Warsaw (Jacobs) to SecState, 482, 21 Oct 56, OJCS files. Received State 212102Z Oct 56. Received JCS 221148Z Oct 56.

21 Oct (U) The New York Times correspondent in Warsaw reported that, with the ouster of Marshal Rokossovsky and the election of a new Polish Politburo, the victory of Poland's "independent" Communist Central Committee appeared complete. Rokossovsky had received only 26 of a possible 75 votes, with a minimum of 50 needed for his seating in the Politburo. Gomulka had been named Party First Secretary in place of Ochab, who would, however, remain a party secretary and a member of the Politburo.

It was also reported in Warsaw that the Soviet troops, which the Russians had started toward Warsaw on the morning of 18 October, were back in barracks at Lodz and Poznan. Marshal Rokossovsky had been rebuked by the Central Committee for having ordered the original troop movement. There was no further word on the Russian troops who had been reported, first, as crossing the border, and then as having started back toward the USSR. According to the New York Times correspondent, it was clear that the people as a whole were behind Gomulka, especially the young people, who had organized meetings and by other public steps clearly displayed their mood of discontent with the old pro-Stalinist order.

NYT, 22 Oct 56, 1:8. Received JCS 221230Z Oct 56.

21 Oct The Embassy in Warsaw reported that, on 21 October, the Central Committee had elected a new Politburo including Gomulka, Cyrankiewicz, Ochab, and others, and a new secretariat that also included Gomulka and Ochab. The new lineup was announced in alphabetical order by a special edition of Zycie Warszawy and confirmed by the Polish Radio. Trybuna, on the morning of 22 October, announced that Gomulka had been chosen first secretary. Excluded from the new Politburo were Rokossovsky and other Stalinists.

(Official Use Only) Msg, Warsaw (Jacobs) to SecState, 483, DA IN 262067, 22 Oct 56. Received State 221202Z Oct 56. Received JCS 230205Z Oct 56.

21 Oct (U) According to the New York Times, the Jordanians elected an anti-Western parliament, including three Communists. Efforts of the parliament were expected to turn toward close collaboration with Egypt, and British sources had conceded that the majority of the new members favored abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian defense treaty.

NYT, 23 Oct 56, 7:1. Received JCS 231230Z Oct 56.

22 Oct (U) The AP reported from London that Polish newspapers had accused President Eisenhower of interfering in Poland's affairs and rebuffed his expressions of sympathy for the Polish people's yearning for liberty and independence.

AP Wire Service, 22 Oct 56. Received JCS 221425Z Oct 56.

22 Oct

no doubt that Israeli forces in the Negév area were being strengthened.

Received JCS 222050Z Oct 56.

22 Oct (U) According to the New York Times speculation was increasing in Cairo that a British-French-Egyptian high-level meeting was likely soon. However, earlier reports that such a meeting was scheduled to begin in Geneva on 29 October had been denied by the Egyptian Foreign Minister, who said no time or place had been fixed.

NYT, 23 Oct 56, 7:1. Received JCS 231230Z Oct 56.

22 Oct (U) According to a New York Times report, following the visit to Belgrade of a party of Hungarian Communist Party officials headed by Erno Gero, it had been announced that Yugoslavia and Hungary would establish closer ties. In an interview, Janos Kadar of the Hungarian delegation had praised the Yugoslav policy of independent Socialism as worth of study.

NYT, 23 Oct 56, 14:1. Received JCS 231230Z Oct 56.

22 Oct (U) According to a New York Times report from Warsaw, the outpouring of Polish feeling against the USSR and Marshal Rokossovsky had gained strength. Demonstrations had taken place throughout the country, featuring chants of "Rokossovsky go home!" and other cries indicating support for Gomulka and the policy of independent action.

NYT, 23 Oct 56, 1:6. Received JCS 231230Z Oct 56.

22 Oct

(S) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 1000, DA IN 262223 (23 Oct 56) 22 Oct 56. Received State 222052Z Oct 56. Received JCS 231537Z Oct 56.

22 Oct

received JCS 251707Z Oct 56.

Both

22 Oct Ambassador Aldrich cabled from London that

Poland was in the midst of a second revolution and unless the Russians chose to crush it by force, there was no turning back. [redacted] reported to have stated that there was no center of power or directing authority either for the Polish Communists or Soviet interests inside Poland, except possibly the Soviet Ambassador in Warsaw.

(S) Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 2201, 22 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 231555Z Oct 56. Received JCS 230931Z Oct 56.

22 Oct

The CIA reported that there appeared to be ample assurance that [redacted] Soviet tank and mechanized divisions stationed in East Germany had moved into [redacted] areas along the Polish frontier on 17-18 October and bivouacked there in camouflaged positions. As many as 100,000 troops may have been involved. This indicated that Khrushchev was considering the use of force against Poland several days before his visit to Warsaw on 19 October and had not abandoned the idea as of the evening of 22 October, when the troops were still in position.

(S) Msg, CIA to JCS, [redacted] DA IN 262495 (24 Oct 56), 241240Z Oct 56. Received JCS 241451Z Oct 56.

22 Oct

The Legation in Budapest reported that the travel restrictions on members of foreign missions in Hungary were being lifted, and recommended reciprocal removal of similar restrictions on Hungarian diplomats in the US.

(Confidential Only) Msg; Budapest (Barnes) to SecState, 148, 22 Oct 56, DA IN 262361. Received State 231027Z Oct 56. Received JCS 240101Z Oct 56.

22 Oct

The Ambassador in Tunis cabled that Prime Minister Bourguiba had summoned him on the evening of 22 October to relate how, that afternoon, the French had kidnapped a party of Arab leaders en route by air from Rabat to Tunis on a peace mission. Bourguiba had already warned the French Ambassador that, if the French did not recover

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the situation before the next morning, Tunisia and Morocco would immediately sever diplomatic relations and initiate guerilla warfare against the French.

(S) Msg, Tunis (Jones) to SecState, 165, 22 Oct 56, DA IN 262303 (23 Oct 56). Received State 230736Z Oct 56. Received JCS 231923Z Oct 56.

22 Oct

The Iraqi Council of Ministers met to consider the Jordanian resolution formally requesting Iraqi military assistance in case of aggression against Jordan, as provided by treaty between the two countries. The American Embassy in Baghdad reported that Iraq did not want, however, to reply to the Jordanian resolution before the outcome of the Jordanian elections and the position of the resulting cabinet were known. Iraq was uneasy that a relatively large number of anti-Iraq, pro-Egypt deputies appeared elected.

(S) Msg, Baghdad (Gallman) to SecState, 674, 23 Oct 56. Received State 231316Z Oct 56. Received JCS 241521Z Oct 56.

22 Oct

According to a report from the US Legation in Budapest, there was growing public agitation in Hungary for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. At a meeting in Aula on 22 October, four or five thousand students had chanted "Go Home" and adopted ten demands, including one for "completely equal economic and political relations with USSR and Yugoslavia, built on principle of no interference in each others internal affairs." Further demands had included freedom of press and opinion, amnesty for political prisoners, government reorganization with Nagy as new leader, and restoration of historic national holidays.

(S) Msg, Budapest (Barnes) to SecState, 151, 23 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 232059Z Oct 56. Received JCS 241156Z Oct 56.

22 Oct

The American Ambassador to Poland reported that Rokossovsky, who had been rumored to be in Moscow or with troops at Legnica, had appeared on the night of 22 October at a reception in Warsaw for visiting members of the Yugoslav parliament. Rokossovsky's attendance, marked by a late arrival and ostentatious behavior, had been clearly designed to discredit the rumors of his "flight." The first appearance in several weeks had been made by the Soviet Ambassador, Ponomarenko, at this same reception.

(S) Msg, Warsaw (Jacobs) to SecState, 501, 23 Oct 56, DA IN 262434 (24 Oct 56). Received State 231503Z Oct 56. Received JCS 241048Z Oct 56.

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(1)

SUPPLEMENT TO
CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
RELATING TO THE CURRENT WORLD CRISIS.
DECISIONS AND ACTIONS TAKEN BY
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
FIRST INSTALLMENT: 2 OCTOBER to 9 NOVEMBER 1956

HISTORICAL SECTION
 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 28 November 1956

OASD(PA) DFOISR 8/TS-103
 CYR-6

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16 Oct ✓ At their meeting of 16 October 1956 the JCS, after hearing a presentation on the Middle East situation by the DepDir for Intelligence, agreed to dispatch to unified commanders a message, describing the existing situation in the Middle East. (Done by JCS 911803, 17 October 1956.)

Note, SecyJCS to Control Sec, "Message to Unified Commanders on the Middle East Situation," 16 Oct 56, CCS 335.14 (6-6-42) sec 36.

17 Oct ✓ In a message to unified commanders the JCS stated that although the tensions arising from the seizure of the Suez Canal had abated, retaliatory raids by Israel against Jordan, the proposed movement of Iraqi troops "in" Jordan, the imminent Jordanian elections, and the apparent increased interest of the other Arab States in the Israeli-Jordan issue, had all contributed to the instability of Jordan. As a result "serious internal disorder, military intervention by neighboring states or both" might occur.

Msg, JCS to Unified Commanders, JCS 911803, 171826Z Oct 56, CCS 381 E.M.M.E.A. (11-19-47) sec 46.

26 Oct ✓ The JCS cabled unified commanders that the over-all situation in Middle East, North Africa, and Eastern European Satellite area was "probably more explosive than any in recent years." The already existing tensions in North Africa and the Middle East had been materially increased by the Moslem reaction to the capture by the French of the five Algerian rebel leaders, by the French discovery of Egyptian arms destined for the Algerian rebels, by the announced extension of the combined Egyptian-Syrian military command to include Jordan, and by the increased combat readiness of Israeli forces. The lessening of tension in Eastern Europe stemming from the "apparent" Soviet acceptance of the new Polish regime had been sharply reversed by the violently anti-communist and anti-Soviet developments in Hungary. The Soviets, stated the JCS, must be apprehensive and "acutely mindful" of a possible threat to their military position in Germany. The Soviets might attempt to restore their position in the troubled areas by major military intervention, which could have "unpredictable repercussions." No specific action or general alerting was required on the part of the unified commanders for the time being, but they were to prepare to respond to situations that might develop quickly.

Msg, JCS to Unified Commanders, JCS 912329, 262120Z Oct 56, OCJCS.

29 Oct ✓ At their meeting on 29 October 1956 the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to take the following actions with respect to the Middle East situation:

1. General.

Dispatch a message to all unified commanders outlining the present situation, including the latest Watch Committee report, and informing them of actions being taken by the JCS. (Done by JCS 912389, 29 October 1956.)

2. Army.

a. Alert one regimental combat team in Europe for possible movement.

b. Alert one regimental combat team from the Continental United States for possible movement.

3. Navy.

a. Direct CINCNELM to establish command headquarters on the U.S.S. Pocono by 2 November 1956. (Defense and State clearance required.)

- b. Order one Hunter killer group (consisting of one CVS, six DD, and two SS) from the west coast of Europe (Rotterdam) into the Mediterranean, to report to Commander, Sixth Fleet. (Defense and State clearance required.)
- c. Cancel Sixth Fleet participation in NATO exercise "BEEHIVE", and order carrier strike force to positions east and southeast of Cyprus and within six hours' sailing distance of Cyprus.
- d. Cancel the amphibious exercise in the Atlantic and issue instructions to plan for loading out one Marine battalion landing team.

4. Air Force.

- a. Alert one C-124 wing in the Continental United States for movement to the Middle East.

5. Marine Corps.

- a. Alert one battalion landing team in the Continental United States for possible movement to the Middle East.

(S) Memo, Wentworth for Radford, "JCS Actions with respect to the Middle East Situation agreed upon at JCS Meeting 29 October 1956," 29 Oct 56, OCJCS.

29 Oct ✓

The JCS cabled unified commanders a Special Watch Report of the IAC. The report, based on the examination of "new evidence" of heavy Israeli mobilization, listed various offensive uses to which this mobilization might be put with probable success, even "in the face of the combined resistance of contiguous Arab states." The motivations "considered" to lie behind this mobilization were also listed. According to the report, the recent events in the Middle East provided a favorable opportunity for a major Israeli attack. The evidence indicated that the attack would be made against Egypt "in the very near future."

(S) Msg, JCS to Unified Commanders, JCS 912389, 290133Z Oct 56, OCJCS.

30 Oct ✓

The JCS cabled unified commanders that the Senior Foreign Liaison Officer in Tel Aviv had reported that Israeli forces had attacked Fedayeen bases in Egypt and taken up positions "towards" the Suez Canal on the night of 29-30 October. The IAC had concluded that this attack was sufficient to precipitate war with Egypt, but Egyptian reaction to the attack was still unknown. The British and French, who were probably involved in the Israeli "move," would probably intervene at an opportune moment. The JCS also stated that Soviet reaction to the situation was "a serious consideration." Two U.S. naval units were being redeployed, and two RCTs and one C-124 wing were being alerted for possible movement.

(S) Msg, JCS to Unified Commanders, JCS 912463, 300238Z Oct 56, OCJCS.

30 Oct ✓

At their meeting on 30 October 1956 the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to take the following actions with respect to the Middle East situation:

1. Send a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense requesting him to ask the State Department to secure the necessary authorization from the Government of Turkey to station a U.S. air task group at Adana, Turkey, in order to be prepared to assist in carrying out any directives which may be issued by the United Nations.
2. Request representation from the Joint Chiefs of Staff of one general or flag officer (from JMEPC) on the Near East Watch Committee. The Chairman stated

he would undertake with the State Department to secure this membership.

(TS) Memo, Wentworth for Radford, "JCS Actions with respect to the Middle East Situation agreed upon at JCS Meeting 30 October 1956," 30 Oct 56, CCJCS.

30 Oct

The JCS agreed to transmit to SecDef a memorandum requesting that he notify SecState of certain base rights requirements necessitated by the Israeli-Arab hostilities. In their memorandum, forwarded on the same day, the JCS also requested that SecDef recommend that SecState take action to acquire, as a matter of urgency, U.S. operational rights at Adana Airfield in Turkey, and U.S. rights for overflight, and in transit and staging stops at certain military facilities in Greece, Italy, and France.

(TS) Note, SecyJCS to Control Sec, "Bases and In Transit Rights," 30 Oct 56, CCS 335.14 (6-6-42) sec 36; (TS) Memo, CJCS to SecDef, same subj, 9 Nov 56, CCS 360 (12-9-42) sec 39.

31 Oct

The JCS submitted to SecDef their comments and recommendations on NSC 5616, a draft statement of "U. S. Policy Toward Developments in Poland and Hungary," prepared by the NSC Planning Board for consideration by the NSC. The draft statement outlined GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS, POLICY CONCLUSIONS, and COURSES OF ACTION pertaining to each country. Also included in NSC 5616 were recent statements by the President on Poland and Hungary, and a statement by the ICA, summarizing limitations on U. S. assistance to the two countries in question.

Under GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS the paper pointed out that the initial objective of the U. S. toward the Eastern European satellite area had been to encourage, as a first step toward eventual full national independence, the emergence of 'national' communist countries. In Poland recent developments appeared favorable to the early attainment of this objective. In Hungary, as well as Poland, developments had revealed the strong anti-Russian and anti-communist sentiments of the population. However, certain factors had been present in the Polish situation which had not existed in the Hungarian uprising; for example, strong leadership at a critical moment, fear of a reunified and irredentist Germany, and the timely promise of reform. These factors, together with an assertion of 'national independence' linked with a closely calculated defiance of Russian pressure, had evidently enabled a reconstituted Polish communist government to launch on a new course with the acquiescence, if not support, of the majority of Poles. Despite legal and administrative limits on U.S. assistance the U. S. had already indicated to Poland that a request for economic assistance would be given sympathetic study.

In Hungary a nationalist movement had been triggered into revolt by the intervention of Soviet troops called in by the Hungarian Government, and the demands of the people had gone far beyond those originally sought. These demands had become anti-communist as well as anti-Soviet. The outcome of the situation in Hungary was still difficult to foresee. The Nagy Government had been compromised by the Soviet intervention, and was seeking to restore its authority by "appearing" to accede to many of the demands made upon it. Soviet forces were still present in the

country, and the Soviet press had been asserting that they were there legally under the terms of the Warsaw Pact. Concerning Hungary, two, and possibly three, courses were open to the U. S. in the "immediate situation:" 1) The mobilization of pressure, through such means as the UN and public appeals, to inhibit the USSR from further armed intervention and from the use of other harsh measures, while at the same time extending assistance in the form of medical supplies and food to the Hungarian people. 2) A course of action ranging from immediate covert support of the rebels to overt military support and recognition of their government if one should be formed and succeed in holding part of the country. 3) A disarmament proposal in which "[. . . the United States endeavors to facilitate the complete withdrawal of Soviet Armed forces from Hungary and the developments of a Hungarian government broadly based on Hungarian public support with an independent sovereign status not allied to either the West or the East in a manner similar to the establishment of Austria.]"

Under POLICY CONCLUSIONS the draft statement stated certain tentative conclusions might now be drawn, and certain courses of action taken, to advance U. S. policies and objectives. The intervention of Soviet troops in Hungary, and the near intervention in Poland, illustrated that, at least in those countries where Soviet troops were stationed, the USSR was willing to use its armed forces to prevent the rise of a non-communist government, or to prevent a communist government from altering a policy of close military and political alliance with the USSR. However, the USSR was "apparently willing" to accept a communist government, which, remaining loyal to its alliance with the USSR, asserted its "national independence." It seemed unlikely that U.S. action short of overt military intervention or obvious preparation for such intervention would lead the USSR to take steps which it believed would materially increase the risk of general war. Actions by the U.S. and other friendly governments should strive to aid and encourage forces in the satellites toward U.S. objectives without provoking counter-action which would result in the suppression of "liberalizing" influences. How much the maintenance of Soviet control in East Germany and Eastern Europe depended on the presence of Soviet forces had been revealed to the rest of the world. And the recent events in Poland and Hungary "may cause" the USSR to reappraise the value of continuing its control through the presence of its armed forces. The U.S. should, therefore, through inducements and pressures, encourage developments which might lead to reduction and withdrawal of Soviet forces in Europe.

Under COURSES OF ACTION the draft policy paper projected, concerning Poland, 1) an early approach to the Polish Government indicating U.S. willingness to discuss all problems affecting U.S.-Polish relations, 2) appropriate steps to reorient Polish trade toward the West, 3) preparations to make available at Polish request economic and technical aid "in moderate amounts sufficient to give Poland an alternative to complete dependence on Moscow," 4) encouragement of the Poles to concentrate on peaceful trade and the satisfaction of consumer demands, 5) increased contacts and exchanges between the U.S. and Poland on economic, scientific, and cultural matters, 6) the "use of whatever capabilities we may possess" to influence the new Polish leaders to fulfill such of their commitments for reform

as would advance U.S. objectives.

Concerning Hungary, the U.S. should pursue the following courses of action:

1) Mobilize all appropriate pressures, including UN action, on the USSR to discourage and prevent Soviet armed intervention as well as harsh measures in Hungary "[while reassuring the USSR we do not look upon Hungary or the other Satellites as potential military allies.]"

2) Consider the advisability of making in the UN or elsewhere a proposal of Hungarian neutrality.

3) "[In line with this approach, consider now whether it is advisable to encourage Soviet withdrawal of its armed forces from Hungary by indicating a willingness of the U.S. to consult with NATO on the probable withdrawal of some U.S. forces from Western Europe if the Soviet does withdraw all of its forces from Hungary.]"

4) Seek to influence the new Hungarian leaders to live up to the commitments they had made to their people which would advance U.S. objectives, including the promise to work for the total withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary.

5) Provide immediate relief assistance to Hungary.

6) Predicated on the assumption that a Hungarian government at least as independent as that of Poland came into power, the U.S. should be prepared to make available economic and technical assistance, increase economic, scientific and cultural contacts and exchanges, and attempt to reorient Hungarian trade along the lines already projected for Poland.

7)

8) Encourage and assist Austria to grant asylum to Hungarians.

In their comments on NSC 5616 the JCS stated that, with certain exceptions, the draft policy statement was acceptable from a military point of view. They felt that the disarmament proposal included under GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS should be deleted, for it added little to the value of the policy paper, was "not concurred in by majority opinion," and the substance of the proposal was included in the courses of action. They felt, too, that under COURSES OF ACTION the bracketed phrase "while reassuring the USSR we do not look upon Hungary or the other Satellites as potential military allies" should also be deleted. The reason given by the JCS was that the "assurances as proposed would tend to undermine such influence as the United States might have on the government which is established in Hungary, and could in the future operate to our military disadvantage." Finally, the JCS believed that the course of action calling for consideration of a proposal to encourage the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary by indicating a willingness of the U.S. to consult with NATO on the probable withdrawal of some U.S. forces in Western Europe should be deleted. On previous occasions, stated the JCS, the U.S. had rejected Soviet proposals to withdraw Soviet forces from East Germany if the U.S. would do the same from the Federal Republic of Germany. For the U.S. to propose now a partial withdrawal of U.S. forces from unspecified areas might invite renewed Soviet efforts to expand the proposal with a view to obtaining complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe. Such

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action would be detrimental to the best interests of the U.S. and its European allies. Furthermore, said the JCS, "it may be that local actions will result in the withdrawal of Soviet military forces from that country without involvement of the United States." In conclusion the JCS recommended that SecDef, "subject to the foregoing," concur in NSC 5616.

(S) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "U.S. Policy Toward Developments in Poland and Hungary (NSC 5616)," 31 Oct 56; (TS) NSC 5616, Note by ExecSecy NSC to NSC, same subj, 31 Oct 56. Both in CCS 092 (9-14-49) sec 9.

31 Oct / The JCS agreed: "That the Chief of Staff, Air Force, would revise the memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, subject: 'Bases and In Transit Rights', dated 30 October 1956, so as to limit the requirements stated therein to operational rights for an air task force at Adana airfield, Turkey, and that the Chairman, JCS, would reopen the question with the Secretary of Defense."

(TS) Memo, Wentworth for Radford, "JCS Actions with respect to the Middle East Situation agreed upon at JCS Meeting 31 October 1956," 31 Oct 56, OCJCS.

1 Nov / In a memo to SecDef the JCS pointed out that the base rights requirements contained in their memo on "Bases and In Transit Rights," dated 30 October 1956, were necessary in order to assure the ability of the U.S. to carry out certain of its military plans in the Middle East should the implementation of these plans be directed. Failure to acquire these rights would involve the acceptance of risks, including:

1) "Failure to obtain overflight, in transit or staging rights in France, Italy and Greece, in advance, may result in one or more of these countries protesting or interfering with the movement of U.S. forces to Turkey."

2) "Assuming that the transit of France, Italy and Greece by combat elements to Turkey could be accomplished, effective support of these forces could be made extremely difficult under the condition of protest."

They understood, stated the JCS, that the Department of State felt it inadvisable to attempt to seek these rights "outside the NATO structure," but that rights necessary for operations out of Adana might be obtained. The JCS considered that acquisition of rights in Turkey was highly desirable from a military point of view, and they urged that these rights be obtained as soon as possible. If rights in Turkey were obtained, operations could be planned on the assumption that circumstances dictating U.S. military action would be such that the countries transited would not object.

Finally, the JCS recommended that SecDef forward the information in their memo to SecState.

(TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Bases and In Transit Rights," 1 Nov 56, CCS 360 (12-9-42) sec 89.

2 Nov / The JCS agreed:

1) That the Joint Middle East Planning Committee and the Joint Strategic Plans Committee would conduct a study and make a report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to possible actions which might be taken by the USSR in order to influence the Middle East situation.

2) That a Marine Corps battalion landing team now in Japan should not be loaded aboard ship for movement to the Middle East at this time but that the Chief of Naval Operations would have a ship loaded in the Far East with supplies and materials for the support of

possible ground force action in the Middle East. It was further agreed that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army would determine jointly the lists of supplies and materials to be loaded and that those supplies and materials should be of such types as would directly support immediate operations in the area and would reduce the requirements for airlift.

(S) Memo, Wentworth for Radford, "JCS Actions with respect to the Middle East Situation agreed upon at JCS Meeting on 2 November 1956," 2 Nov 56, OCJCS.

2 Nov

The JCS cabled unified commanders that the Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt appeared to be aimed at the removal of the military and political threat posed by Nasser to the existence of Israel and to the position and interests of the U.K. and France in the Middle East and North Africa. The removal of the Suez Canal from "unfettered" Egyptian control was an "important aspect." Anglo-French air attacks had been initiated to neutralise the Egyptian Air Force. Preparations for British and French landings in Egypt were proceeding. The other Arab States appeared reluctant to becoming involved in what seemed to be a "losing war."

The Soviet Union, stated the JCS, continued to be faced with "disturbing situations" in Eastern Europe. Any Soviet-sponsored reaction of a military nature, in the Middle East should be apparent within a few days. It appeared that the danger of a general Arab-Israeli war had, for the time being, been mitigated, thus reducing the capability of the Soviets to interfere actively in the Middle East, except by furnishing volunteers and additional equipment.

The JCS also informed the commanders of certain measures they had taken to improve the military readiness of the U.S.

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(S) Msg, JCS to Unified Commanders, JCS 912773, 022318Z Nov 56, OCJCS.

5 Nov

The JCS agreed:

1) That the Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Air Force, would be prepared to provide airlift troops on the order of four or five battalions to the Middle East in the event that the United Nations established an international police force in the Suez Canal area.

2) That the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, would ascertain from the Commander, Dhahran Airfield, whether the Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) is still loading tankers.

3) That all Chiefs of Services would insure that the U.S. military personnel stationed with British and French units will not accompany those units into combat.

4) That all Chiefs of Services would make sure that foreign officers, particularly British and French, assigned to duty with U.S. headquarters or units are not in a position to obtain access to U.S. military or political plans.

5) That the Chief of Naval Operations would insure that U.S. naval forces in Suda Bay remain there for at least 48 hours more.

6) That the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, would take action to return C-124 aircraft from the Middle East to Germany upon completion of the evacuation of U.S. nationals.

7) That the Chief of Staff, Army, and the Chief of Naval Operations, would finalize the arrangements for loading supplies and materials on a ship in the Far East and inform the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, as to what ship will be used for the purpose and provide him with a list of equipment to be loaded in order that he may discuss and clear the action with the Secretary of Defense.

8) That the Deputy Director, Logistics Plans, would attend the next meeting of the Petroleum Committee, headed by Mr. Flemming (ODM), and be prepared to present to the committee the military petroleum situation worldwide.

(MS) Memo, Wentworth for Radford, "JCS Actions with respect to the Middle East Situation agreed upon at JCS Meeting on 5 November 1956," 5 Nov 56, OCJCS.

5 Nov / The JCS agreed:

1) To transmit a message to the commanders of unified and specified commands as a result of a Soviet note to the President and subsequent Soviet comments in the Press. (Done by JCS 912901, 6 November 1956.)

2) To concur in the intentions of the Chief of Naval Operations to issue instructions (JCS 1887/299) to naval units deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean and Persian Gulf areas on the actions to be taken by the naval units in the event of 1) submarine attack, 2) aircraft attack on U.S. Naval forces, 3) USSR attack on British or French units. This concurrence was subject to clearance by the Secretary of Defense; the clearance to be obtained by the Chairman, JCS.

3) To defer action on the loading and sailing of a ship from the Far East with supplies for the support of ground force action in the Middle East until the situation is clarified.

(MS) Memo, Wentworth for Radford, "JCS Actions with respect to the Middle East Situation agreed upon at JCS Meeting on 5 November 1956," 5 Nov 56, OCJCS;

(MS) JCS 1887/299, Memo, CNO to JCS, "Operational Instructions to Mediterranean and Persian Gulf Naval Units," 5 Nov 56, CCS 381 E.M.M.E.A. (11-19-47) sec 47.

6 Nov / The JCS agreed to dispatch to the commanders of unified and specified commands an alert message to include information on those recommendations, made by the JCS to improve the military state of readiness, which were approved by the President and were to be implemented immediately. (Done by JCS 912938, 7 November 1956.)

(MS) Memo, Wentworth for Radford, "JCS Actions with respect to the Middle East Situation agreed upon at the JCS Meeting of 6 November 1956," 6 Nov 56, OCJCS.

6 Nov / The JCS agreed to make the following recommendations to the President to improve the military state of readiness:

1) All Services recall all personnel from regular leave (as distinguished from emergency leave).

2) Improve the readiness of the Continental Air Defense Command. Specific actions to be taken:

a. Increase number of interceptor aircraft on advanced state of alert. Increase from two aircraft on five-minute alert at each station to four aircraft.

b. Stop training in all areas where it interferes with increased readiness.

3) Improve the readiness of the Strategic Air Command. Specific actions to be taken:

a. Deploy tanker squadrons to U.S. bases and to Alaska, Goose Bay, Thule, and Harmon. No deployment to the U.K., Iceland, or French Morocco at this time.

4) Preparations to reinforce the Sixth Fleet.

Specific actions to be taken:

a. Sail the U.S.S. Forrestal, the Franklin D. Roosevelt, one cruiser and three divisions of destroyers toward the Azores.

b. Load and sail one Marine Corps BLT.

5) Improve the readiness of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. Specific actions to be taken:

a. Augment picket stations.

b. Send all antisubmarine warfare units to sea.

c. Prepare other fleet units to sail.

d. Reinforce the Seventh Fleet with 2-CVA's, 1-CA, and 1 Desron.

e. Deploy submarines to reconnaissance stations.

6) Improve the readiness of the Tactical Air Command. Specific actions to be taken:

a. Alert all heavy troop carrier wings in the ZI.

b. Suspend all training and routine support operations.

7) Improve U.S. military readiness in the Persian Gulf area. Specific actions to be taken:

a. Load one Marine Corps BLT in Yokusoka and sail as soon as ready for the Persian Gulf in company with two CVA's, one cruiser and one squadron of destroyers.

8) Send a general warning message to all U.S. commands.

9) Obtain authority to station an air task force from the European Continent at Adana, Turkey, and replace those units with units from the U.S. The task force composition to be:

1 - Fighter-Bomber wing (F-84)

1 - Squadron B-57 (15)

1 - Reconnaissance unit (8 or 12 F-84F and 6 RB-57)

() Memo, Wentworth for Radford, "JCS Actions with respect to the Middle East Situation agreed upon at the JCS Meeting on 6 November 1956," 6 Nov 56, OCJCS.

6 Nov ✓

The JCS cabled unified commanders and the USARMA MADRID that the contents of a very recently received note from the USSR to the U.S. Government, when taken together with subsequent Soviet notes addressed to the U.K., France, and Israel, indicated "at a minimum a very disturbed situation in Moscow and may indicate serious intent on the part of the Soviets." The JCS also stated that they considered the situation required "special vigilance."

() Msg, JCS to Unified Commanders and USARMA MADRID, JCS 912901, C50019Z Nov 56, OCJCS.

6 Nov ✓

The JCS agreed that the JMEPC would undertake, "on a continuing basis," their estimate of Soviet capabilities and possible courses of action in the Middle East.

() Note, SecyJCS to Control Sec, "Analysis of Possible Soviet Courses of Action in the Middle East," 6 Nov 56, CCS 335.14 (5-6-42) sec 36.

7 Nov ✓

The JCS cabled unified commanders that the JCS had taken certain actions to improve the readiness of U.S. forces. These actions were in addition to those taken

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on 30 October (JCS 912463) and on 2 November (JCS 912773). Specific implementing orders would be issued by the appropriate executive agents.

1) The Continental Air Defense Command would assume the status of "increased readiness" as defined in CONADR 55-3.

2) The Sixth Fleet would sail the U.S.S. Forrestal, the Franklin D. Roosevelt, one cruiser, and three divisions of destroyers toward the Azores.

3) The Atlantic and Pacific Fleets would send additional picket ships to DEW Line extensions, send additional antisubmarine warfare units to sea, prepare to reinforce the Seventh Fleet with 2 CVA's, 1 CA and 1 destroyer squadron, deploy submarines to reconnaissance stations, and alert "SOSUS."

4) The Tactical Air Command would place all heavy troop carrier wings in the ZI on 12 hour alert, and suspend training and routine support operations of these wings as directed.

The above actions plus the increased alertness by intelligence personnel as well as general vigilance by all concerned would satisfy readiness requirements for the time being.

The JCS also stated that at the moment there was a reasonable chance that UN "action in obtaining a cease fire" in Egypt might reduce or eliminate the chances of overt Soviet military action.

(S) Msg, JCS to Unified Commanders, JCS 912988, 070456Z Nov 56, OCJCS.

7 Nov ✓ The JCS agreed:

1) That the Chief of Naval Operations would prepare a cover plan for loading and moving a Marine Corps BLT from the Far East and submit it to the Chairman, JCS, for clearance with the President.

2) To take no further action with respect to shipping a Marine Corps BLT from the East Coast until the situation has become more clear.

(S) Memo, Wentworth for Radford, "JCS Actions with respect to the Middle East Situation agreed upon at the JCS Meeting on 7 November 1956," 7 Nov 56, OCJCS.

9 Nov ✓ The JCS agreed that the Chief of Staff, Air Force would coordinate the initial movement of UN forces to Egypt and maintain direct liaison with the U.S. delegation at the UN. They also agreed that the JCS would recommend that the SecDef designate the Department of the Navy as the Executive Agent for such assistance as the U.S. might agree to provide to the UN subsequent to the movement of the UN advance elements. (By CM-401-56, 9 November, the JCS informed SecDef of their action with respect to the Chief of Staff, Air Force, and recommended that the Navy Department be designated the Executive Agent.)

(S) JCS 1887/307, Note by Secys, "Department of Defense Assistance to the United Nations Forces in Egypt," 9 Nov 56, CCS 381 E.M.M.E.A. (11-19-47) sec 48.

9 Nov ✓ The JCS approved CINCSPECOMME Operation Plan No. 215-56 subject to the modifications contained in the Appendix to JCS 1887/297. CINCSPECOMME Operation Plan No. 215-56 was a plan for U.S. military action in the Middle East in the event of certain contingencies. (By SM-896-56, 9 November, the Commander in Chief U.S. Specified Command Middle East was informed of the JCS action, and provided with Appendix to JCS 1887/297.)

(S) JCS 1887/297, Note by Secys, Dec on CINCSPECOMME OPERATION PLAN NO. 215-56, 9 Nov 56, CCS 381 E.M.M.E.A. (11-19-47) sec 47.

CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
RELATING TO
THE CURRENT WORLD CRISIS
SEVENTH INSTALLMENT
1 - 31 MARCH 1957

*DOS concurs with DIA/CTA
conclusions
12 documents
#472*

HISTORICAL SECTION
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
1 August 1957

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CYR-6

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1 Mar (U) The New York Times carried a special report from Cairo stating that Nasser had declared the UN-approved six principles for operating the Suez Canal to be no longer binding upon him. He claimed, according to the report, that the Anglo-French invasion had released Egypt from any obligation to adhere to these principles. Citing "informed sources" as authority, the report said that Nasser had made this statement to King Saud during the three-day meeting of Arab leaders in Cairo, 25-27 February 1957.

NYT, 1 Mar 57, 1:7. Received JCS 011330Z Mar 57.

1 Mar (U) With Israel expected to announce during the afternoon its decision to withdraw from the Gaza and Gulf of Aqaba areas, SecState Dulles met with representatives of nine Arab states in an effort to forestall an adverse Arab reaction to the assumptions on which Israel was basing its withdrawal. Mr. Dulles told the Arabs that "no promises or concessions whatever" had been made by the US to induce Israel to withdraw. The Syrian Ambassador, acting as spokesman for the Arabs, said they would "wait and see what happens" but would continue "as things now stand" to press for sanctions against Israel.

AP Wire Service, 1 Mar 57. Received JCS 011658Z, 011825Z, and 012137Z Mar 57.

1 Mar (U) The Israel Foreign Minister announced to the UN General Assembly Israel's plans for a "full and prompt" withdrawal from Sharm el Sheikh and the Gaza Strip. The withdrawal from Sharm el Sheikh would be made "in confidence that there will be continued freedom of navigation for international and Israeli shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba and through the Strait of Tiran." In this connection she recalled that a UN resolution of 2 Feb 57 contemplated that units of the UNEF would move into the area upon the Israeli withdrawal, and she noted Ambassador Lodge's statement of the same date that it was "essential" for the UNEF troops to remain at the Strait of Tiran "until it is clear that the non-exercise of any claimed belligerent rights has established in practice the peaceful conditions which must govern navigation in waters having such an international interest." Mrs. Meir said the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip would be based on the "assumptions" that a) the takeover of the military and civil control from Israel would be "exclusively" by the UNEF; b) the UN, as contemplated by the Secretary General's report of 22 Feb 57, would be the agency primarily responsible for providing effective police protection, guaranteeing good civil administration, assuring maximum assistance to the refugee program, and the fostering of the economic development of the Gaza Strip; and c) these responsibilities of the UN would continue "for a transitory period from the take-over until there is a peace settlement . . . or a definitive agreement on the future of the Gaza Strip." She added that "if conditions are created in the Gaza Strip which indicate a return to the conditions of deterioration which existed previously, Israel would reserve its freedom to act to defend its rights."

NYT, 2 Mar 57, 1:8, 10:1-2. Received JCS 021330Z Mar 57. AP Wire Service, 1 Mar 57, reports received in JCS beginning 012021Z Mar 57.

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1 Mar (U) Ambassador Lodge told the UN General Assembly that the US welcomed the announcement of the Israeli decision to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Sharm el Sheikh. The US, he said, understood the withdrawal would be "immediate." The US noted that the "declarations" accompanying the announcement of the decision to withdraw did not make the withdrawal conditional. The US believed that, in accordance with the statement of the Secretary General on 22 Feb 57, the future of the Gaza Strip after the Israeli withdrawal should be worked out within the framework of the Armistice Agreement; and the US hoped that the UN could play a useful role in arriving at a definitive settlement of the Gaza Strip question. On Sharm el Sheikh Mr. Lodge said the US position remained as set forth in the US aide-memoire of 11 Feb 57 to Israel. After Israel's complete withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Sharm el Sheikh there would be "no basis for either party to the armistice agreement to assert or exercise any belligerent rights." Any violation of the Armistice Agreement or other international obligation by either party thereafter would call for "appropriate action" by the UN.

NYT, 2 Mar 57, 10:6-8. Received JCS 021330Z Mar 57. An incomplete AP Wire Service report was received in JCS at 012125Z Mar 57.

1 Mar The US Ambassador in Cairo cabled information given him by the Arab consultant of the US Embassy in Jidda concerning Saudi Arabia's reasons for strongly opposing the passage of Israeli ships through the Strait of Tiran. The Saudis feared that operation of the projected Israeli pipeline from Elath to Haifa, which would depend on passage through the Gulf of Aqaba, would have the following undesirable results: 1) The Israeli pipeline, which Saudi Arabia would boycott on principle, could probably offer lower rates than the Suez Canal, and this would give a marketing advantage to such of Saudi Arabia's oil-producing competitors as had no scruples against using the Israeli pipeline. 2) If Egypt had to reduce the Suez Canal tolls to compete with the Israeli pipeline, Egyptian income would be adversely affected. 3) If constructed the Israeli pipeline might establish itself as a factor in world commerce, and as such might be used by Israel as a political weapon against the Arabs.

(S) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 2757, 1 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received State 020025Z Mar 57. Received JCS 041615Z Mar 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

2 Mar (U) Israel delayed preparations for withdrawal of its troops from the Gaza Strip and the Gulf of Aqaba area. Premier Ben Gurion's Cabinet, under heavy fire from Israeli critics of the withdrawal decision, met in extraordinary session.

AP Wire Service, 2 Mar 57. Received 022035Z Mar 57.

2 Mar (U) President Eisenhower sent a letter to Premier Ben Gurion in which he expressed the "hope" that the Israeli withdrawal would "go forward with the utmost speed." The President said he believed that Israel

would "have no cause to regret" such compliance with the "strong sentiment of the world community. . . ." It was "reasonable" for Israel to entertain "hopes and expectations" of realizing, after the withdrawal, "conditions in the area more stable, more tranquil and more conducive to the general welfare than those which existed heretofore." The US, "as a friend of all the countries of the area and a loyal member of the United Nations," would "seek that such hopes prove not to be in vain."

AP Wire Service, 2 Mar 57. Received JCS 022305Z Mar 57. NYT, 3 Mar 57, 1:6, 6:1. Received JCS 031330Z Mar 57.

2 Mar (U) According to the New York Times, Egypt had informed General Wheeler, in charge of UN canal clearance operations, that when it received evidence of the execution of the announced Israeli plan of withdrawal, UN salvage ships would be permitted to begin work on the sunken vessels Edgar Bonnet and Abukir, the two remaining obstacles in the Suez Canal.

NYT, 3 Mar 57, 1:6-7. Received JCS 031330Z Mar 57.

2 Mar The Iraqi Chief of the General Staff, General Rafiq, expressed keen disappointment to [redacted] that no USAF program was scheduled for Iraq (see item for 15 Feb 57). He requested reconsideration of his proposal to place "adequate" radar coverage and "some" modern fighter aircraft in Iraq. He commented that the absence of a USAF program in Iraq was considered by Iraq to be evidence that the Eisenhower Doctrine had no real meaning for the Middle East in general or for Iraq in particular.

(S) Received JCS 061620Z Mar 57. (S) Msg, Baghdad (Gallman) to SecState, 1473, 4 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received State 041215Z Mar 57. Received JCS 051207Z Mar 57.

3 Mar In a meeting with the Israeli Ambassador the SecState refused to give any stronger US backing to the Israeli position on the Gaza Strip and Gulf of Aqaba questions than had been expressed in the President's letter of 2 March to Ben Gurion.

(S) Msg, SecState to Cairo et al., 2936, 5 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received JCS 061536Z Mar 57.

4 Mar In a conversation with the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, the SecState, commenting on Egypt's intimation that the six principles were no longer applicable, said that such a position was untenable because the six principles were an expression of the Convention of 1888. Egypt, he said, was using the Canal as an instrument of national policy, and it was essential that there should be machinery to prevent Egypt from using the Canal for blackmailing purposes in the future.

(S) Msg, Actg SecState to Bonn, 2472, 8 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received JCS 111556Z Mar 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

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- 4 Mar (U) Premier Ben Gurion ordered the Israeli Army to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and the Gulf of Aqaba area.
AP Wire Service, 4 Mar 57. Received JCS 041323Z, 041816Z, and 041822Z Mar 57.
- 4 Mar Ambassador Lodge reported information received from an official of the UN Secretariat about the UN Special Committee investigating the Hungarian revolt. Because of "enormous" pressure from the USSR and Hungary, Austria had decided to limit the Committee's activities in Austria to a day or so in closed session. The Austrian Government would accord the Committee the usual courtesies but could not permit it to interview witnesses, visit refugee camps, or inspect the border. Austria would permit witnesses to go to Geneva to testify, but probably could not recommend a selected list of witnesses.
(S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 839, 4 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received State 050807Z Mar 57. Received JCS 051557Z Mar 57.
- 5 Mar In a conversation with Hammarskjold, the Israeli Foreign Minister amplified the position her government would take on the Gaza and Gulf of Aqaba questions following the Israeli withdrawal, as follows: 1) The return of Egypt "in any way, shape or form" to the Gaza Strip would bring into force a right on the part of Israel to return to the Strip, and this applied not only to the initial takeover period, but also to the future. 2) Israel interpreted "innocent passage" as referring to the conduct rather than the character of shipping and planned to exercise in the following week its right to pass through the Strait of Tiran, using warships if necessary.
(S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 847, 5 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received State 060345Z Mar 57. Received JCS 061636Z Mar 57.
- 5 Mar Hammarskjold discussed with Ambassador Lodge certain complications of the Gaza problem that would confront the UN after the Israeli withdrawal. Hammarskjold believed that under the Armistice Agreement Egypt had the legal right to administer the Strip, and so an agreement concerning the UN's role in the Gaza Strip would have to be made with Egypt. Though willing to accept the assistance of the UN in the Strip, Egypt would insist on avoiding any appearance that its rights there had lapsed, because it wanted to use these rights for bargaining purposes in any future Palestine settlement. Thus Egypt might easily give Israel a pretext for forcibly returning to the area. Another major difficulty was Israel's position that the UNEF could not be stationed on the Israeli side of the armistice line. Hammarskjold felt that unless the presence of the UNEF on the Egyptian side could be balanced by its presence on the Israeli side, Egypt and the countries participating in the UNEF would request its withdrawal.
(S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 847, 5 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received State 060345Z Mar 57. Received JCS 061636Z Mar 57. (C) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 848, 5 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received State 061732Z Mar 57. Received JCS 062045Z Mar 57.

- 5 Mar The US Ambassador in Damascus reported that business in Syria continued to be depressed. Businessmen believed that the commercial stagnancy had resulted from the anti-Western and anti-capitalistic attitude of the Government. "There are soft cries in Damascus and louder ones in Aleppo," the Ambassador cabled, "that Government must alter its economic policies or be changed."
 (S) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 2018, 5 Mar 57, DA IN 851 (6 Mar 57). Received State 051546Z Mar 57. Received JCS 061521Z Mar 57.
- 6 Mar (U) The evacuation of the entire Israeli civil administration from the Gaza Strip was completed, and the first UNEF troops entered. The Israeli Army, which was still in process of leaving the Strip, issued a communique stating that total evacuation of the area by Israel would be completed within 24 hours. The communique added that the administration of Sharm el Sheikh would be transferred by Israel to the UNEF on 8 March.
 NYT, 7 Mar 57, 1:8. Received JCS 071330Z Mar 57. Incomplete AP Wire Service report received in JCS 062126Z Mar 57.
- 6 Mar (U) Syria agreed to permit repair of the damaged IPC pipelines in its territory and resumption of the pumping of oil from Iraq to Mediterranean ports. (The IPC announced on 9 March that the repair work had begun.)
 AP Wire Service, 6 and 9 Mar 57. Received JCS 061616Z and 091424Z Mar 57.
- 7 Mar (U) The Egyptian Suez Canal Authority announced that the Suez Canal would be open on 8 March to vessels up to 500 tons during daylight hours and that all ships paying tolls to Egypt would be allowed to use the Canal. Egyptian officials made it clear, however, according to the New York Times, that Israeli ships would be barred from the waterway.
 NYT, 8 Mar 57, 1:1, 2:6. Received JCS 081330Z Mar 57.
- 7 Mar The US Ambassador in Cairo reported indications of serious differences between Nasser and King Saud during the meeting of Arab leaders in Cairo from 25 to 27 February. An open breach "threatened" to occur when Saud got the impression that Nasser was accusing him of selling out to the US. Saud angrily asserted that what he sold was oil and that he intended to go on selling it to the West; the Soviets had nothing to offer him and his future was irrevocably tied to the West. The two Chiefs of State also differed over 1) King Hussein's letter to Nabulsi (see item of 2 Feb); 2) the terms on which the US was renewing its lease of the Dhahran airfield; and 3) the Kashmir question.
 (S) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 2811, 7 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received State 072327Z Mar 57. Received JCS 082016Z Mar 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

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- 7 Mar The State Department replied to a request from the US Ambassador in Athens for comments on a Syrian offer to buy a quantity of obsolete British ammunition from Greece. Though recognizing the right of the Greek Government to make the final decision, the Department suggested that the US Ambassador comment on the undesirability of furnishing arms to a state directly involved in the Palestine dispute at a time when the UN was making major efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East.
- (S) Msg, Athens (Allen) to SecState, 2968, 2 Mar 57, DA IN 169 (3 Mar 57). Received State 021308Z Mar 57. Received JCS 030811Z Mar 57. (S) Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Athens, 3239, 7 Mar 57, DA IN 1629 (8 Mar 57). Received JCS 081408Z Mar 57.
- 7 Mar (U) Israel completed its evacuation of the Gaza Strip, leaving it under the control of the UNEF. The UNEF commander, General Burns, announced that the UN forces were there "with the consent of the Government of Egypt" and would administer civil affairs "until further arrangements are made."
- NYT, 8 Mar 57, 1:2-3, 2:6. Received JCS 081330Z Mar 57.
- 8 Mar (U) Israeli forces, except for a small detail, evacuated Sharm el Sheikh, and troops of the UNEF assumed control of the area. (It was later announced by Israeli Army Headquarters that the last Israeli soldiers and equipment were withdrawn from Sharm el Sheikh on 12 March.)
- AP Wire Service, 8 and 13 Mar 57. Received JCS 082018Z and 131456Z Mar 57.
- 8 Mar (U) Secretary General Hammarskjold reported to the UN General Assembly that the resolution of 2 February, which called on Israel to complete withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Sharm el Sheikh without further delay, had been fully complied with.
- NYT, 9 Mar 57, 2:4-5. Received JCS 091330Z Mar 57. Incomplete AP Wire Service report received in JCS at 081607Z Mar 57.
- 9 Mar (U) President Eisenhower signed into law the Joint Resolution of Congress establishing the Eisenhower Doctrine as part of the official foreign policy of the US. The final form of the Resolution contained the President's proposals (see item for 3 January) without substantial change; however, his request for "authorization" from Congress to use, upon request of the victim, armed force to repel Communist armed aggression in the Middle East was dropped in favor of a declaration that the US was "prepared," if the President determined it to be necessary, to use armed force under such circumstances. At the same time, the President issued a statement that Ambassador James P. Richards would depart on 12 March on a "special

mission to the Middle East to explain the purposes of the resolution to the Middle Eastern countries," and would report on the most effective ways of carrying out its purposes.

AP Wire Service, 9 Mar 57. Received JCS 091620Z Mar 57. State Dept Bulletin, vol XXXVI, no 926 (25 Mar 57), p. 481.

9 Mar (u) An Egyptian spokesman said that the limit on the size of vessels that would be permitted to use the partially cleared Suez Canal would be 300 tons instead of 500 tons as announced on 7 March. The Associated Press pointed out that since vessels up to 300 tons were exempt from tolls, this change would postpone a showdown on the question of who would receive the tolls, until the Canal was ready for larger vessels and more nearly normal operation.

AP Wire Service, 9 Mar 57. Received JCS 091525Z Mar 57.

9 Mar (u) According to the New York Times, Nasser said that British and French ships would be permitted to go through the Suez Canal if they paid the entire toll to Egypt. He said that no decision had been reached on whether Israeli ships would be allowed to use the Canal.

NYT, 10 Mar 57, 27:2. Received JCS 101330Z Mar 57.

9 Mar (u) According to the Associated Press, "official sources" in the Iraqi Government announced that the IPC had agreed to lend the Iraqi Government up to 25 million dinars (about 70 million dollars) against future oil royalties.

AP Wire Service, 9 Mar 57. Received JCS 091853Z Mar 57.

10 Mar (u) The Israeli Foreign Minister stated in the Israeli official gazette that Israel would not be bound by the decision of the International Court of Justice on any case that might be brought before the Court by the Arab states.

AP Wire Service, 10 Mar 57. Received JCS 101244Z Mar 57.

11 Mar (u) Egypt accused the UNEF of exceeding its authority in the Gaza Strip by firing over the heads of a mob and announced that Egyptian officials would resume control of the Strip immediately. Egypt said the UNEF must confine itself to patrolling the border between the Gaza Strip and Israel.

NYT, 12 Mar 57, 1:8; 11 Mar 57, 1:8. Received JCS 121330Z and 111330Z Mar 57. AP Wire Service, 11 Mar 57. Received JCS 111725Z Mar 57.

11 Mar A French Foreign Office spokesman gave the US Embassy in Paris his government's response to a query from the US Government concerning reports of French guarantees to Israel. France had agreed, he said, that unless the UN took over the administration of the Gaza Strip, Israel had the right to protect its security, as stated by the Israeli Foreign Minister in her speech before the UN General Assembly (see item of 1 Mar); France had given Israel no other guarantees, oral or written.

(S) Msg, Pairs (Yost) to SecState, 4643, 11 Mar 57. Received State 111634Z Mar 57. Received JCS 121609Z Mar 57.

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11 Mar (U) The US, Britain, and France, in separate notes making similar points, replied to the Soviet note of 11 February that they join the USSR in a declaration of basic principles governing their relations with countries of the Middle East (see item for 11 Feb). Affirming its adherence to the other principles of the UN Charter as well as to those singled out by the Soviet note, the US declined "to be party to an attempt by the great powers, as suggested by the U.S.S.R., to arrogate to themselves decisions on matters of vital importance to the nations of the Middle East"; the Middle Eastern states were "fully capable" of making for themselves decisions affecting their collective security. The Soviet proposal, "clearly based on a false premise," stemmed "presumably" from a "distorted interpretation of the nature and purpose of United States policies." While consistently recognizing the need of Middle Eastern countries for armed forces to assure their internal security and capability for legitimate self-defense, the US had also consistently sought to avoid an arms race between the Arab states and Israel; the US regretted that the USSR had not followed such a policy. US economic aid to the Middle East was furnished only to countries requesting it and was designed to help such countries maintain their independence. In the light of Soviet propaganda attacks on US policies, there was "cause for considerable doubt" regarding the sincerity of the proposal. The US would continue to work toward peace and greater stability in the Middle East through the UN and in cooperation with the states of the area. The US hoped that the USSR would make its own contribution to peace in that area--and elsewhere as well--by bringing its conduct into conformity with the principles it was proposing.

NYT, 12 Mar 57, 4:3-5. Received JCS 121330Z Mar 57.
AP Wire Service reports received JCS beginning 111733Z Mar 57. A summary of the US note, contained in State Department Circular 746, dtd 8 Mar 57, was received in JCS 091619Z Mar 57.

11 Mar (U) The Director General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry charged that Egypt was conducting a "campaign of terror" in the Gaza Strip to discredit the UNEF and restore Egyptian rule.

NYT, 12 Mar 57, 1:7. Received JCS 121330Z Mar 57.

11 Mar (U) A spokesman for the Iraq Petroleum Company announced that oil had started flowing again through the Company's repaired pipeline across Syria to the Mediterranean port of Baniyas. (The oil reached Baniyas on 12 March, it was later announced, flowing at 40 per cent of the average rate maintained before the line was sabotaged.)

AP Wire Service, 11 and 12 Mar 57. Received JCS 111515Z and 121659Z Mar 57.

12 Mar (U) Secretary General Hammarskjold and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees issued an urgent world-wide appeal for more aid to Hungarian refugees. Of the 192,200 Hungarians who had fled Soviet oppression of their homeland since last October, the appeal said, 68,000 or about 36 per cent, were still in Austria and Yugoslavia.

AP Wire Service, 12 Mar 57. Received JCS 121934Z Mar 57.

12 Mar Ambassador James P. Richards left Washington for Beirut, the first capital on his itinerary, to carry out his special mission. Subsequently, the SecState listed four tasks with which the Richards Mission was charged, as follows: 1) to explain to governments of the Middle Eastern area the spirit and purpose of the Eisenhower Doctrine; 2) to ascertain whether countries of the area wished to participate in the program authorized under the Doctrine; 3) to agree to assist, in appropriate cases, in strengthening the economies and military defense capabilities of countries of the area; 4) to report its findings to the President. The SecState said it was "much more important" for the Mission to ensure cooperation of the countries visited in working toward common objectives with the US than to obtain formal agreements.

AP Wire Service, 12 Mar 57. Received JCS 121448Z Mar 57. (S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Paris (for Perkins), TOPOL 1755, 25 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received JCS 261211Z Mar 57.

12 Mar The State Department notified various diplomatic posts in Europe and the area of the Middle East that Ambassador Richards was authorized, at his discretion, to inform the Baghdad Pact governments, on a confidential basis, of US readiness to join the Baghdad Pact Military Committee if invited to do so by the Pact Ministerial Council.

(S) Msg, State Dept Cir, 753, 12 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received JCS 132004Z Mar 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

13 Mar The Egyptian Suez Canal Authority announced that, effective immediately, vessels of 500 tons or less would be allowed to transit the Canal.

(S) Msg, Port Said (Dickson) to SecState, 127, 13 Mar 57, DA IN 3231 (14 Mar 57). Received State 131648Z Mar 57. Received JCS 141657Z Mar 57.


13 Mar (U) Premier Ben Gurion declared that Israel reserved the right to take action without prior notice if Egypt returned to the Gaza Strip.

NYT, 14 Mar 57, 1:6. Received JCS 141330Z Mar 57.

13 Mar (U) By an exchange of notes in Amman, Britain and Jordan ended their treaty of alliance on the following terms: 1) All British forces in Jordan were to be withdrawn within six months. 2) All British land and improvements, together with specified quantities of ammunition and other stores, were to be handed over to Jordan. 3) Jordan was to pay Britain £4,250,000 (\$11,900,000), in installments over a period of six years.

NYT, 14 Mar 57, 7:1. Received JCS 141330Z Mar 57. AP Wire Service, 13 Mar 57. Received JCS 132330Z Mar 57.

13 Mar



(S) Msg, CIA to JCS, 7

Received JCS 151443Z Mar 57.

13 Mar

The Political Director of the Syrian Foreign Ministry delivered a note (dated 12 March) to the US Embassy in Damascus saying that the Syrian Government "welcomes visit of Ambassador Richards to Syria and his calling on officials." The US Ambassador in Damascus, in reporting the foregoing, recommended a deliberate delay in replying because 1) the Syrian note failed to express any desire on the part of the Government to discuss the Eisenhower Doctrine, 2) the Syrian Prime Minister had made various public statements unfavorable to the Doctrine, and 3) the Syrian press and radio comments were bitterly hostile.

(S) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 2075, 13 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received State 141400Z Mar 57. Received JCS 141800Z Mar 57.

13 Mar

Hammarskjold informed Ambassador Lodge of the latest developments in the Gaza situation. UN Under Secretary Bunche, who had begun talks with Egyptian officials on 12 March, had just reported from Cairo that the Egyptians planned to send an administrative governor and five civilian administrative officials into Gaza on 14 March. Hammarskjold thought this much participation by Egypt in the administration of Gaza would be consistent with the position the UN had taken.

The next day Ambassador Lodge reported that the Egyptian position was as follows: 1) eventual full political and administrative control of the Gaza Strip by Egypt; 2) no Egyptian military personnel to be in the Gaza Strip; 3) the UNEF to be "astride" the armistice line. Nasser felt that the UNEF should properly have its headquarters in El Auja, and he still favored a five-mile buffer zone on each side of the armistice line.

(S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 625, 13 Mar 57. Received State 131413Z Mar 57. Received JCS 141814Z Mar 57. SEEN by Adm Radford. (S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 635, 14 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received State 142356Z Mar 57. Received JCS 151641Z Mar 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

13 Mar

Hammarskjold queried the French and British delegations, in writing, about their governments' intentions of supporting Israel in its "assumptions and expectations" in regard to the Gaza Strip. Ambassador Lodge recommended that the Acting Secretary of State inform the Israelis, French, and "possibly" the British, that they must under no circumstances take the law into their own hands in the Gaza situation because they could rely on the US to intervene as promptly and vigorously against Egyptian "infractions" as it had against the Israeli and Anglo-French invasion of Egypt.

(S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 626, 13 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received State 140221Z Mar 57. Received JCS 141814Z Mar 57.

13 Mar The French Defense Minister told the US Embassy in Paris that Britain and France were preparing to provide air cover for Israel in the event Israel decided to counter Egyptian moves in the Gaza Strip by reoccupying the Strip. Subsequently the British characterized the Minister's statement as "absolute nonsense," and the US Embassy in Paris reported that the French Foreign Office was about to "virtually disavow" the Minister's remarks.
 (TS) Msg, Paris (Yost) to SecState, 4706, 13 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received State 131949Z Mar 57. Received JCS approximately 141821Z Mar 57. (TS) Msg, London (Whitney) to SecState, 4857, 14 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received State 141224Z Mar 57. Received JCS 141816Z Mar 57. SEEN by Adm Radford. (TS) Msg, Paris (Yost) to SecState, 4763, 15 Mar 57. Received State 152033Z Mar 57; correction issued 160930Z Mar 57. Both received JCS 161853Z Mar 57.

14 Mar The US Ambassador in Baghdad was instructed to inform Prime Minister Nuri and General Rafiq, Chief of Staff of the RIAF, that while the US continued to have an interest in an effective air defense for Iraq, it doubted that defense against any current threat could be effectively strengthened by introducing US equipment into Iraq's Air Force through the military aid program. Eventual discussions concerning sale of US aircraft to Iraq were not ruled out.
 (TS) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Baghdad, 1553, 14 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received JCS 151208Z Mar 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

14 Mar (U) Egyptian Major General Mohammed Abdel Latif and five aides arrived in Gaza City to resume Egyptian administration in the Gaza Strip.
 AP Wire Service, 14 Mar 57. Received JCS beginning 142148Z Mar 57.

14 Mar Acting under instructions of 13 March, the US Ambassador in Cairo conveyed to Nasser President Eisenhower's concern, and a State Department warning, regarding the grave consequences that might result from Nasser's sending Egyptians into the Gaza Strip, even though Nasser had already taken the action that the Ambassador's instructions were designed to prevent. Nasser said he believed that his actions had been within his rights and justified by the circumstances, and the President could be assured that he had no aggressive intentions. Nasser promised to follow a cautious line.
 (TS) Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Cairo, 3030, 13 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received JCS: No Time. (TS) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 2899, 15 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received State 150502Z Mar 57. Received JCS 152037Z Mar 57. Both SEEN by Adm Radford.

15 Mar Acting under State Department instructions, Ambassador Lodge informed Hammarskjold of the positions that the US was prepared to support in Hammarskjold's approaching Cairo talks. They were as follows: (1) The four-power proposals of 19 February should not be considered subject to compromise negotiations and Nasser should be pressed for a reply. (2) Any Egyptian attempt to collect and unilaterally dispose of 100 per cent of Canal tolls

would be a violation of the UN Security Council's six principles. (3) The UNEF should remain in the area of Sharm el Sheikh and Gaza "until its task is completed." Only the UN could terminate the UNEF's mission. (4) No Egyptian force should return to the Sharm el Sheikh area until it was clear that no belligerent rights would be exercised there. (5) No Egyptian military or paramilitary forces should return to the Gaza Strip, and the UNEF should remain there until a settlement was reached regarding the Strip or until some final general agreement was reached between Egypt and Israel. (6) The role of the Egyptian administrators in the Gaza Strip should be "only symbolic," with administrative responsibility for the Strip remaining in UN agencies until the Gaza question was settled. Also, he assumed, said Ambassador Lodge, that if Nasser reached an agreement with Hammarskjold satisfactory to the US, the US would be willing to discuss the "regularizing" of its economic relations with Egypt.

Msg, Actg SecState (Herter) to USUN New York, 708, 15 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received JCS 161856Z Mar 57. SEEN by Adm Radford. (C) Msg, Actg SecState (Herter) to USUN New York, 709, 15 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received JCS 170056Z Mar 57. SEEN by Adm Radford. (C) Msg, USUN New York (Earco) to SecState, 644, 15 Mar 57. Received State 160259Z Mar 57. Received JCS 170054Z Mar 57.

15 Mar (U) Six hundred to 700 Egyptian soldiers moved into El Arish, close to the Gaza Strip, and assumed control of the surrounding area from the UNEF.

AP Wire Service, 16 Mar 57. Received JCS beginning 161457Z Mar 57.

16 Mar Ambassador Richards reported he had informed the Lebanese Government that the US was prepared in principle to take steps to grant up to \$10 million in economic aid and "something over \$2 million" in military aid to Lebanon. The Ambassador further stated that political considerations, such as the need for the Chamoun Government to demonstrate tangible results from a policy of cooperation with the West, were "overriding."

Msg, Beirut (Heath) to SecState, 2223, 16 Mar 57 (section 1 of 2), CJCS files. Received State 171411Z Mar 57. Received JCS 181210Z Mar 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

17 Mar (U) The Iraqi government signed an agreement under which it borrowed from the IPC some \$14 million, interest free. The money was to be used to relieve budgetary difficulties resulting from the loss of revenue through the sabotage of the IPC pipelines in Syria.

AP Wire Service, 17 Mar 57. Received JCS 180316Z Mar 57.

17 Mar Egyptian Foreign Minister Fawzi handed the US Ambassador the draft of a communique, regarding the Suez Canal, that Egypt proposed to issue within 48 hours. The points of the communique were: (1) Egypt reaffirmed its determination to respect "in letter and in spirit" the

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Constantinople Convention of 1888. (2) The system of levying Canal dues (i.e. tolls) would remain as it was under the last (1936) agreement concluded between the Egyptian Government and the Suez Canal Company. (3) The question of compensation and claims resulting from the Canal's nationalization would be settled by either direct agreement or arbitration. (4) Canal dues were to be paid in advance to the Suez Canal Authority "either in Egypt or elsewhere as determined by the Authority." (5) The Canal Authority would create a special fund for improvement of the Canal or for any other measures designed to "meet the increase in traffic in the Canal." (6) The Government of Egypt would soon make another, detailed statement concerning the Canal.

(C) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 2926, 17 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received State 171920Z Mar 57. Received JCS 181210Z Mar 57. SEEN by Adm Radford. (C) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 2929, 17 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received State 180128Z Mar 57. Received JCS 181210Z Mar 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

17 Mar (v) The Syrian Government announced the signing of a contract with a Czechoslovakian firm to build an oil refinery in Syria. (See item of 8 October 56.)

AP Wire Service, 17 Mar 57. Received JCS 172337Z Mar 57.

17 Mar In an interview between the US Ambassador in Amman and King Hussein, the King expressed the hope that the Richards Mission would not arrive in Jordan for some time so that he might work on improving the climate for its reception. In reply the Ambassador pointed out that it was doubtful that the Richards Mission could hold any useful conversations with Jordanian officials while the Prime Minister persisted in his publicly proclaimed opposition to the Eisenhower Doctrine. The King remarked that some changes in the Government were to be expected in the next few days. He said, however, that he had no special reason to think Nabulsi would resign and that he was not prepared to demand Nabulsi's resignation.

(C) Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 1100, 18 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received State 181638Z Mar 57. Received JCS 191214Z Mar 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

18 Mar (v) Preliminary talks began in both Washington and Tel Aviv, looking toward the resumption of the program of US economic aid to Israel. This program had been suspended at the time of Israel's attack on Egypt.

AP Wire Service, 22 Mar 57. Received JCS 221842Z Mar 57.

18 Mar The SecState discussed with Israeli Foreign Minister Meir the developments that had followed Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Sharm el Sheikh. He urged that Israel be patient, for the US was intensively studying how to apply, in coordination with the UN, more pressure on Nasser. Raising the question of Israel's refusal to allow UNEF troops on the Israeli side of the line of demarcation at the Gaza Strip,

Mr. Dulles said it was hard to reconcile this attitude with Israel's bitter complaints against Egypt. Mrs. Meir explained that if UNEF troops were to be stationed along Israel's side of the Egyptian border under the Armistice Agreement with Egypt, then there would be pressure to station them also along Israel's borders with Syria and Jordan under the Armistice Agreements with those countries. So many soldiers on the soil of so small a nation would make Israel an occupied country and no longer independent. The SecState said he hoped that, in any case, Israel would not act abruptly without notice to the US.

(C) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Tel Aviv, 891, 19 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received JCS 201646Z Mar 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

18 Mar (U) The Israeli-chartered freighter Queen of Sheba sailed down the Gulf of Aqaba and through the Strait of Tiran into the Red Sea in what was interpreted as an Israeli attempt to force the issue of freedom of navigation in those waters.
NYT, 19 Mar 57, 1:6. Received JCS 191330Z Mar 57.

18 Mar The Egyptian Government issued a "memorandum" in place of the previously proposed communique stating its position on operation of the Suez Canal. Except for several minor changes, the text of the memorandum was the same as that of the superseded draft communique. (See item for 17 March.)

(C) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 2944, 18 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received State 182035Z Mar 57. Received JCS 191619Z Mar 57. SEEN by Adm Radford. (C) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 2946, 19 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received State 191255Z Mar 57. Received JCS 192004Z Mar 57.

19 Mar (U) Egyptian authorities announced that, effective immediately, vessels up to 1,000 tons would be permitted to transit the Canal. They also granted General Wheeler permission to begin lifting, on 22 March, the sunken Egyptian frigate Abukir, the last major obstacle in the Canal.
AP Wire Service, 19 Mar 57. Received JCS 191530Z and 191838Z Mar 57.

19 Mar In a letter to Hammarskjold the Israeli Foreign Minister formally requested that he put the following question to the Government of Egypt during his forthcoming visit in Cairo: Was Egypt prepared to declare that it renounced all claim to the existence of a state of war between Egypt and Israel and that it would refrain scrupulously from any acts of belligerency against Israel by land, sea, or air, including restrictions against Israel-bound shipping in the Suez Canal and in the Gulf of Aqaba and the organization of raids into Israel from Egypt and other neighboring territories? The letter authorized Hammarskjold to inform Egypt that Israel had already expressed its willingness to make a pledge of nonbelligerency with Egypt.

(C) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 661, 20 Mar 57. Received State 210058Z Mar 57. Received JCS 211659Z Mar 57.

- 19 Mar Acting under instructions, Ambassador Lodge informed Hammarskjold of serious US concern that the Egyptian return to the Gaza Strip was assuming the character of a complete (rather than token) administrative takeover. If press reports of Egyptian activities in the Strip were correct, the US believed that Hammarskjold should instruct the local UN authorities to take all feasible measures to halt this trend of affairs.
~~(S)~~ Msg, SecState to USUN New York, 723, 19 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received JCS 201646Z Mar 57. SEEN by Adm Radford. (C) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 656, 19 Mar 57. Received State 200111Z Mar 57. Received JCS 201644Z Mar 57.
- 19 Mar UN officials clarified the existing status of the UNEF in the Gaza Strip. Hammarskjold had disapproved a request by General Burns to reverse the ratio under which two-thirds of the UN troops were at interior stations in the Strip and one-third on the line of demarcation. Nevertheless, he had authorized Burns to begin moving some additional troops to the demarcation line. According to the UN officials General Burns had emphatic instructions from Hammarskjold to resist Egyptian pressures for more than a symbolic takeover in the Gaza Strip pending Hammarskjold's talks with Nasser.
~~(S)~~ Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 655, 19 Mar 57. Received State 191928Z Mar 57. Received JCS 201644Z Mar 57. (C) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 656, 19 Mar 57. Received State 200111Z Mar 57. Received JCS 201644Z Mar 57.
- 20 Mar The US Ambassador in Cairo conveyed to Egyptian Foreign Minister Fawzi the US reaction to Egypt's "memorandum" on the operation of the Suez Canal--the designation under which Egypt had published its proposed "communique" on the same subject (see item of 17 March) before the US reaction to the proposed communique could be delivered. The US 1) greatly deplored the release of the memorandum in advance of the imminent meeting between Hammarskjold and Nasser, 2) could not view the memorandum as a response to the four-power proposal of 19 February, and 3) believed that there should be an early meeting between the Secretary General and the Government of Egypt for the purpose of discussing interim Canal arrangements pending a final settlement.
~~(S)~~ Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Cairo, 3094, 18 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received JCS 191620Z Mar 57. (C) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Cairo, 3106, 19 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received JCS 202000Z Mar 57. SEEN by Adm Radford. (C) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 2971, 20 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received State 210118Z Mar 57. Received JCS 211701Z Mar 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.
- 21 Mar Ambassador Richards reported that he had proposed to Libya economic assistance totaling \$4.5 million. Though this was somewhat more than the proposal worked out in Washington, it had caused deep disappointment, for the Libyans had apparently expected much more. Prime Minister Ben Halim had urgently requested Ambassador Richards to give further consideration to

Libyan needs after completing his itinerary in the Middle East, and the Ambassador had agreed to do so.

(S) Msg, Ankara (from Richards, signed Warren) to SecState, 2160, 21 Mar 57 (3 secs), CJCS files. Received State: sec 1, 211308Z Mar 57; sec 2, 211412Z Mar 57; sec 3, 211352Z Mar 57. Received JCS: all secs, 221248Z Mar 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

22 Mar

The US Counselor of Embassy in Jidda told the acting head of the Saudi Arabian Foreign Office that the US was willing to join the Baghdad Pact Military Committee if invited to do so. At the same time the Saudi official was assured that this willingness did not foreshadow any change in the attitude of the US toward the Pact. The US was still solely concerned with strengthening the ability of the area to resist Communism.

(S) Msg, Jidda (Jenkins) to SecState, 560, 22 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received State 230019Z Mar 57. Received JCS 231809Z Mar 57. (S) Msg, Actg SecState (Herter) to AmEmbassy Jidda, 717, 14 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received JCS 151208Z Mar 57.

22 Mar

A joint communique issued at the conclusion of the Richards Mission's visit to Turkey announced that agreement had been reached on ways in which US economic and military aid to Turkey could advance the two countries' cooperative aims.

On the same day Ambassador Richards gave the Turks an aide-memoire that reviewed past US defense support for Turkey and called attention to the US Government's recent decision to expedite the equipping of some units of the Turkish Air Force with the most modern types of supersonic aircraft.

(S) Msg, Ankara (Warren) to SecState, 2197, 23 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received State 231213Z Mar 57. Received JCS 241414Z Mar 57. (U) Msg, Ankara (Warren) to SecState, 2198, 23 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received State 231624Z Mar 57. Received JCS 241414Z Mar 57.

24 Mar (U)

President Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Macmillan issued a formal communique concerning the talks they had just concluded at Bermuda. Among the subjects they had agreed on were 1) the "willingness" of the US to join the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact, 2) the condemnation of repressive Soviet policies in Eastern Europe, particularly in Hungary, and of Soviet defiance of relevant UN resolutions, 3) the need for the speedy implementation of recent UN resolutions dealing with the Gaza Strip and the Gulf of Aqaba, and 4) the importance of Egyptian compliance with the Security Council resolution of 13 October 1956 concerning the Suez Canal, and of support for the efforts of the UN Secretary General to achieve a settlement of the question.

NYT, 25 Mar 57, 5:1-6. Received JCS 251330Z Mar 57. Incomplete AP Wire Service reports were received beginning at 241302Z Mar 57.

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25 Mar

King Saud, in an audience at Riyadh, told the US Consul General, stationed at Dhahran, that he had recently agreed with the Shah of Iran that Iran would evacuate the disputed Arabi Island and permit Saudi Arabia to occupy it. This agreement had put Saudi-Iranian relations on an excellent basis. He said that he had also tried, unsuccessfully, to block Syria's signing of the refinery contract with Czechoslovakia. He suggested that Aramco or Tapline might construct a refinery in Jordan as a "counteraction" to the Syrian move, and asked for US views on this suggestion.

(S) Msg, Dhahran (Carrigan) to SecState, 449, 25 Mar 57, and correction, CJCS files. Received State 250930Z Mar 57; correction issued, 261200Z Mar 57. Received JCS 251800Z Mar 57; correction received 261759Z Mar 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

26 Mar

Foreign Minister Fawzi of Egypt handed the US Ambassador in Cairo, on a "personal and confidential" basis, the draft of a memorandum elaborating on the principles set forth in Egypt's memorandum of 18 March concerning the operation of the Suez Canal. Fawzi said that texts were also being given India, the USSR, Yugoslavia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.

In the detailed memorandum the Government of Egypt undertook to maintain the Suez Canal and to make improvements as necessary. The management of the Canal would be under the "autonomous" Egyptian Suez Canal Authority. Tolls were to continue to be levied in accordance with the last agreement between the Government of Egypt and the Suez Canal Company, and there was to be no increase in tolls above 1 per cent in any 12 months' period except as the result of "negotiations." The tolls were to be paid at the National Bank of Egypt or the Bank of International Settlement, to the account of the Suez Canal Authority, which would pay the Government of Egypt a royalty of 5 per cent of the gross receipts. To assure resources for improvement of the Canal the Egyptian Government was establishing the Suez Canal Capital and Development Fund, into which 25 per cent of the Canal's gross receipts were to be paid.

The Egyptian Government also undertook to make the "free and uninterrupted" transit of the Canal available to "all nations in accordance with the Constantinople Convention of 1888." Disputes between parties to the Convention or "in respect of it" should be settled "in accordance with the Charter of the UN"; they should be referred, if not otherwise settled, to the International Court of Justice or, by agreement, to an appropriate organ of the UN. Detailed regulations governing operation of the Canal were embodied in the Canal Code. In administering the Code the Canal Authority had no power to discriminate against or favor any "vessel, company or other party." Complaints could be referred by the Canal Authority to an arbitration tribunal. Claims growing out of the nationalization of the Suez Canal Maritime Company would be referable to arbitration according to established international practice.

(A text of Egypt's detailed memorandum was published in the New York Times on 29 March.)

(S) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 3032, 26 Mar 57 (2 secs and corrections), CJCS files. Received State: sec 1, 270134Z Mar 57; sec 2, 270218Z Mar 57; corrected p. 2 of sec 1 issued 28 Mar 57; corrected p. 1 of sec 2 issued 010300Z Apr 57. Received JCS: secs 1 and 2, 271631Z Mar 57; corrected p. 2 of sec 1, 291637Z Mar 57; corrected p. 1 of sec 2, 012030Z Apr 57. SEEN by Adm Radford: secs 1 and 2 but not the corrections.

27 Mar

considered the question of Israel's right to transit the Suez Canal a practical rather than a legal problem. Nasser felt that to permit the actual transit of the Canal by an Israeli vessel would be tantamount to political suicide on the part of his Government. Therefore, Egypt would reject any decision of the International Court of Justice upholding Israeli transit rights in the Canal. Concerning the Strait of Tiran, the absence of population in the area reduced the likelihood of anti-regime repercussions if Israeli transit took place, but the Government of Egypt had not yet reached a decision on the question.

(S) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 3065, 29 Mar 57. Received State 300155Z Mar 57. Received JCS 011608Z Mar 57. Later copy was SEEN by Adm Radford.

27 Mar

Following a conference in Saudi Arabia, President Chamoun of Lebanon and King Saud released a joint communique stating that they had agreed on the following: 1) the necessity of helping Arabs attain their full rights in Palestine; 2) support of the Algerians and the Arabs of the South Arabian Peninsula in their struggles for independence; 3) the position that the waters of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran were Arab territorial waters; 4) the need to stand by Egypt on the Suez Canal question; 5) cooperation aimed at restoring Saudi Arabian rights in the Buraimi Oasis and other disputed areas; 6) cooperation in combating Communism, Zionism, and colonialism; 7) the desirability of strengthening economic, commercial, and educational ties between Lebanon and Saudi Arabia.

(S) Msg, Jidda (Jenkins) to SecState, 575, 27 Mar 57, DA IN 7102 (28 Mar 57) and 7102C (29 Mar 57). Received State: DA IN 7102, 271932Z Mar 57; DA IN 7102C (issued), 281715Z Mar 57. Received JCS: DA IN 7102, approx. 280711Z Mar 57; DA IN 7102C, approx. 292015Z Mar 57.

28 Mar

Ambassador Richards reported the result of his visit to Iran. Military talks had been held principally with the Shah, who appeared "obsessed" with military matters. The Shah had outlined an ambitious military program for Iran, and had pressed the Richards Mission to provide funds for the construction of an airfield for fighter aircraft. When Ambassador Richards had pointed out that the US must be careful about direct support to bases on the Soviet periphery, the Shah had reacted by saying that Iran was a sovereign country and would soon have sufficient funds to construct as

many airfields as it wished. The Ambassador had offered Iran additional military and economic aid, including 1) an increase of \$11 million in the military construction fund previously allotted, 2) a specified quantity of small arms and 100 trucks for the Iranian Army, and 3) funds for regional communications projects under the auspices of the Baghdad Pact. Finally, the Ambassador had informed the Iranians that the US was willing to join the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact, if invited to do so. In his cable to the State Department the Ambassador stated his belief that the US should not "delay unduly" in exercising its influence in the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact with a view to keeping the aspirations of Iran and other nations of the Middle East within bounds. According to the Ambassador, Iran, like other countries visited by the Mission, had evinced little gratitude.

(S) Msg, Karachi (from Richards, signed Hildreth) to SecState, 2612, 28 Mar 57 (2 secs and corrected p. 2 of sec 2), CJCS files. Received State: sec 1, 290904Z Mar 57; sec 2, 282318Z Mar 57; corrected p. 2 of sec 2 (issued), 300630Z Mar 57. Received JCS: secs 1 and 2, 292036Z Mar 57; corrected p. 2 of sec 2, 011219Z Apr 57.

28 Mar

Ambassador Lodge reported the text of General Burns' memorandum, which Egypt had accepted, and which outlined the functions and responsibilities of the UNEF in the Gaza Strip. The memorandum provided that: 1) Egypt would effectively make known to the population of the Gaza Strip that it was Egyptian policy to prevent infiltration across the demarcation line and that the UNEF was cooperating with Egypt in enforcing regulations against such infiltration. 2) A unit of Palestinian police specially organized to prevent infiltration would cooperate closely with the UNEF, and the feasibility of joint UNEF-Palestinian police night patrols would be explored. 3) The UNEF would have authority to arrest infiltrators within a specified zone near the demarcation line, and Egypt would "eventually" authorize UNEF troops to fire on infiltrators who refused to halt in this zone during curfew hours, if Israel would agree to like arrangements on the Israeli side of the line. 4) The UNEF headquarters base would be moved from Abu Suweir (near the Suez Canal) to Rafah (in the southern part of the Gaza Strip). 5) Personnel and vehicles of UNEF would have full freedom of movement in performance of their duties in the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula. 6) UNEF aircraft would continue to have the "right" to fly freely over the Sinai and the Gaza Strip; the air facilities at Abu Suweir would be moved to El Arish as soon as practicable; the Gaza (city) airstrip would be manned by the UNEF, with a representative of the Egyptian-UNEF liaison office present; and the UNEF would have the right to use Gaza as a "port" for the landing of stores and equipment. (By 30 March the UN Advisory Committee had approved the understanding between the UNEF and Egypt.)

(S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 692, 28 Mar 57. Received State 290040Z Mar 57. Received JCS 291637Z Mar 57. (S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 708, 30 Mar 57. Received State 302353Z Mar 57. Received JCS 011508Z Mar 57.

28 Mar The SecState cabled the US Ambassador in Baghdad his response to a suggestion by Prime Minister Nuri of Iraq of a quasi-formal organization of nations favoring the Eisenhower Doctrine. The SecState said that efforts in that direction would harm the purposes of the Doctrine by providing a basis for charges that the US was attaching strings to its assistance and thus attempting to commit and dominate various Middle Eastern states.
(S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Baghdad, 1681, 28 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received JCS 291211Z Mar 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

28 Mar Hammarskjold informed Ambassador Lodge of the results of his talks with Egyptian leaders in Cairo. He said he had made no firm commitments; all understandings reached were subject to approval by the UN.

As to the Gaza Strip, the results were: 1) The Egyptians had definitely agreed not to move in troops. 2) They had not pressed for stationing of the UNEF on the Israeli side of the demarcation line. 3) They had satisfied General Burns with concrete arrangements regarding the functions of the UNEF. Hammarskjold thought the main political fact concerning Gaza was that "the Egyptians are working with us to prevent raids."

Regarding Sharm el Sheikh, the Egyptians had made clear that they had no intention of moving in, or of asking the UNEF to leave.

On the Suez Canal problem, Hammarskjold said he had told Nasser that the principal defect of the Egyptian memorandum was that other nations did not trust Egypt. He had prevailed upon Egypt, in drafting the detailed memorandum on the operation of the Canal (see item for 26 March) to leave the door open to arrangements for cooperation with the users of the Canal, but Egypt had remained adamant against Israel's right of transit.

(S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 691, 28 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received State 290008Z Mar 57. Received JCS 291637Z Mar 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

29 Mar The US Ambassador in Amman reported that the political situation in Jordan was "still fluid and now uneasy." He said there was no doubt that Prime Minister Nabulsi was "intent on destroying Jordan as presently constituted and throwing out King in favor of still undefined federation with Syria and Egypt." The King, on the other hand, continued to show sincere concern that Ambassador Richards should be well received, and there were increasing indications that he might soon change the government, probably by a "sort of 'coup de palais.'" (S) Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 1147, 29 Mar 57, DA IN 7873 (30 Mar 57). Received State 291648Z Mar 57. Received JCS 301207Z Mar 57. A copy received later was SEEN by Adm Radford.

29 Mar A State Department officer gave Israeli Minister Shiloah a summary of the results of Hammarskjold's mission to Cairo (see item for 28 March), with US comments. Shiloah was informed that the US considered the results in Gaza

constructive; that, respecting the Gulf of Aqaba, the US and Britain had agreed at Bermuda on broadly identical legal positions and would consult further on establishing a permanent legal position; that Egypt's position regarding the Suez Canal was unsatisfactory to the US and the forthcoming US reply to Egypt's memorandum would emphasize the need for implementation of the Security Council's six principles. The State Department officer reminded Shiloah of Israel's agreement not to try to send a ship through the Suez Canal without first consulting the US and urged that for the present no such attempt be made. To this Shiloah made a "preliminary" reply: Israel would not do anything precipitate regarding transit of the Canal so long as the US was seeking suitable operating conditions. However, if the US accepted Nasser's dictate, Israel would not feel bound any longer to refrain from trying to find ways of exercising its rights. He was not, however, saying that, even then, Israel would not consult the US for support.

(S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Tel Aviv, 924, 29 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received JCS 201700Z Mar 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

29 Mar (U) The first convoy since November 1956 entered the Suez Canal, "strictly on Egyptian terms." Italian, Soviet, Greek, West German, and Rumanian ships were included among the nine in the convoy. The event marked a big step toward resumption, possibly by mid-April, of normal operation of the Canal. The largest vessel in the convoy was one of 7,064 tons.

AP Wire Service, 29 Mar 57. Received JCS 300030Z Mar 57.

30 Mar In accordance with the State Department's instructions the US Consul General in Dhahran conveyed to King Saud the US Government's preliminary reaction to the suggestion that a Western firm build an oil refinery in Jordan. Saud was informed that the project involved many difficulties that might render it infeasible but the US would give the suggestion careful study.

(S) Msg, Dhahran (Carrigan) to SecState, 3 Apr 57, CJCS files. Received State (corrected page two) 060505Z Apr 57. Received JCS 061227Z Apr 57. SEEN by Adm Radford. (S) Msg, SecState to AmConsul Dhahran, 382, 25 Mar 57. Received JCS 261603Z Mar 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

30 Mar The US Ambassador in Amman reported that official and public reaction in Jordan was unanimously unfavorable to the announcement that the US would join the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact.

(Offl Use Only) Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 1156, 30 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received State 301918Z Mar 57. Received JCS 011222Z Apr 57.

30 Mar In an audience at Riyadh King Saud told the US Consul General stationed at Dhahran that the Gulf of Aqaba question was a matter of "life and death" to Saudi Arabia and that his country would defend its territorial waters at all costs. The king asserted that these waters had never been international in the past and that to make

them so now would benefit only Israel, and place the Arab States at a great disadvantage. The King also expressed his belief that the US decision to join the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact would undoubtedly destroy some of the goodwill the US had built up in the area. In his opinion the Pact would not last long, because all Arabs, including the Iraqi people, opposed it, and recent events had increased this opposition.

(S) Msg, Dhahran (Carrigan) to SecState 478, 2 Apr 57 (sec 1 of 2), CJCS files. Received State 030013Z Apr 57. Received JCS 031208Z Apr 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

30 Mar

Received JCS 311640Z Mar 57.

30 Mar (U) According to the New York Times, Nasser, in a statement to a group of touring US newspaper and radio men in Cairo, charged that the US had tried to pressure Egypt by refusing to sell it surplus wheat. Contrasting this US attitude with that of the Soviet Union--which, he alleged, had sent Egypt 600,000 tons of wheat during the last year--Nasser asserted that Egypt would never surrender to pressure. Egypt would continue to bar Israeli shipping from the Suez Canal until the problem of the Palestinian Arab refugees was settled. Less emphatically, Nasser referred to the Gulf of Aqaba as being, along with the Suez Canal, Egyptian territorial waters.
NYT, 31 Mar 57, 1:2, 3:5 (early edition, Sunday).
Incomplete AP reports were received in JCS beginning at 301650Z Mar 57.

31 Mar (U) Iraq officially ended its policy, pursued in concert with the other three Moslem members of the Baghdad Pact since the Anglo-French attack on Egypt, of refusing to conduct Pact business with Britain. The occasion was King Feisal's inauguration of the Baghdad Pact nuclear center at Shalichiyah, near Baghdad. Britain had provided most of the necessary technical equipment, and Iraq had furnished the buildings.

AP Wire Service, 31 Mar 57. Received JCS 312208Z Mar 57.

31 Mar (U) An official of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, in response to Nasser's public statement of 30 March concerning the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba, said that interference with Israeli shipping on either waterway "would be an act of war."

AP Wire Service, 31 Mar 57. Received JCS 010021Z Mar 57.

31 Mar (U) Returning from a visit to Moscow, Hungarian Premier Kadar stated that Soviet troops in Hungary defended the nation's independence and security, and that they would remain "as long as necessary." Also, he outlined four

principal tasks of his regime: 1) to strengthen the Hungarian Communist party, 2) to crush the remnants of counter-revolutionary forces, 3) to raise the standard of living, and 4) to strengthen relations with other Communist countries.

AP Wire Service, 31 Mar 57. Received JCS 312015Z Mar 57.

31 Mar

The US Ambassador in Cairo presented a written US reply to the Government of Egypt's invitation for comments on Egypt's draft memorandum concerning the future status of the Suez Canal (see item for 26 Mar). Egypt was informed that the US considered the basic problem to be the re-establishment of international confidence that the Suez Canal could be permanently depended upon as a secure and economical way of transport. Further, Egypt's proposals in the draft memorandum were insufficient to re-establish such confidence because 1) they represented a unilateral arrangement subject to unilateral change at any time, 2) they failed to implement the six points approved by the Security Council on 13 October 1956, and 3) they made no provision for organized cooperation between Egypt and the Canal users. The US suggested specific changes designed to correct these faults and was ready to discuss these changes immediately. Exercising discretionary authority, the Ambassador then pointed out orally that alternatives to use of the Canal would be sought and developed, and Egypt and its oil-producing neighbors could not prosper in the long run without the cooperation of the non-Arab nations. Therefore, the best interests of the Middle East lay in an international arrangement that would restore confidence in the operation of the Suez Canal.

~~(S)~~ Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Cairo, 3253, 30 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received JCS 011609Z Mar 57. (C) Msg, Cairo to SecState, 3081, 31 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received State 311346Z Mar 57. Received JCS 012030Z Apr 57. Both SEEN by Adm Radford. (C) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Cairo, 3238, 29 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received JCS 301702Z Mar 57.

31 Mar

Aramco informed the State Department that it had agreed to make available to the Saudi Arabian Government forty-four million dollars in interest-free loans over the next four months. Saudi Arabia had agreed to repay the loans at the rate of five million dollars a month, beginning 15 September.

~~(S)~~ Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy, Jidda, 807, 1 Apr 57. DA IN 8531 (2 Apr 57). Received JCS 020954Z Apr 57.

SUPPLEMENT TO
CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
RELATING TO THE CURRENT WORLD CRISIS
DECISIONS AND ACTIONS TAKEN BY
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
SIXTH INSTALLMENT: 1 through 31 MARCH 1957

HISTORICAL SECTION
 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 1 August 1957

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1 Mar ✓

The JCS sent a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense stating that, from the military point of view, the recommendations contained in the Department of State draft of General Paper No. 11, dated 27 February 1957, subject "Ambassador Richards' Mission to the Middle East," constituted "appropriate guidance" for Ambassador Richards.

According to the State Department draft, the Richards Mission should take the following positions in talks with foreign officials:

1. Only the President had the authority to employ, if requested to do so, the armed forces of the US to assist a nation subjected to overt armed aggression by international Communism.

2. The President was empowered by the Joint Resolution of Congress to act quickly in an emergency.

3. Any country in the general area of the Middle East showing by its acts a determination to maintain its independence against international Communism might safely rely on the US to take, upon request, "appropriate action inside or outside of the United Nations."

4. The Mission should avoid any appearance of soliciting suggestions for combined planning, bases, or other facilities; it should state that any views which area countries wished to advance on these subjects would "be considered carefully by the US except for existing arrangements."

5. The President's proposals supplemented, but did not in any way supplant, the Baghdad Pact. The US statement of 29 November 1956 continued in full force and effect. (This statement, reaffirming US support for the collective efforts of the four Middle Eastern members of the Baghdad Pact to maintain their independence, ended with the words: "A threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of the members would be viewed by the United States with the utmost gravity.")

6. The top leaders of the Baghdad Pact would be told, for their own information only, that the US was prepared, if invited at the next meeting of the Council, to join the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact. King Saud would also be told of the decision, with emphasis laid on its importance in developing the strength of the area against Communism.

~~(S)~~ Dec on JCS 1887/344, "Ambassador Richards' Mission to the Middle East (U)," 1 Mar 57, CCS 381 E.M.M.E.A. (11-19-47) sec 55. Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, same date, and same file. Dept of State Bulletin, "U.S. Support for Baghdad Pact," vol XXXV (10 Dec 56), p. 918.

13 Mar ✓

The JCS agreed to dispatch a cable to the Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands summarizing recent developments in the Middle East. The cable, dispatched the next day as JCS 919364, stated that certain major

developments in the Middle East threatened the "delicate balance" existing in the area.

Briefly, the JCS said that the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Straits of Tiran and the Gaza Strip had been predicated on two "assumptions": 1) that free passage of the Straits of Tiran would be assured and 2) that Egypt "would not return to the Gaza Strip." Israeli leaders had repeatedly threatened to invoke the right of self-defense if either of these assumptions proved wrong. These assumptions, neither of which had been guaranteed by the US or the UN, had aroused violent Arab opposition. The US and other maritime nations had taken the position that, unless the Court of International Justice ruled otherwise, the right of free passage applied to the Straits, and the Gulf of Aqaba constituted international waters. Concerning the Gaza Strip, the JCS stated that the UN Secretary General had indicated Egypt was willing to accept UN administration of the Strip "for a while." Shortly after the entry of UNEF into the Gaza Strip however, riots against UN administration of the area had taken place. Egypt had protested the defensive actions of the UN troops, and immediately appointed an Egyptian Civil Governor. In the Sharm el Sheikh area the UNEF occupation had been effected without incident. But Jordanian and Saudi Arabian leaders had "outdone Nasser in their opposition to the use of the Gulf of Aqaba without Arab consent." Despite the seriousness of the situation, however, Israel had not as yet mobilized.

The Suez Canal, stated the JCS, was expected to be open for heavy-draft vessels by 10 April, but interim international arrangements covering canal operations had not as yet been concluded. Israel was contemplating a "test transit" of the Canal after interim arrangements were concluded. In view of this situation, no US Naval or MSTTS vessels would transit the Suez Canal until an interim settlement had been achieved.

The JCS also listed other significant developments that might upset the precarious balance in the Middle East area. These included: 1) the struggle for power in Jordan, 2) the continued influx of Soviet arms and technicians into Syria, 3) the growing probability that the USSR was introducing new arms into Egypt, 4) the continuing pressure by Yemen, supported by the USSR and other Arab states, on the Aden Protectorate, and 5) the evidences of rising discontent in the upper classes and Army of Egypt.

Finally, the JCS informed the Commanders that the flow of oil across Syria, although limited by the unrepaired damage to pumping stations, had been resumed. Also, Saudi Arabia had resumed pumping oil to Bahrein, and lifted the embargo prohibiting British and French tankers from carrying Saudi Arabian oil.

(S) Dec on SM-195-57, "Summary of Middle East Developments (U)," 13 Mar 57, CCS 335.14 (6-6-42) sec 37. (S) Msg, JCS to CINCAL et al, JCS 919364, 14 Mar 57, CCS 381 E.M.M.E.A. (11-19-47) sec 56.

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20 Mar ✓

The JCS, after making amendments, noted the conclusions of the report by JSPC on "Military Planning Talks with Middle Eastern Countries (C)" (JCS 1887/347). These conclusions were as follows:

- 1) The activation of a centralized command for the Middle East, though desirable, was not considered necessary for the conduct of these military planning talks with Middle Eastern countries.
- 2) US concepts for the defense of the Middle East area under conditions of general war and conditions short of general war should be developed by an appropriate committee of the JCS as a necessary prerequisite to military planning talks with those Middle East nations who availed themselves of the safeguards implicit in the Joint Resolution of Congress.
- 3) The projected military planning talks with the Middle Eastern countries should be conducted, on a preliminary basis, by a group comprised of the following members:
 - a. A senior representative designated by the JCS from the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
 - b. A member of the JMEPC.
 - c. The Deputy Director for Military Assistance Affairs, Joint Staff, or his designated representative.
- 4) A group charged with detailed military planning should be formed from the JMEPC. When formed, the group should be assisted by representatives from the Military Services, including representatives from USCINCEUR and CINCNELM "as appropriate." This group should visit the Middle Eastern countries after completion of the preliminary talks. The MAAG Chiefs and/or Military Attaches should join and assist the detailed planning group on its arrival in their respective countries.

5) The objectives, general guidance, and guidance on a country-by-country basis for the conduct of the preliminary planning talks and the detailed planning talks, set forth in Enclosure "A" of the paper, were considered to be adequate pending the recommendations of the Richards Mission.

(TS) Dec on, JCS 1887/347, "Military Planning Talks with Middle Eastern countries (C)," 20 Mar 57, CCS 381 E.M.M.E.A. (11-19-47) sec 56. (TS) JCS 1887/347, Rpt by JSPC, same subj, 14 Mar 57, same file.

22 Mar ✓

The JCS forwarded a memorandum on "Military Planning Talks with Middle Eastern Countries (C)," together with an appendix titled "Objectives of the Military Talks," to the Secretary of Defense. The JCS recommended that the information in the memorandum and its appendix be transmitted by the Secretary of Defense

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to the Department of State; they believed that knowledge of their plan for the conduct of the military talks would be helpful to Ambassador Richards in his exploratory talks with the countries of the Middle Eastern area.

The plan approved by the JCS called for a Preliminary Military Planning Group to visit the capitals of the Middle Eastern members of the Baghdad Pact "as soon as practicable" after the results of the Richards Mission had been determined. This group, which the JCS considered should be composed of three flag and/or general officers headed by one of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would also visit any other Middle Eastern countries recommended by Ambassador Richards. The main concern of the group would be "area-wide aspects inherent in a defense of the Middle East." Specifically, it would 1) explain the military aspects of the Joint Resolution to individual governments of the Middle East, "as appropriate," and clarify for them the readiness of the US to help strengthen the defense of independent nations against either direct or indirect Soviet aggression, and 2) estimate the dimensions of the problem of area-wide defense of the Middle East and establish a "suitable framework" for effectively implementing the common defense of the area. In carrying out these objectives, the group would give attention to 1) impressing upon the countries visited the magnitude of the help the US could render, 2) winning the approval and adoption of US defense concepts by such countries, and 3) persuading these countries to cooperate among themselves, especially by facilitating the movement and maintenance of indigenous troops without undue regard for national boundaries.

After the return of the Preliminary Military Planning Group and the incorporation of guidance from it and the Richards Mission into appropriate terms of reference, a Detailed Military Planning Group would continue the planning talks. The JCS contemplated that these detailed planning talks would be conducted by the Joint Middle East Planning Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assisted by appropriate representatives from each of the military services.

(TS) Dec on JCS 1887/348, "Military Planning Talks with Middle Eastern Countries ()", 22 Mar 57, CCS 381 E.M.M.E.A. (11-19-47) sec 56. Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, same date, and same file.

CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
RELATING TO
THE CURRENT WORLD CRISIS
SIXTH INSTALLMENT:
1 - 28 FEBRUARY 1957

*DoS
 comments with DIA/CTA
 excisions*

HISTORICAL SECTION
 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 4 June 1957

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1 Feb (U) In the UN General Assembly the US, supported by five other nations, introduced two resolutions on the Middle East situation. The first called attention to five previous UN requests for Israel to withdraw, deplored Israel's failure to comply with these requests, and called on Israel to complete its withdrawal without further delay. The second resolution recognized that an Israeli withdrawal must be followed by action aimed at the creation of peaceful conditions in the Middle East, and called on both Egypt and Israel to observe the provisions of the 1949 armistice agreement between the two countries. This resolution also stated that, after the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sharm el Sheikh and Gaza areas, maintenance of the armistice agreement required both the stationing of UNEF troops on the armistice line and the implementation of the measures proposed in the Secretary General's report of 24 January 1957 (presented to the UN 25 January).

NYT, 2 Feb 57, 1:2, Text, 2:3-4. Received JCS 021330Z Feb 57.

1 Feb (U) The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry announced that Marshal Tito would not visit Washington "for the time being," because the "conditions and atmosphere" in the US were unfavorable for a Tito-Eisenhower meeting.

NYT, 2 Feb 57, 1:5. Received JCS 021330Z Feb 57.

2 Feb (U) In a letter released to the public, Jordan's King Hussein warned Premier Nabulsi to beware of "a new type of colonialism" in the form of Communism. He urged him to adopt a policy aimed at creating a "strong national structure, free from Communist propaganda, and Bolshevik teachings."

AP Wire Service, 2 Feb 57. Received JCS 022114Z and 022202Z Feb 57.

2 Feb In statements to Ambassador Lodge and to the General Assembly, Egyptian Foreign Minister Fawzi summed up Egypt's position on the two resolutions proposed on 1 February by the US: 1) Israel must withdraw immediately behind the armistice line. 2) UNEF should then be positioned "exclusively on both sides of the armistice line." 3) Deployment of UNEF anywhere on Egyptian territory must be with the consent of Egypt. If UNEF troops entered Sharm el Sheikh it could only be for the purpose of securing or supervising an Israeli withdrawal. 4) UNEF was not empowered "to resolve any question or settle any problem."

(U) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 647, 3 Feb 57, CJCS files. Received State 032145Z Feb 57. Received JCS 041115Z Feb 57. SEEN by Adm Radford. NYT, 3 Feb 57, 1:8, Text, 21:5 (late edition, Sunday).

Israeli delegate Eban told the General Assembly that Israel still insisted on Israeli administration, in association with the UN, of the Gaza Strip. Israel also wanted UNEF to stay in the Gulf of Aqaba area until freedom of navigation was assured.

NYT, 3 Feb 57, 1:8 (late edition, Sunday).

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- 2 Feb The General Assembly adopted the two resolutions proposed by the US (see item of 1 February). The vote on the first resolution was 74-2-2, with Israel and France opposing passage and Luxembourg and the Netherlands abstaining. The second resolution was approved 56-0-22, with Israel, France, the Netherlands, and the Arab and Soviet blocs abstaining.
NYT, 3 Feb 57, 1:8 (late edition, Sunday).
(C) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 648, 3 Feb 57, DA IN 292989 (4 Feb 57). Received State 040719Z Feb 57. Received JCS 050037Z Feb 57.
- 3 Feb (U) An Israeli Foreign Office spokesman announced that Israel still refused to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Gulf of Aqaba area because the UN resolutions did not include "guarantees" for "definite stoppage of Egypt's belligerence and sea blockage of Israel."
AP Wire Service, 3 Feb 57. Received JCS 040053Z Feb 57.
- 3 Feb ✓ President Eisenhower sent a personal letter to Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion urging that Israel comply with the UN resolutions of 2 February.
(C) Msg, CINCNELM to DNI, et al., 091407Z Feb 57. Received JCS 100718Z Feb 57. NYT, 21 Feb 57, 4:5.
Received JCS 211330Z Feb 57.
- 4 Feb The Israeli delegate to the UN, Eban, presented an aide-memoire to Secretary General Hammarskjold requesting him 1) to obtain a commitment from Egypt to refrain from belligerent acts after the withdrawal of Israeli troops, and 2) to say whether the UNEF would replace Israeli units in the Gulf of Aqaba area and remain there until "permanent freedom of navigation" was insured. In reply, Hammarskjold 1) asked if Israel recognized the fact that the General Assembly's resolutions of 2 February called for withdrawal of not only Israeli troops but also Israeli administrative agencies, and 2) inquired, after reminding Eban that the stay of the UNEF in Egypt would require Egypt's consent, if Israel was prepared to agree in principle to the stationing of UNEF troops on the Israeli side of the armistice line. Hammarskjold stated that he could give no further consideration to the aide-memoire until Israel answered these questions.
(C) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 666, 5 Feb 57, CJCS files. Received State 060236Z Feb 57. Received JCS 061655Z Feb 57. SEEN by Adm Radford. (Lmt'd Offl Use) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 679, 7 Feb 57. Received State 072226Z Feb 57. Received JCS 081645Z Feb 57. Text of the aide-memoire, State Dept Bulletin, vol XXXVI, no 924 (11 Mar 57), p. 397.
- 4 Feb Hammarskjold told Ambassador Lodge that Nasser had informed him Egypt was prepared to begin formal conversations on the Suez Canal immediately after the withdrawal of Israeli forces. Nasser had not linked Suez-settlement talks with the questions of clearance or reopening of the Canal or of deploying

UNEF in Sharm el Sheikh. Also, Nasser was willing to accept "any conditions" on the payment of tolls providing the tolls were "legally paid" to Egypt.

(S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 651, 4 Feb 57, CJCS files. Received State 050220Z Feb 57. Received JCS 051625Z Feb 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

4 Feb (U) Talks between the UK and Jordan on abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty began in Amman. In a welcoming speech, Premier Nabulsi assured the British delegates that Jordan still wished to continue her friendship with the UK.
NYT, 5 Feb 57, 4:4. Received JCS 051330Z Feb 57.

5 Feb In a letter to Hammarskjold, Eban referred to the questions asked by the Secretary General during their conversation of 4 February. Eban stated that "an affirmative response from Egypt" to the first point raised by the Israeli aide-memoire and a "positive response" (presumably by Hammarskjold) to the second would create "a position" in which Hammarskjold's questions "could be considered in a more practical way."
Hammarskjold replied the next day that Israel had failed to answer his questions and that he therefore "must assume" that Israel's reply was "negative."
(Lmt'd Offl Use) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 698, 8 Feb 57. Received State 100211Z Feb 57. Received JCS 112049Z Feb 57. Text of Eban's letter and Hammarskjold's reply, State Dept Bulletin, vol XXXVI, no 924 (11 Mar 57), p. 397.

5 Feb (U) Israel handed over to the UNEF for repatriation the last group of Egyptian prisoners captured during October and November 1956.
AP Wire Service, 5 Feb 57. Received JCS 060105Z Feb 57.

5 Feb Iraqi Crown Prince Ilah conferred with President Eisenhower and then with SecState Dulles. The Prince stated that his primary mission was to urge US adherence to the Baghdad Pact. SecState Dulles told him that the US could not join at the moment but that after Congressional approval of the President's Middle East proposals the US hoped to be able to "go much further in our participation in the Pact's Military Committee, as well as in all activities of the Pact directed against Communism." Prince Ilah and his Deputy Chief of Staff also asked for more military assistance for Iraq.
(S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Baghdad, 1423, 21 Feb 57, CJCS files. Received JCS 221716Z Feb 57.
(S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Baghdad, 1442, 26 Feb 57, CJCS files. Received JCS 271208Z Feb 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

5 Feb (U) SecState Dulles told his news conference that the US would not allow "fear of what the Soviet Union might do" to deter this country from proceeding with any

course it thought was right in the Middle East. Dulles also said the US would "give serious consideration" to any UN action calling for sanctions against Israel.

AP Wire Service, 5 Feb 57. Received JCS 051649Z and 052122Z Feb 57. Text, NYT, 6 Feb 57, 4:1-8. Received JCS 061330Z Feb 57.

5 Feb Jordan's King Hussein told the US Ambassador in Amman that after the conclusion of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty discussions he planned to make substantial changes in the Cabinet.

Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 894, 6 Feb 57, CJCS files. Received State 061640Z Feb 57. Received JCS 071218Z Feb 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

5 Feb (U) In the first of several moves aimed at halting the spread of Soviet propaganda; Jordan banned the issue of a daily bulletin published by Tass. The next day Jordanian security police were ordered to confiscate all Communist propaganda publications and Soviet newspapers from bookshops throughout Jordan. The Government also banned the showing of Soviet movies in public theaters.

NYT, 7 Feb 57, 8:6. Received JCS 071330Z Feb 57.

6 Feb Discussing future US military aid to Lebanon, President Chamoun told the US Ambassador in Beirut that he thought such assistance should be in the form of a 3-5 year program aimed at creating an army of at least one division and two brigades, strong enough "to deter Syria." Chamoun said Lebanon would be available to the US or other Western fleets as a base.

Msg, Beirut (Heath) to SecState, 1905, 7 Feb 57, CJCS files. Received State 081226Z Feb 57. Received JCS 091320Z Feb 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

6 Feb The Israeli delegation to the UN made public the points raised in the aide-memoire given to Hammarskjold by Eban on 4 February. Hammarskjold later told a member of the US delegation that this move by Israel made it impossible for him to raise these points with Egypt, since the Egyptians could not now agree to them without appearing to be giving in to conditions imposed by Israel as a price for withdrawal.

NYT, 7 Feb 57, 7:4. Received JCS 071330Z Feb 57. (Lmt'd Offl Use) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 679, 7 Feb 57. Received State 072226Z Feb 57. Received JCS 081645Z Feb 57.

6 Feb Noting that the opening of the Suez Canal for limited traffic was expected soon, the State Department instructed Ambassador Lodge to present to Hammarskjold its views on an interim arrangement for the payment of tolls. The Department saw "no justification" for Nasser's linkage of the opening of formal conversations on the Canal to the question of Israel's withdrawal. (See entry of 4 February.) The Department held that the time had come for Hammarskjold to obtain Egypt's agreement to a temporary arrangement on tolls that

included these points: 1) payment of all tolls to a neutral agency, with at least one-half to be held for later disposal in accordance with an agreement which would "implement six principles and constitute definitive settlement"; 2) approximately one-half of the tolls to be turned over to Egypt by the neutral agency.

(S) Msg, SecState to USUN New York, GADEL 133, 6 Feb 57, CJCS files. Received JCS 071218Z Feb 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

6 Feb (U) Ambassador Lodge, addressing the Political Committee of the General Assembly, supported a French program for Algeria calling for a cease-fire in Algeria, a French-conducted election, and French negotiations thereafter with the elected Algerian representatives.

NYT, 7 Feb 57, 1:4, Text, 4:6-7. Received JCS 071330Z Feb 57. Text of Pineau's speech, NYT, 5 Feb 57, 8:1-6. Received JCS 051330Z Feb 57.

7 Feb Syrian Prime Minister Asali told the US Ambassador in Damascus that at the request of Egypt he had denied IPC permission to start repairs, despite the fact that, after an intense effort on his part, the Syrian Cabinet on 4 February had agreed to the repair and operation of the pipeline. Reporting this to the State Department, the US Ambassador stated that, according to IPC representatives, Asali had told them that no repairs could be made until the Israelis withdrew from Sinai and Gaza and UN forces left Sinai. IPC technicians also reported that almost all pumping units in Syria had been irreparably damaged and would have to be redesigned and rebuilt in order for the flow of oil to be fully resumed.

(S) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1851, 8 Feb 57, CJCS files. Received State 081739Z Feb 57. Received JCS 091316Z Feb 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

7 Feb (U) Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion replied to President Eisenhower's letter of 3 February, stating that Israel would not evacuate military forces from the Gaza Strip unless Israel retained the civil administration of the area. Moreover, he said, Israel would not withdraw from the Gulf of Aqaba area unless freedom of passage through the Straits of Tiran was assured.

(C) Msg, CINCNELM to DNI, et al., 091407Z Feb 57. Received JCS 100718Z Feb 57. NYT, 21 Feb 57, 4:5. Received JCS 211330Z Feb 57.

7 Feb The State Department instructed the US Ambassador in Ankara to deliver a memorandum to the Government of Turkey proposing a procedure by which USAF all-weather interceptor aircraft might be deployed to Turkey from time to time in up to squadron strength, supported by a US radar element. The US desired to accomplish this under the terms of existing agreements in order to avoid the exaggerated Soviet attention that might result from parliamentary debate. (The memorandum was delivered on 11 February.)

(S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Ankara, 1816, 7 Feb 57, CJCS files. Received JCS 081645Z Feb 57. SEEN by Adm Radford. (S) Msg, Ankara (Warren) to SecState, 1933, 20 Feb 57. Received State 210426Z Feb 57. Received JCS 211635Z Feb 57.

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7 Feb The US replied to the memorandum of the exchange of views among the Chiefs of State of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Jordan at their Cairo meeting of 18 January 57, which had been delivered to the President by King Saud on 30 January. The principal points of the Arab memorandum were as follows: 1) The Eisenhower Doctrine needed "more elucidation," especially on what the US required of the Arab states, the meaning of "direct and indirect aggression," and the meaning of "filling up the vacuum" in the Middle East. 2) The economic pressure applied to Egypt by the freezing of its funds was responsible for Egypt's promoting its relations with the "Eastern Bloc." 3) For the time being the only practicable measure that might be taken to solve the Palestine question was the establishment of peace by the prevention of aggression; the first step should be the unconditional withdrawal of Israel behind the armistice lines. 4) Egypt would cooperate with the Canal users but could not accept their domination of the Canal. Egypt was ready to guarantee freedom of navigation in the Canal, according to the Constantinople Convention of 1888, and to make an agreement concerning tolls, but negotiations on these subjects were "not feasible" until after Israeli withdrawal and "the restoration of the status quo ante in the Gaza Strip and the Aqaba area." 5) The Arab states did not object to the legitimate Western economic interests within their boundaries, but to the "theory" of spheres of influence.

The US reply was as follows: 1) The Eisenhower Doctrine was primarily designed to reinforce the provisions of the UN Charter that neither force nor the threat of force should be used against the political independence or territorial integrity of any state. The US believed that only force would be effective against a Communist attack in the Middle East area, and the Eisenhower Doctrine was designed to provide such force upon request of the country attacked. The US required nothing of the Arab states, but hoped they would seek to maintain their independence "against encroachment from any quarter." "Direct aggression" was "armed attack" within the meaning of the UN Charter, whereas "indirect aggression" was infiltration and subversion of the kind that led to the overthrow of Czechoslovakia in 1948. The US believed that any lack of power in the Middle East should be made good, "not by external or alien force, but by the increased vigor and security of the independent nations of the area." 2) Egypt had turned toward the Soviet bloc of its own choice after the US had rendered major assistance in its political problems, and was extending economic assistance and seeking other ways to be helpful. When the Egyptian Government nationalized the Suez Canal Company, the US had frozen funds of the Canal Company and of the Egyptian Government in the US pending clarification of the claims and counterclaims that would result. 3) The US was strongly supporting the UN resolutions calling for Israeli withdrawal behind the armistice lines. 4) The US agreed that the users should not dominate the Suez Canal; but the US also believed that the Constantinople Convention of 1888 and the six principles approved by the Security Council in October 1956 provided a basis for a just settlement of the Suez problem, and that negotiations between Egypt and the Canal users should start as soon as possible. 5) The US was opposed to the theory of spheres of influence.

Dept of State Instn to Cairo et al., CA-6659,
18 Feb 57, subj "Exchange of Memoranda During Saud Visit,"
DA IN 297809 (22 Feb 57). Received JCS 220831Z Feb 57.

8 Feb (U) President Eisenhower and King Saud concluded their talks and issued a joint communique containing the following principal points: 1) The "vital importance" of Saudi Arabia in the Middle East and the interests of world peace required that Saudi Arabia be strengthened. 2) The US and Saudi Arabia asserted their opposition to the use of force from any source as a means of settling international disputes, which, they held, should be settled within the framework of the UN Charter. 3) Any aggression against the political independence or territorial integrity of a Middle Eastern nation would be a threat to peace and should be opposed "in accordance with the purposes and principles" of the UN. 4) King Saud received "with satisfaction" President Eisenhower's explanation of the purposes of his proposals to Congress concerning the Middle East. 5) The US was willing to "provide assistance for the strengthening of the Saudi Arabian armed forces within the constitutional processes of the US," and it was King Saud's "intention" that the US should continue to use the facilities of the airfield at Dhahran for five additional years under the conditions of the agreement dated 18 June 51.

NYT, 9 Feb 57, 1:7, 2:7-8. Received JCS 091330Z Feb 57. AP Wire Service reports, beginning at 081335Z Feb 57.

9 Feb The SecState notified the US Embassy in Amman that, according to King Saud, the arms seen by [redacted] at the railway junction of Ma'an, Jordan, en route to Saudi Arabia (see item for 31 January), had been obtained in Switzerland. However, [redacted] reported his opinion three days later that he believed the shipment of arms had been arranged without the knowledge of King Saud as a gift from Syria, but a "fast reshuffle" would now take place, with "no acceptance in offing."

Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Amman, 918, 9 Feb 57. Received JCS 111643Z Feb 57. (S) [redacted] USAARMA Amman to ACSI DEPTAR, CX 15, 121430Z Feb 57, [redacted] Received JCS 130947Z Feb 57.

9 Feb The US Ambassador in Cairo cabled SecState "reliable" information indicating that Nasser was extremely annoyed at the contents of King Hussein's letter to Nabulsi (see item of 2 February). Although Nasser had encouraged Hussein to take measures against the Communists and Baathists, he had not expected Hussein's categorical linking of Jordanian Communist activity with Soviet imperialism. The Ambassador commented that Nasser, for the sake of his own anti-Communist pose and his relations with Hussein, would nevertheless like to endorse Hussein's letter; however, this would be very difficult because Nasser had always differentiated between the Soviets and the local Communists, and because Nasser was now dependent on Soviet arms, wheat, oil, and other imports.

Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 2555, 9 Feb 57, CJCS files. Received State 092101Z Feb 57. Received JCS 111643Z Feb 57.

- 9 Feb (U) Marshal Zhukov said that the Eisenhower Doctrine "undoubtedly is a step toward war" and a "new edition of the old colonialist policy."
AP Wire Service, 9 Feb 57. Received JCS 091707Z Feb 57.
- 9 Feb (U) Calling for high-level British-Yemeni talks to end border clashes between his nation and Aden, the Iman of Yemen told reporters he would accept a plebiscite to determine the future of that portion of the British-controlled Aden Protectorate claimed by Yemen.
AP Wire Service, 9 Feb 57. Received JCS 100002Z Feb 57.
- 10 Feb The UN Secretary General and Ambassador Lodge conferred on the question of Israeli withdrawals from the Gaza Strip and Sharm el Sheikh area. Hammarskjold told the Ambassador that in the event Israel evacuated both of the disputed areas, Egypt, he felt, would not exercise rights of belligerency or restrict passage in the Strait of Tiran. If, however, Israel were to withdraw only from the Sharm el Sheikh area, Egypt probably would then assert the right of self-defense and restrict Israeli use of the Strait.
(S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 700, CJCS files. Received State 110118Z Feb 57. Received JCS 111642Z Feb 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.
- 11 Feb The USSR presented to the US, UK, and France a note on the Middle Eastern situation and the text of a proposed six-point joint declaration of principles to be made by the four great powers. According to the proposed declaration, the signatories would be bound in their policies toward "the Near and Middle East" by the following principles: 1) preservation of peace, using only peaceful negotiation to settle questions in dispute; 2) non-interference in the internal affairs of the countries of the area, and respect for their sovereignty and independence; 3) renunciation of all attempts to draw the Middle Eastern countries into great-power military blocs; 4) liquidation of foreign bases in and the withdrawal of foreign forces from the countries of the Middle East; 5) mutual renunciation of deliveries of arms to Middle Eastern countries; 6) cooperation in economic development of the Middle East without requiring any ties or considerations incompatible with the dignity and sovereignty of the independent countries of the area.
(S) Msg, Moscow (Bohlen) to SecState, 1938, 11 Feb 57. Received State 120018Z Feb 57. Received JCS 121616Z Feb 57. SEEN by Adm Radford. Corrected page 2 received State 130100Z Feb 57. Received JCS 141734Z Feb 57. (Offl Use On'y) Msg, Moscow (Bohlen) to SecState, 1939, 11 Feb 57. Received State 120200Z Feb 57. Received JCS 121616Z Feb 57.

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11 Feb (u) Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd revealed that the UK had received assurances from Egypt through the UN that British ships would be allowed to use the Suez Canal under the Convention of 1888, once the blocked waterway was cleared. He also said that Israel's evacuation of the two areas still held by its troops should be accompanied by an Egyptian guarantee that Israel shipping would have free access to the Gulf of Aqaba.

AP Wire Service, 11 Feb 57. Received JCS beginning 111600Z Feb 57.

11 Feb (u) Secretary General Hammarskjold reported to the UN General Assembly that his efforts to obtain the withdrawal of the Israelis from the Gaza Strip and the Gulf of Aqaba area had been "frustrated."

NYT, 12 Feb 57, 1:6-7, 10:1-8.

11 Feb The SecState handed Israeli Ambassador Eban an aide-memoire reviewing the situation regarding Israeli withdrawal, and setting forth certain proposals designed to break the deadlock on this issue. It was understood, the aide-memoire stated, that Israel 1) would withdraw its military forces from the Gaza Strip if it retained control of the civil administration and police there, "in some relation" to the UN, and 2) would withdraw from Sharm el Sheikh entirely if freedom of passage through the Strait of Tiran were assured. The US position and proposals were set forth as follows: 1) The UN General Assembly had no right to modify substantially the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement, which gave Egypt the right and responsibility of occupation of the Gaza Strip; hence the Israelis should promptly and unconditionally withdraw from that area, "leaving future of Gaza Strip to be worked out through efforts and good offices of UN." The UNEF should be stationed on the boundary between the Gaza Strip and Israel to prevent recurrence of the border-crossing raids and reprisals of the past. 2) The US believed that the Gulf of Aqaba constituted international waters and that no nation had the right forcibly to prevent free and innocent passage in the Gulf or through the Strait giving access thereto. The US recalled having been informed by Egypt on 28 January 1950 that Egyptian occupation of the islands of Tiran and Sanafir at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba had been undertaken to protect these islands from possible violation and was not designed "in any way" to obstruct "innocent passage" through the adjacent waters. Therefore, barring an "overriding decision" to the contrary, as by the International Court of Justice, the US was prepared to exercise the right of free and innocent passage in these waters and join with others to secure general recognition of this right. Israel, however, would have to withdraw its forces to be eligible to exercise such a right. The UNEF, as a precautionary measure, should move into the Strait area as Israeli forces were withdrawn. 3) The US

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believed that Israeli withdrawal should precede the other measures called for by the UN resolutions. The US was prepared to declare publicly that it would use its influence, in concert with other UN members, to the end that, following Israel's withdrawal, these other measures would be implemented.

(S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Tel Aviv, 779, 11 Feb 57, CJCS files. Received JCS 121212Z Feb 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

12 Feb Hammarskjold, discussing the Gaza situation with Ambassador Lodge, stated that he had asked the Egyptian Foreign Minister if Egypt would permit UN administration of Gaza. He had received a reply which, he believed, indicated that Egypt would not object to an increase in UN activities in Gaza, nor to some form of UN administration that kept "an Egyptian face on it."

(S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 718, 12 Feb 57. Received State 130218Z Feb 57. Received JCS 131616Z Feb 57.

12. Feb The Iraqi Counselor in Washington presented an aide-memoire to the US Government requesting a loan of 85 million dinars (approx. \$233,750,000) against future oil revenues. The State Department agreed to study the matter and discuss it with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund.

(S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Baghdad, 1376, 14 Feb 57. Received JCS 152041Z Feb 57.

12. Feb The State Department issued instructions to 18 chiefs of mission in North Africa and the Middle East concerning the Richards Mission. The addressees were to inform the governments to which they were accredited that Ambassador Richards would, at the request of the President, "undertake special mission to general area of Middle East to discuss and explain spirit and purpose of President's ME proposals." A favorable reply to the note, in writing, would be considered an "adequate invitation" to the Richards Mission to visit a given country.

(S) Msg, State Dept Cir, 625, 12 Feb 57, DA IN 295419 (13 Feb 57). Received JCS 132023Z Feb 57.

12 Feb

(S) Msg, CIA to JCS, 57.

13 Feb

The US Ambassador in Amman reported that "a new political situation is fast emerging in Jordan with possibility proper action by US may put this central and now virtually buffer state on side of west." King

Hussein was seeking to follow an anti-Communist policy, but Prime Minister Nabulsi, though not in actual opposition to the King, was giving him no support. The balance of power appeared to be held by the Jordanian Army; it was "generally assumed" to be loyal to the King, but the Ambassador had "real doubts" on this score. To strengthen the King, the Ambassador recommended that in addition to Point IV aid, Jordan should be given nonmilitary aid, totaling 15 million dollars, under the Eisenhower Doctrine. The "repetitious local chant" that no aid could be accepted with strings attached should be rejected and Jordan should be required to recognize its obligations under any agreement made. Further, there should be flexibility in granting or withdrawing the aid in order to make of it a "diplomatic tool and weapon." "The battle is joined," the Ambassador cabled, and "at least one champion is in the lists in person King Hussein." The King should be supported as long as he appeared to be keeping Jordan on the side of the West.

(●) Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 928 (secs 1 and 2), 13 Feb 57, CJCS files. Received State, sec 1, 121801Z Feb 57; sec 2, 131914Z Feb 57. Received JCS (both secs) 131204Z Feb 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

14 Feb Ambassador Lodge reported that according to a member of the UN Secretariat Nasser had asked the UN official to inform the US Delegation that, if Israel failed to withdraw from Egypt, the Arab nations would hold the US responsible. Nasser also had emphasized that a satisfactory settlement of the Suez Canal question depended on the US "being able to get Israel out of Egypt."

(●) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 739, 14 Feb 57, DA IN 296130 (15 Feb 57). Received State 150751Z Feb 57. Received JCS 151836Z Feb 57.

14 Feb (v) The USSR announced that it had ratified a Soviet-Polish treaty on "temporary" stationing of Soviet troops in Poland. (See item for 17 December 56; the date the treaty was signed.)

AP Wire Service, 14 Feb 57. Received JCS 141518Z Feb 57.

14 Feb Nasser told the US Ambassador in Cairo that Egypt had reached no final decision on the question of Israeli passage in the Gulf of Aqaba. Further, any leniency shown by Egypt on the question of Israeli transit of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal would be considered by the Arab world as a betrayal of the "Arab cause re frontiers and refugees." Nasser also stated that originally he had supported the repair of the IPC pipeline. But when the Israelis began making difficulties over the withdrawal, he had agreed with the Syrian Prime Minister that, if Israel remained obdurate, there would be no repair of the pipeline and Canal clearance would be halted.

(●) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 2625, 15 Feb 57, CJCS files. Received State 160724Z Feb 57. Received JCS 161730Z Feb 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

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15 Feb (v) UN salvage headquarters announced the final clearance of a small-vessel channel through the length of the Suez Canal. However, the first phase of the salvage operations, which would mark the clearance of a channel large enough to permit passage to vessels of 10,000 tons, would not be complete until after the removal of the sunken vessels Edgar Bonnet and Abukir. The Egyptians had been refusing the UN salvage team permission to work on either of these vessels since 10 January, alleging the necessity of removing explosives from the Edgar Bonnet before such work would be safe.

NYT, 16 Feb 57, 1:3, 6:2. Received JCS 161330Z Feb 57.

15 Feb (v) Israel replied to the US memorandum of 11 February regarding Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Gulf of Aqaba area. The State Department announced that the reply was not "responsive" to the US position and added that the question was being further studied by both sides. Secretary Dulles and Ambassador Lodge flew to Thomasville, Ga., to confer with President Eisenhower on the matter.

AP Wire Service, 15 Feb 57. Received JCS 152236Z, 152244Z, and 152333Z Feb 57.

15 Feb The UN General Assembly passed, unanimously, a compromise resolution on the Algerian question. Avoiding the recommendation of any specific action, the resolution expressed the hope that, "in a spirit of co-operation, a peaceful, democratic and just solution will be found, through appropriate means, in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations."

AP Wire Service, 15 Feb 57. Received JCS 151644Z Feb 57. (●) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 741, 15 Feb 57. Received State 151845Z Feb 57. Received JCS 161731Z Feb 57.

15 Feb Iraq was given the following reply to its request for additional military assistance (see item of 5 February): 1) The Mutual Defense Assistance Program for the fiscal year 1957 provided for a substantial increase in aid to Iraq over that for FY 1956. 2) Some equipment scheduled to be furnished in FY 1958, including 24 M-24 tanks, was being advanced to the FY 1957 program. 3) The US was adding 5 pilot-training spaces and 2 air staff spaces to the 15 spaces already programmed. 4) The US agreed in principle to assist the Iraqi internal-security forces. 5) The US accepted as additional force objectives for Iraq a third infantry division and one armored unit, but Iraq would have to pay for equipping these units. 6) The US could not at present meet the requests of the Iraqi Air Force but suggested later discussions.

(●) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Baghdad, 1411, 20 Feb 57, DA IN 297593 (21 Feb 57). Received JCS 211603Z Feb 57.

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15 Feb

The SecState cabled the US Ambassador in Ankara that, although the State Department realized the desirability of early consultation between the Richards Mission and the Baghdad Pact countries, it was necessary to avoid giving the impression of a special connection between the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Baghdad Pact, for this might weaken the effectiveness of the Eisenhower Doctrine. Accordingly, the Department was planning to send the Richards mission first to Libya and next to Lebanon, after which it would proceed to Ankara and other Baghdad Pact capitals. The "so-called neutral nations" of the Middle East would be visited last.

() Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Ankara, 1899, 15 Feb 57, CJCS files. Received JCS 161231Z Feb 57.

17 Feb (U)

In a note made public by President Eisenhower, the US again urged Israel to comply with the UN resolutions on withdrawal from Egypt and the Gaza Strip. The US note said that the UN action of 2 February and the US memorandum of 11 February gave Israel "the maximum assurance that it can reasonably expect at this juncture, or that can be reconciled with fairness to others."

NYT, 18 Feb 57, 1:8, 6:3. Received JCS 181330Z Feb 57.

18 Feb (U)

A spokesman for General Wheeler stated that the United Nations salvage team would not be able to meet the scheduled date of 10 March for completion of the first phase of the Canal-clearance operations. Delay caused by failure of the salvage team to receive permission from the Egyptian authorities to begin work on the sunken vessels Edgar Bonnet and Abukir was responsible, the spokesman said.

NYT, 19 Feb 57, 1:8. Received JCS 191330Z Feb 57.

18 Feb

In a letter to the President of the UN Security Council, Britain said it was "perturbed" at firm evidence in its possession of arms and military aid being supplied to Yemen by the Soviet bloc and Egypt. Britain said it was pursuing efforts to arrange direct talks with Yemen concerning the many new assaults that had been made inside the Aden Protectorate by Yemeni troops and tribesmen.

() Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 762, 18 Feb 57, DA IN 296986 (19 Feb 57). Received State 190658Z Feb 57. Received JCS 191900Z Feb 57.

19 Feb (U)

In response to a question at a press conference, SecState Dulles explained the term "international waterway" as applied to the Gulf of Aqaba and its entrance, the Strait of Tiran. Since the Gulf of Aqaba itself "comprehends international waters," he said, "the right of access to it cannot, we believe, in international law be denied as against the wishes of any one of the four littoral states." The entrance to the Gulf, though less than six miles wide and thus falling within the three-mile limit of one side or the other, was nevertheless the avenue of access to a

body comprehending international waters and therefore not properly subject to being closed to innocent passage. "Innocent passage," he said, means "a passage which is not designed to do injury to anybody," though "the writers of international law differ . . . in some respects as to precisely what it means."

NYT, 20 Feb 57, 8:1, 8:6. Received 201330Z Feb 57.

19 Feb The SecState instructed the US Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council that "it is important to discourage any Council action that would tend to establish formal or institutional ties" between NATO and the Baghdad Pact organization. Direct contact, either overt or covert, between military authorities of the two organizations should therefore be avoided. However, the SecState believed that Britain and Turkey, as members of both organizations, could "insure that Baghdad Pact planning does not conflict with their NATO responsibilities and NATO plans" and "see that Baghdad Pact planning complements NATO plans."
(●) Msg, SecState to Paris (Perkins), TOPOL 1457, 19 Feb 57, CJCS files. Received JCS approximately 201646Z Feb 57.

19 Feb The US, Britain, France, and Norway--the four principal users of the Suez Canal--delivered an aide-memoire to the Secretary General of the UN setting forth the position agreed upon by the four governments as a basis for operating the Suez Canal pending a final settlement. Since the Canal was expected to be ready for limited operation early in March, the four powers requested the Secretary General to negotiate with Egypt for an interim arrangement based on their proposals. These were: 1) that Egypt would designate either the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development or the UN as the agent to receive, hold, and dispose of all Canal tolls; 2) that the agent would immediately pay 50 per cent of the tolls to Egypt for operating costs, retaining the remainder for disposition under a final Suez Canal settlement; 3) that the Canal would be operated, pending the final settlement, in accordance with the six principles approved by the Security Council on 13 October 1956 and the obligations of the Constantinople Convention of 1888.

(●) Msg, SecState to New York (Lodge), 146, 18 Feb 57, CJCS files. Received JCS 191646Z Feb 57. NYT, 20 Feb 57, 1:5. Received JCS 201330Z Feb 57.

19 Feb (v) The last high-ranking Soviet Army officer in the Polish Army, serving as Chief of Staff and Deputy Defense Minister of Poland, was recalled to Moscow.
NYT, 20 Feb 57, 14:3. Received JCS 201330Z Feb 57.

19 Feb According to the Counselor of the US Embassy at Jidda, a Yemen Airlines aircraft arrived at that city en route to Yemen with a small cargo of arms. A source considered reliable by the Counselor stated that Syrian Airways would soon have scheduled runs between Damascus and Hodeida for the purpose of transporting

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Czech arms to Yemen. This source said there were no jet pilots among the East German technicians in Yemen. () Msg, Jidda (Jenkins) to SecState, 471, 20 Feb 57, DA IN 297604 (21 Feb 57). Received State 201905Z Feb 57. Received JCS 211611Z Feb 57.

19 Feb

The Political Director of the Syrian Foreign Office, Kayyali, informed the US Embassy in Damascus that he was authorized to say, in the name of the Foreign Ministry and the Cabinet, that Syria would welcome the Richards Mission and was prepared to provide Ambassador Richards with a clear idea of the situation in Syria. He stressed the fact that the invitation to Ambassador Richards was being extended only orally, because of the prevailing "atmosphere in [the] Cabinet." When told that the US Embassy would expect a written invitation, as had been supplied by the other Arab states, Kayyali said he would refer the matter immediately to the Foreign Minister. However, when the Ambassador saw the Foreign Minister later that day, the latter did not mention the subject.

The next day Kayyali told the Italian Ambassador that the US was pressuring Syria to "formally invite" the Richards Mission for a discussion of certain proposals opposed by public opinion; if this was a squeeze play designed to try to change the Syrian Government or its attitude, said Kayyali, it would only result in driving Syria from neutrality to the USSR.

() Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1926, 20 Feb 57, DA IN 297603 (21 Feb 57). Received State 200154Z Feb 57. Received JCS 211611Z Feb 57. (C) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1940, 22 Feb 57, DA IN 298104 (23 Feb 57). Received State 230053Z Feb 57. Received JCS 231600Z Feb 57.

20 Feb (U)

President Eisenhower made a special radio-TV address dealing with the impasse resulting from Israel's refusal to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and the Gulf of Aqaba area without guarantees. The UN had "no choice but to exert pressure upon Israel to comply with the withdrawal resolutions," the President declared; to give Israel guarantees as a condition of such withdrawal, however, would be to countenance the use of force as a means of settling international differences or gaining national advantages. It should not be assumed that Egypt would violate the Armistice Agreement "or other international obligations." But, if such a violation should occur, the matter should be firmly dealt with by "the society of nations."

AP Wire Service, 20 Feb 57. Received JCS 210101Z and 210107Z Feb 57.

20 Feb

The SecState cabled the US Ambassador in Amman, for communication to King Hussein, the US views on major problems in the Middle East as expressed to King Saud in Washington on 7 February (see item for that date). King Hussein had requested this information in preparation for his meeting in Cairo on 26 February with Saud, Nasser, and Quwwatli. The Ambassador reported on 23 February that he had delivered the information to Hussein.

() Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 958, 19 Feb 57, CJCS files. Received State 191626Z Feb 57.

Received JCS 201643Z Feb 57. (●) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Amman, 978, 20 Feb 57. Received JCS 211635Z Feb 57. (●) Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 970, 23 Feb 57, CJCS files. Received State 231528Z Feb 57. Received JCS 251950Z Feb 57.

21 Feb (U) Ben Gurion declined to comply with President Eisenhower's demand that Israel withdraw from the Gaza Strip and the Gulf of Aqaba areas immediately; at the same time he expressed the hope that "the door is not closed to further discussions."
NYT, 22 Feb 57, 1:8. Received JCS 221330Z Feb 57.

21 Feb (U) The UN Special Committee established to investigate conditions in Hungary submitted an interim report on its fact-finding activities. The report said that witnesses before the committee had unanimously testified that the revolt of the previous fall had not been instigated or organized from sources outside of Hungary, as charged by the USSR. Kadar himself, the report observed, had admitted on two occasions in the past two months that his regime "could not at this stage claim the support of the majority of the Hungarian people." The committee said it intended to "persevere" in its efforts to gain admittance to Hungary for an on-the-spot inquiry in continuation of its investigation.
NYT, 22 Feb 57, 3:2. Received JCS 221330Z Feb 57.

21 Feb The State Department cabled the chiefs of mission at Foreign Service posts in 18 Middle Eastern countries to express its concern at reports that many of these countries appeared to anticipate large amounts of additional economic assistance as a result of the forthcoming visit of Ambassador Richards. In order to avoid "adverse effects" on the object of Mr. Richards' mission, the chiefs of mission concerned were requested "discreetly to discourage excessive expectations."
(●) Msg, State Dept Cir, 708, 21 Feb 57, CJCS files. Received JCS 220916Z Feb 57.

22 Feb (U) Secretary General Hammarskjold told the General Assembly "with confidence" that the Egyptian Government desired the Gaza Strip to be occupied by the UNEF and administered by UN civil affairs representatives. He also said that Egypt was prepared to make special agreements with the UN and some of its specialized bodies to effect the deployment of the UNEF on the armistice line defining the Gaza Strip.
AP Wire Service, 22 Feb 57. Received JCS beginning 221356Z Feb 57. NYT, 23 Feb 57, 1:8 and 2:2-3. Received JCS 231330Z Feb 57.

22 Feb (U) Six nations of the Arab-Asian bloc introduced a resolution in the UN General Assembly calling for condemnation of Israel for its refusal to evacuate the Gaza Strip and the Egyptian territory occupied by Israeli forces on the Gulf of Aqaba. The resolution also called for economic sanctions against Israel.
AP Wire Service, 22 Feb 57. Received JCS beginning 221356Z Feb 57. NYT, 23 Feb 57, 1:8 and 2:3-7. Received JCS 231330Z Feb 57.

- 22 Feb The Hungarian Government asked that US Minister-designate Wailes either present his credentials or leave Hungary. It alleged that in his present status the Minister was conducting himself in a manner inconsistent with international practice and law.
() Msg, Budapest (Wailes) to SecState, 682, 22 Feb 57. Received State 221519Z Feb 57. Received JCS 231813Z Feb 57.
- 22 Feb (v) The White House issued a statement expressing the regret of the US Government that Israel "has not yet found it possible" to withdraw from Egypt. But, the statement continued, the "door is certainly not closed" to continued negotiations.
AP Wire Service, 22 Feb 57. Received JCS beginning 221703Z Feb 57. NYT, 23 Feb 57, 3:1. Received JCS 231330Z Feb 57. Text of the statement is in State Dept Bulletin, vol XXXVI, no 924 (11 Mar 57), pp. 393-394.
- 23 Feb The Egyptian Under Secretary for Political Affairs conveyed to the US Embassy in Cairo an aide-memoire asserting that his government would welcome a visit by Ambassador Richards. Egypt preferred, however, that the visit did not take place until after the withdrawal of all Israeli troops from Egyptian territory.
() Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 2675, 23 Feb 57, DA IN 298265 (24 Feb 57). Received State 232349Z Feb 57. Received JCS 242046Z Feb 57.
- 24 Feb Secretary of State Dulles and Israeli Ambassador Eban held a long conference on the question of Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza and Gulf of Aqaba areas and on Israeli use of the Suez Canal. The Ambassador said that his government would no longer insist upon guarantees of freedom of transit in the Gulf as a prerequisite to its withdrawal from the occupied areas. Israel, however, was still interested in a proposal for the stationing of UNEF naval forces in the waters south of the Strait of Tiran. Eban also indicated that his government was prepared to protect, within the limits of the UN Charter, the passage of the Gulf by its vessels.
With respect to Gaza, Eban said that Israel now favored as an interim measure a UNEF-international civil administration but that his government would consider any reasonable proposal on the question. The only thing that Israel categorically refused to consider was a return of Gaza to Egypt.
With respect to the Suez Canal, Eban said that his government desired that the US publicly issue a "policy" statement to the effect that it should not be assumed in advance that Egyptian policy would be to deny passage of the Canal to Israeli ships.
Secretary Dulles replied, in regard to the Aqaba area: 1) It was the intention of the US to maintain a trade route through the Gulf of Aqaba. 2) The US would support a UNEF naval patrol in the Gulf if the circumstances indicated it would serve a useful

purpose. 3) The US would be glad to reaffirm its position on the use of the UNEF in the Aqaba area as stated in the UN on 28 January and 2 February. 4) The question of linking solutions for the Gulf of Aqaba and Gaza problems was a matter that would have to be explored with the UN Secretary General.

With respect to the Gaza Strip the Secretary noted that the Secretary General's statement of 22 February should help allay Israeli's apprehension regarding that area. Concerning the use of the Suez Canal by Israeli ships, the Secretary said that it was the belief of the US that after Israeli forces withdrew from the Gulf of Aqaba and the Gaza Strip, Israeli ships should be permitted unhampered passage through the Canal.

(●) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Tel Aviv, 825, 26 Feb 57, CJCS files. Received JCS 272029Z Feb 57.

25 Feb

During the course of two conferences between Secretary General Hammarskjold and Ambassador Eban the Israeli diplomat told the Secretary General that the Israeli Government desired assurances that its withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Gulf of Aqaba areas would be accompanied by: 1) an agreement that the UNEF would occupy and administer the evacuated areas in order to prevent possible acts of belligerency, 2) an understanding that the Secretary General's office would undertake to seek General Assembly approval prior to making any agreement to withdraw the UNEF from the Sharm el Sheikh area, and 3) a guarantee that Egypt would not be permitted to resume control of the Gaza Strip.

The Secretary General replied to the Israeli proposals substantially as follows: 1) He accepted the Israeli view on the functions of the UNEF, with the qualification that the international force would never be used to force a solution to any controversial political or legal problem. 2) He believed that the question of prior notice to the General Assembly before any agreements for the withdrawal of the UNEF were concluded was a subsidiary problem which could be left to an advisory committee. 3) Since Egypt had been given control of the Gaza Strip by the Israeli-Egyptian Armistice Agreement, he could not agree to any conditions which would restrict Egypt's rights.

Hammarskjold made the substance of the above public in a report to the UN General Assembly the next day.

(●) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 802, 25 Feb 57. Received State 260240Z Feb 57. Received JCS 261642Z Feb 57. (C) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 806, 26 Feb 57. Received State 260641Z Feb 57. Received JCS 261642Z Feb 57. (Lmt Offl Use) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 809, 26 Feb 57. Received State 262734Z Feb 57. Received JCS 271623Z Feb 57.

25 Feb

Premier Ben Gurion received an overwhelming 72-29 vote of confidence from his Parliament. The vote

came after the Premier had repeated that while Israel stood firm on its demands, it was willing to leave a door open for settlement of the Middle Eastern crisis.

AP Wire Service, 25 Feb 57. Received JCS beginning 251511Z Feb 57. (Offl Use Only) Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 1004, 27 Feb 57, DA IN 299471 (28 Feb 57). Received State 281253Z Feb 57. Received JCS 011441Z Mar 57.

25 Feb

A four-power conference of Arab chiefs of state convened in Cairo. Presidents Nasser and Quwwatli and King Hussein joined with King Saud for discussions on the problems of the Middle East and, particularly, on the results of Saud's recent visit to Washington.

AP Wire Service, 25 Feb 57. Received JCS 251658Z Feb 57. () Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 2722, 25 Feb 57, CJCS files. Received State 252127Z Feb 57. Received JCS 261642Z Feb 57. NYT, 26 Feb 57, 1:5. Received JCS 261330Z Feb 57.

25 Feb (U)

In a radio broadcast, President Eisenhower stated that the well-being of the people of the Middle East required that the nations of that region strengthen their own economies and local institutions. He said it was the aim of his Administration's new program to encourage such self-help and to insure that the Middle East remained free of international Communism--by action within the UN, if possible. However, if the world organization was unable to meet the Communist threat, the US was prepared, at the invitation of a threatened nation, to intervene.

NYT, 26 Feb 57, 4:2 (text). Received JCS 261330Z Feb 57. An advance text of the speech was received in the JCS via AP Wire Service, 25 Feb 57, beginning 251537Z Feb 57.

25 Feb

The Managing Director of the IPC conferred in Baghdad with an Iraqi committee on a loan to the Iraqi Government and the construction of a new pipeline from Kuwait to Iraq's southern oil fields. The IPC official informed Premier Nuri that the IPC was prepared to extend a loan to the Government of Iraq for the period ending 31 March 1958.

AP Wire Service, 25 Feb 57. Received JCS 252019Z Feb 57. () Msg, Baghdad (Gallman) to SecState, 1444, 26 Feb 57, CJCS files. Received State 261156Z Feb 57. Received JCS 262026Z Feb 57.

26 Feb

US and Polish representatives met in Washington to discuss US economic aid for Poland. US sources said that while any aid granted would probably be on a "modest" scale, the US was ready to listen sympathetically to a Polish plea for surplus US wheat, corn, fats and oils, and credit for the purchase of coal-mining machinery.

AP Wire Service, 26 Feb 57. Received JCS beginning 261435Z Feb 57. State Dept Bulletin XXXVI, no 925 (18 Mar 57), p. 440. () Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Warsaw, 593, 27 Feb 57. Received JCS 281630Z Feb 57. () Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Warsaw, 706 25 Mar 57. Received JCS 261604Z Mar 57.

26 Feb

The US Ambassador in Cairo reported that he had conferred with King Saud on the course of the discussions among the four Arab chiefs of state meeting in Cairo. Despite Saud's assertion that all was well, information available to the US Embassy indicated that Saud was having an extremely difficult time persuading his fellow rulers that any communique on the meeting must express the Arab leaders' appreciation for the stand that President Eisenhower had taken on the problems of the Middle East. The Ambassador also noted that he, personally, was concerned with the degree to which Saud seemed to have accepted the Egyptian position on the causes and solutions of Middle Eastern problems.

AP Wire Service, 26 Feb 57. Received JCS 261529Z Feb 57. NYT, 27 Feb 57, 8:5. Received JCS 271330Z Feb 57. (●) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 2732, 27 Feb 57, CJCS files. Received State 271933Z Feb 57. Received JCS 281222Z Feb 57. (●) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 2733, 27 Feb 57, CJCS files. Received State 272117Z Feb 57. Received JCS 281629Z Feb 57.

26 Feb (v)

The Premier of Poland, Cyrankiewicz, announced to the Polish Parliament that, on the following day, he would present for its approval a new cabinet. The nominees for the new cabinet had been selected after consultations with representatives of the Communist, United Peasants, and Democratic parties. The most notable feature of the proposed governmental realignment was the retention in office, as a Deputy Premier, of Zenon Nowak. In October 1956 Nowak had led the opposition to Gomulka.

The cabinet designees were on the following day overwhelmingly approved by the Parliament.

NYT, 27 Feb 57, 1:7. Received JCS 271330Z Feb 57. NYT, 28 Feb 57, 10:3. Received JCS 281330Z Feb 57.

27 Feb (v)

Secretary Dulles, in conference with the Israeli Foreign Minister, again urged that Israel withdraw, voluntarily, from the Egyptian territory she had occupied.

AP Wire Service, 27 Feb 57. Received JCS beginning 271423Z Feb 57.

27 Feb

The State Department, in reply to a report from the US Embassy in Tehran that high Iranian military officials were expressing a desire for Iranian adherence to NATO, instructed the US mission in Iran "firmly" to discourage such aspirations.

(●) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Tehran, 1625, 27 Feb 57, CJCS files. Received JCS 281220Z Feb 57.

27 Feb

The Turkish Government agreed to the US proposal that USAF air defense units be stationed in Turkey.

(●) Msg, Ankara (Warren) to SecState, 2010, 1 Mar 57. Received State 011822Z Mar 57. Received JCS 021634Z Mar 57.

27 Feb

The Secretary of State authorized the US Ambassador in Beirut to inform the Lebanese Government that the US had decided to supply the Lebanese Army, on a grant basis, approximately \$2 million worth of signal and engineer equipment. On 1 March the US Ambassador informed President Chamoun of the US decision.

(●) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Beirut, 3134, 27 Feb 57, CJCS files. Received JCS 281222Z Feb 57. (S) Msg, Beirut (Heath) to SecState, 2095, 1 Mar 57, CJCS files. Received State 040842Z Mar 57. Received JCS 041611Z Mar 57.

27 Feb

Concluding three days of high-level conferences, the heads of state of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Iraq issued a communique reaffirming their solidarity on the problems of the Middle East. The announcement indicated failure to take a stand on either the Eisenhower Doctrine or the proposal of King Saud that the Arab countries take action to halt the spread of Communism in the Middle East.

AP Wire Service, 27 Feb 57. Received JCS beginning 271457Z Feb 57. NYT, 28 Feb 57, 3:3. Received JCS 281330Z Feb 57. (●) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 2744, 28 Feb 57, CJCS files. Received State (uncorrected copy) 281918Z Feb 57. Received JCS 011621Z Mar 57.

27 Feb (v)

The State Department announced the recall from Hungary of US Minister-designate Wailes and released the text of a Hungarian protest on the Minister's conduct and failure to present his credentials. Mr. Wailes departed from Hungary on the same day.

AP Wire Service, 27 Feb 57. Received JCS beginning 271511Z Feb 57. State Dept Bulletin, vol XXXVI, no 925 (18 Mar 57), pp. 441-442.

27 Feb (v)

After three days of debate the UN voted against a Soviet motion to condemn the US for alleged subversion and intervention in the internal affairs of Eastern Europe. The US had voted to place the charges on the agenda and then had effectively dismissed the accusations as propaganda designed to mask Soviet brutality and intervention in the very area in which it was charging the US with acting improperly.

AP Wire Service, 27 Feb 57. Received JCS 272220Z Feb 57.

28 Feb

The US Ambassador in Baghdad reported that the UK Ambassador had informed him that the British Government was providing to the Iraqis, on a grant basis, five Hawker Hunter Mark VI aircraft and a considerable quantity of spare parts.

(●) Msg, Baghdad (Gallman) to SecState, 1459, 28 Feb 57, CJCS files. Received State 040846Z Mar 57. Received JCS 041611Z Mar 57.

28 Feb (v)

Following another US-Israeli meeting, Ambassador Eban made a public statement announcing that he had advised Secretary of State Dulles of the Israeli Government's intention to inform the UN on the next day of Israel's decision to withdraw from the Gaza and Gulf of Aqaba areas.

AP Wire Service, 28 Feb 57. Received JCS beginning 281420Z Feb 57.

28 Feb (U) Reports from Budapest indicated that both the Kadar regime and the Hungarian Communist party had been drastically reorganized. Five cabinet posts were affected: Ferenc Muennich, formerly Defense Minister and Interior Minister, was promoted to the post of Deputy Premier; Lt. Gen. Geza Revesz became the Defense Minister; Bela Biszku was appointed to the Ministry of the Interior; Gyula Kallai was named Minister of Culture; Dr. Frigyes Doleschal became Minister of Health; and Sandor Ronai was relieved of his post as head of the Ministry of Trade. Under the new organization the party hierarchy was headed by a five-man secretariat composed of 1) Kadar, 2) Kallai, 3) Minister of State Gyoergy Marosan, 4) Jenoe Fock, the Secretary of the government trade unions, and 5) Karoly Kiss, a former leather worker now a party dignitary of considerable power.
AP Wire Service, 28 Feb 57. Received JCS beginning 281432Z Feb 57.

28 Feb (U) Concluding three days of conferences aimed at reestablishing the amicability of Franco-American relations, President Eisenhower and Premier Mollet announced that 1) they held a common conviction that the problems of the Middle East could be solved by peaceful means in conformity with principles of justice and international law, and 2) their countries would adhere both to the six principles for settling the Suez Canal problem approved on 13 October by the Security Council and to the provisions of the Treaty of 1888.
AP Wire Service, 28 Feb 57. Received JCS beginning 281456Z Feb 57. NYT, 1 Mar 57, 3:2-4. Received JCS 011330Z Mar 57. State Dept Bulletin, vol. XXXVI, no 925 (18 Mar 57), pp. 438-439 (text of communique).

28 Feb (U) Mr. Tracy S. Voorhees, US coordinator for the Hungarian relief program, resigned after reporting to the President that the "emergency" phase of the program had been completed. He said that 27,273 refugees had been received at the Joyce Kilmer reception center in New Jersey and that to date more than 94 per cent of these had left the center for resettlement.
AP Wire Service, 28 Feb 57. Received JCS 282257Z Feb 57.

SUPPLEMENT TO
CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
RELATING TO THE CURRENT WORLD CRISIS
DECISIONS AND ACTIONS TAKEN BY
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
FIFTH INSTALLMENT: 1 through 28 FEBRUARY 1957

HISTORICAL SECTION
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
4 June 1957

OASD(PA) DFOISR ⁴¹-TS-103
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DOES NOT APPLY

1 Feb ✓ In response to a request from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) (JCS 1887/336, 17 January 57), the JCS reviewed the military aid program for the Middle East and submitted comments and recommendations on the supplemental aid they felt would be necessary to support the Eisenhower Doctrine.

In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, the JCS stated their opinion that free-world objectives in the Middle East were 1) to keep the nations of that area free of Communist domination, 2) to keep Middle East strategic positions, resources, and transit rights available to the free world, and 3) to deny these advantages to the Communist bloc. The adoption and implementation of the President's Middle East proposals, said the JCS, should result in military advantages contributing to the accomplishment of these objectives. They considered that the best defense of the Middle East would involve the combined use of U.S. and indigenous forces, but planning for such a defense should await the completion of an "approved U.S. defense plan with its concomitant force requirements," then under preparation by the JCS.

The JCS stated that "the majority of countries in the Middle East aspire to military forces in excess of their capability to support, technically or economically. Announced United States intentions, coupled with deployed United States forces and prepared and prestocked United States bases as necessary, may provide a combined U.S.-indigenous capability of sufficient strength to permit the reduction of Middle East military forces to levels more nearly compatible with indigenous support capability."

Success of the Eisenhower Doctrine in combating overt Communist aggression in the Middle East would depend to a certain extent on a reduction of Arab-Israeli tensions. To avoid increasing these tensions, for the time being the U.S. should plan no military assistance for Egypt, Syria, or Israel, except under "the most exceptional circumstances." To combat Communist subversion in the Middle East the U.S. should try to bolster local morale and strengthen resistance to subversion through emphasis on the "announced intentions" of the U.S. rather than on the expansion of support for indigenous forces. If any Middle East governments not now oriented to the West were to be replaced by governments friendly toward the West, the U.S. should take prompt action to support such governments, economically and/or militarily.

The JCS pointed out that the background against which Military Assistance Programs for Middle Eastern countries had now to be determined had changed considerably since October 1956, when such programs had been recommended for the fiscal years 1957 and 1958. Since October 1956 the loss of oil revenues had seriously weakened certain nations of the Middle East economically, posing the threat of economic collapse followed by Communist infiltration. Military Assistance

Programs should avoid providing equipment the support of which would further strain the economy of any nation in such a weakened condition. In view of this consideration, the JCS recommended 1) Supplemental Military Assistance Programs for Turkey, Iraq, and Lebanon, 2) no supplemental programs for any other Middle Eastern nations with Military Assistance Programs, and 3) no new Military Assistance Programs in the Middle East. They stated, however, that U.S. training of foreign personnel, in the U.S. or in their own countries, would be a most effective contribution toward achievement of U.S. objectives. They recommended that such training receive early consideration in any military assistance plans that might be designed to support the Eisenhower Doctrine.

Noting that the Congressional resolution on the Eisenhower Doctrine authorized use in the Middle East of \$200 million of funds already appropriated for economic and military assistance, the JCS stated that, to insure U.S. military advantages from the use of such funds, it was "essential" that military planning precede fund commitments for military assistance.

Finally, the JCS proposed that the recommendations embodied in their memorandum, and the inclosed documents supporting them, be forwarded to the President's Special Representative to the Middle East for his information and guidance.

[On 13 February 1957 the Deputy Secretary of Defense informed the Chairman, JCS, that the recommendations of the JCS had been approved and forwarded to the Deputy Under Secretary of State.]

(S) Dec on JCS 1887/340, "Military Aid for the Middle East (U)," 1 Feb 57, CCS 381 E.M.M.E.A. (11-19-47) BP pt 5. (S) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Military Aid Aspects of the Administration's Proposed Joint Resolution for the General Area of the Middle East," 1 Feb 57, same file, sec 55. (S) N/H JCS 1887/340, "Military Aid for the Middle East (U)," 19 Feb 57, same file, BP pt 5.

3 Feb ✓ The JCS informed the Secretary of Defense that the draft policy statement entitled "U.S. Policy Toward Iran" (NSC 5703), a revision of NSC 5504, was acceptable to them from a military point of view. They recommended that the Secretary of Defense concur in its adoption.

(S) Dec on JCS 1714/94, "U.S. Policy Toward Iran (NSC 5703) (U)," 5 Feb 57, CCS 092 Iran (4-23-48) sec 19. (S) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Draft Statement of U.S. Policy Toward Iran (NSC 5703) (U)," 5 Feb 57, same file.

13 Feb ✓ The JCS, at the recommendation of the Chief of Naval Operations, agreed to note an ONI study on "Major Factors Pertaining to the Suez Canal Problem."

(S) Dec on JCS 2105/50, "Major Factors Pertaining to the Suez Canal Problem (U)," CCS 092 Egypt (7-28-56) sec 3.

15 Feb ✓ On the recommendation of the Chief of Naval Operations, the JCS agreed to note an ONI study setting forth "a program which the United States might follow with respect to the Eisenhower Doctrine." The study listed requirements for the success of the Doctrine and discussed possible U.S. courses of action in the Middle East.

(●) Dec on JCS 1887/341, "Possible U.S. Programs in the Middle East Deriving from the Eisenhower Doctrine (U)," 15 Feb 57, CCS 381 E.M.M.E.A. (11-19-47) sec 55.

15 Feb ✓ The JCS agreed to forward to SecDef a memorandum embodying their comments and recommendations on the draft policy statement in NSC 5705, "U.S. Policy Toward Certain Contingencies in Poland." NSC 5705 examined the probable consequences for the U.S. of UN-US alternative courses of action, measures short of the use of force and measures involving the use of force, which might be taken to prevent the USSR from reimposing its control over Poland by military action. The memorandum of the JCS, forwarded on the same day, stated that subject to certain deletions the draft statement was acceptable from a military point of view. The deletions recommended by the JCS appear below in brackets.

"7. A middle course might be to intervene in a manner and on a scale calculated to produce within Poland a stalemate or defeat of Soviet forces. Our stated intention would be, in order to support the Polish Government, to confine and localize hostilities to the approximate area of Poland. This course of action could be successful if, but only if, the USSR also were willing to localize the war; [even then it would be necessary to attack lines of communication in the USSR itself in order to produce a stalemate or defeat the Soviets.]"

The JCS objected to the bracketed clause because "Attacking lines of communications in the USSR would be bound to enlarge the war."

"19. If all the above actions fail to halt the Soviet military action against Poland, the United States will, at that time, have to decide whether or not and how to use U.S. military force, with or without UN approval. [Because the use of military force would gravely risk general nuclear war, the U.S. decision to use its military force should be based on a judgment as to whether failure to do so would create the belief at home and abroad that the United States would, under threat of nuclear war, progressively retreat from interests it had previously been willing to defend.]"

In this case the objection of the JCS stemmed from their conviction that "The U.S. decision to use its military forces should be based on the ultimate security of the United States."

"[20. In order to effectuate any decision to support the use of UN force in Poland, the United

States should seek to devise means by which a suitable UN force could be activated in time to be used with maximum effectiveness.]"

Finally, the JCS questioned the "advisability of the United States taking the initiative within the UN on setting up a permanent United Nations Expeditionary Force (UNEF)."

(The policy statement as adopted by the NSC on 21 February and approved by the President on 25 February did not include the portions of the paper objected to by the JCS.)

(S) Dec on JCS 2066/29, "U.S. Policy Toward Certain Contingencies in Poland (U)," 15 Feb 57, CCS 092 (9-14-49) sec 11. (S) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Draft Statement of Policy on U.S. Policy Toward Certain Contingencies in Poland (NSC 5705) (C)," 15 Feb 57, same file. (S) NSC 5705/1, "U.S. Policy Toward Certain Contingencies in Poland," 25 Feb 57, encl to JCS 2066/30, Note by Secys, same subj, 27 Feb 57, same file.

26 Feb

In response to a request from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), the JCS submitted their recommendations on MAP support for the defense of the Turkish Straits.

In a memorandum to SecDef the JCS reaffirmed an earlier statement on the importance of the Turkish Straits, but stated that:

- 1) Any future increase in U.S. objectives for Western Turkey should be based on an over-all defense plan for that area. Priorities should be based on SACEUR's recommendations as to weapons and forces that would make the maximum contribution to the over-all defense of the Turkish Straits.
- 2) The Turkish request of 22 August 1956 for U.S. aid to support the defense of the Straits should not be favorably considered as a separate action.

On the same day the JCS decided to request USCINCEUR to expedite submission of that portion of a NATO defense study on defense requirements in the Turkish Straits being prepared by U.S. Element, SHAPE, as well as USCINCEUR recommendations on the study. [A message to this effect was sent to USCINCEUR on 27 February 1957.]

The Chairman, JCS, did not participate in this action.

[On 8 March 1957, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) sent a memorandum to Chief, JAMMAT, embodying the JCS decision.]

(S) Dec on JCS 2099/705, "Turkish Request for Inclusion of the Turkish Straits in the U.S. Aid Program (S)," 27 Feb 57, CCS 092 (8-22-46) (2) sec 39. (S) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 26 Feb 57, same file, sec 40. (S) Msg, JCS to USCINCEUR Paris, JCS 918519, 27 Feb 57, same file. (S) N/H JCS 2099/705, "Inclusion of the Straits in the U.S. Aid Program (S)," 12 Mar 57, same file, sec 39.

CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
RELATING TO
THE CURRENT WORLD CRISIS
FIFTH INSTALLMENT:
1 - 31 JANUARY 1957

*Das
 Concurrence with
 OIP/CIA
 excisions*

HISTORICAL SECTION
 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 3 May 1957

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- 1 Jan (U) Nasser signed a decree formally terminating the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1954.
AP Wire Service, 1 Jan 57. Received JCS 012050Z and 020114Z Jan 57.
- 1 Jan
 (S) Teletyped Info Rpt, CIA to JCS, Received JCS 251307Z Jan 57.
- 1 Jan (U) President Eisenhower told Congressional leaders that, within five or six days, he would present to them a request for new legislation aimed at countering any Communist aggression in the Middle East.
AP Wire Service, 1 Jan 57. Received JCS 012339Z Jan 57.
- 2 Jan (U) The UK rejected Egypt's abrogation of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1954.
AP Wire Service, 2 Jan 57. Received JCS 021539Z Jan 57.
- 2 Jan (U) The Yemeni Legation in London protested to the Foreign Office that two RAF planes had bombed a border area between Yemen and Aden on 31 December, and asked the UK "to stop the aggression." At the UN, the Yemeni delegate accused the UK of aggression against Yemen, and called on the Secretary General to use his good offices in the situation.
AP Wire Service, 2 Jan 57. Received JCS 022053Z Jan 57. AP Wire Service, 3 Jan 57. Received JCS 031435Z Jan 57.
- 3 Jan The State Department instructed all US diplomatic missions to invite the attention of the governments to which they were accredited to the President's statement to Congressional leaders on 1 January concerning the proposed Middle Eastern policy. These governments were to be informed that, in a special message to Congress on 5 January, the President would request Congressional authority: 1) to cooperate with and assist Middle Eastern countries to develop economic strength; 2) in support of the right of self-defense recognized in the UN Charter, to undertake programs of military assistance and cooperation with any nation in the Middle East requesting such help; and 3) consonant with the UN Charter and other US treaty obligations, to employ US armed forces to protect the territorial integrity and political independence of Middle Eastern nations against Communist armed aggression.
(S) Msg, Sec State to All Posts, Circular 574. 3 Jan 57. Received JCS 041632Z Jan 57.

3 Jan The State Department instructed the US Ambassador in Cairo to mention to the Egyptian Government that Congressional concern over continuing reports of Egyptian mistreatment of Jews would doubtless be reflected in Congressional attitudes toward any future aid to Egypt.

(●) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Cairo, 2169, 3 Jan 57. Received JCS 041632Z Jan 57.

4 Jan ✓ According to an official Israeli announcement on 6 January, the Israeli Ambassador in Washington handed the State Department an aide-memoire stressing Israel's vital interest in keeping the Gulf of Aqaba open to shipping of all nations. CINCNELM commented that the despatch of two Israeli frigates to the Gulf of Aqaba made it apparent that Israel was determined to retain free access to the Gulf.

(●) Msg, CINCNELM to CNO, 061731Z Jan 57. Received JCS 071422Z Jan 57.

4 Jan (U) A spokesman of the Turkish Foreign Office told newsmen that Jordan had notified Turkey of its intention to close the Jordanian Embassy in Ankara, allegedly for economic reasons.

NYT, 5 Jan 57, 6:1. Received JCS 051330Z Jan 57.

4 Jan At the UN, Secretary General Hammarskjold told the US delegation that, in dealing with the Suez problem, he would do his best 1) to obtain assurances that negotiations for an over-all settlement of the canal problem would be pursued rapidly; 2) to work out a definitive plan for financing the total cost of rehabilitating the canal, including provision for repayment of interim advances; and 3) to obtain assurances from Egypt that, pending a final settlement, the canal would be operated in accordance with the principles of the 1888 convention and the six principles formulated at the UN in October 1956.

(●) Msg, New York (Wadsworth) to SecState, DELGA 433, 4 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State 050905Z Jan 57. Received JCS 071715Z Jan 57.

4 Jan The Polish Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs emphasized to the US Ambassador in Warsaw that Poland was still very much interested in the US aid offer, and that some concrete results were urgently needed.

(●) Msg, Warsaw (Jacobs) to SecState, 913, 5 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State 051807Z Jan 57. Received JCS 071714Z Jan 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

4 Jan The US Ambassador in Tel Aviv reported that the question of free navigation of the Gulf of Aqaba had acquired so much importance in the public mind that even Ben Gurion might not be able to continue in office if he withdrew Israeli forces from Gaza without making a convincing case that he had obtained effective guarantees for keeping the Gulf open to Israeli commerce.

(●) Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 80L, 4 Jan 57, DA IN 285869. Received State 052127Z Jan 57. Received JCS 082009Z Jan 57.

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4 Jan

Khrushchev and Malenkov concluded a meeting in Budapest with Kadar and Communist party chiefs of Bulgaria, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia. In their communique, the Communist leaders condemned the Eisenhower doctrine for the Middle East, defended Soviet intervention in Hungary, and approved the policy of the Kadar regime. The US Ambassador in Moscow believed that the primary purpose of the meeting was to display solidarity and support for Kadar and to provide a backdrop for the new program announced by Kadar on 6 January. In the Ambassador's view, however, the chief point of interest was the absence of Polish representatives from the meeting.

NYT, 6 Jan 57, 1:5, 2:3-6, 3:1-6 (Sunday, late edition). (S) Msg, Moscow (Bohlen) to SecState, 1653, 7 Jan 57, DA IN 285935 (8 Jan 57). Received State 080113Z Jan 57. Received JCS 090055Z Jan 57.

5 Jan

The US Ambassador in Damascus, upon instructions from the State Department, again approached Syrian Prime Minister Asali on the matter of permitting repair of the IPC pipeline. The Ambassador reported that Asali's attitude left little doubt that Syria was preventing repairs in order to create difficulties for the US and Iraq. He recommended that no further approaches be made lest the Syrian Government be led to believe that its effort to pressure the US was succeeding.

(S) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1642, 6 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State 071329Z Jan 57. Received JCS 072229Z Jan 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

5 Jan

After the US Ambassador in Cairo had summarized President Eisenhower's Middle East doctrine for the Acting Foreign Minister of Egypt, the Minister said that the plan seemed to have possibilities. He pointed out, however, that the aid should be given to individual countries and not to the area as a whole, and that the vacuum in the Middle East should be filled by the Arabs themselves.

(S) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 2155, 5 Jan 57. Received State 061338Z Jan 57. Received JCS 071713Z Jan 57.

5 Jan

The State Department cabled the US Ambassador in Tel Aviv commenting on the points raised by Ben Gurion in his interview with the Ambassador on 30 December. The US doubted that Israel's interests were served by insisting that the armistice agreement between Israel and Egypt was no longer valid. The presence in Gaza of the UNEF might make possible a solution of unresolved problems of the Middle East. The Straits of Tiran were an international waterway, but the conditions for Israeli passage would have to be worked out with Hammarskjold.

(S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Tel Aviv, 675, 5 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received JCS 071714Z Jan 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

5 Jan (u) Speaking to a joint session of Congress, President Eisenhower outlined his proposed Middle East doctrine and asked for authority to put it into effect.
AP Wire Service, 5 Jan 57. Received JCS beginning at 052035Z Jan 57. Text in NYT, 6 Jan 57, 34:2-7 (Sunday).

5 Jan The State Department instructed all diplomatic missions to make available to, and discuss with, officials of the governments to which they were accredited the text of the President's message to Congress concerning the new US policy in the Middle East.
(u) Msg, SecState to All Posts, Circular 580, 5 Jan 57, DA IN 285474 (6 Jan 57). Received JCS (No Time).

5 Jan The Counselor of the US Embassy in Baghdad called on Prime Minister Nuri Said to outline President Eisenhower's new Middle East doctrine. Nuri expressed his pleasure over this evidence that the US was embarking on a strong policy and not limiting its action to the UN. The Prime Minister then asked that the views of the US be secured on a plan he had in mind for rectifying the northern border between Iraq and Syria. The definition of this frontier by the mandatory powers at the close of World War I, he said, had been purely artificial and political, and the inhabitants of the area on the Syrian side had strong pro-Iraqi leanings. Nuri wanted to bring the question before the UN and have a neutral commission appointed to conduct a plebiscite. The Ambassador believed Nuri's motives lay in his desire to take the psychological offensive against Syria, to divert Syria's attention from its current plans to strengthen ties with Egypt, and to set a precedent for later plebiscites in Syria and Jordan that might facilitate union or federation with Iraq.
(u) Msg, Baghdad (Fritzlan) to SecState, 1186, 5 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State 051518Z Jan 57. Received JCS 071714Z Jan 57.

6 Jan In Budapest, the Kadar Government issued a declaration announcing a comprehensive economic and political program by which Hungary was to be ruled.
AP Wire Service, 6 Jan 57. Received JCS beginning at 071021Z Jan 57.

Analyzing this document, the US Minister in Budapest reported on 9 January that the Kadar declaration in effect conceded gains won by the populace in the economic field but conceded nothing in the political field.

(u) Msg, Budapest (Wailles) to SecState, 524, 9 Jan 57, DA IN 286609 (10 Jan 57). Received State 092241Z Jan 57. Received JCS (No Time).

6 Jan (u) Following three days of talks in Tunis, Libyan Premier Ben Halim and Tunisian Premier Bourguiba signed a treaty of friendship and solidarity.
AP Wire Service, 6 Jan 57. Received JCS 062200Z Jan 57.

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- 6 Jan (U) Leaving Paris for New York, French Foreign Minister Pineau said that, if the UN General Assembly declared itself competent to discuss the Algerian question, France would again walk out of the UN.
AP Wire Service, 6 Jan 57. Received JCS 070023Z Jan 57.
- 7 Jan (U) In a report to the UN General Assembly, Hammarskjold recommended that a new committee, consisting of representatives of five governments, be formed to take testimony from Hungarian refugees concerning the Soviet intervention in Hungary.
AP Wire Service, 7 Jan 57. Received JCS 071555Z, 071600Z, 071615Z, 071829Z, and 071914Z Jan 57. Text in NYT, 8 Jan 57, 4:3-6.
- 7 Jan (U) The President appointed former Congressman James P. Richards Special Assistant on problems of the Middle East with the rank of Ambassador.
NYT, 8 Jan 57, 1:6. Received JCS 081330Z Jan 57.
- 7 Jan (U) Referring to an announcement by the Kadar Government on 6 January that Hungary would accept aid from the West if no political conditions were attached, a State Department spokesman said that the US "would not assist the present regime in Hungary."
AP Wire Service, 7 Jan 57. Received JCS 071817Z Jan 57.
- 7 Jan (U) According to a New York Times report, the US, in response to a Polish note received in October 1956, had decided to negotiate with Poland on a wide range of questions, including a US loan to Poland and increased cultural exchanges between the two countries.
NYT, 8 Jan 57, 1:4, 8:3-4. Received JCS 081330Z Jan 57.
- 7 Jan The US Ambassador in Tel Aviv outlined for Ben Gurion the points made by SecState Dulles in his cable of 5 January commenting on Ben Gurion's statements to the US Ambassador on 30 December. In reply, Ben Gurion said that he could see no reason for re-establishing the Egyptian-Israeli armistice agreement except to provide a basis for Nasser's return to Gaza, which he could not permit because it would mean a resumption of Fedayeen activity. Moreover, the UNEF was not the solution to the Gaza problem because it could not prevent renewed Fedayeen raids. Ben Gurion categorically declared that Israel had to have free passage of the Straits of Tiran. If Nasser tried to impose the blockage again, "then [the Israelis] will have to start shooting."
() Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 812, 8 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State 090156Z Jan 57. Received JCS 101705Z Jan 57.
- 7 Jan King Hussein of Jordan summoned the US Ambassador in Amman and told him that he found President Eisenhower's

speech to Congress admirable. He said that it was gratifying to know that any gap in the Arab world that might be filled from without would be filled by those concerned with right and justice.

(S) Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 745, 7 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State 071703Z Jan 57. Received JCS 081220Z Jan 57.

8 Jan (U) The nine-nation political committee of the Arab League, meeting in Cairo, pledged "support to Yemen in its stand against [British] aggression," and voted to inform Arab bloc delegates at the UN of the problem in order that they could adopt a unified stand.

AP Wire Service, 8 Jan 57. Received JCS 081453Z Jan 57.

In a note handed the Yemeni Charge d'Affaires in London, the UK rejected as untrue Yemen's protest that RAF planes had bombed Yemen on 31 December.

NYT, 9 Jan 57, 4:5. Received JCS 091330Z Jan 57.

8 Jan The US Ambassador in Rabat reported his belief that the French now envisaged regular long-term use of the dock within the US naval base area of Port Lyautey. The only factors that were likely to change French intentions, he thought, would be Moroccan permission to land supplies at Casablanca, which appeared unlikely, or conclusion of a new Franco-Moroccan military accord, which neither party seemed to be seeking at present.

(S) Msg, Rabat (Cannon) to SecState, 416, 8 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State 081948Z Jan 57. Received JCS 091657Z Jan 57.

8 Jan During a dinner at the UN, the UK delegate discussed Israel's stand on guarantees with the US Ambassador. Israeli Foreign Minister Meir had held a series of meetings with Arabs, Asians, and Latin Americans to tell them of Israel's firm decision not to withdraw from Gaza unless its conditions were met on freedom of transit through the canal and the Gulf of Aqaba, as well as guarantees that Egypt would not reoccupy Gaza. The UK delegate advocated supporting the Israeli position, and added that the UK favored developing an alternate route to Suez involving transshipment from Elath to an Israeli port on the Mediterranean. He proposed that the US and UK delegations meet to discuss how to handle the problem of Israeli withdrawal.

(S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 458, 9 Jan 57. Received State 092231Z Jan 57. Received JCS 102205Z Jan 57.

8 Jan A member of the Budapest Central Workers Council informed the US Legation that the Council, which Kadar had disbanded, had been reorganized "underground." It had formed a nation-wide network, had a radio transmitter, hidden arms, and was covertly publishing a newspaper.

(S) Msg, Budapest (Wailes) to SecState, 512, 8 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State 091542Z Jan 57. Received JCS 101705Z Jan 57.

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- 9 Jan A French Foreign Office official told a US Embassy officer that France was considering a substantial reduction of her forces in Morocco and an increase in French forces assigned to NATO in Germany.
(S) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 3327, 9 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State 091835Z Jan 57. Received JCS 101655Z Jan 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.
- 9 Jan (U) Polish Minister of Agriculture Antoni Kuligowski was replaced by Edward Ochab. At the same time Poland announced sweeping reforms aimed at putting her farming industry on a firmer economic basis.
AP Wire Service, 9 Jan 57. Received JCS 091444Z Jan 57.
- 9 Jan (U) The UK sent a strong protest to Yemen, charging the Yemenis with border raids on the Aden protectorate. Yemen countered with accusations of UK attacks on border tribesmen. Later, a Yemeni spokesman said his government and Czechoslovakia had reached an agreement under which Yemen would receive Czechoslovak arms.
AP Wire Service, 9 Jan 57. Received JCS 091534Z and 092358Z Jan 57.
- 9 Jan Nasser discussed President Eisenhower's Middle East proposals with the US Ambassador in Cairo for over two hours. While he was ambiguous and at times almost "incoherent," Nasser's overall reaction was unfavorable. He felt the President's plan was vague and took no cognizance of Egypt's immediate problems. Egypt was concerned at the moment with Israel, the UK, and economic difficulties. There was no danger of Soviet aggression and the problem of internal Communism in Egypt, while serious, was manageable. Nasser also said that: 1) a visit by Hammarskjold to Cairo would do much to hasten a solution to the Suez Canal problem; 2) he hoped the Israeli evacuation and a settlement on the future operation of the Canal would be concluded before the Canal was cleared so as to avoid other problems, such as the question of who would collect tolls; 3) he had sent out word that no further Fedayeen action should be taken except with his approval; 4) if the UN could not dislodge the Israelis from Gaza, he was prepared to act unilaterally.
(S) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 2222, 10 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State (Section One) 111000Z Jan 57, (Section Two) 111218Z Jan 57. Received JCS 122019Z Jan 57, Corrected Copy (Section One only) 141712Z Jan 57. SEEN by Adm Radford. (S) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 2223, 10 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State 111638Z Jan 57. Received JCS 122019Z Jan 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.
- 9 Jan French Premier Guy Mollet gave reporters his long-awaited declaration of French policy toward Algeria, in preparation for the forthcoming UN debate on the Algerian problem. The declaration called for pacification, free elections, and then negotiations with

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the elected Algerian representatives. The negotiations, however, were to be conducted within a framework of "indissoluble ties" between Algeria and France.

AP Wire Service, 9 Jan 57. Received JCS 091831Z Jan 57. (An earlier report that Mollet was going to make such a statement, including a detailed summary of the statement, was received in JCS in (S) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 3310, 8 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State 082204Z Jan 57. Received JCS 091709Z Jan 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.)

9 Jan (U) Prime Minister Eden resigned, pleading ill health. (On the next day Harold Macmillan was chosen to be the new British Prime Minister.)

AP Wire Service, 9 Jan 57. Received JCS 091858Z Jan 57. AP Wire Service, 10 Jan 57. Received JCS 101349Z Jan 57.

10 Jan (U) The Yemeni Charge d'Affaires in Bonn, in a news conference, invited the Soviet Union and other nations to send "volunteers" to aid his country against the UK. He said "several thousand volunteers," including men from both West and East Germany, had already offered their services.

AP Wire Service, 10 Jan 57. Received JCS 101523Z Jan 57.

10 Jan In an official statement denouncing President Eisenhower's plan for the Middle East, Syria declared that defense of that area was the responsibility solely of its "inhabitants." The statement rejected the "artificial theory" of a Middle East power vacuum and asserted that the area was threatened only by "imperialism and Zionism."

(U) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1671, 11 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State 111644Z Jan 57. Received JCS 121244Z Jan 57.

10 Jan The US Ambassador in Moscow described Soviet reaction to President Eisenhower's plan for the Middle East as "strongly negative." He felt that the Eisenhower Doctrine would not provoke any direct action by the USSR. However, the Soviets had already indicated their intention to exploit it as thoroughly as possible. To countries of the Middle East, they were stressing the "colonial" aspects of the policy; to Western Europe they were emphasizing alleged US efforts to "oust" British and French influence from the Middle East.

(S) Msg, Moscow (Bohlen) to SecState, 1675, 10 Jan 57. Received State 101657Z Jan 57. Received JCS 111645Z Jan 57.

10 Jan The US Embassy in Cairo confirmed that two brigadiers, five colonels, and three other senior officers were included in a wave of arrests that began in Egypt on the night of 5 January. Unconfirmed reports placed the total number of officers arrested at 100 as of 8 January.

(S) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 2219, 10 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State 110948Z Jan 57. Received JCS 112105Z Jan 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

10 Jan According to reports forwarded by CINCNELM, a Soviet tanker arrived at Tripoli, Lebanon, with 9,000 tons of crude oil from Baniyas, Syria, to be refined for Syria at the Tripoli refinery. The cargo was part of 179,000 tons of crude oil confiscated from IPC by Syria.
 (S) Msg, CINCNELM to CNO, 111939Z Jan 57. Received JCS 130257Z Jan 57. (Earlier reports that the Soviet tanker was loading the oil were received in JCS over AP Wire Service at 101612Z Jan 57 and in (S) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1662, 10 Jan 57; DA IN 286836 (11 Jan 57). Received State 101818Z Jan 57. Received JCS 111857Z Jan 57.)

10 Jan (U) After a conference with Israeli Chief of Staff Dayan, General Burns said Israeli forces would evacuate the Egyptian base of El Arish, in the northern Sinai, by 15 January, but they were not being withdrawn from Sharm el Sheikh, at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba.
 NYT, 11 Jan 57, 7:1. Received JCS 111330Z Jan 57. (An earlier, incomplete report was received in JCS over AP Wire Service at 101919Z Jan 57.)

10 Jan Pakistani President Mirza and Syrian President Quwwatli and their Prime Ministers ended four days of talks in Karachi. No positive results were achieved and the talks served mainly to emphasize differences in the Syrian and Pakistani attitudes towards the Baghdad Pact and the Soviet Union.
 AP Wire Service, 10 Jan 57. Received JCS 101921Z Jan 57. (S) Msg, Ankara (Warren) to SecState, 1617, 15 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State 151536Z Jan 57. Received JCS 161214Z Jan 57. SEEN by Adm Radford. (C) Msg, Karachi (Hildreth) to SecState, 1939, 17 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State 171652Z Jan 57. Received JCS 180719Z Jan 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

10 Jan The names of parliamentary candidates opposed to the policies of the Gomulka Government were ordered stricken from the lists for the 20 January Polish elections.
 NYT, 13 Jan 57, 1:3 (Sunday). (S) Msg, Warsaw (Jacobs) to SecState, 953, 14 Jan 57, DA IN 287778 (15 Jan 57). Received State 141837Z Jan 57. Received JCS 152134Z Jan 57.

10 Jan (U) The UN General Assembly voted to establish a five-nation committee to inquire into the Hungarian situation. Only the Soviet bloc opposed the measure.
 AP Wire Service, 10 Jan 57. Received JCS 102223Z and 102226Z Jan 57.

10 Jan (U) A conference of Kadar, Chou En-lai, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Shepilov, and Mikoyan was held in the Kremlin, according to a Soviet announcement. The official statement, which gave no details, stressed that this was a Communist Party meeting as well as a government conference, and that leaders of the Hungarian and Chinese Communist Parties were present.
 AP Wire Service, 11 Jan 57. Received JCS 111826Z and 112010Z Jan 57.

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10 Jan At the SCUA Council meeting in London, the British and French expressed extreme pleasure with the US proposal that SCUA undertake a study of the possible establishment of a priority system to regulate traffic of members after the Suez Canal was reopened. The British and French, reported the US Ambassador, regarded the US proposal as evidence of US belief that SCUA "has a future."

(●) Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 3716, 11 Jan 57. Received State 112235Z Jan 57. Received JCS 141710Z Jan 57.

11 Jan The US Army Attache in Amman reported that, the RAF squadron at Mafrag had left for England on 10 January and no replacement was scheduled. The US Attache stated that the RAF would probably phase out troops at Mafrag as soon as possible

(●) Msg, USARMA Amman to DEPTAR, CX 2, 111330Z Jan 57, DA IN 286932, CJCS files. Received JCS 120039Z Jan 57.

11 Jan (U) Radio Budapest said that the new UN committee to investigate the Hungarian situation would be barred from entering Hungary.

AP Wire Service, 11 Jan 57. Received JCS 111421Z Jan 57.

11 Jan Yemen called a meeting of the joint command of the Egyptian, Saudi Arabian, and Yemeni armies--set up in April 1956--to consider British military actions on Yemen's borders. On the same day, the Yemeni Ambassador in Cairo called on the US Ambassador and stated that Nasser had offered to assist Yemen with both arms and men.

NYT, 12 Jan 57, 1:7. Received JCS 121330Z Jan 57.
(●) MSG, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 2235, 12 Jan 57, DA IN 287326 (13 Jan 57). Received State 121313Z Jan 57. Received JCS 130729Z Jan 57.

11 Jan (U) Secretary of Interior Seaton announced that US oil shipments to Western Europe between 1 November and 2 January totalled 28,200,000 barrels.

AP Wire Service, 11 Jan 57. Received JCS 111732Z Jan 57.

11 Jan (U) The State Department announced that Iraqi Crown Prince Abdul Ilah would visit the US early in February to discuss "current Middle East problems."

AP Wire Service, 11 Jan 57. Received JCS 111842Z Jan 57.

12 Jan (U) The Yemeni Ambassador in Cairo declared publicly that British "aggression" against his country had abrogated treaties fixing the Yemen-Aden border. In Washington the First Secretary of the Yemeni Legation called on the US to stop "the British aggression" against Yemen.

AP Wire Service, 12 Jan 57. Received JCS 121827Z and 121940Z Jan 57.

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14 Jan

The State Department advised Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri that the US believed his proposal to raise the question of the Iraqi-Syrian border in the UN might create more problems than it would solve. Nuri accordingly agreed not to press the matter at this time and to take no future action on the question without the backing of the US.

(S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Baghdad, 1177, 11 Jan 57. Received JCS 121930Z Jan 57. The message SEEN by Adm Radford was received JCS 122019Z Jan 57. (TS) Msg, Baghdad (Fritzlan) to SecState, 1225, 14 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State 151230Z Jan 57. Received JCS 161651Z Jan 57.

14 Jan

The US Ambassador in Paris reported French concern that a UN condemnation of France on the Algerian question might provoke the European population of Algeria to take matters into its own hands in order to "impose a solution." In such an event, the French Government doubted that the French Army in Algeria would act against the European population. There was even greater doubt that the Government would order the Army to be used against Europeans in Algeria.

(S) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 3397, 14 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State 141302Z Jan 57. Received JCS 151216Z Jan 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

14 Jan

French Minister of Finance Ramadier called in the US Ambassador in Paris to discuss France's foreign exchange problem. Ramadier said that the closing of the Suez Canal and the shutting off of the IPC pipeline would cost France an additional \$200 million to \$300 million by 1 July. This would result in a "balance of payments crisis" in the third quarter of calendar year 1957 unless the US helped France. In case of a crisis, France would have to close her frontiers to foreign imports as she had in 1952.

(S) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 3401, 14 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State (Section One) 142133Z Jan 57; (Section Two) 142135Z Jan 57. Received JCS 151621Z Jan 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

14 Jan

In a note delivered by the Israeli Ambassador to the UN, Israel informed Hammarskjold that by 22 January the Sinai Desert would be "entirely evacuated" by Israeli forces with the exception of the Sharm el Sheikh area. Israel was "prepared to enter forthwith into conversations" with Hammarskjold on the question of Sharm el Sheikh.

(S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 506, 14 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State 150657Z Jan 57. Received JCS 151621Z Jan 57. Text of the Israeli note, as reproduced by the Secretary General in a report to the General Assembly on 16 January, was published in NYT, 17 Jan 57, 4:3-4. Received JCS 171330Z Jan 57.

14 Jan

Jordanian-Egyptian talks on the subject of Arab aid to Jordan were concluded in Cairo and the Jordanian delegation left for Riyadh to hold similar discussions with the Saudi Arabian Government. Jordanian Foreign

Minister Rimawi said the talks were a complete success. King Hussein was scheduled to talk with King Saud in Saudi Arabia on 16 January before both met with Nasser in Cairo to sign an agreement.

(C) Msg, Cairo (Hart) to SecState, 2276, 15 Jan 57, DA IN 288132 (16 Jan 57). Received State 160504Z Jan 57. Received JCS 162249Z Jan 57.

14 Jan

A British Foreign Office spokesman announced that arrangements were being made for officials of Aden and Yemen to hold talks aimed at ending their dispute. AP Wire Service, 14 Jan 57. Received JCS 141438Z and 150027Z Jan 57.

The US Consul in Aden reported that the military situation on the Yemen-Aden border appeared in no way to justify "Yemeni-Egyptian-Soviet propoganda." With a single exception, the British had refrained from violating Yemeni territory in retaliating against Yemeni-inspired attacks on the Aden protectorate.

(S) Msg, Aden (Lakeland) to SecState, 32, 14 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State 141920Z Jan 57. Received JCS 151614Z Jan 57.

14 Jan

The US Ambassador in Cairo reported that he had been informed that, as of 31 December, 4,322 British and 5,596 French nationals had left Egypt.

(C) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 2259, 14 Jan 57. Received State 150548Z Jan 57. Received JCS 161652Z Jan 57.

14 Jan (U)

The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) announced in Paris that member nations had agreed to contribute a total of 200,000 tons of oil every 10 days into a special pool to help meet Europe's oil shortage.

NYT, 16 Jan 57, 10:3. Received JCS 161330Z Jan 57.

15 Jan

Talks between the US and UK on the subject of aid to Libya began in London. The British were planning to cut sharply their troop strength in Libya by the end of 1958. They were also considering reducing their annual contribution of four million pounds to one million pounds, and were weighing a single contribution of 1.25 million pounds for equipping the Libyan Army. This plan, reported the US Ambassador in London, was apparently one of a number of moves by the British to reduce their external commitments.

(C) Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 3773, 15 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State 160617Z Jan 57. Received JCS 161644Z Jan 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

(C) Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 3774, 15 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State 160420Z Jan 57. Received JCS 161643Z Jan 57. SEEN by Adm Radford. (C) Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 3815, 18 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State 180553Z Jan 57. Received JCS 182043Z Jan 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

During the course of the talks, the State Department directed the US Ambassador in London to inform

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the British of US concern over the drastic reductions contemplated in UK financial support of Libya. The Ambassador was also instructed to inform the British of the possibility that the US would be required to assume progressively greater responsibility for the Libyan Army.

(S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy London, NIACT 4906, 16 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received JCS 172044Z Jan 57.

15 Jan (v) Israeli troops withdrew from El Arish. Yugoslav units of the UNEF moved in a few minutes later.
AP Wire Service, 15 Jan 57. Received JCS 151440Z Jan 57.

15 Jan (u) Radio Budapest announced that Communist China had granted Hungary a loan of 200 million rubles (\$50 million) for reconstruction.
AP Wire Service, 15 Jan 57. Received JCS 151503Z Jan 57.

15 Jan (u) The Egyptian Government ordered all foreign banks, insurance companies, and trading firms in Egypt to be converted to Egyptian management and ownership. For British and French firms, the decree was to be effective on 16 January. All other foreign businesses were given five years to make the conversion.
NYT, 16 Jan 57, 1:8. Received JCS 161330Z Jan 57.

Cairo newspapers on 16 January stated that sequestrated British and French firms would be transferred to a newly formed economic organization. Fair compensation would be fixed by a judicial body and paid to a custodian of enemy property.

(U) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 2281, 16 Jan 57. Received State 161807Z Jan 57. Received JCS 171752Z Jan 57.

15 Jan The US Ambassador in Jidda reported official Saudi reaction to the Eisenhower Doctrine as one of general satisfaction, especially concerning President Eisenhower's reference to economic and military aid. King Saud, however, asked two questions raised by Syria during a visit of Quwwatli and Bitar on 5-7 January: 1) Why had the President limited the focus of his speech to Communist aggression rather than aggression from any source? 2) How did the US answer the Communist charge that by accepting US assistance the Arabs would be merely exchanging one imperialist-power influence in the Middle East for another?
(S) Msg, Jidda (Wadsworth) to SecState, 382, 15 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State 162158Z Jan 57. Received JCS 171744Z Jan 57.

16 Jan The UK informed Jordan that, having "noted" various declarations by Jordan of intent to terminate the Anglo-Jordanian treaty, the UK would like to begin immediate talks on the "future" of the treaty. The British requested Jordan to set a date and place for these discussions.
(S) Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 806, 16 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State 161752Z Jan 57. Received JCS 171751Z Jan 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.
NYT, 22 Jan 57, 2:4. Received JCS 231330Z Jan 57.

16 Jan In a report to the General Assembly on the Israeli withdrawal, Hammarskjold called on Israel to evacuate Sharm el Sheikh and the islands in the Straits of Tiran. The Secretary General declared that international law might "be considered to justify" the "right of innocent passage" through the straits, but that the General Assembly had not authorized him to discuss the "various aspects of this matter."

Text of the report, NYT, 17 Jan 57, 4:3-8.
 Received JCS 171330Z Jan 57. An earlier report of this, based on a draft Hammarskjold showed the US representative, reached JCS in () Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 510, 15 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State 160337Z Jan 57. Received JCS 161642Z Jan 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

16 Jan (U) According to the New York Times, the Western powers agreed that UNEF should occupy Sharm el Sheikh and the Gaza Strip pending permanent agreements on these areas.

NYT, 17 Jan 57, 1:1. Received JCS 171330Z Jan 57.

17 Jan (U) The Afro-Asian bloc in the UN General Assembly introduced a resolution calling for the Secretary General to continue his efforts to obtain complete withdrawal by Israel from Egypt. The US proposed that UNEF troops replace the Israelis in the Gaza Strip and along the Gulf of Aqaba.

AP Wire Service, 17 Jan 57. Received JCS 171401Z, 171422Z, and 172149Z Jan 57.

17 Jan (U) Israeli Foreign Minister Meir warned the Assembly that entry of the UN force into Sharm el Sheikh would not in itself be a solution to the problems in that area. Israel would require assurance that the force would function until a peace settlement was achieved or until permanent freedom of navigation was established in the Gulf of Aqaba by international guarantees.

NYT, 18 Jan 57, 4:2. Received JCS 181330Z Jan 57.

17 Jan Seeking a solution to Syria's continuing oil shortage, the Syrian Minister of National Economy proposed to ARAMCO representatives 1) that Esso, Socony, and Caltex resume their normal supply program for Syria and 2) that Syria require Tapline to deliver 200,000 tons of crude to be refined locally or abroad. Reporting this information two days later, the US Ambassador in Damascus recommended that the oil companies be encouraged to refuse the Syrian demands.

() Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1723, 19 Jan 57, DA IN 289228 (20 Jan 57). Received State 191514Z Jan 57. Received JCS 201109Z Jan 57.

17 Jan At the closing session of US-UK talks on aid to Libya, the British said that they would not reduce the level of their support before 31 March 1958. The two countries agreed to continue to exchange views on the Libyan problem.

() Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 3815, 18 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State 180553Z Jan 57. Received JCS 182043Z Jan 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

- 17 Jan The Yemeni Minister in Cairo told the US Political Counselor that he had been instructed by the Imam to ask Nasser for implementation of Egypt's military agreement with Yemen. The Minister said he had replied that this measure was not necessary for the time being. As an alternative he was opening two offices in Cairo to register Egyptian volunteers. He asked the US to intervene to end the hostilities.
(S) Msg, Cairo (Hart) to SecState, 2297, 17 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State 180735Z Jan 57. Received JCS 182043Z Jan 57.
- 17 Jan The US Ambassador in Beirut was instructed to inform the President of Lebanon that the US was sympathetic to his desire to bolster his country's security with defensive arms and economic assistance. Specifically, the Ambassador was to say that the State Department was discussing the details of economic assistance with other government agencies and that the Lebanese arms request was being given high-level consideration.
(S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Beirut, 2600, 17 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received JCS 181713Z Jan 57.
- 18 Jan Prime Minister Nuri of Iraq called on the US Charge d'Affaires in Baghdad to discuss the question of financial aid for President Chamoun of Lebanon. Chamoun had asked Iraq for 200,000 dinars to assist him in the election to be held in about two months. The Iraqi Crown Prince, Abdul Ilah, had become convinced during a visit to Beirut that assistance was imperative if a moderate, friendly government was to continue in Lebanon, and he had urged Nuri to contribute not only 200,000 dinars for that purpose but also 100,000 dinars for the benefit of Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Nuri, however, felt that in view of Iraq's financial situation he could not ask Parliament for 300,000 dinars without revealing the purpose of the expenditure. He felt strongly that Chamoun should be supported by collective action, in which Iraq would be willing to join. He hoped that the US would provide substantial assistance. The British Ambassador had already been approached on the question, he added.
(S) Msg, Baghdad (Fritzlan) to SecState, 1260, 18 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State 181652Z Jan 57. Received JCS 191914Z Jan 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.
- 18 Jan The British Ambassador in Amman told the US Ambassador that the UK would discontinue financial assistance to Jordan on 31 March.
(S) Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 813, 18 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State 181934Z Jan 57. Received JCS 201449Z Jan 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.
- 18 Jan (U) A four-man team of UN economic observers that visited Budapest on 4 to 7 January issued its report to the UN. The observers found that Hungary was threatened with a severe food shortage, and with 12 per cent unemployment, by mid-1957. They recommended that 440,000 tons of food, 14,500 tons of seed, and 10,150 tons of chemical fertilizer be provided for Hungarian relief.
AP Wire Service, 18 Jan 57. Received JCS 181434Z, 181444Z, 181655Z, and 181901Z Jan 57.

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18 Jan (U) In Moscow, Bulganin and Chou En-lai issued a joint declaration condemning the Eisenhower Middle East policy and pledging the USSR and China "to continue to give any necessary support to the peoples of the Near and Middle East in order to avert aggression and interference in the affairs . . . of that region." The statement also demanded indemnification of Egypt by France, Britain, and Israel for damages inflicted during the invasion and opposed "any intrigues by the imperialists to place the Suez Canal under international control."

AP Wire Service, 18 Jan 57. Received JCS 182003Z, 182014Z, 182022Z, 182118Z, 182130Z, and 182137Z Jan 57.

18 Jan (U) King Saud and King Hussein arrived in Cairo for talks with Nasser and Prime Minister Asali of Syria. Shortly after the talks began, the press was told that the Syrian, Saudi Arabian, and Egyptian leaders had agreed to pay Jordan 12½ million pounds annually to replace the British subsidy.

AP Wire Service, 18 Jan 57. Received JCS 182026Z and 190034Z Jan 57.

18 Jan The State Department instructed the Charge d'Affaires in Baghdad to tell Prime Minister Nuri that the US was giving urgent consideration to ways in which it could support Lebanon and its President. The Department believed that it would be sounder to work along the lines already under consideration than to adopt "those suggested by Abdul Ilah."

(U) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Baghdad, 1221, 18 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received JCS 191914Z Jan 57.

19 Jan (U) The General Assembly adopted a resolution noting Israel's failure to comply with its earlier demands for complete withdrawal from Egypt and requesting the Secretary General to continue his efforts to obtain that withdrawal. He was to report to the Assembly within five days. The US and Britain were among 74 nations voting for the resolution. Only France and Israel opposed it.

AP Wire Service, 19 Jan 57. Received JCS 191713Z, 191817Z, 191859Z, and 192015Z Jan 57.

19 Jan (U) In Cairo, King Saud, Prime Minister Asali, and Nasser signed an agreement with King Hussein promising Jordan \$36 million a year for 10 years to replace the British subsidy. Saudi Arabia and Egypt each promised to provide the equivalent of \$14,400,000 annually. Syria's contribution was set at \$7,200,000.

AP Wire Service, 19 Jan 57. Received JCS 191840Z Jan 57.

According to the New York Times, the three countries agreed to supply part of the payment in currency and part of it in arms. The Jordanian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs said that as soon as the agreement was ratified by the Jordanian Parliament, he would start negotiations to end the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty.

NYT, 20 Jan 57, 1:8 (Sunday).

According to the US Embassy, the four conferees also discussed the Eisenhower plan.

() Msg, Cairo (Hart) to SecState, 2342, 20 Jan 57, DA IN 289311 (21 Jan 57). Received State 210548Z Jan 57. Received JCS 211151Z Jan 57.

- 19 Jan (u) In a broadcast on the eve of Polish parliamentary elections, Gomulka warned voters that if they crossed National Front candidates off the ballot, it would mean "crossing Poland off the map of Europe."
AP Wire Service, 19 Jan 57. Received JCS 192056Z Jan 57.
- 20 Jan (u) Yugoslavia requested urgent assistance from the UN to cope with an increasing number of refugees from Hungary. In the preceding 24 hours, 684 Hungarians had entered Yugoslavia, bringing the total to 7,958.
AP Wire Service, 20 Jan 57. Received JCS 202055Z Jan 57.
- 20 Jan (u) In Cairo, a government spokesman said that Egypt would reject the stationing of UN troops in the Gaza Strip or the Sharm el Sheikh area.
NYT, 21 Jan 57, 9:3. Received JCS 211330Z Jan 57.
- 20 Jan (u) The French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs conferred with the Sultan of Morocco at Nice in the first high-level meeting between the two countries since the French arrest of five Algerian nationalist leaders in October. After the meeting the Secretary said that the Algerian problem would not necessarily interfere with the re-establishment of Franco-Moroccan relations.
AP Wire Service, 20 Jan 57. Received JCS 201902Z Jan 57.
- 20 Jan The US Ambassador in Beirut cabled that he was puzzled over President Chamoun's request to Iraq for financial aid to secure re-election. The Ambassador observed that the approaching elections were only for the parliament, which would not choose a president for a year. Furthermore, Chamoun had told the Ambassador that he was not worried over the fact that Syria, Egypt, and perhaps Saudi Arabia were prepared to spend large sums to influence the election results. The Ambassador believed that Chamoun's slate would need some outside funds and saw no objection to Iraq's furnishing the amount requested if the donation could be kept secret. However, he considered it undesirable that the US should join with Iraq in such action.
() Msg, Beirut (Heath) to SecState, 1745, 20 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State 210933Z Jan 57. Received JCS 211705Z Jan 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

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20 Jan

At a dinner held during the four-power Moslem conference in Ankara, the US Ambassador to Turkey informed the Crown Prince and the Prime Minister of Iraq of the US position on election aid to President Chamoun. The Iraqi leaders responded that some immediate action to help Chamoun was essential. The British Ambassador in Ankara volunteered the opinion that the UK would be prepared to contribute \$25,000 to a joint aid fund. The US Ambassador urged the State Department to secure a prompt US commitment for the fund.

(S) Msg, Ankara (Warren) to SecState, 1670, 20 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State 200610Z Jan 57. Received JCS 211705Z Jan 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

20 Jan (U)

An estimated 90 per cent of Poland's 17½ million eligible voters turned out for parliamentary elections and most cast ballots for the Communist and other National Front candidates preferred by Gomulka. The AP reported that although thousands of voters had evidently exercised their right to cross names off the ballot list, an overwhelming majority had filed their ballots without marking them, thus automatically giving their votes to the candidates whose names were placed at the top of the list.

AP Wire Service, 20 Jan 57. Received JCS 201952Z and 210046Z Jan 57.

Unofficial returns reported by the AP on 22 January showed that of 459 parliamentary seats, parties of the National Front had won all but one seat, and for this seat a new election was scheduled. The Communists, with 236 seats, obtained a majority.

AP Wire Service, 22 Jan 57. Received JCS 230007Z Jan 57.

21 Jan (U)

The exchange of war prisoners between Egypt and Israel began with Israel's delivery of 500 Egyptian captives to UN authorities at El Arish.

AP Wire Service, 21 Jan 57. Received JCS 211456Z Jan 57.

21 Jan

At the end of a two-day meeting in Ankara, the four Moslem members of the Baghdad Pact announced full support of the Eisenhower Doctrine. Their communique also deplored the sabotage of the IPC pipeline and called for insulation of the Suez Canal "from the national politics of any one power."

AP Wire Service, 21 Jan 57. Received JCS 211345Z and 211609Z Jan 57. Text of the communique is in State Dept Bulletin, vol XXXVI, no 920 (11 Feb 57), pp. 216-217.

According to a report obtained from a Turkish Foreign Office source by the US Ambassador in Ankara, the most important outcome of the meeting was the changed attitude of the Pakistanis, who recognized the need for the Baghdad Pact more than at any time in the past. Pakistan, Turkey, and Iran believed that UK popularity in the Middle East should be built

up again, the source said. The Iraqi Government concurred, but it would be restrained by public opinion from openly supporting the UK.

(S) Msg, Ankara (Warren) to SecState, 1717, 24 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State 251551Z Jan 57. Received JCS 261315Z Jan 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

22 Jan

(S) Teletyped Info Rpt, CIA to JCS.

Received JCS 280116Z Jan 57. Reports that a slowdown was occurring were received JCS on AP Wire Service, 240044Z Jan 57, and in NYT, 24 Jan 57, 10:3, 241330Z Jan 57.

22 Jan

(S) reported that deliveries of materiel to Syria were being accelerated and that the presence in Syria of an increased number of Slavic Europeans was evident. For the first time, reports had been received from reliable observers indicating that "equipment in some amount" was moving from Latakia to Aleppo and possibly beyond.

Jan 57.

Received JCS 230106Z

22 Jan (U)

Yemen said that it was ready to open negotiations for a settlement of its border dispute with Aden. AP Wire Service, 22 Jan 57. Received JCS 221753Z Jan 57.

The British Foreign Office questioned the sincerity of Yemen's willingness to negotiate.

AP Wire Service, 23 Jan 57. Received JCS 231450Z Jan 57.

22 Jan (U)

Israel announced that it had completed withdrawal from all of the Sinai Peninsula except "a very small strip" along the west coast of the Gulf of Aqaba.

AP Wire Service, 22 Jan 57. Received JCS 221812Z Jan 57.

22 Jan

The US Embassy in London reported that the UK had sent a note to Jordan asking that negotiations on the Anglo-Jordanian treaty begin forthwith in view of the announcement in Cairo of Jordan's agreement with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria. Jordan had not replied to the British note of 16 January that expressed willingness to begin negotiations.

(S) Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 3885, 22 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State 230359Z Jan 57. Received JCS 231538Z Jan 57.

22 Jan

The State Department informed the US Ambassador in Ankara that it believed contributions to President Chamoun along the lines suggested by Iraq would be regarded as interference in the internal affairs of Lebanon. The Ambassador was instructed to make clear to Iraqi, Turkish, and British officials with whom he had discussed the matter on 20 January that the US felt the disadvantages of the Iraqi suggestion far outweighed the advantages. There was no likelihood that the US would participate in such action, the Department said.

(S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Ankara, 1665, 22 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received JCS 232134Z Jan 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

23 Jan

President Chamoun of Lebanon asked that the President and SecState be informed of his belief that no effort should be spared during Saud's Washington visit to detach Saud from Egypt and incline him toward cooperation with Iraq. He urged the US to oppose establishment of a UN administration in the Gaza Strip because it would be unwelcome to Saud.

(S) Msg, Beirut (Heath) to SecState, 1777, 23 Jan 57, DA IN 290205 (24 Jan 57). Received State 240756Z Jan 57. Received JCS 241959Z Jan 57. A copy received JCS 242046Z Jan 57 was SEEN by Adm Radford.

23 Jan

Abba Eban, Israel's delegate to the UN, gave Secretary General Hammarskjold an aide-memoire setting forth the Israeli position on withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Sharm el Sheikh area. Israeli sources told the AP that the document included the conditions announced by Prime Minister Ben Gurion in a speech delivered to the Knesset at approximately the same time that the memorandum was given to Hammarskjold. Ben Gurion reiterated Israel's demands for assurance of free navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba and security against Fedayeen attacks from the Gaza Strip.

AP Wire Service, 23 Jan 57. Received JCS 231410Z, 231542Z, 231907Z, 231650Z, and 232247Z Jan 57.

According to the New York Times, Ben Gurion demanded that troops of the UNEF be stationed at Sharm el Sheikh until Israel and Egypt achieved a peace settlement. He opposed the entry of UN forces into the Gaza Strip, however, claiming that Israel's security would be adversely affected. The Prime Minister declared that Israel must retain control of the Strip by maintaining a civilian police force there and supervising public service and economic development under "suitable arrangements" with the UN. Finally, he appealed to the UN to prepare a plan for permanent settlement of the Palestine refugees, including those in the Gaza Strip, and said that Israel would contribute to a solution of the refugee problem. The Knesset gave him a vote of confidence, 54-17.

NYT, 24 Jan 57, 1:2, 11:1. Received JCS 241330Z Jan 57. The aide-memoire containing these points was transmitted in (Lmt'd Offl Use) Msg, New York (Lodge)

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to SecState, DELGA 572, 23 Jan 57. Received State
12:46 p.m. [sic; a.m.] (0546Z) 24 Jan 57. Received
JCS 241634Z Jan 57.

In a conversation with Ambassador Lodge, Hammar-
skjold termed the Israeli position "unfortunate." He
said that Israel was trying to annex the Gaza Strip.
Its demand that the UNEF remain in the Sharm el Sheikh
area pending a peace settlement was, in his opinion,
impossible. He believed that if the Israelis could
be made to withdraw, it would be possible to obtain
agreement on many of the points that they desired.
Egypt could not make concessions before the Israelis
had withdrawn, he said, because such concessions
would appear to be fruits of aggression. Lodge
recommended to the State-Department that a high-level
effort be made to persuade the Israelis that they
were "going against their own best interests."
() Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA
571, 23 Jan 57. Received State 240408Z Jan 57.
Received JCS 241634Z Jan 57.

24 Jan The Foreign Minister of Iraq confirmed to the UK
Embassy in Baghdad that the Government of Iraq was
agreeable to resuming meetings of the Baghdad Pact
"technical committees" provided there was no publicity.
(The Counselor of the US Embassy in Baghdad commented
to the State Department the next day that the re-
sumption of Baghdad Pact meetings at the Council or
deputies level would depend on developments growing
out of the new Middle East program and the Crown
Prince's trip to Washington.)
() Msg, Baghdad (Fritzlan) to SecState, 1294,
25 Jan 57, DA IN 290699 (26 Jan 57). Received State
251337Z Jan 57. Received JCS 260721Z Jan 57.

24 Jan Secretary General Hammarskjold told US Ambassador
Lodge in New York that he greatly feared the conse-
quences of failure by the UN to bring about Israeli
withdrawal in accordance with UN resolutions would
be (1) a serious deterioration in the UN's influence,
(2) Egypt's turning to the USSR for support, and
(3) greatly increased difficulty in obtaining a basic
Suez settlement.
() Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 581,
24 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State 250544Z Jan 57.
Received JCS 251629Z Jan 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

24 Jan Egyptian Foreign Minister Fawzi told US Ambassador
Lodge in New York that Egypt would allow passage
through the Suez Canal to any ship that paid its tolls
to Egypt; when asked if this included Israeli ships,
he was noncommittal. He said that as soon as the
Israeli withdrawals were complete, Egypt would be
ready to discuss a Suez Canal settlement in a con-
structive and expeditious manner.
(Lmt'd Offl Use) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState,
DELGA 583, 24 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State
250332Z Jan 57. Received JCS 252108Z Jan 57. SEEN
by Adm Radford.

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24 Jan

The US Embassy in Cairo reported that the US Information Service project to counter the attacks in the Egyptian press on the Eisenhower Middle East program was "successful beyond expectations."

(S) Msg, Cairo (Hart) to SecState, 2338, 24 Jan 57, DA IN 290885 (26 Jan 57). Received State 251936Z Jan 57. Received JCS 262320Z Jan 57.

24 Jan

CIA was informed.

Received JCS 301241Z Jan 57.

25 Jan (U)

Secretary General Hammarskjold presented a special report to the UN General Assembly on the Middle East situation and an aide-memoire from Israel defining Israel's position regarding withdrawal. (The latter is briefed under 23 January.) Hammarskjold said that Israel had not completed the withdrawal required by UN resolutions and repeated his belief that Israel should withdraw promptly. Under the 1949 Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement, he said, the UN could not accept Israel's proposed control of the Gaza Strip, "even if it were of a non-military character." Nor could the UN itself assume the administration of the Gaza Strip without the consent of Egypt. However, the UNEF should enter the Strip and cooperate with the Truce Supervision Organization in preventing "incursions and raids across the armistice demarcation lines"; in this connection Hammarskjold said he had been informed of the desire of Egypt that all such incursions and raids, in both directions, should cease, "and that United Nations auxiliary organs afford effective assistance to that effect." As to the Sharm el Sheikh area, Hammarskjold noted that the question of navigation of the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba was involved and pointed out that "a legal controversy exists as to the right of innocent passage" through those waters. Pending a decision on this question by the International Court of Justice, he believed the Israelis should withdraw their troops and both sides should refrain from claiming or exercising belligerent rights in the area (i.e., Egypt should cease interfering with Israeli shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba). The UNEF could move into the Sharm el Sheikh area after the Israeli withdrawal but "should not be used so as to prejudice the solution of the controversial questions involved" or "to protect any special position on these

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questions," though it might "function in support of mutual restraint in accordance with the foregoing."

NYT, 26 Jan 57, 1:8, 6. Received JCS 261330Z Jan 57. AP Wire Service reports began arriving in JCS at 251648Z Jan 57.

- 26 Jan (U) The Cairo agreement of 19 January, under which Jordan was to receive \$36 million a year from Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia in lieu of an annual British subsidy, was unanimously approved by the Jordanian Senate. The agreement had previously passed the lower house of the Jordanian Parliament.
AP Wire Service, 26 Jan 57. Received JCS 261619Z Jan 57.
- 26 Jan The Prime Minister of Iran told the US Ambassador in Tehran that the consensus of the four Moslem powers of the Baghdad Pact at their Ankara meeting had been that Britain must resume an active role in the Pact. The date of the next full meeting of the Council would not be discussed, however, until the return of the Crown Prince of Iraq from the United States.
(S) Msg, Tehran (Chapin) to SecState, 1150, 26 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State 261751Z Jan 57. Received JCS 281313Z Jan 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.
- 26 Jan Secretary General Hammarskjold sent a message to Nasser asking that Israeli withdrawal not be made a pre-condition to discussions of a basic Suez settlement and requesting that Egypt agree to begin such discussions at once.
(S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 598, 28 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State 290216Z Jan 57. Received JCS 291620Z Jan 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.
- 26 Jan The US Ambassador in Beirut reported that, according to information from President Chamoun and General Chehab, budgetary difficulties would prevent the British Government from furnishing the jet fighter planes with which it had tentatively planned to replace the Vampires previously furnished the Lebanese Air Force. Chamoun and Chehab wanted to know if the US could either provide funds for the purchase of the British jets or send US jets, in the latter case with a US air training mission to replace the British training mission. General Chehab had told the US Army Attache in Beirut that by April 1957 he had to have planes capable of defeating Syrian MIG-17's.
(S) Msg, Beirut (Heath) to SecState, 1804, 26 Jan 57, DA IN 291060 (27 Jan 57). Received State 261528Z Jan 57. Received JCS 272047Z Jan 57.
- 27 Jan (U) Israel offered to negotiate with Egypt for a peaceful settlement of the issues between them. At the same time, according to the AP, Israel said that Hammarskjold's recommendation for a return to the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement of 1949 was an attempt "to revive an agreement which has collapsed beyond repair owing to Egypt's policy of belligerency against Israel."
AP Wire Service, 27 Jan 57. Received JCS 280010Z Jan 57.

assurances that are sought in this connection can be given effect--and they must be given effect--only after Israel completes the withdrawal of its forces behind the armistice lines."

NYT, 29 Jan 57, 1:8, 3:3-4. Received JCS 291330Z Jan 57.

28 Jan SecState instructed the US Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council to advise that body as follows if the question of economic aid to Poland should arise: The US believed it important that the Western powers should try to reorient Polish trade toward the West and should offer economic aid and trade inducements toward this end. The US was already permitting the sale of surplus agricultural products to Poland for dollars at world market prices. It was encouraging trade with Poland in private business channels and was seeking increased contacts and exchanges with Poland in technical and cultural fields. The US hoped to take action soon in regard to talks on trade suggested by the Poles, to be held in Washington.

(S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Paris, TOPOL 1277, 28 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received JCS 292024Z Jan 57.

28 Jan SecState wrote the Secretary General of the UN, stressing (1) the great importance to Egypt and the Canal users that the Canal be opened at the earliest possible moment, and (2) the need for agreements at the earliest possible date giving effect to the six principles of the 13 October Security Council resolution. SecState suggested the desirability of consulting with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development concerning the financial matters, including tolls, connected with the clearance and opening of the Canal.

(S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Ankara, 1790, 5 Feb 57. Received JCS 061653Z Feb 57.

28 Jan (U) Iraq's Cabinet approved a treaty of friendship with Morocco that pledged united efforts against both Communism and Zionism. The treaty opened a way for other North African countries besides Morocco to join the anti-Israeli Arabs of the Middle East. After the Cabinet's action, the treaty was sent to the Iraqi House of Deputies for approval.

AP Wire Service, 28 Jan 57. Received JCS 290048Z Jan 57.

30 Jan SecState instructed the US Ambassador in Tel Aviv to inform Ben Gurion that the US considered that Hammar-skjold's report and recommendations provided a "sound basis for further constructive UN action" and to urge Israel's cooperation in carrying out the UN resolutions. SecState also instructed the US Embassy in Cairo to express similar views concerning Egyptian cooperation, and the US delegation at the UN in New York to speak to Israeli representatives there in the same vein.

(S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Tel Aviv, 749, 30 Jan 57. Received JCS 011656Z Feb 57.

30 Jan (v) The Iraq Petroleum Company announced that it had paid the Syrian Government \$4,800,000 (\$13,440,000) for the passage of the IPC oil across Syrian territory in 1956. The amount was \$4,760,000 less than normal because the flow of oil had been stopped early in November by Syrian sabotage of the pipelines.
AP Wire Service, 30 Jan 57. Received JCS 301550Z Jan 57.

30 Jan (v) King Saud of Saudi Arabia arrived in Washington for an official visit with President Eisenhower and to confer with the President about the situation in the Middle East.
NYT, 31 Jan 57, 1:6. Received JCS 311330Z Jan 57.

31 Jan The US Ambassador in Amman reported that [redacted] had observed four boxcars and two flatcars loaded with heavy weapons at the Jordanian railway junction of Ma'an on the night of 29-30 Jan; a local source had told him this materiel was of Czechoslovakian origin, was now owned by Syria, and was being sent as a gift to Saudi Arabia. [redacted] had also seen a convoy of 20 Saudi Arabian trucks at Ma'an, loading antitank and light field guns that appeared to be of Soviet make. The Ambassador commented to the State Department that if this development were unknown to King Saud he might wish to ascertain the facts through his own channels and make a statement or take action.
Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 860, 31 Jan 57, DA IN 292131, CJCS files. Received State (No Time). Received JCS 311734Z Jan 57. SEEN by Adm Radford. [redacted]

312219Z Jan 57. Received JCS

31 Jan SecState cabled the US Embassies at Karachi, Baghdad, Tehran, Ankara, and London that the Department did not wish to link the President's Middle East program with the Baghdad Pact, "at least at this time," because such action "would inevitably affect adversely attitude certain other countries whose cooperation we are seeking."

Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Karachi, 1821, 31 Jan 57. Received JCS 011654Z Feb 57.

SUPPLEMENT TO
CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
RELATING TO THE CURRENT WORLD CRISIS
DECISIONS AND ACTIONS TAKEN BY
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
FOURTH INSTALLMENT: 1 through 31 JANUARY 1957

HISTORICAL SECTION
 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 3 May 1957

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3 Jan ✓

The JCS agreed to inform the Secretary of Defense of actions taken since 3 December 1956 to modify the alert status of U.S. military forces. In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, dated 4 January, the JCS listed these actions:

a. Army: The alert of the USAREUR army task Force was cancelled on 21 December 1956 and the force directed to retain the capability for deployment to the Middle East.

b. Navy

(1) On 13 December 1956 CINCNELM debarked from the U.S.S. Pocono and established Command Headquarters in London.

(2) On 17 December 1956 the Sixth Fleet was directed to resume normal operations. The anti-submarine group returned to the United States and the task group was dissolved.

(3) The Forrester-Roosevelt fast carrier group returned to the United States and the task group was dissolved.

(4) On 29 December 1956 two amphibious ships from the Seventh Fleet, with one Marine BLT embarked, were directed to return from the Middle East to the Far East. On 28 December CINCPACFLT had been directed to return the AKA carrying additional equipment from Subic Bay to the Far East Command area.

c. Air Force

(1) On 7 December 1956 the Tactical Air Command was returned to a condition of normal readiness and training.

(2) On 7 December 1956 CINCSAC was directed to return SAC to a status of normal readiness and training but to maintain an increased intelligence watch.

(3) On 7 December 1956 the heavy transport aircraft of the Tactical Air Command were removed from alert status.

(4) On 21 December 1956 CINCONAD terminated increased intelligence watch and reverted to normal sustained preparedness.

() Memo, DN-4-57, Dir JS to JCS, "Alert Status of U.S. Military Forces," 2 Jan 57, CCS 381 E.M.M.E.A. (11-19-47) sec 53. () Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Alert Status of U.S. Military Forces (U)," 4 Jan 57, same file.

4 Jan ✓

The JCS approved the conclusions of a JSSC memorandum on European security. This memorandum was prepared in response to a recommendation of the Chief of Naval Operations that the UK "zone plan" of 1955, which proposed the creation of a demilitarized belt including East Germany, Austria, and the western halves of Poland and Czechoslovakia, be restudied in light of recent developments in the Soviet satellite system.

The conclusions of the JSSC memorandum, approved by the JCS, were as follows:

"a. The Soviet objective of maintaining her position in Eastern Europe, by controlling satellite areas with force if necessary, has not been modified by recent developments in Poland and Hungary; nor does there appear to be any reasonable expectation that this objective will change in the foreseeable future.

"b. The presentation in the United Nations or elsewhere by the United States, or one of her allies, of a plan calling for a demilitarized zone in Eastern Europe or the neutralization of satellite areas could result in Communist or neutralist counterproposals requiring a relocation or withdrawal of United States military forces in or from Europe, which courses of action are unacceptable to the United States. Moreover, discussions of such nature under current international tensions, might well lead to a further weakening of NATO and of the United States world position.

"c. The United States, in consultation with its allies, should not retreat from its position that the unification of Germany in freedom is a prerequisite to agreements with the USSR on modification of allied military deployments in Europe."

(S) JCS 2124/179, Note by Secys, "European Security," 21 Nov 56, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) sec 32. (S) Dec on JCS 2124/181, "European Security (U)," 4 Jan 57, same file.

8 Jan ✓

The JCS advised the Secretary of Defense of their concurrence in the State Department's proposals for strengthening the air defenses of Turkey. The State Department, commenting on JCS recommendations of 30 November and 3 December 1956, had proposed that 12 U.S. interceptor aircraft and appropriate radar units from forces under SACEUR be deployed, on a rotational basis, to Adana, Turkey. The JCS considered this plan sound and feasible. They recommended, however, that while the aircraft, crews, and radar personnel should be rotated frequently, the radar equipment should be left in Turkey for the duration of the mission. In addition, the JCS emphasized that Turkish authorities should be informed that U.S. aircraft crews could not be ordered to engage hostile aircraft under any circumstances other than the rules of engagement contained in M.C. 66 without prior U.S. approval, and that the stationing of U.S. forces in Turkey did not imply that either the United States or NATO had assumed responsibility for the peacetime air defense of Turkey.

(S) JCS 1887/329, Note by Secys, "State Department Comments Regarding Air Defense Assistance for Turkey (S)," 19 Dec 56, CCS 381 E.M.M.E.A. (11-19-47) sec 52. (S) Dec on JCS 1887/333, same subj, 8 Jan 57, same file, sec 53. (S) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 8 Jan 57, same file.

9 Jan

15 Jan

The JCS, in response to a request of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) (JCS 1887/327, 7 December 1956), submitted to the Secretary of Defense their views on the military aspects of a proposed 4,000 mile highway linking Istanbul and Karachi. The JCS believed that those portions of the highway between the port of Iskenderon, Turkey, and the mountain passes in northern Iraq and northwestern Iran, and between the ports on the Persian Gulf and the central passes of the Zagros Mountains, would be of considerable military value. Of less value, but still providing an avenue for movement of Iranian and Pakistani troops and supplies, would be the section of the highway between Arak, Iran, and Karachi. The section between Iskenderon and Istanbul would be useful as an alternate line of communication to support Turkish forces defending the Middle East.

The Chiefs pointed out, however, that the highway would run between the Zagros and Elburz Mountains. Although the Baghdad Pact powers had adopted a concept of defense against Soviet aggression based on defending the Elburz line, indigenous forces were as yet not strong enough to hold this line, and would have to defend along the Zagros line. Therefore, until such time as the Baghdad Pact powers were able to defend the Elburz line, that portion of the highway north of the Zagros Mountains would benefit the Soviet attackers rather than the defenders.

Although confining their remarks to the military aspects of the proposed highway, the JCS added that, in their opinion, the principal justification for the project lay more in political, economic, and cultural benefits than in military benefits.

(S) Dec on JCS 1887/334, "International Highway in the Near East to Link Baghdad Pact Countries (S)" 15 Jan 57, CCS 381 E.M.M.E.A. (11-19-47) sec 53. (S) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 15 Jan 57, same file, sec 54.

18 Jan ✓

The JCS, after making amendments, approved a paper drawn up by the Chairman, JCS, containing proposed answers to certain questions, asked by Senator Fulbright, dealing with the strategic value of the Middle East to the United States. The Senator had addressed the questions to the Secretary of State in connection with the Congressional hearings on the President's proposed Middle Eastern policies, and the State Department had referred those questions of a military nature to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), who had submitted them to the JCS on 16 January 1957. Forwarding the answers to the Secretary of Defense, the JCS suggested that, in order not to establish a precedent for other members of Congress to submit questions to the JCS, the enclosed answers not be attributed to the JCS.

Included in the answers made by the JCS to Senator Fulbright's questions were the following points:

(1) The Middle East could be used by the USSR as a staging area for attack on U.S. and Allied forces and installations in the area. The Soviet Union aspired to control the Middle East as a major step towards eventually undermining the strength of the free world. Moreover, control of Middle Eastern oil would almost insure control of Europe.

(2) The Middle East could be used as a staging area for direct attacks on Greece and Italy. Acquisition of Turkey and Iran by an enemy would imperil the "western" flank of NATO, and probably result in the loss of allied control of the Eastern Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and contiguous areas.

(3) The Middle East offered an avenue for aggression against India, West Pakistan, and the Asian countries lying to the east of them. The Middle East was also an avenue for potential aggression against Africa via the numerous air facilities in Turkey, Iran, and the Arab states; via the sea lanes of the area; and via the Sinai Peninsula.

(4) In the event of war between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Middle East would offer a major avenue of retaliation against the USSR. Greece, Turkey, and Iran offered the closest approach for air and land assaults on the vital Ukraine.

(5) The United States was not dependent upon Middle Eastern oil to wage war, but her allies were. Therefore, the United States and her allies could not carry on a prolonged war without Middle Eastern oil.

(6) While denial of Middle Eastern petroleum resources to a potential enemy was considered essential, the United States also had access to Middle Eastern bases and other military facilities that would be lost or drastically reduced in value if the Soviets gained control

of any significant portion of the area. The world-wide defensive structure of the United States would thus be seriously weakened. Communist acquisition of the Middle East would divide the free world, undermine the economic and military strength of Western Europe, and jeopardize the aspirations and programs of many Asian nations for economic and social progress.

(S) Dec on JCS 1887/338, "Questions Submitted by Senator Fulbright (S)," 18 Jan 57, CCS 381 E.M.M.E.A. (11-19-47) sec 54. (S) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 18 Jan 57, same file.

18 Jan ✓

The JCS agreed to recommend to the Secretary of Defense that the plan to provide arms assistance to the victim(s) of aggression in the event of Arab-Israeli hostilities be terminated entirely. That portion of the plan relating to Egypt had already been cancelled, but the rest of the plan, calling for augmentation of Israeli forces with aircraft and equipment on 48-hour notice, was still in effect. The JCS, in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, stated their belief that current developments in the Middle East made it highly unlikely that this plan would be carried out in the foreseeable future. Moreover, supplies and equipment stockpiled to support the plan were urgently needed to fill other requirements in Europe and in the Mediterranean area. Therefore, the plan ought to be terminated. [On 21 February 1957 the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) informed the Chairman, JCS, that the State Department agreed with the JCS views and that, accordingly, the plan was being terminated.]

(S) Dec on JCS 2105/49, "Termination of a Plan to Provide Arms Assistance to the Victim(s) of Aggression (S)," 18 Jan 57, CCS 092 Egypt (7-28-56) sec 3. (S) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 18 Jan 57, same file. (S) N/H JCS 2105/49, same subj, 26 Feb 57, same file.

18 Jan ✓

The JCS agreed to furnish the Secretary of Defense with a list of additional base rights and in transit rights that the United States would need in the Middle East in order to implement joint plans for protecting or evacuating U.S. nationals, for guarding U.S. national interests, and for intervening in Arab-Israeli hostilities. Current base rights in the area derived largely from NATO and/or mutual defense arrangements, which would not permit use of the bases if U.S. forces were unilaterally deployed for intervention in the Arab-Israeli dispute. In a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, dated 18 January, the JCS listed the new base and transit rights that each of the three Services would require to carry out these plans. They stated that the list was only tentative, however, since the new Middle Eastern policies then being considered by the United States might alter the

requirements. They recommended, therefore, that no steps be taken for the time being to seek any rights outside the NATO framework.

(S) Dec on JCS 1887/332, "Base Requirements for U.S. Forces Deployed in the Middle East in Support of CINCSPECOMME Operations Plan 215-56 (U)," 18 Jan 57, CCS 381 E.M.M.E.A.(11-19-47) sec 53. (S) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Base Requirements and In Transit Rights for U.S. Forces Deployed in the Middle East in Support of CINCSPECOMME Operations Plan 215-56 (U)," 18 Jan 57, same file, sec 54.

18 Jan ✓ Noting that the Suez Canal might become operational before a settlement of the Suez problem was reached, the JCS directed that the JSSC study the question of possible demands for U.S. military action, either unilateral or within the United Nations, in the event of a deadlock in negotiations concerning use of the canal. The JCS also expressed the desire to be kept informed, while this study was in progress, in case any indication of a requirement for U.S. military action arose.

(S) Memo, SM-62-57, Secy JCS to JSSC, "Reopening of the Suez Canal (U)," 18 Jan 57, CCS 092 Egypt (7-28-56) sec 3.

CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

RELATING TO

THE CURRENT WORLD CRISIS

FOURTH INSTALLMENT:

4 - 31 DECEMBER 1956

HISTORICAL SECTION
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
19 April 1957

OASD(PA) DFOISK SI-TS-703
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4 Dec (U) British forces south of Port Said began to turn over their positions to UNEF troops and the first Allied contingents boarded ships for evacuation from Egypt. At the same time, UNEF troops fanned out into the Sinai Desert from Suez.
NYT, 5 Dec 56, 1:7, 22:3-5. Received JCS 051330Z Dec 56.

4 Dec (U) The State Department announced that the US had pointedly called Syria's attention to the US warning of 29 November that any aggression against Iraq would be viewed in Washington with utmost gravity. In Damascus, Premier Asali disclosed that the US Ambassador had "explained to me the new United States policy toward the Middle East."
AP Wire Service, 4 Dec 56. Received JCS 041418Z and 041952Z Dec 56.

4 Dec The US Ambassador in Baghdad, reporting the favorable reaction of Iraqi officialdom to the US statement of 29 November concerning the Baghdad Pact, predicted that this mood would prove transitory and that efforts to secure US adherence to the Pact would be redoubled. Nuri's policies, the Ambassador said, were so closely bound to the Baghdad Pact that his fall would probably presage a change in Iraq's attitude toward the Pact, followed by a drift toward neutralism, and perhaps ultimately an unsettled situation in Iraq comparable to that in Syria and Jordan. The Ambassador felt that, should such a sequence occur while the US was consistently refusing to join the Pact, the US would find it difficult to convince the Iraqis of its intention to protect Iraq from the USSR. While Nuri and his associates were grateful for US support they could not understand why, if the US were determined to protect the area from the Soviets, it did not join the Pact formed under US sponsorship for that purpose. Recommending that the US promptly join the Pact the Ambassador said he had "repeatedly stated during the past 20 months [that] half measures are not enough."
(S) Msg, Baghdad (Gallman) to SecState, 992, 4 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 051418Z Dec 56. Received JCS 070059Z Dec 56.

4 Dec The US Ambassador in Tehran reported that the Shah of Iran regarded the US statement of 29 November concerning the Baghdad Pact as helpful but insufficient. In the Shah's opinion, stability in the Middle East was still dependent upon US adherence to the Pact. The Prime Minister had expressed mild satisfaction with the US statement but regarded it as a prelude to US membership in the Pact. The Ambassador advised SecState that, in the absence of general war, a number of specific US actions would be necessary to give continuity and substance to the position established by the statement of 29 November. Despite the statement, Iranians still had many doubts about what course the US would follow in the Middle East. US adherence to the Baghdad Pact would go far toward dispelling these doubts.
(S) Msg, Tehran (Chapin) to SecState, 858, 4 Dec 56. Received State 041458Z Dec 56. Received JCS 051611Z Dec 56.

- 4 Dec The US Ambassador in Tehran cabled a report, obtained from Iranian officials, of a conversation held in Moscow between the Iranian Ambassador and Bulganin. During the course of the conversation, Bulganin stated that the USSR had advised Egypt to accept a Suez settlement based on the six points formulated at the UN in October. Bulganin also said that rumors of Soviet bases or volunteers in Syria were totally unfounded.
(S) Msg, Tehran (Chapin) to SecState, 862, 4 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 061454Z Dec 56. Received JCS 070253Z Dec 56.
- 4 Dec According to an official of the Turkish Foreign Office, the Pakistani Government suggested to the Turkish Ambassador in Karachi that, in view of public opinion in Pakistan and the UK's membership in the Baghdad Pact, the forthcoming meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council be held in Ankara instead of Karachi. This proposal had also been submitted to Iraq and Iran. Pakistan had also asked King Saud to invite the four Moslem Baghdad Pact powers to meet with him in Riyadh in early January. If Saud refused, Pakistan was prepared to meet in Ankara between 4 and 9 January.
(S) Msg, Ankara (Warren) to SecState, 1338, 6 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 072138Z Dec 56. Received JCS 072358Z Dec 56.
- 4 Dec ✓ For the second time, a French commercial vessel arrived at the US wharf at Port Lyautey. According to the US Embassy, the ship had first attempted to unload at Casablanca but had been prevented by Arab dockworkers.
(S) Msg, COMNAVACTS to CNO, 051815Z Dec 56. Received JCS 061123Z Dec 56.
- 4 Dec (U) A New York Times correspondent in Tel Aviv reported that an Israeli plan, backed by France, to build a 30-inch pipeline across Israel from the Red Sea to a Mediterranean port had been blocked by the US State Department. As a result, the Israeli Cabinet was now considering the construction of an 8-inch pipeline from Elath to Beersheeba.
NYT, 5 Dec 56, 20:1. Received JCS 051330Z Dec 56.
- 4 Dec (U) The French National Assembly voted 48 billion francs for economic and social development in Morocco and Tunisia, but coupled the appropriation with a warning to the two countries to adopt a more friendly and cooperative attitude toward France and French settlers.
NYT, 5 Dec 56, 15:1. Received JCS 051330Z Dec 56.
- 4 Dec (U) In notes delivered to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, the USSR and Hungary replied to the Yugoslav notes of 24 November protesting Nagy's abduction after leaving the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest. Both the USSR and Hungary disclaimed responsibility for the incident. The Soviets said the Nagy affair was an internal Hungarian matter, while Kadar said Nagy had gone to Rumania voluntarily, an explanation already rejected by Yugoslavia.
NYT, 5 Dec 56, 7:1. Received JCS 051330Z Dec 56.

The Yugoslav delegate to the UN told the General Assembly that Hungary had violated good faith by abducting Nagy. He rejected the Hungarian claim that Nagy had gone to Rumania of his own free will.

AP Wire Service, 4 Dec 56. Received JCS 041802Z Dec 56.

4 Dec The Military Section of the Hungarian Foreign Liaison Office told the US Army and Air Attaches in Budapest that the Hungarian Army and Air Force had ceased to exist as such. Below the Ministry of Armed Forces, there was no organization of military units. All Hungarian officers--Army, Air Force, Border Guard, AVH, and Civil Police--now belonged to the "Armed Forces Officers Corps" and had the sole mission of disarming "counter-revolutionaries." Enlisted men and junior officers who had reported for duty were in their barracks, unarmed and generally idle.

(C) Msg, USARMA and USAIRA Budapest to DEPTAR, B-301, 050852Z Dec 56, DA IN 277612. Received JCS 052159Z Dec 56.

4 Dec (U) The Jordanian Parliament voted to send a message asking King Faisal of Iraq to abandon the Baghdad Pact in the interests of Arab unity. However, the Parliament turned down a proposal to ask Faisal to dismiss Premier Nuri Said.

AP Wire Service, 4 Dec 56. Received JCS 050051Z Dec 56.

4 Dec (U) During the afternoon, the UN General Assembly debated the 14-power resolution to call on Hungary and the USSR to comply with previous UN resolutions on Hungary and to consent by 7 December to admit UN observers to Hungary. In the midst of the debate, Hungarian Foreign Minister Imre Horvath announced that he was ready to meet Secretary General Hammarskjold immediately to discuss a date for Hammarskjold's visit to Budapest.

AP Wire Service, 4 Dec 56. Received JCS 042157Z Dec 56.

After conferring with Hammarskjold, Horvath said Hammarskjold had informed him of his desire to visit Budapest for three days 16-18 December. Horvath said he had cabled this information to his government and was waiting to learn whether or not it was willing to receive Hammarskjold at that time.

AP Wire Service, 4 Dec 56. Received JCS 042341Z Dec 56.

Later, Hammarskjold announced to the General Assembly that he had arranged for a representative to leave for a 10-day visit to Budapest beginning 9 December. He himself wanted to visit Hungary a week later.

AP Wire Service, 4 Dec 56. Received JCS 050342Z Dec 56.

Shortly after midnight, the General Assembly adopted, 54-10, the 14-power resolution introduced on 3 December.

AP Wire Service, 5 Dec 56. Received JCS 051359Z Dec 56. Text in State Dept, Bulletin, vol XXXVI, no. 912 (17 Dec 56), p. 963.

5 Dec

In Washington, the Ambassadors of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan called on SecState Dulles to express concern over the situation in Iraq and Syria. They feared that if the Nuri Government in Iraq collapsed, no successor government would keep Iraq in the Baghdad Pact. The best way to stabilize the situation, the Ambassadors said, was for the US to join the Pact. They suggested that, if this were impossible, the US should intimate that it would join later. Secretary Dulles referred to his statement of 29 November concerning the Pact, and added that it would be a great mistake for the US to intimate that it would join the Pact unless it were prepared to do so immediately. He assured the Ambassadors that the US was fully alive to the problems that they had raised and intended to do something about them. After the meeting the Ambassadors told reporters that Mr. Dulles had reiterated US support of the Baghdad Pact.

() Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Ankara, 1360, 12 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 131609Z Dec 56. Press reports, disclosing in general terms the subjects discussed, reached JCS by AP Wire Service, 5 Dec 56. Received JCS 051618Z, 051748Z, 051840Z, and 052229Z Dec 56.

5 Dec

DIA
Several hundred Hungarians calling for UN help demonstrated in front of the US Legation in Budapest during the afternoon. While Soviet tanks and troops patrolled the area, AVH troops in Civil Police and Army uniforms dispersed the demonstrators. Reporting this incident, the US Army Attache commented that the Hungarians were not being fooled by the Soviet tactic of disguising security forces in police and military uniforms, and now suspected all unknown persons in such uniforms of being AVH personnel.

() Msg, USARMA Budapest to DEPTAR, B-305, 060911Z Dec 56, DA IN 277970. Received JCS 070054Z Dec 56. AP Wire Service, 5 Dec 56. Received JCS 051404Z, 051533Z, 051644Z, 051646Z, 051726Z, 051824Z, 051830Z, 052211Z, and 052214Z Dec 56.

5 Dec

S-1
The Kadar regime in Hungary issued a decree dissolving the revolutionary committees in government offices and other institutions, and ordering officials ousted by the committees to return to work immediately. The US Minister in Budapest commented that the edict was clearly motivated by the Soviet desire to eliminate focal points of patriotism and potential resistance, and to return trusted agents to positions of influence.

() Msg, Budapest (Wailles) to SecState, 389, 5 Dec 56, DA IN 278014 (6 Dec 56). Received State 060210Z Dec 56. Received JCS 070716Z Dec 56.

5 Dec (U) The Hungarian Government announced over Budapest Radio that a visit to Hungary by UN Secretary General Hammarskjold was "not suitable" for the Hungarian Government and "therefore the visit will not take place on Dec. 16."

AP Wire Service, 5 Dec 56. Received JCS 051923Z and 051940Z Dec 56.

5 Dec The US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia arrived in Riyadh at the behest of King Saud, who wished to use the Ambassador's visit as the occasion for issuing a public statement expressing appreciation of the US efforts to end the Suez crisis. (A draft statement drawn up by one of the King's officials and revised in consultation with the Ambassador was approved, with one modification, by the State Department on 8 December.)

(S) Msg, Dhahran (Carrigan from Wadsworth) to SecState, 278, 7 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 071438Z Dec 56. Received JCS 072339Z Dec 56.

(S) Msg, Dhahran (Carrigan from Wadsworth) to SecState, 279, 7 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 071623Z Dec 56. Received JCS 072359Z Dec 56. (S) Msg, SecState to AmConsul Dhahran, 223, 8 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 101939Z Dec 56.

The Ambassador stressed the importance of taking prompt action to reopen the Suez Canal, but the King stated that such action should be taken when the British and French had completed their withdrawal from Egypt. Later, Saud confided that he had telegraphed Nasser on 4 December strongly urging him to temper his actions, words, and propaganda.

(S) Msg, Dhahran (Carrigan from Wadsworth) to SecState, 281, 7 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 071711Z Dec 56. Received JCS 072359Z Dec 56.

King Saud said that he had advised both Syria and Iraq that, in the interest of Arab unity, they should cease their violent propaganda attacks on each other. He had also told King Hussein of Jordan that, if he expected to establish close relations with the US, he should not recognize Communist China. According to Saud, Syria had assured him that the IPC pipeline could be repaired once British and French troops had left Egypt.

(S) Msg, Dhahran (Carrigan from Wadsworth) to SecState, 282, 7 Dec 56. Received State 111623Z Dec 56. Received JCS 121621Z Dec 56. (S) Msg, Dhahran (Carrigan from Wadsworth) to SecState, 283, 7 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 111623Z Dec 56. Received JCS 120002Z Dec 56.

Saud emphasized the importance he attached to receiving a favorable reply from the US on the new list of arms requested by Saudi Arabia on an emergency basis. The question of defense, he said, "haunts me."

(S) Msg, Dhahran (Carrigan from Wadsworth) to SecState, 285, 7 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 111623Z Dec 56. Received JCS 120002Z Dec 56.

The King also condemned Iran's action in occupying the disputed Farsi and Arabi Islands, claimed by Saudi Arabia, and the Iranian attitude in refusing even to negotiate the matter with Saudi Arabia. Ambassador Wadsworth offered to have the US Ambassador in Tehran mention the high importance Saudi attached to a message he had sent to the Shah of Iran concerning the controversy, and the King agreed that such a move might be helpful.

(U) Msg, Dhahran (Carrigan from Wadsworth) to SecState, 280, 7 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 071902Z Dec 56. Received JCS 072359Z Dec 56.

5 Dec (U) General Burns and General Stockwell, Allied Commander in Egypt, agreed in Port Said that UNEF troops would cover the withdrawal of the British and French forces from Port Said. General Stockwell told correspondents that he had asked General Burns to allow no Egyptian troops into Port Said until the last Allied soldier had departed, and he assumed Burns would accept that obligation. General Stockwell also said that the Allied withdrawal would be completed within two or three weeks.

NYT, 6 Dec 56, 14:6 (late edition). Received JCS approximately 061700Z Dec 56.

5 Dec Iraqi Premier Nuri Said, professedly acting as spokesman for numerous highly placed Iraqis, asked the US Ambassador in Baghdad if the US could issue a statement applying to the entire Arab world the position enunciated in the US statement of 29 November concerning the northern-tier countries. Such a statement, said Nuri, would be found reassuring by the Arabs, would serve notice on Moscow that the US was prepared to move into the Middle Eastern vacuum, would discourage Soviet attempts at penetration, and could well bind the Arab states more closely together in their determination to resist Soviet pressure.

(U) Msg, Baghdad (Gallman) to SecState, 1001, 5 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 051633Z Dec 56. Received JCS 052326Z Dec 56.

5 Dec The French Foreign Office informed the US Embassy in Paris that previous reports of Soviet arms buildup in Syria were probably exaggerated. The French General Staff believed that the Soviets had not been stockpiling arms in Syria but merely re-equipping the Syrian Army with Soviet materiel. The Turkish General Staff also held this view.

(U) Msg, Paris (unsgd) to SecState, 2790, 5 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 052213Z Dec 56. Received JCS 062006Z Dec 56.

5 Dec The French Foreign Office provided the US Embassy in Paris with a highly classified memorandum containing information, regarded by the French as "absolutely firm," of arms contracts between Syria and the USSR. The document listed large quantities of Soviet arms

and ammunition scheduled for delivery to Syria beginning about 30 November.

(U) Msg, Paris (Yost) to SecState, 2804, 5 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 060859Z Dec 56. Received JCS 070059Z Dec 56.

5 Dec In Paris, the Oil Committee and the Petroleum Emergency Group (European counterpart of the US Middle East Emergency Committee) of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation held their first meeting since US oil companies were authorized to coordinate supply efforts. At this meeting, these organizations sought to clarify functions and relationships. Subsequent meetings were held on 6 and 7 December.

(U) Msg, Paris (Perkins) to SecState, POLTO 1379, 10 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 101627Z Dec 56. Received JCS 110249Z Dec 56.

5 Dec (U) British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Allan Noble told the House of Commons that Jordan had informed the UK that it wished to terminate the Anglo-Jordanian treaty. The Minister of Defense, however, stated that the UK had received no request from the Jordanian Government for withdrawal of British troops from Jordan.

NYT, 6 Dec 56, 14:1 (late edition). Received JCS approximately 061700Z Dec 56.

5 Dec (U) The French Cabinet, in a move to give Moslems more representation, adopted a series of decrees authorizing sweeping reform of local administration in Algeria. The Cabinet also authorized new local elections throughout Algeria.

AP Wire Service, 5 Dec 56. Received JCS 052052Z Dec 56.

5 Dec (U) At the UN, Hammarskjold and Israeli Ambassador Eban conferred on arrangements for replacing Israeli with UN troops in the western part of Sinai. Israeli sources said Hammarskjold agreed with Eban's contention that UN and not Egyptian troops should be responsible for this area. General Burns was scheduled to meet with either Israeli General Moshe Dayan or a deputy on 6 December at El Arish to work out staff arrangements for entry of UN troops into the area. Israeli Foreign Minister Meir told the General Assembly that Israel would withdraw from Egyptian territory as promised, but she asked what the role of the UNEF would be after Israeli troops had withdrawn.

NYT, 6 Dec 56, 1:5, 14:6-8. Received JCS 061330Z Dec 56.

6 Dec [

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(●) Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 596, 6 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 071212Z Dec 56. Received JCS 071704Z Dec 56.

The Turkish Ambassador in Amman told the US Ambassador that, upon learning of the Jordanian request for withdrawal of Iraqi troops, he had recommended to Ankara that Turkey make every effort in Baghdad to have Iraqi troops kept in Jordan in order to restrain the Syrians and encourage the more moderate Jordanian political elements.

(●) Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 597, 7 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 071228Z Dec 56. Received JCS 071704Z Dec 56.


6 Dec

The US Ambassador in Ankara reported that, in the judgment of the Embassy, the US statement of 29 November concerning the Baghdad Pact countries had had a calming influence in Turkey and had served as sufficient demonstration to Turkish officialdom and the majority of informed Turkish opinion that the US was determined to protect the northern-tier countries from the USSR. Although Turkish newspapers, without known exception, had interpreted the US statement as a real guarantee to Turkey, the working level at the Foreign Office was cautious about accepting it as a full guarantee.

(●) Msg, Ankara (Warren) to SecState, 1331, 6 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 072003Z Dec 56. Received JCS 081716Z Dec 56.

6 Dec

CIA



090525Z Dec 56. Received JCS

6 Dec

In an interview with the US Ambassador in Amman, Prime Minister Nabulsi made clear that Jordan would oppose any current attempt in the UN to effect a settlement of the Palestine issue. This decision, he said, had in fact been taken by a ministerial committee at the Beirut conference of Arab Chiefs of State.

(●) Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 595, 6 Dec 56, DA IN 278233 (7 Dec 56). Received State 061941Z Dec 56. Received JCS 071454Z Dec 56.

6 Dec

Reporting the maneuvers of Soviet tanks in front of the US Legation in Budapest on 4 and 5 December, the US Minister recommended that the State Department, as a means of dramatizing the continuing brutal Soviet repression in Hungary, formally protest to the Soviet Ambassador in Washington and release an appropriate bulletin to the press.

(●) Msg, Budapest (Wailles) to SecState, 390, 6 Dec 56, DA IN 278013. Received State 061217Z Dec 56. Received JCS 070404Z Dec 56.

The State Department summoned the Soviet Charge d'Affaires in Washington and protested the use of tanks against "helpless civilians" in Hungary, as well as the activities of the tanks in front of the US Legation in Budapest.

AP Wire Service, 6 Dec 56. Received JCS 061817Z, 061822Z, and 061857Z Dec 56.

6 Dec

SecState instructed the US Ambassador in Rabat to reply to the Moroccan note of 29 November protesting French use of Port Lyautey and calling for re-examination of the matter of US bases in Morocco. The Ambassador was to point out that the US had not been consulted and bore no responsibility for French actions, which in fact posed a real problem for the US with the population of Port Lyautey. The US doubted that it had any legal basis to demand that the French cease their activities, but had nonetheless been trying to remove the causes of friction in talks with the French, of which the Moroccans had been kept fully informed. Now the Moroccan Government had broadened the Port Lyautey problem by calling for re-examination of the entire base question. As for Port Lyautey, the US, while it would continue to work for a solution, felt that the Moroccan and French Governments should reach a direct modus vivendi. As for the larger question of bases, the US wished to delay a formal reply to the Moroccan note until discussions could be held with Morocco and France. SecState also instructed the US Ambassador in Paris to reiterate the strong US concern over French activities at Port Lyautey, to repeat the US view that all exceptional French activity there should cease, and to urge the French to undertake direct negotiations with the Moroccans on the question.

(S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Rabat, 322, 6 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 071704Z Dec 56.

6 Dec

The US Army Attache in Damascus reported that between 80,000 and 100,000 Syrians had completed 15-day training cycles as members of the Popular Resistance Movement. Over 20,000 were in Damascus alone. The Damascus army, equipped with Czech submachine guns, was composed largely of undisciplined youth who were to be seen brandishing their arms on all streets of the capital. The Attache thought these weapons might yet prove a greater threat to Syrian stability than Soviet tanks or artillery.

(S) Msg, USARMA Damascus to DEPTAR, CX 336, 061915Z Dec 56, DA IN 278420, CJCS files. Received JCS 081646Z Dec 56.

6 Dec

At the UN, the Libyan delegate told the US delegation that the Asian-African nations were considering a resolution providing for UN observers in Algeria. One reason Libya had voted for the 4 December resolution on Hungary, he said, was the precedent it set for an observer group. Other Arab states were drawing a similar parallel.

(S) Msg, New York (Wadsworth) to Sec State, DELGA 282, 6 Dec 56. Received State 070557Z Dec 56. Received JCS 071706Z Dec 56.

- 6 Dec The US Ambassador in London reported that it appeared that, although no decision had been reached, the British would be able to provide some assistance to the Libyan Army and Navy but not to the Air Force. It therefore appeared to the Foreign Office that the Libyans would turn to Egypt or the USSR for Air Force support unless the US helped.
(S) Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 3169, 6 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 062156Z Dec 56. Received JCS 072359Z Dec 56.
- 6 Dec The US Minister in Budapest reported that the Kadar regime was carrying out wholesale arrests of officials and members of the Workers Councils, students, intellectuals, and factory workers. Negotiations between Kadar and the Central Workers Council were reported to have taken place during the afternoon, the workers arguing for cessation of arrests, release of those arrested, and permission to publish a Council newspaper.
(S) Msg, Budapest (Wailles) to SecState, 402, 6 Dec 56, DA IN 278298 (7 Dec 56). Received State 062321Z Dec 56. Received JCS 072220Z Dec 56.
- 6 Dec The US Minister in Budapest reported that street fighting had broken out in the capital during the afternoon between anti-Kadar demonstrators and a crowd styled as pro-Kadar demonstrators, but thought to be AVH troops in civilian clothes. Uniformed AVH men appeared and shot into the crowd, causing several casualties. Throughout the incident, Soviet tanks in heavy strength patrolled the streets but did not fire. The US Minister thought the Soviets were trying to make the fighting in Budapest look like civil war between Hungarians with Soviet troops present in an attempt to maintain peace and restore order.
(S) Msg, Budapest (Wailles) to SecState, 401, 6 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 062212Z Dec 56. Received JCS 070545Z Dec 56. The AP account of the Budapest demonstrations reached JCS on AP Wire Service, 6 Dec 56. Received JCS 061442Z, 061446Z, 061509Z, 061531Z, and 061954Z Dec 56.
- 6 Dec (U) In Augusta, Georgia, President Eisenhower announced a combined US sea and air lift aimed at moving 21,500 Hungarian refugees to the US by 1 January or shortly thereafter.
NYT, 7 Dec 56, 1:3, 16:4. Received JCS 071330Z Dec 56.
- 6 Dec (U) General Burns and Israeli General Moshe Dayan met at El Arish to discuss the technical details of transferring Western Sinai from Israeli to UN forces. General Burns said a Yugoslav unit had already moved 15 miles into Sinai. All indications pointed to the fact that the Israelis were following a scorched-earth policy in withdrawing from Sinai in order that Egyptian forces would again approach Israel only with great difficulty.
NYT, 7 Dec 56, 3:1-3. Received JCS 071330Z Dec 56.

6 Dec (v)

In a statement circulated to UN delegates, the US called on the General Assembly to consider action against the Hungarian delegation because of Hungary's refusal to receive the UN Secretary General in Budapest. The statement charged that the UN had been deceived by the Hungarian delegate, Foreign Minister Imre Horvath, who had apparently agreed to the Hammarskjold mission only to be contradicted by a Budapest Radio announcement. India's Krishna Menon called on the USSR to use its influence to secure Hammarskjold an invitation to visit Hungary "without delay."

NYT, 7 Dec 56, 1:3, 18:2-3. Received JCS 071330Z Dec 56. Text in State Dept Bulletin, vol XXXV, no. 912 (17 Dec 56), pp. 964-965.

6 Dec

After further talks with the British, French, and Egyptians, Hammarskjold advised the US delegation at the UN that UN debate on the Suez problem would only confuse the issue. Reporting Ambassador Lodge's agreement with Hammarskjold's assessment, the Deputy US Representative recommended that SecState, in discussions with the NATO foreign ministers, take the position that a Suez settlement should be left in the hands of the Secretary General working immediately with interested parties, and that no debate ensue, at present, in the General Assembly.

() Msg, New York (Wadsworth) to SecState, DELGA 276, 6 Dec 56. Received State 070128Z Dec 56. Received JCS 071606Z Dec 56.

6 Dec

At a meeting in New York of the 14 sponsors of the 4 December General Assembly resolution on Hungary, the US failed to obtain support for a proposal to bar the Hungarian delegation from the UN in retaliation for Hungary's refusal to permit Hammarskjold and UN observers to enter Hungary. The co-sponsors agreed to meet again on 7 December. After the meeting Hammarskjold told the Deputy US Representative that UN action on Hungary ought to be based on specific events transpiring in Hungary rather than on failure to comply with the recommendations of the General Assembly.

() Msg, New York (Wadsworth) to SecState, DELGA 282, 6 Dec 56. Received State 070557Z Dec 56. Received JCS 071706Z Dec 56.

6 Dec (v)

After two days of heated debate in the House of Commons, the Eden Government won solid endorsement of its policy towards Egypt.

NYT, 7 Dec 56, 1:5, 12:4. Received JCS 071330Z Dec 56.

6 Dec (v)

In a major policy speech in New York, Vice President Nixon said that the US should give aid to the UK to meet the financial plight it faced as a result of the Suez crisis. He also emphasized the necessity of closing the breach between the US and the UK and France.

NYT, 7 Dec 56, 1:8, 8:1-8. Received JCS 071330Z Dec 56. Text in State Dept Bulletin, vol XXXV, no 912 (17 Dec 56), pp. 943-948.

6 Dec Following a reception in Belgrade, Tito kept a small group of Western ambassadors for further conversation, during which he gave his views on the Hungarian situation. He stated emphatically that the West should keep hands off Hungary in all respects. He was in the midst of negotiations with the Soviets, and any Western efforts to help would only be harmful. Tito implied that there was more going on than Western diplomats were aware of, and that the West ought to have more faith in Yugoslav policy.
 (S) Msg, Belgrade (Riddleberger) to SecState, 795, 6 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 071429Z Dec 56. Received JCS 072359Z Dec 56.

7 Dec (U) British forces began withdrawing from positions near El Cap, turning over all territory between Port Said and the old front-line sector to UN troops.
 AP Wire Service, 7 Dec 56. Received JCS 071914Z Dec 56.

7 Dec (U) Top administration officials disclosed plans for helping the UK meet the financial crisis caused by the Suez venture. Direct aid was not deemed necessary, but the administration planned to cast a favorable vote in the International Monetary Fund to authorize Britain to draw \$1 billion. In addition, Congress would be asked to cancel the \$81 million due the US in interest payments for 1956, and the US would support any British request for a loan from the Export-Import Bank.
 NYT, 8 Dec 56, 1:3-4, 10:4. Received JCS 081330Z Dec 56.

7 Dec *STATE* The SecState passed on to the US Ambassadors in Middle Eastern capitals evidence of Egyptian plans to destroy Tapline installations in Saudi Arabia in the event the US veered from its pro-Arab policy. Sabotage plans had reportedly been mapped out, under Egyptian leadership, at a meeting of the Confederation of Arab Trade Unions held in Damascus from 29 November to 1 December.
 (S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Damascus et al., 1050, 7 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 091613Z Dec 56.

7 Dec *STATE* The British Foreign Office asked the US Embassy in London if there was any truth to reports that the US was considering economic aid to Egypt and even reopening the Aswan Dam aid project. The Foreign Office pointed out that such aid to Nasser in the near future would be the last straw in Anglo-American relations. The Embassy replied that it had no knowledge of any specific US proposals for new aid to any particular country of the Middle East, but asked SecState for guidance to be used should the matter be raised again.
 (S) Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 3193, 7 Dec 56. Received State 072108Z Dec 56. Received JCS 081712Z Dec 56.

~~TOP SECRET~~
7 Dec

The Secretary General of NATO submitted a report to the North Atlantic Council dealing with the military threat to NATO's southern flank. Among the conclusions were the following: 1) There was no intelligence to indicate that stocks of military equipment in Egypt and Syria were meant to be used by anyone except the indigenous forces of those countries. 2) Reports of large quantities of Soviet aircraft, tanks, and personnel in Syria were not supported by intelligence. 3) Although Egyptian and Syrian armed forces, as presently organized and equipped, posed no effective military threat to NATO, continuation of current trends in Egypt and Syria would increasingly jeopardize NATO communications and oil sources, and present the Soviets with opportunities for establishing military bases outflanking NATO.

Msg, Paris (Perkins) to SecState, POLTO 1371, 7 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 081112Z Dec 56. Received JCS 082326Z Dec 56.

7 Dec

The Chief of the Turkish General Staff called on SACEUR (General Norstad) in Paris and read a memorandum on behalf of Turkish Prime Minister Menderes. The memorandum described the Soviet threat to Turkey and to NATO's southeastern flank resulting from Soviet activities in the Middle East, particularly in Syria; and requested six heavy radars and "a squadron or two" of higher performance interceptor aircraft. The memorandum also stated that Turkey would have to "oppose" Soviet actions in the Middle East, and that the US should take the lead in meeting the Soviet threat to the area. General Norstad, after expressing appreciation for these views, suggested that the most effective channel for the Turks to use in the future for such communications lay through the US Embassy and the MAAG in Ankara. In view of the references to opposing the Soviets, General Norstad also twice warned against any action that would provide the USSR with a convenient excuse for stepping up its activities in the Middle East.

Msg, Paris (Yost) to SecState, 2824, 7 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 071454Z Dec 56. Received JCS 081711Z Dec 56.

7 Dec

Discussing the reported Soviet arms buildup in Syria with the US Ambassador in Moscow, the Syrian Ambassador stated that the arms currently arriving in Syria were covered by contracts concluded "four or five months ago" with the USSR and other Eastern European countries. He also said that there were no Soviet instructors or military personnel in Syria, and that, to avoid the necessity for any, Syrian officers were being sent to Eastern Europe and the USSR for training. The Ambassador was evasive when queried about possible new Syro-Soviet arrangements concluded during Syrian President Quwwatli's trip to Moscow in early November, but indirectly confirmed the existence of some such arrangements.

Msg, Moscow (Bohlen) to SecState, 1400, 7 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 071809Z Dec 56. Received JCS 080313Z Dec 56.

~~TOP SECRET~~
7 Dec

An official of the Israeli Foreign Ministry expressed to the US Ambassador in Tel Aviv Israel's "deep regret" that the US did not try to dissuade Turkey from withdrawing its Minister from Israel, and was not attempting to persuade the Turks to reconsider their decision. The official renewed the appeal for the US to influence the Turks not to insist that the Israeli Minister leave Ankara. The Israeli diplomat pointed out that Turkey was the only state to follow the Soviet example of recalling its envoy from Israel.
() Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 723,
7 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 071836Z Dec 56.
Received JCS 080313Z Dec 56.

7 Dec

The State Department informed the US Ambassadors in all Middle Eastern capitals that the Israeli Ambassador in Washington on 30 November had delivered a note pointing out that the US, in issuing its 29 November statement on the Baghdad Pact countries, had failed to indicate concern for the security of Israel and might thereby have given the undesired impression that the US was indifferent to aggression against Israel. The Israelis had urged that the US make a public statement indicating as a US policy objective the maintenance of Israel's independence. The State Department said that, replying to the Israeli note on 7 December, it had pointed out that recent US declarations and actions had made clear the US policy of preventing violation of frontiers and armistice lines in the Middle East, of opposing aggression in the area, and of preserving the State of Israel, thus amply affirming the points of concern to Israel. The US statement of 29 November applied to certain Middle Eastern states only in their capacity as members of the Baghdad Pact.

() Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Tel Aviv et al.,
Circular 477, 7 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received JCS
081246Z Dec 56.

7 Dec

The US Ambassador in Damascus reported that officials at the Syrian Foreign Office uniformly displayed opposition to timely action on the US resolution to form a UN committee to deal with the Palestine issue. One official said Syria would oppose the resolution "to last ditch."

() Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1394,
7 Dec 56, DA IN 278461 (8 Dec 56). Received State
071455Z Dec 56. Received JCS 080646Z Dec 56.

7 Dec (✓)

As new strikes and street fights swept Budapest, the Central Workers Council issued a proclamation charging that continued jailing of worker leaders would end in "a general strike, bloodshed and a new national tragedy." A three-man delegation, representing the Council, called on Kadar to protest continued arrests. At the Csepel iron and steel works, several thousand workers stayed away from their jobs.

AP Wire Service, 7 Dec 56. Received JCS 071424Z,
071503Z, and 072208Z Dec 56. NYT, 8 Dec 56, 1:7,
3:7-8. Received JCS 081330Z Dec 56.

- 7 Dec (U) Following a conference in Washington with Under SecState Hoover, Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir told reporters that she had "asked that the United States use its influence in Cairo through diplomatic channels" to keep Egypt from carrying out any discriminatory practices against Egyptian Jews.
AP Wire Service, 7 Dec 56. Received JCS 072233Z Dec 56.
- 7 Dec The Department of the Interior approved the first two schedules drawn up by the Middle East Emergency Committee (MEEC) to alleviate petroleum shortages and dislocations caused by the Middle East crisis. The schedules were designed to provide more efficient utilization of tankers and other petroleum transportation facilities.
(C) Msg, SecState to All Posts, Circular 483, 8 Dec 56, DA IN 278880 (9 Dec 56). Received JCS (No Time).
- 7 Dec (U) Moroccan Foreign Minister Ahmed Balafrej, discussing with correspondents in Rabat his recent visit to Washington, said that, although the US had decided to provide Morocco with economic aid, the question of US base rights in Morocco was still unsolved. Balafrej said that US air bases in Morocco were "legally non-existent" because they were built under a Franco-US agreement "that ignored Moroccan sovereignty."
NYT, 9 Dec 56, 9:1-3. Received JCS 091330Z Dec 56.
- 7 Dec (U) The Yugoslav Government published figures on Hungarian refugees who had fled to Yugoslavia since the outbreak of the revolt in Hungary, but Western observers doubted their authenticity. The first contingent of Hungarian repatriates left Yugoslavia for Hungary under a veil of secrecy. Western diplomats, correspondents, and UN refugee officials were prevented from talking to the refugees.
NYT, 8 Dec 56, 3:1. Received JCS 081330Z Dec 56.
AP Wire Service, 7 Dec 56. Received JCS 071633Z Dec 56.
- 7 Dec At the UN, the British representative told Hammarskjold that, as British troops had begun to withdraw from Port Said, the UK would soon be unable to protect its salvage fleet. Therefore, some sort of planned withdrawal of the salvage fleet would have to begin within a few days unless the UK received two assurances: 1) that the salvage forces and administrative support could remain and would be used by the UN; and 2) that the necessary safeguards for their protection could be arranged, including UN diplomatic immunity, identity cards, and arm bands for all personnel, and UN flags for all ships.
(C) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 301, 9 Dec 56, DA IN 278915 (10 Dec 56). Received State 091248Z Dec 56. Received JCS 101243Z Dec 56.

- 7 Dec At the UN, the 14 sponsors of the 4 December resolution met for the second time to consider further measures on Hungary. They decided to meet again on 8 December to choose between a US, a Belgian, and a Peruvian draft resolution.
(S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 296, 7 Dec 56. Received State 080812Z Dec 56. Received JCS 081710Z Dec 56.
- 7 Dec (U) The Hungarian delegation at the UN denied US Ambassador Lodge's charge that it had tried to deceive Hammarskjold and the General Assembly in negotiations on a visit of the Secretary General to Budapest. The Hungarian statement said that the delegation was still in contact with Hammarskjold on the "date of meeting," which was "subject to mutual agreement as is usual in the practice of such negotiations."
AP Wire Service, 7 Dec 56. Received JCS 071911Z and 072243Z Dec 56.
- 7 Dec *State* The Danish Ambassador in London held a dinner meeting, attended by the diplomatic representatives of all 15 member nations of SCUA, to discuss the future role of SCUA. The participants generally felt that SCUA could be of little assistance in the immediate problem of clearing the canal or in the negotiations of a permanent regime for the canal. They agreed, however, that SCUA might well anticipate playing a useful role in the ultimate long-range operation of the canal, although no one advanced any specific proposal dealing with the nature of possible SCUA participation.
(S) Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 3208, 8 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 082023Z Dec 56. Received JCS 101644Z Dec 56.
- 8 Dec Lt Gen Raymond A. Wheeler (USA, Ret) and 19 UN salvage experts appointed by Hammarskjold arrived in Cairo to begin a detailed study of canal clearance problems. General Wheeler told reporters that his group was "fully organized" and had "adequate equipment from Danish, Italian and Norwegian salvage firms." "I don't think we will need British help," he said.
AP Wire Service, 8 Dec 56. Received JCS 081548Z Dec 56.
- State* CINCNELM Rear Echelon reported that the British were distraught over what they considered unwarranted procrastination on the part of General Wheeler's survey team. The British felt that each day's delay brought the UK closer to economic disaster.
(S) Msg, CINCNELM Rear Echelon to CNO et al., 081654Z Dec 56. Received JCS 091243Z Dec 56.
- 8 Dec The French Foreign Office expressed grave concern to the US Embassy in Paris at reports that Egypt, while not objecting to UN use of Anglo-French equipment to clear the Suez Canal, would object to operation of this equipment by British and French crews. The Foreign Office stressed that the equipment could not

be effectively operated except by personnel trained to do so, and pointed out that, in addition to equipment already at Port Said, about three times as much was already en route to Port Said.

(S) Msg, Paris (Yost) to SecState, 2854, 8 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 082119Z Dec 56. Received JCS 091612Z Dec 56.

8 Dec

The US Minister in Budapest reported that it was as yet unclear whether or not the Hungarian Foreign Office intended to press the matter of his presenting credentials, and recommended that no move be made until the Foreign Office inquired, at which time the matter could be referred to Washington.

(S) Msg, Budapest (Wailes) to SecState, 413, 8 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 091005Z Dec 56. Received JCS 101644Z Dec 56.

8 Dec (U)

Discussing the Baghdad Pact at a press conference in Karachi, Pakistani Foreign Minister Noon expressed Pakistan's desire that the US join the Pact. He said India would be welcomed into the Pact once the Kashmir question was settled, and other Arab states were also welcome. Noon declared that Pakistan would like to see NATO and the Baghdad Pact linked, with the Baghdad Pact patterned after NATO.

(U) Msg, Karachi (Hildreth) to SecState, 1625, 10 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 110525Z Dec 56. Received JCS 111219Z Dec 56.

8 Dec

The SecState cabled the US Ambassador in London the US position on SCUA. The US, he said, believed SCUA should play an important part in the administration of the canal. Its exact role ought to be determined through negotiations, supervised by Hammarskjold, between the UK, France, and Egypt based on the six principles formulated at the UN in October. SecState thought that SCUA would have to be enlarged in order to speak for all canal users who wished to join it.

(S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy London, 4056, 8 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 101645Z Dec 56.

8 Dec

Lebanese Foreign Minister Malik admitted to the US Ambassador in Beirut that Lebanon, about two years previously, had agreed that Egypt might send a limited number of Fedayeen with a small amount of explosives to Lebanon to be used against Israel. According to the agreement, the Fedayeen would take no action without prior consent of, and instruction by, the Lebanese Army. Later, it was discovered that the Fedayeen and explosives greatly exceeded the number and quantity agreed upon, and the Fedayeen had operated without any liaison with the Lebanese Army. (Subsequently, the Lebanese Chief of Staff told the Ambassador that these Egyptians were for intelligence purposes only, and that Lebanon had not agreed to accept explosives or trained Fedayeen. The Ambassador thought it possible that

Foreign Minister Malik had not been completely informed on the agreement between Egypt and Lebanon.)

(S) Msg, Beirut (Heath) to SecState, 1477, 8 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 100955Z Dec 56. Received JCS 102308Z Dec 56. (S) Msg, Beirut (Heath) to SecState, 1503, 12 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 121647Z Dec 56. Received JCS 130522Z Dec 56.

8 Dec

The US Embassy in Paris again took up the question of Port Lyautey with the French Foreign Office, emphasizing the US belief that all recent exceptional French activity at Port Lyautey should cease. The US did not consider the latest French position--discontinuance of barracks construction but erection of a storage shed and retention of plans to use the wharf if necessary--satisfactory, and believed the problem should be worked out between France and Morocco. The Foreign Office official explained that, at present, the French did not plan any construction at all in the wharf area. As for unloading vessels, the Moroccans had agreed on 18 October that the French could bring supplies and personnel, for replacement purposes, into Morocco through Casablanca but had been unable to live up to their agreement. The French had used Port Lyautey only because of this situation.

(S) Msg, Paris (Yost) to SecState, 2856, 8 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 082203Z Dec 56. Received JCS 091612Z Dec 56.

8 Dec

State
The SecState advised the US Ambassadors in Rabat and Paris that the recent visit of the Moroccan Foreign Minister to Washington, the Port Lyautey incidents, and the Moroccan note of 29 November made necessary a review of the US position on base rights in Morocco. The Moroccan Foreign Minister had made clear that Moroccan sovereignty would be satisfied only by new bilateral agreements with the US. Although the US felt that a trilateral French-US-Moroccan approach was necessary, the Foreign Minister had categorically rejected French participation. The problem for the US, therefore, was to devise means to negotiate bilaterally with Morocco with minimum adverse effect on US-French and US-Moroccan relations. Another element in the problem was the pending Franco-Moroccan defense agreement. If the US undertook base negotiations with Morocco prior to conclusion of this agreement, the French would charge the US with attempting to replace them in North Africa. If the US decided to wait until after conclusion of the agreement, the French could procrastinate and bring about a deterioration of US-Moroccan relations. SecState desired the comments of the Ambassadors in Rabat and Paris on the following proposal: The US would brief French Foreign Minister Pineau on the recent talks with the Moroccan Foreign Minister in Washington, stressing that the US had made every effort to persuade the Moroccans to negotiate the base question trilaterally, but had failed. It would be explained to Pineau that the US, France, and the West in general would suffer from US refusal to

negotiate the base question with Morocco and from continued inaction on the Franco-Moroccan agreement. Therefore, the US would like to set in motion a procedure that would result in three separate bilateral agreements having the same effect as the trilateral approach: 1) between the US and France defining their respective interests in US-built Moroccan bases, 2) between the US and Morocco defining the new status of US bases in Morocco, and 3) between France and Morocco defining defense arrangements for Morocco. If this solution proved impractical, the US would proceed with bilateral discussions with Morocco anyhow, keeping in close touch with France throughout.

(S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Rabat, 329, 8 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 100559Z Dec 56.

8 Dec

STATE

The State Department informed the US delegation at the UN General Assembly that, now that the UNEF was replacing Anglo-French and Israeli troops in Egypt and progress was being made toward reopening the Suez Canal, the time had come to press for long-range settlements between the Arabs and Israelis. The US delegation was instructed to discuss with the Secretary General, the British and French, and subsequently select members of other delegations, the US resolution introduced in the General Assembly on 4 November to create a new Palestine Commission. In the US view, this commission, if established, should deal with such issues as the refugee problem, territorial problems, economic development projects, and security guarantees. As for the Suez resolution also introduced on 4 November, the US believed that, for the time being, the most fruitful approach to the Suez problem lay in Hammarskjold's promoting quiet conversations between the UK, France, and Egypt based on the six principles of 13 October.

(S) Msg, SecState to USUN New York, et al., Circular 482, 8 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 100550Z Dec 56.

8 Dec

STATE

The US Ambassador in Belgrade reported that for three successive days he had maintained pressure on the Yugoslav Foreign Office to honor the Government's assurance that Hungarian refugees would be given freedom to go where they chose. Although the Acting Foreign Secretary had reaffirmed that refugees would be given freedom of choice, the method of repatriation was disturbing to the Ambassador, especially the decision barring correspondents from refugee centers.

(S) Msg, Belgrade (Riddleberger) to SecState, 813, 8 Dec 56, DA IN 278917 (10 Dec 56). Received State 091505Z Dec 56. Received JCS 101241Z Dec 56.

8 Dec

STATE

[Redacted area]

(S)

Received

JCS 111237Z Dec 56.

~~TOP SECRET~~
8 Dec

~~TOP SECRET~~
Received JCS 120549Z Dec 56.

8 Dec (U) The Soviet news agency Tass carried an official announcement saying that the British, French, and Israeli pledge to withdraw from Egypt "naturally cancels the question of dispatching Soviet volunteers to Egypt."

AP Wire Service, 8 Dec 56. Received JCS 081755Z and 081915Z Dec 56.

8 Dec (U) The Kadar regime apparently bowed to demands of Workers Councils and freed 96 persons, but Council members said they did not know how many the Government still held. Although Budapest was relatively quiet, scores of Hungarians were killed and wounded in clashes with police and Soviet troops throughout the countryside.

AP Wire Service, 8 Dec 56. Received JCS 082139Z, 082144Z, 082155Z, and 082250Z Dec 56.

8 Dec ~~STATE~~ The Iraqi Government issued a communique announcing that, in response to a request contained in a note from the Jordanian Foreign Ministry, Iraq had decided to withdraw its troops from Jordan. A Foreign Ministry spokesman in Baghdad said that Iraq had sent troops to Jordan because of the Israeli danger. Iraq felt this danger had not ended or even receded, but on the contrary was increasing.

(U) Msg, Baghdad (Gallman) to SecState, 1031, 10 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 101235Z Dec 56. Received JCS 101941Z Dec 56. (AP Wire Service, 8 Dec 56, carried a brief announcement of the communique. Received JCS 090129Z Dec 56.)

8 Dec According to [redacted] of the Iraqi Army, orders were issued to the Iraqi 19th Brigade, stationed near Mafrag, Jordan, to withdraw to pumping station H3 in Iraq.

(U) [redacted] Received JCS 102014Z Dec 56.

8 Dec (U) In a report to the UN General Assembly, Hammarskjold expressed doubt that there would be any purpose in his visiting Budapest unless he could do so soon. He also disclosed that he had written Austria, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia for permission to send observers to those countries to investigate the situation in Hungary. Later, the Austrian delegate said that his country had given permission for UN observers to enter Austria to investigate the Hungarian situation.

AP Wire Service, 8 Dec 56. Received JCS 081532Z and 081913Z Dec 56.

recommended that, under these circumstances, the Embassy in Tel Aviv not encourage the Israeli Government to attempt to keep its Minister in Ankara.

(S) Msg, Ankara (Warren) to SecState, 1361, 9 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 091253Z Dec 56. Received JCS 100600Z Dec 56.

9 Dec (U) At the UN, the US circulated its draft resolution on Hungary, which had been endorsed by 12 countries on 8 December. The resolution would censure the USSR for violating the UN Charter by using armed force against the Hungarian people, and would call on the USSR to cease intervening in Hungarian affairs and withdraw its forces from Hungary under UN observation. The US was understood to have deferred its earlier proposal to suspend the Hungarian delegation because of Hungary's refusal to admit UN observers.

NYT, 10 Dec 56, 1:8, 12:4-6. Received JCS 101330Z Dec 56.

9 Dec (U) The Central Workers Council in Budapest called a 48-hour strike after unsuccessfully protesting to Kadar against the arrest of many of its members. The Kadar Government responded by decreeing dissolution of the regional workers councils, shutting off communications with the West, instituting martial law, and announcing the death penalty for anyone found in possession of weapons.

AP Wire Service, 9 Dec 56. Received JCS 092006Z, 092035Z, 092054Z, and 092137Z Dec 56.

9 Dec UN Secretary General Hammarskjold cabled General Wheeler instructions to take over the direction of the UN salvage fleet. Six "selected" Anglo-French salvage vessels would be needed, he said, but they would be operated by UN crews and retain only three British and French crew members per vessel to act as instructors. For "specific and limited salvage projects under way on individual vessels," the Anglo-French crews might be retained until the work was completed.

(S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 348, 14 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 150426Z Dec 56. Received JCS 171706Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

9 Dec (U) Dr. Max Koenig, the Swiss diplomat representing France and the UK in Egypt, told reporters in Zurich that, despite Egypt's assurance that British and French residents of Egypt would not be expelled as a group, individual expulsion was continuing "relentlessly and on a large scale." Also, the sequestration of property and assets of British and French residents continued unabated. In Cairo, the Egyptian Minister of the Interior said 1,452 of the 18,000 British and French nationals in Egypt had been expelled from the country.

AP Wire Service, 9 Dec 56. Received JCS 092047Z and 092223Z Dec 56.

- 9 Dec (U) A spokesman for the Iraqi Foreign Ministry said that Iraq was on the alert for Israeli aggression against any Arab state, particularly Jordan, and was "re-inforcing its troops inside Iraq to repel an Israeli aggression at any moment."
AP Wire Service, 9 Dec 56. Received JCS 100020Z Dec 56.
- 9 Dec (U) In a television interview in New York, Israeli Foreign Minister Meir said she would not agree to having UN troops stationed on Israeli territory. She also said that the UN should not allow Egyptian troops to re-enter the Sinai Desert until a peace settlement had been arranged.
AP Wire Service, 9 Dec 56. Received JCS 091955Z Dec 56.
- 10 Dec (U) Egyptian guerrillas attacked a British patrol in Port Said with hand grenades and machine gun fire, wounding one British soldier slightly. The ambush was reported to have been the first such attack in Port Said since the cease-fire had gone into effect on 8 November. The British cordoned off the area, arrested seven Egyptians, and sent an urgent protest to UNEF headquarters accusing Egypt of a cease-fire violation. General Burns hastened to Port Said from Cairo and announced that he had received assurances from the Egyptian Government that there would be no further attacks.
AP Wire Service, 10 Dec 56. Received JCS 101406Z, 101445Z, 101606Z, and 102048Z Dec 56.
- 10 Dec (U) The US and 15 other UN members introduced a resolution in the General Assembly condemning the USSR for its action in Hungary. The resolution called on the USSR to withdraw its armed forces from Hungary immediately and to permit the re-establishment of Hungarian political independence.
AP Wire Service, 10 Dec 56. Received JCS 101415Z Dec 56.
- 10 Dec Foreign Minister Bashayan of Iraq asked the US, through its Embassy in Baghdad, to issue a statement deploring Syrian and Egyptian radio attacks on the Nuri Government. The latest false charge, the Minister said, was that Iraq and Turkey had established a joint military command aimed against Syria.
(U) Msg, Baghdad (Gallman) to SecState, 1033, 10 Dec 56, DA IN 279010. Received State 101338Z Dec 56. Received JCS 102332Z Dec 56.
- 10 Dec ✓ Secretary Dulles, arriving in Paris a day ahead of the annual NATO ministers' meeting, held a private talk with British Foreign Secretary Lloyd and subsequently with French Foreign Minister Pineau. Some NATO members were pressing for a Big Three meeting, such as usually precedes NATO ministerial sessions, to demonstrate a renewal of solidarity among the Alliance's

major members. However, Mr. Dulles was reported to have refused such a conference and Lloyd and Pineau were not pressing for one.

AP Wire Service, 10 Dec 56. Received JCS 101419Z, 101605Z, 101636Z, and 101640Z Dec 56.

According to the report of the conversations sent by Mr. Dulles to the State Department, Lloyd declared that because the US had "demanded it," the impending departure of the UK force from Egypt would be unconditional. No commitments had been obtained from Nasser on such matters as detention of British Suez technicians, compensation for British property sequestered by the Egyptians, clearance of the canal and the canal's future status. Lloyd argued that the UN had an obligation to obtain conditions from Egypt covering these points--the same conditions that the UK, under other circumstances, would have negotiated for itself. He urged that Hammarskjold be asked to go immediately to Cairo for that purpose. Mr. Dulles did not commit the US to any particular course of action. He told Lloyd that the US now believed that the status of the canal could be more effectively settled through Hammarskjold's informal activities than through the formation of a UN committee. Hence the US would not pursue the resolution that it had introduced on 4 November. Lloyd said that the British had given Jordan 800,000 pounds for December.

He agreed with Dulles that Jordan was unlikely to obtain much assistance from Arab countries in replacement of the British subsidy.

(S) Msg, Paris (Dulles) to SecState, SECTO 3, 10 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 101801Z Dec 56. Received JCS 120002Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.
(S) Msg, Paris (Dulles) to SecState, SECTO 5, 10 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 110001Z Dec 56. Received JCS 111633Z Dec 56.

Pineau in his conversation with the Secretary said he favored an approach to Hammarskjold urging greater speed in canal clearance. He said that the French were inclined to favor settlement of the canal's status through direct negotiations with Egypt under UN auspices.

(S) Msg, Paris (Dulles) to SecState, SECTO 6, 11 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 110305Z Dec 56. Received JCS 111633Z Dec 56.

10 Dec

According to a report from

had stated that American action against Communist influence in Syria was imperative.

(S)
110712Z Dec 56.

Received JCS

10 Dec The US Embassy in Rabat cabled that it was in complete accord with procedures outlined by the State Department on 8 December for an approach to the French on solution of US base rights problems in Morocco. The Embassy concurred with the Department's view that the Algerian war "and its accessory situation" constituted formidable obstacles to early conclusion of a Franco-Moroccan military agreement.
 (S) Msg, Rabat (Cannon) to SecState, 363, 10 Dec 56, DA IN 279168. Received State 101905Z Dec 56. Received JCS 110941Z Dec 56.

10 Dec The Acting SecState protested to the Hungarian Charge d'Affaires against an interruption of communications with the US Legation in Budapest. The interruption had begun on 9 December and lasted more than 24 hours.
 (S) Msg, Actg SecState to AmLegation Budapest, 373, 10 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 111046Z Dec 56.

10 Dec UN Secretary General Hammarskjold told Ambassador Lodge that he believed the best approach to solution of the question of canal control lay in British-French-Egyptian negotiations on the basis of the Security Council's six principles. He said Lloyd and Fawzi were prepared to enter into discussions promptly but the French position was uncertain. The Secretary General advised against further discussion of the Suez problem in the General Assembly. He also opposed bringing before the Assembly the US resolution, introduced on 4 November, that provided for the creation of a new Palestine Commission. He said it would only produce bitter debate and make solution of basic Arab-Israeli problems more difficult, especially in view of the "scorched-earth" policy being followed by the Israelis in their retreat from the Sinai Peninsula. On the subject of canal clearance, he said that arrangements were proceeding well but difficulties had arisen over the use of British ships and their personnel. The UK had taken the position that all or none of its force of 40 ships and 2,000 civilians should be used. On the basis of "political realities," Hammarskjold was planning to use only six British and French vessels. He expressed fear that the UK position would jeopardize all his efforts on behalf of canal clearance. He reported that General Wheeler and the Egyptians were satisfied with arrangements and the only source of trouble was the UK.
 (S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 307, 10 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 110216Z Dec 56. Received JCS 111218Z Dec 56. (S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 308, 10 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 110215Z Dec 56. Received JCS 111218Z Dec 56.

10 Dec The US Ambassador in Belgrade reported that the Hungarian ban on workers' councils had deepened the rift between Yugoslavia and the Kadar Government. Yugoslavs were

trying to disassociate themselves from Kadar, he said, and were finding it increasingly difficult to justify the second Soviet intervention in Hungary.

() Msg, Belgrade (Riddleberger) to SecState, 827, 10 Dec 56, DA IN 279351 (11 Dec 56). Received State 111149Z Dec 56. Received JCS 120406Z Dec 56.

10 Dec The State Department replied to the Turkish memorandum of 14 November containing Turkey's views on Soviet infiltration in the Middle East and asking for US views and information on the problem. The Department stated that it agreed with "the Turkish view regarding the potential dangers of a Soviet policy of encirclement and isolation." Even though various reports had "considerably exaggerated" the extent of Soviet penetration in Syria, the US felt the situation there to be "the cause of serious concern." The US believed that the Syrian problem could be dealt with more easily after the withdrawal of foreign forces from Egypt. The dangers facing Iran were also clear, and the US would continue to demonstrate in all feasible ways its interest in the welfare and security of that country. Furthermore, the US was prepared to explore ways to contribute to the solution of Turkey's own air defense problem.

() Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Ankara, 1339, 10 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 111633Z Dec 56.

10 Dec (u) Rioting Poles marched on the Soviet Consulate in Stettin, near the East German border. After smashing windows and trying to storm the doors of the Consulate, the rioters were scattered by troops and "workers' militiamen" called in by local Communist officials. Reliable sources told the Associated Press that the demonstration was started by students and young factory workers in sympathy with Hungary.

AP Wire Service, 11 Dec 56. Received JCS 111930Z Dec 56.

10 Dec (u) Iraq announced that the withdrawal of its troops from Jordan was the result of Jordan's demand that they be placed under the Syrian-Jordanian-Egyptian military command, headed by Egypt.

AP Wire Service, 11 Dec 56. Received JCS 111433Z and 111534Z Dec 56.

10 Dec (u) The International Monetary Fund announced that the UK had been extended credits of \$1,300,000,000 to help the country overcome financial difficulties brought on primarily by the Middle East crisis.

NYT, 11 Dec 56, 1:8. Received JCS 111330Z Dec 56.

11 Dec The US position on Suez Canal clearance was described as follows in a message from Secretary Dulles to the State Department:-- 1) The principal concern of the US-- was clearance of the canal as quickly as possible.

~~TOP SECRET~~

2) The UN Secretary General and General Wheeler were in the best position to judge what action, if any, by the US or other users would assist in accomplishing that objective. 3) Accordingly, the US Ambassador in Egypt should make representations to the Egyptian Government with regard to the use of British-French salvage equipment only if requested to do so by Hammarskjold or Wheeler.

(S) Msg, Paris (Dulles) to SecState, SECTO 7, 11 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 111712Z Dec 56. Received JCS 120002Z Dec 56.

11 Dec (U) The US made public a master plan for an emergency oil lift to Europe. Officials estimated that the program would result in the shipment of about 500,000 barrels daily to Europe in excess of the normal pick-up from Gulf Coast and Venezuelan ports.

AP Wire Service, 11 Dec 56. Received JCS 112152Z and 112207Z Dec 56.

11 Dec Blaming Moslem fanatics for the 10 December ambush of a British patrol in Port Said, Egyptian sources told the AP that Nasser would rush 2,000 Egyptian police into the city to combat trouble after the French and British withdrawal. The informants expressed the Egyptian Government's fear that the Moslem Brotherhood, outlawed in 1954, would embarrass the Nasser regime by harassing UN troops. The UN forces in Port Said reached a total of 1,400 with the arrival of 250 Swedes and 170 Colombians.

AP Wire Service, 11 Dec 56. Received JCS 111443Z and 112226Z Dec 56.

STATE The US Consul in Port Said reported that the Governor had asked the Egyptian Government for 1,500 police as soon as possible. He said the British and French were expected to complete their withdrawal within two weeks and it was believed that the UN troops replacing them would not be effective in law enforcement.

(S) Msg, Port Said (Cuomo) to SecState, 106, 11 Dec 56, DA IN 279297. Received State 111006Z Dec 56. Received JCS 120059Z Dec 56.

11 Dec Most of Hungary's industry and commerce was paralyzed as rebellious workers began a 48-hour general strike called by the Budapest Central Workers' Council. Despite a proclamation of martial law and the arrest of labor leaders, men stayed away from work by the hundreds of thousands. There was a complete work stoppage in the iron and steel works on Csepel Island.

AP Wire Service, 11 Dec 56. Received JCS 111519Z, 111551Z, 111611Z, 112012Z, 112140Z, and 112233Z Dec 56.

STATE US Legation officers, after checking important industrial areas in Budapest, reported that the strike was almost 100 per cent effective. They said, however, that utilities were not shut down, and bakeries, bread

stores and a market remained open. No buses and only about 10 per cent of the city's street cars were in operation.

(~~SECRET~~) Msg, Budapest (Wailles) to SecState, 427, 11 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 121908Z Dec 56. Received JCS 130219Z Dec 56.

11 Dec (U) In the course of debate on the resolution condemning Soviet intervention in Hungary, the Hungarian delegation, led by Foreign Minister Imre Horvath, walked out of the General Assembly. Sentiment was building up in favor of the resolution, which by now had 20 sponsors, and against an Indian plan to delete the condemnation clause and substitute a request that the Secretary General go to Budapest and Moscow to negotiate for Soviet withdrawal from Hungary.
AP Wire Service, 11 Dec 56. Received JCS 111358Z, 111559Z, and 112157Z Dec 56.

11 Dec According to the US Army Attache in Beirut, the British felt that deliveries of 20 Charioteer tanks, then on their way to Beirut, and of signal equipment, shipment of which was under consideration by the UK, would satisfy the Lebanese Army's urgent needs.

Received JCS 120206Z Dec 56.

11 Dec [redacted] told the US Army Attache that Saudi Arabian and Syrian troops would probably stay in Jordan for some time. The Iraqi withdrawal was expected to be virtually completed that night.
(~~SECRET~~) Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 609, 11 Dec 56, DA IN 279462 (12 Dec 56). Received State 111604Z Dec 56. Received JCS 121124Z Dec 56.

11 Dec Hammarskjold told the US Delegation to the UN that the British had cleared a narrow channel of 25-foot draft in the Suez Canal from Port Said to the cease-fire line. First major objective of the UN would be to remove nine obstacles in Egyptian-controlled territory (south of the cease-fire line) in order to extend the channel the full length of the canal. The Egyptians had agreed that work could begin as soon as the British and French withdrawal was complete. Hammarskjold said that the UK was continuing to deny a UN request for use of six Allied vessels on the grounds that its salvage fleet ought to be used as an entity or not at all. However, Hammarskjold foresaw some softening of the British position.
(~~SECRET~~) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 323, 11 Dec 56. Received State 120334Z Dec 56. Received JCS 121221Z Dec 56.

11 Dec The US declined to comply with the Iraqi Foreign Minister's request for a public statement deploring

Syrian and Egyptian radio attacks on Iraq. The Department said it felt US interference in an inter-Arab political controversy of this sort might do more harm than good, but it would continue to present its views through diplomatic channels.

(●) Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Baghdad, 1003, 11 Dec 56. Received JCS 121621Z Dec 56.

11 Dec The US Ambassador in Paris, in conversation with Premier Mollet, observed that there were rumors that the Premier would go to the UN to present the French position on Algeria. If he did plan a trip to the US, the Ambassador said, it might be convenient for him to come to Washington for a meeting with the President. Mollet replied that he was considering going to the UN, but he would do so only if he had relatively firm assurance of US support in the General Assembly. He said a declaration on Algerian policy would be made before 25 December. If on the basis of this statement the US felt that it could oppose UN action on Algeria, then there was nothing Mollet would like better than to go to the US and talk with the President.

(●) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2902, 11 Dec 56. Received State 112224Z Dec 56. Received JCS 121621Z Dec 56.

11 Dec In the major speech at the opening NATO Council session in Paris, Secretary Dulles, without mentioning Britain and France, denounced countries that deliberately resort to force as an instrument of national policy, even though they believe their cause to be just.

AP Wire Service, 11 Dec 56. Received JCS 111409Z, 111538Z, 111638Z, 112053Z, and 112044Z Dec 56.

Foreign Secretary Lloyd and Foreign Minister Pineau defended the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt. Lloyd argued that the intervention would not damage the interests of the West if the UN would take advantage of the opportunity for action that had been created.

(●) Msg, Paris (Perkins) to SecState, POLTO 1392, 11 Dec 56. Received State 110506Z and 120541Z Dec 56. Received JCS 121620Z Dec 56.

11 Dec Lebanese Foreign Minister Malik told the US Ambassador in Beirut that Lebanon desired the stationing of a permanent UN garrison in southern Lebanon to provide security against an Israeli or Syrian attack.

(●) Msg, USARMA Beirut to DEPTAR, C 177, 121320Z Dec 56, DA IN 279572. Received JCS 130003Z Dec 56.

11 Dec A French official, having just returned from a trip to Libya, told the US Embassy in Paris that withdrawal of French troops from Fezzan had been completed without incident.

(●) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2907, 12 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 121950Z Dec 56. Received JCS 131230Z Dec 56.

TOP SECRET
11 Dec

The Egyptian Minister of Finance summoned the US Ambassador in Cairo to ask that the order freezing Egyptian assets in the US be rescinded. The Minister said that the order was hampering Egypt's development program and forcing Egypt increasingly to channel its trade to Communist countries.

(S) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1855, 12 Dec 56. Received State 130002Z Dec 56. Received JCS 131655Z Dec 56.

11 Dec

The State Department instructed the US Ambassador in Cairo to tell Nasser that the US expected Egypt to demonstrate a constructive attitude toward the solution of underlying problems in the Middle East. Specifically, the US desired Egypt to: 1) offer full cooperation in urgent clearance of the Suez Canal; 2) offer full cooperation in renewal of negotiations on a future Canal regime; 3) place no obstacle in the way of fulfillment by the UN force of its responsibilities under the General Assembly's resolutions; 4) take effective measures to prevent Fedayeen operations; 5) cease operations by Egyptian agents in violation of the sovereignty and authority of neighboring states; 6) move toward settlement of outstanding problems between the Arab states and Israel; and 7) cease inflammatory radio attacks on neighboring states.

(S) Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Cairo, 1912, 11 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 121622Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford. (S) Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Cairo, 1925, 12 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 131957Z Dec 56.

11 Dec

7-19-56
Responding to a State Department request of 8 December for comment on a new approach to the problem of Moroccan base rights, the US Embassy in Paris urged that everything possible be done to bring about a Franco-Moroccan defense agreement. The Embassy warned that, if the US opened bilateral negotiations with Morocco before the French and Moroccans had resolved basic defense questions, Morocco would attempt to get the US to assume all responsibility for supplementing its defense.

(S) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2897, 11 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 121328Z Dec 56 and 121923Z Dec 56. Received JCS 130522Z Dec 56 and 132338Z Dec 56.

11 Dec

The Iranian Foreign Office told the US Embassy that the Foreign Minister's remarks of 9 December about a conference of high Middle East officials were directed to the possibility of a meeting at Riyadh in March, during the Shah's scheduled visit to King Saud. Turkish and Pakistani chiefs of state would be invited as well as those of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. Iran requested US support for the proposed meeting.

(S) Msg, Tehran (Chapin) to SecState, 896, 11 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 111514Z Dec 56. Received JCS 161348Z Dec 56.

~~TOP SECRET~~
12 Dec

The scheduled 48-hour general strike in Hungary went into its second day with an estimated 80 per cent of the country's work force idle. Night reports from Budapest indicated that the strike might be continued beyond the original deadline in protest against the arrest of two leaders of the Budapest Workers' Council. The Kadar Government decreed mandatory death for all persons convicted of crimes under its newly-issued martial law decree.

AP Wire Service, 12 Dec 56. Received JCS 121354Z, 122027Z, and 130050Z Dec 56.

The US Minister in Budapest cabled that the success of the strike and continued popular defiance of the Government showed that "opposition spirit has been hardly bent, much less broken, by the Soviets and that prospects for public capitulation in near or medium future are poor unless even more forceful and terroristic moves are used."

(C) Msg, Budapest (Wailes) to SecState, 430, 12 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 121811Z Dec 56. Received JCS 130522Z Dec 56.

12 Dec (U)

Much of the NATO Council's session was devoted to discussion of proposals for increased political consultation. Secretary Dulles, while approving the principle of increased consultation, declared that the US reserved full freedom to act in defense of its vital interests without consulting NATO in advance.

AP Wire Service, 12 Dec 56. Received JCS 121807Z, 121820Z, 121939Z, 122004Z, 122250Z, 122253Z, and 122310Z Dec 56.

12 Dec (U)

The UN General Assembly, by a vote of 55 to 8, adopted a resolution condemning the Soviet intervention in Hungary and calling on the USSR (for the third time) to withdraw its forces from that country. Thirteen nations abstained, including India, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Indonesia, and Yugoslavia. Afro-Asian members voting in favor of the resolution included Burma, Ceylon, Iran, Lebanon, Libya, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, Tunisia, and Yemen. During the day's debate the USSR laid before the General Assembly a formal complaint charging the US with subversive action in Eastern Europe. After the Assembly adjourned, the UN released a communication from Hungary saying that 16 December would not be an appropriate date for Secretary General Hammarskjold to visit the country. The message said that Hungary would make a proposal for a visit at a later date.

AP Wire Service, 12 Dec 56. Received JCS 121409Z, 121610Z, 122327Z, 122339Z, and 130010Z Dec 56.

12 Dec (U)

The Associated Press reported that the bulk of Israeli forces on the Sinai Peninsula had been withdrawn but that some units remained to cover the final phases of

the pull-out. Yugoslav troops, moving eastward from the Suez Canal to replace the Israelis, were being slowed down by minefields and damaged roads.

AP Wire Service, 12 Dec 56. Received JCS 121417Z Dec 56.

12 Dec (U) Iraq formally protested to Egypt and Syria that they permitted "hostile" radio broadcasts from their countries aimed at the Nuri Government.
AP Wire Service, 12 Dec 56. Received JCS 121516Z Dec 56.

12 Dec (J) France and Britain complained to the UN General Assembly that Egypt was mistreating their nationals. The French submitted a resolution suggesting that the UN send observers to Egypt to see that the rights of foreign nationals were respected.
NYT, 13 Dec 56, 24:2. Received JCS 131330Z Dec 56.

12 Dec (J) According to a United Press dispatch carried by the New York Times, representatives of 30,000 steel-workers in Poznan passed a resolution demanding the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. The action capped a week of anti-Soviet demonstrations in various Polish cities.
NYT, 13 Dec 56, 1:8. Received JCS 131330Z Dec 56.

12 Dec Israeli representatives at the UN told Hammarskjold that Israel had to have assurance that UNEF troops moving into the Sinai Peninsula would act as a shield between Israeli and Egyptian forces and would stay until Egypt instituted a policy of peaceful intentions. Israel hoped that the UNEF would prevent the re-entry of any Egyptian troops into Sinai. Hammarskjold replied that the UNEF would function as long as there was a risk of recurrence of hostilities. The General Assembly would decide when its task was finished. He would not exclude the possibility that Egyptian and UNEF troops would be stationed on the Peninsula simultaneously. The Israeli delegate said he would leave for later discussion the problem of withdrawal from the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba.
(S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 360, 16 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 170346Z Dec 56. Received JCS 171706Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

12 Dec The State Department instructed the US Ambassador in Amman to tell the Jordanian Prime Minister that the US believed Jordan should hold fast to its relationship with the UK. Developments which would isolate Jordan from its friends and damage its own defense capabilities might place obstacles in the way of US aid, the Department's message said.
(S) Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Amman, 698, 12 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 131957Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

The Department also instructed the US Ambassadors in Beirut and Jidda to suggest that the Governments of Lebanon and Saudi Arabia seek to discourage Jordan from any action that would cause a deterioration in that country's defense capability or increase the Communist threat there.

(S) Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Beirut, 2202, 12 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 131957Z Dec 56. (TS) Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Jidda, 424, 12 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 131957Z Dec 56.

12 Dec The French Foreign Office showed US officials a highly classified memorandum indicating that 130 to 140 Soviet military personnel would be sent to Syria under an agreement negotiated in Moscow late in November. The memorandum was based on Syrian documents.

(S) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2908, 12 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 122301Z Dec 56. Received JCS 131957Z Dec 56.

12 Dec According to the US Naval Commander in Port Lyautey, unarmed Moroccan civilians established a barricade on the road used by French convoys leaving the US dock. The French cancelled military leaves in Port Lyautey and stationed tanks and armored cars at the barricade. Earlier in the day COMNAVACTS had been requested to make room for another French ship. Naval authorities had resisted the request on the grounds that the US needed the berth.

(S) Msg, Rabat (Cannon) to SecState, 368, 12 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 122035Z Dec 56. Received JCS 130218Z Dec 56.

12 Dec The US Ambassador in Tel Aviv reported that there was increasing public resentment of the Israeli Army's withdrawal from Sinai before Israel had received satisfaction of its security requirements. Israel's Foreign Office, he said, was concerned because domestic pressure on the Prime Minister to reconsider the withdrawal policy was mounting, while on the other hand Hammarskjold appeared to be increasing pressure for an immediate evacuation of all of the Sinai Peninsula, including the Straits of Tiran.

(S) Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 739, 12 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 131631Z Dec 56. Received JCS 141637Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

13 Dec (U) The two-day nation-wide strike in Hungary came to a formal end, but tens of thousands of workers continued to stay away from their jobs, while others returned to work only to stand idly by their machines. They were protesting the arrest of two Workers' Council leaders. At least six persons had been reported killed during riots that accompanied the strike. "An informed Budapest source" told the AP that General Ivan Serov, Soviet secret police boss, had taken over control of the Kadar Government.

AP Wire Service, 13 Dec 56. Received JCS 131016Z, 131023Z, and 131125Z Dec 56.

~~TOP SECRET~~
13 Dec

The US Embassy in Rabat reported that barricades had been removed from a road leading from the Port Lyautey base, where they had been placed by Moroccan civilians to obstruct French convoys. Following discussions between the French Embassy and the Moroccan Foreign Office, the Moroccan Ministry of the Interior had intervened to prevent difficulties. French troops had removed the barricades. At Port Lyautey a French ship had pulled out but had been replaced by another that Casablanca workers had refused to unload. Still another ship docked at Casablanca after the French had obtained agreement that it would be unloaded. Workers refused to remove the cargo, however, when they discovered its military character.

(S) Msg, Rabat (Cannon) to SecState, 372, 13 Dec 56, DA IN 280022 (14 Dec 56). Received State 131825Z Dec 56. Received JCS 141258Z Dec 56.

13 Dec (U)

Metalworkers in Poznan withdrew a threat to strike, in return for assurances that their resolution calling for withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary would be brought directly to Gomulka's attention. Local Communist Party officials had been successful in appealing to the workers to maintain order out of loyalty to Gomulka. But elsewhere in Poland sporadic demonstrations and incidents continued to take place.

NYT, 14 Dec 56, 13:1. Received JCS 141330Z Dec 56.

13 Dec

According to the US Ambassador in London, the British Foreign Office indicated its intention to continue payment of a subsidy to Jordan as long as the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty remained in force. The Foreign Office emphasized, however, that it rejected Jordan's contention that the UK was obligated to maintain the subsidy through the fiscal year.

(S) Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 3299, 13 Dec 56. Received State 132252Z Dec 56. Received JCS 141639Z Dec 56.

13 Dec (U)

Egyptian Foreign Minister Fawzi, speaking at a Press Club luncheon in Washington, criticized moves to provide economic aid for Britain and France while "hardly anything" was being said about aiding Egypt's recovery from war damage. Fawzi disclosed that Egypt had interned 1,573 British, French and Jews. He said that "only 280 stateless Jews" had been ordered deported.

AP Wire Service, 13 Dec 56. Received JCS 131842Z Dec 56.

13 Dec (U)

Remnants of British-French forces pulled back an additional six miles from their entrenched positions south of Port Said to a point about 14 miles south of the city. Indian troops of the UNEF moved in.

AP Wire Service, 13 Dec 56. Received JCS 132239Z Dec 56.

- 13 Dec In response to Iran's request for US support for a meeting of Moslem heads of state, the State Department issued a circular message saying that the US welcomed any move toward constructive cooperation among the Near Eastern states.
() Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Jidda, et al., Circular 499, 13 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 141640Z Dec 56.
- 13 Dec The French Director General of Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs told a US Embassy officer that the French were continuing to unload military supplies at the Port Lyautey naval facilities in order to avoid arousing public opinion and possible incidents. Unfortunately, he said, the only naval facilities within the base area were in the US sector. On the subject of US base rights in Morocco, he said that the Moroccans had much on their minds of a more urgent nature and the status of US bases was perhaps not as pressing as the US had been led to believe.
() Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2944, 13 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 131934Z Dec 56. Received JCS 141637Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.
- 13 Dec Foreign Minister Malik told the US Ambassador in Beirut that both he and President Chamoun felt that UN forces should be stationed at some base in the Middle East for an indefinite period. Lebanon would be glad to provide a base and all other facilities, Malik said.
() Msg, Beirut (Heath) to SecState, 1522, 13 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 131845Z Dec 56. Received JCS 141640Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.
- 13 Dec The US Ambassador in Cairo was instructed to inform Nasser that Egypt's public position in the US was being harmed by continuing reports of mistreatment of Jews. The US felt that Egypt, in the "calmer atmosphere" then prevailing, could cease harassment of individuals who had been innocent of any connection with the hostilities.
() Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Cairo, 1960, 13 Dec 56. Received JCS 141944Z Dec 56.
- 13 Dec The State Department instructed 16 US Ambassadors to urge the governments to which they were accredited to make representations to Syria against delay in repair of the IPC pipeline. The Department also sent a message to the US Ambassador in Damascus instructing him to make urgent representations directly to Syria and informing him that the Department would make representations to the Syrian Charge d'Affaires in Washington.
() Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Athens, et al., Circular 498, 13 Dec 56, DA IN 280132 (14 Dec 56). Received JCS 141534Z Dec 56. () Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Damascus, 1083, 13 Dec 56, DA IN 280134 (14 Dec 56), CJCS files. Received JCS 141640Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

~~TOP SECRET~~
13 Dec

The Syrian Foreign Minister told the US Ambassador in Damascus that the Council of Ministers had decided that repair work on the IPC pipeline could not start until British and French troops had withdrawn from Egypt. The Foreign Minister did not mention Israel.

(S) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1443, 14 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 141406Z Dec 56. Received JCS 151315Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

13 Dec

The US Ambassador in Jidda warned King Saud of the possibility of sabotage of the Tapline by Arab extremists. Saud agreed to approach Syrian leaders again on the matter and, in the Ambassador's presence, dictated a telegram ordering that guard posts along the Tapline be strengthened.

(S) Msg, Jidda (Wadsworth) to SecState, 332, 15 Dec 56, DA IN 280725 (16 Dec 56). Received State 152034Z Dec 56. Received JCS 162210Z Dec 56.

14 Dec

The French informed the US that Egypt had ordered all French citizens out of the country by 18 December, the date the Egyptians probably calculated the Anglo-French withdrawal would be completed. France intended to introduce a resolution on the expulsion in the General Assembly on 15 December and desired US support. British Foreign Secretary Lloyd told SecState Dulles that the UK had reluctantly decided to support the French.

(S) Msg, Paris (Dulles) to SecState, SECTO 23, 14 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 141614Z Dec 56. Received JCS 151318Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

(S) Msg, Paris (Dulles) to SecState, SECTO 27, 14 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 150359Z Dec 56. Received JCS 151650Z Dec 56. (S) Msg, Actg SecState to USUN New York, GADEL 67, 14 Dec 56. Received JCS 172347Z Dec 56.

14 Dec

In New York, Hammarskjold strongly advised the UK and France not to raise the question of Egyptian treatment of their nationals in the General Assembly at this time.

(S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 353, 14 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 151053Z Dec 56. Received JCS 171705Z Dec 56.

14 Dec

The State Department sent instructions on the Port Lyautey situation to the US Embassies in Rabat and Paris. Although the situation seemed "somewhat improved temporarily," the Department was concerned over the potential involvement of the US in any serious incident. The French had apparently made an effort to reach a modus vivendi with the Moroccans that would permit a resumption of normal supply to French troops through the usual commercial facilities, but the Moroccan Government was either unable or unwilling to enforce such an agreement. The Ambassador in Rabat was directed to inform the Moroccans that the US was continuing efforts with the French to obtain a

modus vivendi and that if agreements to offload normal supplies through usual facilities were unenforceable, the US position in trying to help settle the Port Lyautey question with the French would be considerably weakened. At the same time, the French were to be told of US efforts with the Moroccans to help obtain a modus vivendi and of the US hope that such an agreement would permit the cessation of "exceptional" activity at Port Lyautey.

(C) Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Paris, 2274, 14 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 171650Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

- 14 Dec (U) The UN General Assembly voted to debate Soviet charges that the US had intervened "in the domestic affairs" of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and the USSR. The US supported the move to have the Soviet charges discussed.
AP Wire Service, 14 Dec 56. Received JCS 141758Z Dec 56.
- 14 Dec Lebanon informed Syria that the supply of petroleum products from Lebanese refineries to Syria would stop after 10 January, when stocks of crude oil at the Tripoli refinery would be exhausted. Lebanon intended to reserve the output from the Sidon refinery served by Tapline for its own use. According to CINCNELM, Syria was coming under increasing pressure to permit repair of the IPC pipeline and, with the failure of negotiations with Lebanon, was now in a critical position because of her urgent need for oil products.
(C) Msg, Beirut (Heath) to SecState, 1541, 17 Dec 56, DA IN 280961 (18 Dec 56). Received State 171824Z Dec 56. Received JCS 181053Z Dec 56. (C) Msg, CINCNELM to CNO et al., 181706Z Dec 56. Received JCS 191322Z Dec 56.
- 14 Dec (U) Under SecState Hoover protested to Syrian Ambassador Zeineddine over the delay in allowing repairs on the IPC pipeline. He called for the Syrian Government to "take immediate steps" to start the oil flowing again.
AP Wire Service, 14 Dec 56. Received JCS 150012Z Dec 56.
- 14 Dec SCUA Administrator Bartels suggested to SecState Dulles in Paris that he (Bartels) contact Egyptian canal authorities on the technical level and that SCUA "enter the picture" within a month or two after the canal was cleared. He stressed the need to give SCUA some function in order to keep it from falling apart.
(C) Msg, Paris (Dulles) to SecState, SECTO 25, 14 Dec 56. Received State 142339Z Dec 56. Received JCS 151648Z Dec 56.
- 14 Dec-- The French Foreign Office informed the US Embassy in Paris that the French Navy was under strictest orders to unload at Casablanca, and to use Mehdiya Beach near Port Lyautey only if completely unable to use Casablanca.

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
The Foreign Office emphasized that the French were continuing to make every effort to work things out with Moroccan authorities, who were doing their utmost to cooperate, but difficulty was arising from the dock workers' continued refusal to unload French vessels.

(S) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2988, 14 Dec 56, DA IN 280666 (16 Dec 56). Received State 150401Z Dec 56. Received JCS 161429Z Dec 56.

14 Dec (U) In a communique ending the fifteen-nation North Atlantic Council meeting in Paris, the NATO Foreign Ministers called for a permanent peaceful settlement of all Middle East problems through the UN. They stressed the need for quick clearance of the Suez Canal, final settlement of the disputed waterway's future, and a permanent Arab-Israeli peace. The communique also denounced the USSR for "the brutal suppression of the heroic Hungarian people," and urged the UN to maintain the pressure of world public opinion to induce the Soviets to withdraw. Finally, in the light of their assessment of Soviet policy, the NATO Ministers approved a military directive placing primary emphasis on tactical atomic weapons. AP Wire Service, 14 Dec 56. Received JCS 141940Z, 142135Z, and 142140Z Dec 56. The text of the communique was printed in NYT, 15 Dec 56, 12:5-8. Received JCS 151330Z Dec 56.

14 Dec (U) Secretary of the Interior Seaton said the US had moved more than 14 million barrels of petroleum to western Europe since the closing of the Suez Canal and the damaging of Middle East pipelines. AP Wire Service, 14 Dec 56. Received JCS 142007Z Dec 56.

14 Dec The US Ambassador in Jordan commented on the State Department's instructions of 12 December. He noted that a recent purge of high-ranking government employees of alleged pro-Western sympathies as well as government support of an economic union with Syria had raised the "belief" that the stripping of Jordan's independence was "proceeding not only with acquiescence but even with active assistance" of the Jordanian government. The Ambassador also noted that anti-UK opinion was now so strong in Jordan that the British could never regain their former prestige and that an improved position for the West in Jordan would have to come mainly "from goodwill towards the United States alone." For the US to try to bolster the British position, he said, "does little to help them and damages ourselves."

(S) Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 618, 14 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 151152Z Dec 56. Received JCS 172026Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

14 Dec



Received JCS

151216Z Dec 56.

15 Dec (U) Egyptian guerrillas fired on a Norwegian UN Police patrol in Port Said during a stepped-up campaign of violence against the British and French. It was the first attack on UN soldiers since their arrival. Maj Gen Burns protested strongly to Egyptian authorities. AP Wire Service, 15 Dec 56. Received JCS 151422Z, 151430Z, and 151551Z Dec 56.

15 Dec *STATE* The US Ambassador in Damascus delivered to the Syrian Prime Minister the State Department's note of 13 December concerning repair of the IPC pipeline. The Syrian Foreign Minister, who also received a copy of the US note, said he hoped evacuation of Port Said would be completed soon, thus removing the last obstacle in the way of repairs. (U) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1459, 15 Dec 56, DA IN 280593. Received State 151509Z Dec 56. Received JCS 160207Z Dec 56.

Later, the Syrian Minister of National Economy told reporters that Syria would not permit one drop of oil to cross her territory until the Middle East returned to the status quo before the Anglo-French and Israeli invasions of Egypt. AP Wire Service, 15 Dec 56. Received JCS 151542Z Dec 56.

15 Dec *STATE* The US Ambassador in Cairo reported there had been no general order for the expulsion from Egypt of remaining French and British nationals, although official pressure continued to be exerted on many of them. Most British and French Jews, as well as some other non-Egyptian Jews, had been expelled or subjected to pressure to leave. (U) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1907, 15 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 151952Z Dec 56. Received JCS (corrected copy) 172026Z Dec 56.

15 Dec In a three-hour talk with the US Ambassador in Cairo, Nasser made these general points: 1) The main object of nationalizing the Suez Canal had been to build up Egypt's domestic economy and raise its standard of living, Egypt's most pressing needs. 2) The inclusion of Iraq in the Baghdad Pact was contrary to the security and stability of the area. 3) Syria and Jordan were

doing everything possible to avoid outside domination. 4) He was ready to cooperate in finding a solution of Middle East problems, but first he must have a period of trust and confidence. 5) He was fully convinced he was right in purchasing arms for Egypt. The amount of Egyptian cotton mortgaged for arms purchases had been greatly exaggerated. 6) Egypt's foreign policy was basically one of "non-alignment." She had no secret agreement with the USSR nor any mutual policy with the Soviets in the Middle East, nor did she give orders to or exert pressure on other Arab countries. 7) Egypt had not been consulted by Syria and Saudi Arabia concerning the recognition of Communist China or the purchase of Soviet arms. 8) The supply of Soviet arms to Syria was limited by Syrian capacity to pay. Syrian air and tank trainees were sent to Egypt for training, and Syrian planes for assembly. There had been no Soviet technicians in Syria before 29 October. 9) On the question of Egyptian-Israeli relations, he believed that settlement was now out of the question, but Egypt was prepared to make peace without a settlement. He did not see how the Israeli problem could be settled unless related to a settlement of the problems existing among the Arabs themselves.

Turning to specific points raised by the US Ambassador, Nasser made these comments: 1) He was ready to cooperate in clearing the Canal and thought satisfactory progress was being made. 2) Egypt was ready to renew negotiations on the future of the Canal on the basis of the six points proposed by the Security Council on 13 October and the Convention of 1888, but not by direct negotiations with the British and French. Nasser doubted if Israeli ships could be allowed to use the Canal. 3) Egypt would cooperate fully with UNEF so long as the force was not used to further the colonial aspirations of London and Paris. 4) Nasser was unaware of any inflammatory Egyptian radio attacks on neighboring states except Iraq, and this had been in retaliation for similar Iraqi attacks on Egypt.

(S) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1926, 16 Dec 56, CJCS files. Section One Received State 170509Z Dec 56. Received JCS 172026Z Dec 56. Section Two Received State 170444Z Dec 56. Received JCS 172025Z Dec 56, Corrected Copy 191641Z Dec 56. Section Three Received State 170708Z Dec 56. Received JCS 172349Z Dec 56, Corrected Copy 191641Z Dec 56. Section Four Received State 170508Z Dec 56. Received JCS 172026Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

- 15 Dec (U) Anti-Soviet demonstrations were reported in five Polish towns.
AP Wire Service, 15 Dec 56. Received JCS 151537Z, 152336Z, and 160041Z Dec 56.
- 15 Dec (U) President Eisenhower announced that the US was allocating an additional four million dollars for assistance to

Hungarian refugees. One million dollars had been set aside for this purpose on 14 November.

AP Wire Service, 15 Dec 56. Received JCS 151651Z Dec 56.

15 Dec (U) UN sources said Israeli troops had halted their withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula pending a further agreement with the UN on the timetable and mechanics of the pullout. Also, UN sources indicated the first stage of the withdrawal had been completed according to a plan worked out by Burns and the Israelis on 6 December.

AP Wire Service, 15 Dec 56. Received JCS 151717Z Dec 56.

15 Dec (U) Syrian and Jordanian officials said that as the result of a recent three-day conference in Damascus an economic union between their countries would soon be created. The conference, they said, also paved the way for further talks on financial aid to Jordan from Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia to replace the British subsidy.

AP Wire Service, 15 Dec 56. Received JCS 160044Z Dec 56.

15 Dec

[redacted] told [redacted] that: 1) there never had been any MIGs in Syria, but Syrian pilots had had MIG training in Egypt and Syrian MIGs were in Egypt when the Anglo-French attack began. 2) [redacted] was flirting with the Communists in order to get vital arms, unobtainable elsewhere, but actually he was "no more Communist than Eisenhower." 3) Syria had planned to attack Israel with a force of three armored regiments and two or three infantry brigades, but had held off because of "orders" issued by Nasser.

[redacted] Received JCS 172049Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

15 Dec

At 2100Z, the UK representative at the UN handed Hammarskjold an ultimatum on the Suez Canal clearance issue. The British threatened to withdraw all their salvage ships unless, by 161700Z December, Egypt agreed to the retention of British crews under these conditions for their protection: 1) armed UN sentries on each vessel authorized "to resist any hostile action" towards the crews; 2) UN land forces to cover the ships from the canal bank; 3) UN patrols to protect supply convoys.

Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 358, 15 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 160709Z Dec 56. Received JCS 171706Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

15 Dec

The US Ambassador to the UN reported that Afro-Asian sentiment was being whipped up by the Arabs over the failure of Israeli forces to withdraw behind the armistice lines and over reports of Israeli atrocities against Arabs in Israel. He recommended that the State

Department make a high-level approach to Israel, with appropriate publicity, urging an unconditional and immediate withdrawal.

(S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 355, 15 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 151844Z Dec 56. Received JCS 171707Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

16 Dec (U) After talking with Israeli Chief of Staff Dayan, Maj Gen Burns said that Israeli forces holding a line in Sinai 31 miles east of the Suez Canal would pull back further during the ensuing week.

AP Wire Service, 16 Dec 56. Received JCS 161127Z Dec 56.

16 Dec King Saud informed the US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia that Syria had agreed to permit a certain number of engineers to inspect the blown-up IPC pipeline stations and determine the extent of repairs required, provided no repairs were started until after the evacuation "of territories occupied by the aggressive forces."

(S) Msg, Jidda (Wadsworth) to SecState, 340, 16 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 170843Z Dec 56. Received JCS 172026Z Dec 56.

16 Dec The State Department directed the US Ambassador in Cairo to discuss with Nasser reports of Egyptian maltreatment of British and French nationals and Jews. At his discretion, the Ambassador might urge moderation in the interest of continuing progress toward the settlement of many outstanding questions.

(S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Cairo, NIACT 1995, 16 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 172026Z Dec 56.

16 Dec Hammarskjold handed the UK representative to the UN a lengthy aide-memoire in response to the British ultimatum of 15 December. He expressed concern that British ships, then engaged in lifting operations, might be withdrawn before completion of those operations. For the ships slated to be used in clearing the Canal under UN direction, it was the position of the UN that security would be provided by local Egyptian civilian police. Hammarskjold stated that the use of UNEF to protect British crews along the length of the Canal was not justified by General Assembly decisions.

(S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 359, 16 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 170252Z Dec 56. Received JCS 171706Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

16 Dec (U) In an address over Baghdad Radio, Iraqi Premier Nuri Said declared that his country would remain in the Baghdad Pact. He attacked Communism as the source of attacks on the pact, and stated Iraq's determination to fight both Communism and Zionism. He denied that Iraq had ever deviated from pro-Arab policy and declared that his country had been a more consistent champion of the Arab cause than Egypt.

NYT, 17 Dec 56, 9:1. Received JCS 171330Z Dec 56. (Earlier, incomplete reports of Nuri's speech were received in JCS over AP Wire Service at 161927Z, 162151Z, and 162331Z Dec 56.)

16 Dec (U) British forces turned over control of most of Port Said to UN forces and retired into a narrow waterfront perimeter as a preliminary to a final Allied withdrawal from Egypt. This move followed a night that had seen the heaviest fighting in the Port Said area since the cease-fire nearly six weeks before.
 NYT, 17 Dec 56, 1:3. Received JCS 171330Z Dec 56.

17 Dec Charging that Egyptians had dynamited a tractor in Israel on the night of 15 December, the Israeli Foreign Ministry advised the US Embassy in Tel Aviv that Israel intended to send a letter to the UN accusing Egypt of violating the UN cease-fire resolution.
 (S) Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 750, 17 Dec 56, DA IN 281208 (18 Dec 56), CJCS files. Received JCS 191138Z Dec 56.

17 Dec In answer to a query by the US Ambassador in Damascus, Syrian Prime Minister Asali said that various statements made by Syrian Cabinet Ministers in regard to the conditions required to be fulfilled prior to restoration of the IPC pipeline referred to conditions for permitting oil to flow, not to repairs. He said Syria now agreed to admit IPC representatives for discussions and to carry out repairs. This, he pointed out, did not include permission to start the flow of oil.
 (S) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1473, 17 Dec 56, DA IN 280900. Received State 171644Z Dec 56. Received JCS (No Time).

17 Dec The Hungarian Charge d'Affaires delivered a note to the State Department in response to the Department's protest of 10 December over the interruption of communications with the US Legation in Budapest. The Hungarian note stated that "technical defects" had caused the interruption of telegraphic communications between Budapest and foreign countries on 9 and 10 December. The Foreign Ministry had been unable to transmit a coded telegram since it could not assume responsibility for exact transmission. The State Department replied that this explanation was unsatisfactory.
 (S) (See Only) Msg, SecState to AmLegation Budapest, 412, 17 Dec 56. Received JCS 181945Z Dec 56.

17 Dec King Saud sent a message to King Hussein of Jordan urging that Jordan take no "precipitate action" in abrogating the British treaty or establishing diplomatic relations with the USSR or Red China. These problems, said Saud, presented "no pressing urgency."
 (S) Msg, Jidda (Wadsworth) to SecState, 348, 20 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 210350Z Dec 56. Received JCS 211625Z Dec 56. Corrected Copy 261741Z Dec 56.

- 17 Dec (U) Israel proposed to Egypt, through the International Red Cross, a general exchange of all prisoners of war. Israel held about 5,600 Egyptian prisoners; Egypt had four Israelis.
 NYT, 19 Dec 56, 20:5. Received JCS 191330Z Dec 56. (Earlier mention of this offer appeared in (S) Msg, CNO to CINCLANTFLT et al., 171931Z Dec 56. Received JCS 180137Z Dec 56.)

- 17 Dec (U) Gasoline and oil products were rationed in the UK for the first time since the lifting of restrictions on them in 1950. In France, the government raised the price of gasoline to 79 cents a gallon, an increase of nine per cent.
 NYT, 17 Dec 56, 6:7. Received JCS 171330Z Dec 56. AP Wire Service, 17 Dec 56. Received JCS 171542Z and 171625Z Dec 56.

- 17 Dec (U) General strikes took place in Jordan, Egypt, and Syria, in protest against the government of Iraqi Premier Nuri Said and his policy of standing by the Baghdad Pact.
 AP Wire Service, 17 Dec 56. Received JCS 171442Z, 171518Z, and 171634Z Dec 56.

- 17 Dec (U) Lt Gen Sir Hugh Stockwell, Allied commander at Port Said, said that all arrangements for the final withdrawal of his forces from Egypt were complete. He declined, however, to reveal the date on which the troops would leave.
 NYT, 18 Dec 56, 1:5. Received JCS 181330Z Dec 56.

- 17 Dec (U) The Soviet Charge d'Affaires in Washington called on Deputy Under SecState Murphy and declined to accept the US protest of 6 December against the massing of Soviet tanks in front of the US Legation in Budapest.
 NYT, 18 Dec 56, 1:7. Received JCS 181330Z Dec 56. (Earlier, incomplete accounts were received in JCS over AP Wire Service at 171514Z and 171719Z Dec 56.)

- 17 Dec (U) Poland and the Soviet Union signed a military "status of forces" agreement giving Poland a voice in the movements of Soviet troops stationed within her borders. The agreement included these points: 1) Soviet troops in Poland would not move within the country without Polish approval. 2) These troops could not be used as an instrument of political pressure. 3) Their numbers and locations were to be agreed on mutually. 4) Soviet troops and their families would be subject to Polish law when off post. 5) Poland was to receive full payment for supplies delivered to Soviet units.
 AP Wire Service, 17 Dec 56. Received JCS 171929Z and 171951Z Dec 56. The text of the agreement, as released by Tass on 18 December, was printed in NYT, 18 Dec 56, 18:3-6 (late edition). Received JCS approximately 181700Z Dec 56.

17 Dec

Hammarskjold showed Ambassador Lodge a copy of a letter he intended to give to the UK representative, turning down the UK ultimatum. The letter stated that Hammarskjold would rather attempt the Suez Canal clearance without British ships, and accept the resultant delay, than undertake the risk of using UK nationals on the vessels. He agreed, however, to provide the British with the desired protection in the Port Said area, should clearing operations under way there extend beyond the date of the final withdrawal of UK troops.

(S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 362, 17 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 180126Z Dec 56. Received JCS 181622Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

17 Dec ✓

CINCNELM reported that all Iraqi troops in Jordan had been withdrawn. There were, however, indications that Syrian and Saudi Arabian troops in Jordan were digging in for a "prolonged stay."

(S) Msg, CINCNELM to CNO et al., 171852Z Dec 56. Received JCS 181029Z Dec 56.

18 Dec (v)

Israeli Premier Ben Gurion told New York Times writer Hanson Baldwin in an interview that "under no conditions" would Israel allow Egypt to return to the Gaza Strip. Ben Gurion also said Israel had received no official response to its proposal of a general exchange of prisoners with Egypt.

NYT, 19 Dec 56, 20:4-5. Received JCS 191330Z Dec 56.

18 Dec (v)

Israeli forces in Sinai pulled back another fifteen miles to a line about 47 miles east of the Suez Canal.

AP Wire Service, 18 Dec 56. Received JCS 181526Z Dec 56.

18 Dec (v)

Foreign Minister Pineau told the French National Assembly that France would help Israel build a pipeline from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean as a means of increasing the flow of oil to Europe.

NYT, 19 Dec 56, 20:3. Received JCS 191330Z Dec 56. (Earlier, incomplete reports were received in JCS over AP Wire Service at 181544Z and 181608Z Dec 56.)

18 Dec (v)

SecState Dulles told his news conference that a visit by Yugoslavia's Marshal Tito to the US would serve a useful purpose and that President Eisenhower was considering sending Tito a formal invitation.

Discussing the diminution of Soviet influence in the satellite countries, Mr. Dulles told the reporters that the US "has no purpose at all to turn these satellite countries into our Allies, in the sense that we have no desire to surround the Soviet Union with a band of hostile states." He said that US policy hoped to facilitate a "peaceful evolution" of the satellite nations toward "genuine independence."

The SecState also said that the US was deeply concerned that the Suez Canal be reopened as soon as possible. However, he said, the US believed that the

best approach was to back fully the efforts of UN Secretary General Hammarskjold. He further stated that the US would continue to try for a settlement in Palestine along the lines of his statement of 26 August 1955. [On that date SecState Dulles told the Council on Foreign Relations that the US was willing to: 1) contribute substantially to an international loan to enable Israel to pay indemnities to Arab refugees for lost property; and 2) join in treaties guaranteeing the Israeli-Arab borders after both sides had agreed on permanent boundaries.]

AP Wire Service, 18 Dec 56. Received JCS 181652Z, 181658Z, 181744Z, 190001Z Dec 56. NYT, 19 Dec 56, 14:8. Received JCS 191330Z Dec 56. The text of Mr. Dulles' speech of 26 August 1955 is printed in State Dept Bulletin, vol XXXIII, no 845 (5 Sep 55), pp. 378-380.

- 18 Dec (U) In Belgrade, "responsible sources" said they thought Tito would accept an invitation to visit the US.
AP Wire Service, 18 Dec 56. Received JCS 182205Z Dec 56.
- 18 Dec (U) Vice President Nixon departed for Austria to explore the possibility of admitting more refugees to the US, the need for additional legislation to speed the program, and the question of whether or not Austria required more aid in handling the refugees.
NYT, 19 Dec 56, 1:8. Received JCS 191330Z Dec 56.
- 19 Dec STATE As a result of a request by the US to India, the Indian Minister in Damascus approached the Syrian Foreign Office on the question of repair of the IPC pipeline. Syrian Foreign Minister Bitar told the Minister that Syria was ready to allow IPC to begin repairing the damaged pumping stations. But Syria could not permit connection of the pipes by-passing the pumping stations, which would allow the pipelines to be used at one-third their capacity, until after the complete evacuation of Egyptian territory and the Gaza Strip by Israeli forces. However, if the US could issue a statement "fixing definite date for complete Israeli withdrawal," Syria would permit the immediate attachment of these pipes.
(S) Msg, New Delhi (Bartlett) to SecState, 1730, 19 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 200025Z Dec 56. Received JCS 201641Z Dec 56.
- 19 Dec STATE Socony representative Eckert was called in by the Syrian Minister of Public Works and the Minister of National Economy who requested that Socony find tankers to haul crude oil from storage tanks at Banias, Syria, to the refinery at Tripoli, Lebanon. The Minister of National Economy told Eckert that the Soviets had offered to make good the expected shortage of gasoline and kerosene when the supply from Tripoli ceased, but Syria preferred not to have to accept the

Soviet offer. Reporting this, the US Ambassador in Damascus said that crude oil at Baniyas was estimated at 150,000 to 300,000 tons.

Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1510, 21 Dec 56, DA IN 282370 (22 Dec 56) and 282370-C (24 Dec 56). Received State 211120Z Dec 56. Received JCS 221352Z Dec 56, Corrected Copy (No Time).

19 Dec (U) At 1000Z British officers in Port Said handed over to Swedish officers of the UNEF all responsibility for civil affairs in that city. The Swedes would govern the city during the last stages of the Allied withdrawal and for a short time thereafter until the Egyptians could resume its administration.
NYT, 20 Dec 56, 22:6. Received JCS 201330Z Dec 56.

19 Dec The US Ambassador in Rabat discussed the Port Lyautey situation with Moroccan Foreign Minister Balafrej, in accordance with the State Department's instructions of 6 and 14 December. Balafrej admitted that the Moroccan note of 29 November on the situation was "inexact" in certain particulars. He apparently had not been consulted about it and wished that it had not been sent. He definitely did not want to receive a formal reply and had no intention of making any "publicity use" of the note. Balafrej stated that he had already taken the initiative with the French on the subject of a modus vivendi, including proposals aimed at enabling his government to cope with the problem of dock workers.

Msg, Rabat (Cannon) to SecState, 381, 19 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 191950Z Dec 56. Received JCS 202353Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford. Corrected copy received JCS 212302Z Dec 56.

19 Dec In an answer to King Saud's message of 17 December, King Hussein declared that the question of Jordan's establishing diplomatic relations with the USSR or Communist China had been "wrapped up and put away" and Jordan was "no longer even thinking about" it.
Msg, Jidda (Wadsworth) to SecState, 349, 21 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 220926Z Dec 56. Received JCS 261741Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

19 Dec (U) Premier Ben Gurion told the Knesset that Israel would not "under any circumstances" let Egypt reoccupy the Gaza Strip.
AP Wire Service, 19 Dec 56. Received JCS 191427Z Dec 56.

In Cairo, there was strong reaction to Ben Gurion's statement. Egyptian sources said that if Israel refused to return the Gaza Strip to Egypt the US would face the alternative of getting tough with Israel or losing the newly gained confidence of the Arab world.

AP Wire Service, 19 Dec 56. Received JCS 192233Z Dec 56.

- 19 Dec (U) Hungarian Premier Kadar was quoted as saying his armed forces were getting strong enough to fight the rebels without Soviet assistance. At the same time his government disclosed that it had authorized pay raises up to ten per cent in an effort to draw workers into factories and mines. The nation's coal and power situation was so desperate, however, that the Kadar regime had reduced work in the steel and machine-building industries to three days a week.
AP Wire Service, 19 Dec 56. Received JCS 1916C4Z, 192159Z, and 192248Z Dec 56.
- 19 Dec King Hussein summoned the US Ambassador and inquired about US financial aid for Jordan. He was not interested in help from the UK nor from "leftist and extremist" sources. The Ambassador explained the US view as outlined in his instructions of 12 December. The King replied that he was determined not to submit to "outside influences" but to maintain the sovereignty of Jordan. He was confident he had the backing of the Army but, he added, Jordan needed assistance in order to survive and he hoped the US would help.
- The Ambassador recommended that the US move quickly to assist Jordan.
(TS) Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 647, 20 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State (Part One) 210014Z, (Part Two) 202310Z Dec 56. Received JCS 211925Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.
- 19 Dec (U) Iraq clamped curfews on the areas around K-3 and T-1, two of the four pumping stations on the IPC's Kirkuk-Tripoli pipeline. A government announcement said the curfews were imposed "for reasons of public interest."
AP Wire Service, 19 Dec 56. Received JCS 191606Z Dec 56. NYT, 20 Dec 56, 7:1. Received JCS 201330Z Dec 56.
- 19 Dec The Polish Ambassador in Paris told the US Ambassador there that Poland had great need of prompt economic aid from the US. Agricultural products and machinery for modernization of coal mines were the biggest requirements. The USSR was supplying substantial quantities of grain to Poland, but this was insufficient for her needs.
(TS) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 3074, 20 Dec 56, DA IN 282765 (24 Dec 56). Received State 222000Z Dec 56. Received JCS 240301Z Dec 56. (C) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 3075, 20 Dec 56, DA IN 282762 (24 Dec 56). Received State 222000Z Dec 56. Received JCS 240307Z Dec 56.
- 19 Dec UN Secretary General Hammarskjold replied to the British ultimatum on Suez Canal clearance along the lines of the note he had shown US UN Ambassador Lodge on 17 December. The New York Times reported that

Hammarskjold said that if the British were willing to allow the six ships under discussion to serve with "neutral" crews, they could keep three officers as observers aboard each vessel. (Ambassador Lodge had not reported such a statement.)

NYT, 20 Dec 56, 1:5-6. Received JCS 201330Z Dec 56.

19 Dec Hammarskjold was advised by the UNEF commander that he had "'noted' but not accepted" Israel's statement that it would withdraw from Sinai at the rate of 25 kilometers per week.
(C) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 381, 19 Dec 56. Received State 201759Z [sic; 200559Z] Dec 56. Received JCS 201641Z Dec 56.

19 Dec (U) French Foreign Minister Pineau told the National Assembly that the main reason for the Anglo-French agreement to a cease-fire in Egypt was pressure from the British Labor Party on Prime Minister Eden. Other reasons why the UK and France stopped fighting before gaining full control of the Suez Canal were pressure from the US and the UN, and the threat of Soviet military intervention. Pineau said the latter was a more or less negligible factor. He denied charges of Anglo-French-Israeli collusion, but said the UK and France had been aware that Israel would undertake a police action in Sinai and had coordinated their own ideas as to what to do when it happened.

Turning to the future, he declared that "the test of success for the United Nations will be the clearing of the Canal." He said that a three-pronged program to lessen Europe's dependence on the Suez Canal was being put into operation: 1) Suez Canal users were drawing up plans for two new pipelines, one across Turkey and the other across Israel from Eilat to Haifa; 2) huge tankers were being built for the journey around the Cape of Good Hope; 3) France would hasten its exploitation of recently-discovered oil deposits in southern Algeria.

AP Wire Service, 19 Dec 56. Received JCS 192153Z and 192209Z Dec 56.

19 Dec As of this date, according to a report from the US Consul in Alexandria, there was no apparent relaxation and some indication of acceleration in expulsions in the Alexandria area of Jews and British and French nationals. British and French nationals were being "advised" to leave the country by written notice at a rate of 200-250 per day.

(S) Msg, Alexandria (Washburn) to SecState, 312, 20 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 201555Z Dec 56. Received JCS 210040Z Dec 56.

20 Dec (U) The Kadar Government of Hungary restored the Stalin-era policy of internment without trial.
AP-Wire-Service; 20-Dec 56. Received JCS 201432Z and 202023Z Dec 56. NYT, 21 Dec 56, 1:4. Received JCS 211330Z Dec 56.

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~

20 Dec (V) UN representatives in Cairo announced that plans for beginning canal clearance operations were complete. Actual work on reopening the canal was expected to follow immediately after the final Anglo-French evacuation of the Suez area.
AP Wire Service, 20 Dec 56. Received JCS 201515Z Dec 56.

20 Dec (V) Kadar was reported to have said that the reorganized Hungarian armed forces were getting strong enough to control the situation in his country without Soviet aid. Despite this statement the Hungarian leader was still working behind the guns of Soviet tanks on a "new program," which he expected to announce some time during the Christmas holidays.
AP Wire Service, 20 Dec 56. Received JCS 202044Z Dec 56.

20 Dec The US Ambassador in Paris reported that he had communicated to the French Foreign Ministry the State Department's expression of interest and concern in the Port Lyautey problem as transmitted to him by the Department on 14 December. The official of the Foreign Ministry who discussed the problem with the Ambassador said that he would do what he could to bring about cessation in the use by the French of the Port Lyautey facilities, but he also pointed out that as long as the Moroccan authorities were unable or unwilling to make it possible for the French to use normal commercial facilities the French military authorities would be confronted with a serious dilemma.
(●) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 3095, 20 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 202216Z Dec 56. Received JCS 211922Z Dec 56.

20 Dec ~~STATE~~ The Secretary General of the Arab League gave Ambassador Lodge at the UN what the Ambassador described as the "most encouraging word I have yet had" on prospects for progress on Suez and Palestine settlements. The Secretary General said that he was sure that the Egyptians wanted to "regularize" the status of the canal so that it could once again be a source of revenue and not a source of constant friction and danger. Negotiations on this matter could begin as soon as the last French and British troops left Egypt. The Secretary General also said that, with respect to Palestine, he thought the Arabs would be willing to recognize the existence of Israel if the negotiations on the question were begun with a full understanding that recognition of Israel's political existence was only one of several problems. The problems included, (a) the question of Arab refugees from Israel, (b) definition of the borders of Israel, and (c) the internationalization of Jerusalem. Negotiations on Palestine, he said, might begin as soon as the UN's cease-fire and withdrawal resolutions had been complied with and the situation brought about by the recent Israeli military operations had been "completely wiped away."

~~TOP SECRET~~

Ambassador Lodge concurred with the Secretary General on the timing of negotiations and further indicated that he felt it was possible to get Arab agreement on Israeli recognition and on the settlement of the other outstanding Arab-Israeli questions.

(●) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 390, 21 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 211846Z Dec 56. Received JCS 221720Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

20 Dec In reply to Egypt's request of 12 December to relax US controls on Egyptian funds in the US, the State Department instructed Ambassador Hare to point out to the Egyptians that US restrictions on certain Egyptian and Suez Canal Company assets arose out of confusion incident to the seizure of the canal and disagreement over the status of some of these assets. The US did not yet feel that the confusion and disagreement had been dispelled. The US Embassy in Cairo was instructed to point out that restrictions were not applicable to current accruals. Therefore, in the view of the US Government there was not necessarily a relationship between US controls and the Egyptian decision with respect to trade with the Soviet bloc and conversion of its dollar assets.

(●) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Cairo, 2051, 20 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 211925Z Dec 56.

20 Dec (✓) A New York Times correspondent in Warsaw reported that Poland was adopting, in an attempt to salvage Poland's economy from Soviet dictated policies, economic practices almost identical to those used earlier by Yugoslavia. It had just been announced that the 1957 economic development program would be stripped of grandiose schemes and long term projects which could not be completed and utilized in the course of the current five-year plan (by 1960).

NYT, 21 Dec 56, 13:3. Received JCS 211330Z Dec 56.

20 Dec The Italian Legation in Budapest reported to Rome that the ability of the Hungarian Government to restore the life of the country to normal was greatly lessened by the November uprisings. Kadar's unyielding stand against the workers' demands presented the Soviets with the dilemma of either maintaining troops in Hungary at the expense of their economy and international prestige until an apparently unattainable "Socialist" or pseudo-Socialist political system was re-established or giving up now, withdrawing and allowing the deviationist tendencies of the country to operate freely. Meanwhile, the economic condition of the country was best described as one of complete chaos.

(●) Msg, Rome (Jernegan) to SecState, 2718, 28 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 071426Z Jan 57. Received JCS 072228Z Jan 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

21 Dec The Department of State instructed the US Embassies in Paris and Rabat to encourage the Moroccan Government to proceed promptly with Franco-Moroccan defense negotiations. It was to be made clear to Morocco that

the US had no desire to supplant France as the principal source of economic aid for Morocco. But, within the terms of this limitation, the US reserved the right to work directly with the Government of Morocco on the question, and to determine for itself if the US should extend some economic aid.

The French were to be told: (1) that the US had not received a Moroccan request for equipment for 6000 troops, and that the US would not be favorably disposed toward such a request at this time; and (2) that the US reserved to itself the right to determine what aid should be extended to Morocco by the US.

(2) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Paris, 2392, 21 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 231253Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

21 Dec

[redacted] had informed the US Embassy of an approach by the Syrian Minister to Turkey on the possibility of the American company's surveying the damage done to the IPC. A formal proposal that the US company undertake the task was expected after Damascus replied to the Syrian Minister's request for instructions.

[redacted] also reported that a two-man Iranian technical delegation had recently arrived in Ankara to undertake jointly with the Turks a survey of a pipeline across Southern Turkey to the Qum field in Iran.

(6) [redacted] Received JCS 230913Z Dec 56.

21 Dec

Israeli Ambassador Eban informed US Ambassador Lodge that Israel planned to accelerate its withdrawal from Sinai, and that all Israeli forces would be out of Sinai west of El Arish by about the first week in January. He also indicated that the accelerated withdrawal would leave a number of problems still unsolved. These included: (1) restrictions on Israeli use of the Gulf of Aqaba (2) Gaza, (3) the demilitarization of Sinai, (4) the continuance of Fedayeen activities, and (5) restrictions on Israeli use of the Suez Canal. Ambassador Eban also expressed the view that his government now looked to the US to play an active role in helping bring about a settlement of these problems.

(6) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 392, 21 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 220123Z Dec 56. Received JCS 221725Z Dec 56.


21 Dec

The US Ambassador in Beirut, reporting compliance with the State Department's instructions of 12 December, passed on the assurance of President Chamoun that he would not neglect any opportunity to impress upon the Government of Jordan the necessity for maintaining

its independence and friendly ties with the free world. The Lebanese President also said that Jordan had been unable to obtain Egyptian and Syrian assurances that they would assume the major part of the burden of a subsidy for Jordan should the Anglo-Jordanian treaty be terminated. Further, King Saud had informed the Jordanians that he would assume a share of a subsidy only if the UK were the party taking the initiative to end the subsidy.

(S) Msg, Beirut (Heath) to SecState, 1577, 21 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 241851Z Dec 56. Received JCS 261741Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

21 Dec



(S) Msg, USARMA Beirut to DEPTAR, CX 181, 211215Z Dec 56, DA IN 282525. Received JCS 222344Z Dec 56.

21 Dec (U) It was reported in Port Said that the final date for allied evacuation of Suez was imminent. General Stockwell moved his headquarters aboard ship, General Wheeler established his headquarters aboard a Danish salvage ship in the Port Said harbor, and the UNEF posted sentries in the former allied headquarters building. Perhaps the last major obstacle to the allied evacuation was removed with the turning over by the British and French of 386 Egyptian POWs, and by the Egyptians of 450 civilian internees, to the UNEF.
AP Wire Service, 21 Dec 56. Received JCS 211518Z, 211531Z and 211558Z Dec 56.

21 Dec (U) Commenting on a Yemeni complaint that UK jets had attacked portions of the Aden Protectorate that Yemen considered its territory, the UK Foreign Office admitted that British-led Adeni troops had skirmished with dissident Adenis in a northern portion of the UK-supported protectorate of Aden. The Yemeni complaint had also noted that the UK had concentrated large numbers of troops, tanks, and jet aircraft immediately south of Yemen. The UK Foreign Office denied the allegation, and said it was assumed that the troop concentration charges were directed at these recent operations against the Yemeni-supported Adeni dissidents.
AP Wire Service, 21 Dec 56. Received JCS 212025Z Dec 56.

21 Dec (U) UN Secretary General Hammarskjold informed the General Assembly that Israel planned a partial withdrawal of troops from their Sinai positions by 10 January, but he was unable to say when all Israeli troops might be withdrawn from the Peninsula.

AP Wire Service, 21 Dec 56. Received JCS 220143Z Dec 56.

21 Dec The UN General Assembly ratified the UN Budget Committee's recommendation that the operations of the UNEF be financed by a special assessment of \$10 million on the 80 members of the UN.

(U) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 397, 22 Dec 56, DA IN 282593. (Received State 220958Z Dec 56. Received JCS (No Time). AP Wire Service, 20 Dec 56. Received JCS 202258Z Dec 56.

22 Dec



(U) Msg, DA IN 284998. Received JCS 041345Z Jan 57, 040354Z Jan 57.

22 Dec

The US Ambassador in Paris transmitted an informal translation of the French reply to a Moroccan note of 29 November concerning the Port Lyautey situation. The reply called the attention of the Moroccan Government to France's right, under the protocol of 2 March 1956, to support its army in Morocco in the same fashion as before Morocco attained its independence. The materiel unloaded from the Commandant Millasseau was destined for such French forces and was therefore admissable within the framework of the temporary agreements between France and Morocco. The French note also pointed out that notification of intention to unload the Commandant Millasseau had been given to the Moroccan General Staff in conformance with Franco-Moroccan agreements; thus there had been no intention to present the Royal Moroccan Government with a fait accompli. Furthermore, the decision to unload the vessel at Port Lyautey rather than at Casablanca had been made in an attempt to avoid incidents at Casablanca. There had been no intention to infringe on Moroccan sovereignty. In addition, the French Government pointed out that the naval installation at Port Lyautey was a French base and was only being used by the US under certain conditions. Finally, the French informed the Moroccan Government that they were desirous of removing all misunderstandings between the two countries and that therefore they would be happy to discuss not only the Casablanca question, but the entire question of US bases in Morocco, if necessary in conjunction with US authorities and within the

framework of the forthcoming Franco-Moroccan negotiations for common defense.

(C) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 3128, 22 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 221911Z Dec 56. Received JCS 241317Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

22 Dec

The US Ambassador in Amman reported that

recent statements by Nasser and Syrian leaders might well indicate that Arab aid for Jordan was closer than the US suspected.

(C) Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 662, 22 Dec 56, DA IN 282697 (23 Dec 56). Received State 221958Z Dec 56. Received JCS 231132Z Dec 56.

22 Dec

The details of an alleged plot against the Syrian Government were released in Damascus. According to the official statement 46 persons, including ex-President Adib Shishakli, were charged with collaborating in anti-government activity with representatives of Iraq, the UK, and France.

Received JCS 251146Z Dec 56.

22 Dec

The State Department suggested that the US Ambassador in London contact the UK Foreign Office and SCUA Administrator Bartels to determine the feasibility of undertaking a study on the possible establishment of a Suez Canal user's priority system for application when the canal was once again opened to traffic. The State Department felt that, should a system of priorities eventually be established the SCUA could serve a most useful role in administering the priority system.

(C) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy London, 4407, 22 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 261741Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

22 Dec (U)

The UNEF assumed responsibility for the Suez area as the last allied forces in Egypt sailed from Port Said at 221550Z.

NYT, 23 Dec 56, 1:8. Received JCS (Sunday).

22 Dec (U)

Premier Asali of Syria and his cabinet resigned. However, the relinquishment of the reins of government by Asali was merely a strategic move to permit the Premier to form a new and more "harmonious" government and to rid his cabinet of associates he deemed objectionable.

NYT, 23 Dec 56, 1:6-7. Received JCS (Sunday).

22 Dec

Prime Minister Ben Gurion, in an interview with the US Ambassador in Tel Aviv raised the question of US Suez-Sinai policy and its effect on Israel's security after Israeli forces were withdrawn from Sinai. He stated that his government must reach a vital policy decision early in January and that Israel wanted very much to coordinate its policy with that of the US if at all possible. Specifically, the Prime Minister asked for statements of US policy regarding (1) free transit of the Suez Canal by Israeli shipping, (2) freedom of Israeli shipping to transit the Gulf of Aqaba, (3) possible re-establishment of an Egyptian military base in eastern Sinai, and (4) the elimination of Egyptian-directed Jordanian Fedayeen attacks on Israel. The Prime Minister also stated that he felt there had been unequal pressure on Israel and Egypt with respect to compliance with the UN resolution on cessation of hostilities, and that public opposition to Israeli troop withdrawals was growing.


(S) Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 774, 23 Dec 56. Received State 240118Z Dec 56. Received JCS 261710Z Dec 56, CJCS files. SEEN by Adm Radford. (S) Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 775, 23 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 231531Z Dec 56. Received JCS 261516Z Dec 56.

23 Dec (v)

Egypt refused to permit the movement of any of the British and French salvage vessels at Port Said into the Suez Canal to begin clearance operations, even though the last of the British-French troops had departed on the evening of 22 December. General Wheeler said talks on this subject between him and Egyptian officials had reached "a very critical stage."

NYT, 24 Dec 56, 1:8. Received JCS 241330Z Dec 56.

23 Dec



(S) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 2098, 31 Dec 56. Received State 010614Z Jan 57. Received JCS 021537Z Jan 57.

23 Dec

The US Ambassador in Damascus reported that Syrian Foreign Minister Bitar had not mentioned, in several conversations about the IPC pipeline, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai and Gaza areas as a condition for repair of the pipeline and the resumption of oil flow through it. According to the Dutch Charge d'Affaires, Bitar had told him that Syria had agreed to let IPC representatives assess the damage to the

pipeline but would not permit repairs or flow of oil until Israeli forces were out of the Sinai and Gaza areas.

(U) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1529, 23 Dec 56, DA IN 282776 (24 Dec 56). Received State 231653Z Dec 56. Received JCS 240836Z Dec 56.

- 23 Dec (U) Pravda denounced elements inside the Communist world who placed "nationalism" above unity with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. The statement was aimed at recent Polish Communist demands that Poland's national aspirations be given more attention; however, it also applied, by extension, to Yugoslavia, where the theme of "national communism" had received its fullest support, and to elements in Hungary and other Soviet satellite nations.
NYT, 24 Dec 56, 1:5. Received JCS 241330Z Dec 56.
- 23 Dec (U) Nuri, in one of his rare press conferences, asserted that the question of Iraq's connection with the Baghdad Pact was one for determination by the Government of Iraq and its people alone. His statement was in answer to criticism, especially by Egypt, Syria, and the USSR, of Iraq's membership in the Pact.
AP Wire Service, 24 Dec 56. Received JCS 241436Z Dec 56.
- 24 Dec (U) The Egyptian Navy began clearing mines from the Suez Canal. It had never been officially announced that mines had been placed in the Canal.
AP Wire Service, 24 Dec 56. Received JCS 250150Z Dec 56.
- 24 Dec (U) US State Department officials expressed satisfaction with UN progress in clearing the Suez Canal. Since the Egyptians had agreed on 21 December to the use of a part of the British-French salvage fleet, they said, the dispute in Cairo concerned not the principle but the degree of British and French participation.
NYT, 25 Dec 56, 1:6. Received JCS 251330Z Dec 56.
- 24 Dec (U) Israel accused Egypt of renewing Fedayeen raids and of "deliberately flouting" the UN cease-fire resolution. The accusation also charged Jordan with "heavy responsibility" for the raids, because, according to the statement, the raids were based in Jordan.
AP Wire Service, 24 Dec 56. Received JCS 241444Z Dec 56.
- 24 Dec A high official of the Syrian Foreign Office told the US Ambassador in Damascus that the US should not risk its growing prestige in the Middle East by taking the lead in the UN regarding a settlement of the Palestine question. A nation known to be free of UK, US, or French influence, such as India, would be more appropriate. He thought the Arab leaders would consider a UN-formulated settlement if the Israelis made no

border trouble for six months to a year. Because of anti-Israeli public opinion among Arabs, the Syrian Government would have to oppose the present US resolution on Palestine by intensifying its propaganda linking Israel and Zionism with "aggressive imperialism."

~~(S)~~ Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1566, 27 Dec 56. Received State 282109Z Dec 56. Received JCS 291602Z Dec 56.

24 Dec

Prime Minister Nuri of Iraq requested the US Embassy in Baghdad to take up urgently with the State Department the question of mitigating hostility between Egypt and Iraq and of finding a basis for cooperation between them. He thought Nasser should realize that the propaganda war between Iraq and Egypt benefited only the Soviets; if Nasser were really anti-Communist, he would deplore this. Nuri thought that an understanding with Nasser was the key to normalizing Iraq's relations with the other Arab states. For its part, Iraq was prepared to cooperate in a solution to the Palestine question and in the economic field. Nuri considered Iraq's membership in the Baghdad Pact a purely internal question, could not see how it adversely affected other Arab states, and was bewildered by their anti-Pact propaganda. The Embassy commented to the State Department that it was clear that Nuri would not compromise on the Baghdad Pact but hoped Nasser would cooperate to stem the pro-Soviet tide in the Near East.

~~(S)~~ Msg, Baghdad (Fritzlan) to SecState, 1118, 25 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 251427Z Dec 56. Received JCS 261741Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

24 Dec (U)

Egypt submitted a resolution to the UN Secretary General calling for "adequate compensation" from Britain, France, and Israel for their invasion of Egypt. The resolution listed nine categories of damages, ranging from casualties and property destruction to interruption of Suez Canal traffic and damage to the Egyptian economy "as a whole." If Egypt pressed the claim, Britain, France, and Israel were expected to submit counterclaims.

NYT, 25 Dec 56, 1:8. Received JCS 251330Z Dec 56.

24 Dec

The State Department instructed the US Ambassador in Amman to warn King Hussein that any Arab aid that might be offered to replace the British subsidy would be of uncertain duration and that Soviet assistance might lead to Soviet penetration and the loss of Jordan's independence. The advantages of retaining the British financial relationship were to be stressed, especially in the light of Britain's capacity to adjust her relationships to changed circumstances, as in India, Burma, and Ceylon. Hussein was to be reminded of existing US economic aid to Jordan and of US efforts in the UN to solve Middle East problems. He should realize that the efforts of Jordan's Western friends to help her might be expected to be limited if Jordan

() Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Amman, 748,
24 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 261741Z Dec 56.
SEEN by Adm Radford.

24 Dec The State Department cabled the US Ambassador in
Damascus that US oil companies had indicated to the
Department their inability to furnish tankers to
transport crude oil from Banias to the refinery at
Tripoli, as requested by Syria. The oil companies,
stated SecState, would so inform Syria.

() Msg, SecState to Damascus, 1153, 24 Dec 56,
DA IN 282838 (25 Dec 56). Received JCS 250740Z Dec 56.

25 Dec (u) The Egyptian Suez Canal Authority announced that
clearance operations in the Canal could not begin
until after all Israeli forces were out of Egypt.
This announcement came on the same day on which two
high UN officials--Andrew W. Cordier, executive
assistant to Hammarskjold, and Alfred G. Katzin,
Deputy Assistant Secretary General--took off from
New York for Cairo to try to end the existing
delay in the start of the clearance operations.
NYT, 26 Dec 56, 1:5. Received JCS 261330Z Dec 56.

25 Dec (u) The State Department received a note from Israel
asking the US to use its good offices to halt
Egyptian-directed raids into Israel. The note
alleged that 19 raids had occurred between 3 and 24
December. The State Department took the note under
consideration.
AP Wire Service, 26 Dec 56. Received JCS
261627Z Dec 56.

25 Dec The US Ambassador in Cairo reported to SecState on
the situation regarding British, French, and Jewish
residents of Egypt. He said that "virtually all
Metropolitan French and so-called 'British British'
have departed." British and French nationals still
in Egypt were continuing to receive "invitations"
to depart, but many were passively resisting. Current
government policy seemed designed to eliminate British
and French influence in Egypt. As for the Jews, the
policy was to encourage them to depart by applying
long-term pressure, mostly economic. Harsher measures
had been dropped. Although the sense of immediate
danger for Jews was less acute, their long-term
prospects were "grim."

() Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 2023,
25 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 260538Z Dec 56.
Received JCS 261741Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

25 Dec The US Ambassador in Damascus reported that, on the basis of his discussions with the Prime Minister of Syria, public statements of Syrian officials, and other indications, it appeared that Syria would officially condition permission to resume operation of the IPC pipeline--but not necessarily its repair--on Israeli withdrawal behind the 1949 armistice line. The Embassy had expressed doubt to Syria that that country had either a moral or a legal basis for linking the pipeline matter with an Israeli-Egyptian problem, but "without visible effect." It was the Syrian view that the US could force Israeli withdrawal; hence the Syrians would judge US sincerity by whether or not such a withdrawal were promptly executed. However, even if the "Syrian (and Arab)" position were accepted in toto by the US, the Embassy could not guarantee that Syrian obstructionism, "which may be inspired from Cairo," would end.

~~(S)~~ Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1549, 25 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 271319Z Dec 56. Received JCS 261741Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

26 Dec Mustapha Amin, former special Egyptian emissary to Washington, told the US Ambassador in Cairo that Egyptian Communists, who had been issued arms during the invasion, were refusing to give them up and were conducting training in their use. Nasser did not fear Communist propaganda but did see danger of a Communist coup. He felt, however, that he could disarm the Communists only after the Israelis withdrew from Egypt. Amin therefore requested that the US put the greatest possible pressure on Israel to withdraw promptly and completely. The Ambassador replied that he would forward this information and request to the US Government, but observed that Egypt itself appeared to the outside world to be a disturbing element in the Middle East. Later that day Amin told the Ambassador he had talked with Nasser, and the latter wanted the Ambassador to know that (1) Nasser had recalled several military attaches and ordered all others by personally signed telegram to cease clandestine activities; (2) Nasser had contacted Syrian authorities four days earlier and urged them to begin repair of the pipelines at once; (3) he was not responsible for and knew nothing about recent Fedayeen activities; (4) in fighting Iraq he was fighting Britain and must continue so long as Iraq "fights him."

~~(S)~~ Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 2042, 27 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State, Section One 280241Z Dec 56, Section Two 280855Z Dec 56. Received JCS, Section One 282305Z Dec 56, Section Two 282305Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

- 26 Dec The US Ambassador in Moscow cabled his opinion to the State Department concerning the desirability of informal confidential talks at the UN between the US and Soviet Delegates regarding the Hungarian situation. If the purpose of such talks was solely to discover what the Soviet Union had in mind as an eventual solution in Hungary, in the Ambassador's view they would be advantageous. But if the delegates attempted to work out any agreement, however informal, between the US and the USSR, he believed they would risk making the US on accessory after the fact in the Soviet treatment of Hungary. Moreover, since he could see no possible Hungarian settlement except as part of a general European settlement, the Ambassador believed it better that "any really concrete or constructive views" of the Department should be presented through the Moscow Embassy directly to those having the ultimate decision in such matters.
- (S) Msg, Moscow (Bohlen) to SecState, 1550, 26 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 262124Z Dec 56. Received JCS 271617Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.
- 26 Dec (U) After conferring together, an IPC delegation and three Syrian Government ministers, headed by Foreign Minister Bitar, issued a communique saying that Company representatives could inspect IPC installations in Syria on condition that the question of repairing them or moving oil through them should not be raised until after "Jewish aggressive forces" had withdrawn from Sinai and Gaza.
- AP Wire Service, 26 Dec 56. Received JCS 261743Z Dec 56.
- 26 Dec (U) The Egyptian Information Director announced that, because of the Anglo-French attack on Egypt, his country was no longer obligated to negotiate with Britain and France for a settlement of the Suez dispute but would deal directly with the UN. He said that Egypt was still willing to negotiate on the basis of the six principles approved by the Security Council on 13 October. An earlier AP report had indicated that Egypt not only would refuse to negotiate with Britain and France but would also reject the UN-approved six principles.
- NYT, 27 Dec 56, 1:7. Received JCS 271330Z Dec 56. AP Wire Service, 26 Dec 56. Received JCS 261610Z Dec 56.
- 27 Dec (U) Israel officially opened a naval base at the Gulf of Aqaba port of Elath (also spelled Eilat). This event followed the arrival at Elath of the Israeli Navy frigate Miznak. The purpose of the new base was to guard Israel's southern sea lane through the Gulf of Aqaba to the Red Sea. Before the Israeli capture of the adjoining Sinai Peninsula, this passage had been denied to Israel by Egyptian guns on the east coast of the Peninsula.
- AP Wire Service, 27 Dec 56. Received JCS 271549Z Dec 56.

- 27 Dec The US Ambassador in Amman conveyed to King Hussein the contents of State Department telegram No. 748 (see item for 24 December above). Hussein replied that he would continue trying to keep Jordan oriented to the West but that this would be increasingly difficult and the outcome was uncertain. He doubted that British aid, even if continued, would be adequate. In any case, the Suez attack had made such aid politically unacceptable, and it could not be accepted much longer. He planned to go to Cairo soon to discuss in person Arab aid for Jordan. He also expected a visit from King Saud shortly to discuss this question. If other Arab countries could not furnish adequate guarantees of aid, he could then go before the people, report the situation, and state that he was obliged to accept aid from non-Arab sources. He had hoped these would be friendly sources. He had not necessarily expected a firm commitment from the US, but an indication of favorable consideration would have been very helpful.
- ~~(S)~~ Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 679, 27 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 281137Z Dec 56. Received JCS 281914Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.
- 27 Dec (U) The Moscow radio and Tass, the official Soviet news agency, reported statements made by Nasser in an interview with Soviet correspondents. Nasser thanked the Soviet people for their support "during the British-French-Israeli aggression." He denied the assertion of "the imperialists" that the Arabs wished to substitute Soviet for British influence, saying that the Arabs believed in coexistence with the Soviet Union but "want to be independent and are realizing their national aspirations."
- AP Wire Service, 27 Dec 56. Received JCS 271851Z Dec 56. NYT, 28 Dec 56, 3:4. Received JCS 281330Z Dec 56.
- 27 Dec The State Department instructed the US Ambassador in Beirut to inform President Chamoun and Foreign Minister Malik that the SecState's "preliminary reaction" to their proposal of a UN Force in Lebanon was that the "idea has merit." However, it would require careful examination, and answers would have to be found to such questions as 1) whether such a force should be suggested in the General Assembly or the Security Council, 2) whether it could grow out of the existing UN Force originated for the "Egyptian matter," 3) how it would be financed, and 4) whether it could be used under the General Armistice Agreement between Lebanon and Israel. Such questions having been disposed of, the proposal might provide a basis for a "new departure in developing Middle East security." The further views of Chamoun and Malik would be welcomed.
- ~~(S)~~ Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Beirut, 2372, 27 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 281641Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

27 Dec The British Government instructed its UN Delegate to inform Hammarskjold urgently that: 1) Britain considered Egyptian conditions on the use of British salvage vessels in canal clearance operations to be in violation of the agreement on this subject reached by Hammarskjold, Britain, and Egypt; 2) the commander of the British salvage fleet had expressed fear that his vessels might be in danger; 3) if Hammarskjold's two aides then in Egypt, Cordier and Katzin, could not obtain Egyptian compliance with the agreement, the entire British salvage fleet would start withdrawing within the next 24 hours.

(S) Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 3473, 27 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 272009Z Dec 56. Received JCS, Basic: 281213Z Dec 56, Correction: 281642Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

28 Dec (U) Aides of General Wheeler arrived in Suez with instructions to begin immediately the job of clearing the Canal. They were stalled by an official of the Egyptian Suez Canal Authority, who said he had received no orders that the clearance work was to start. The operation failed to begin this date.

AP Wire Service, 28 and 29 Dec 56. Received JCS 282030Z and 291406Z Dec 56.

28 Dec The State Department instructed the US Embassy in Cairo to find out if Egypt intended to press her resolution in the UN calling for damages from Britain, France, and Israel. The Embassy was to discourage Egypt from pressing the resolution, pointing out that counterclaims would be made and that the resulting situation would not be conducive to a settlement of Middle East problems. The US would not support the resolution in its existing form.

(S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Cairo, 2114, 28 Dec 56, DA IN 283825. Received JCS 292229Z Dec 56.

28 Dec [redacted] his doubts that the Jordanian Government was ordering raids on Israel as alleged by the Israelis. He did consider it possible, however, that some extremist element might be directing raids from Jordan without governmental consent. It was also possible that the Israeli charges might be no more than propaganda designed to pave the way for an attack on Jordan.

(S) [redacted] Received JCS 291733Z Dec 56.

28 Dec In Washington the Israeli Foreign Minister told SecState that Israel did not wish to annex either the Gaza or the Sharm el Sheikh area, but Israeli public opinion would not permit withdrawal of Israeli troops from those areas without effective assurances that 1) the Egyptians would not be allowed to re-establish a base in the Gaza Strip for Fedayeen operations and 2) the Gulf of Aqaba would be kept open as an international

waterway not subject to Egyptian blockade. The presence of the UNEF in Gaza would not prevent Fedayeen raids, said the Foreign Minister, for the Fedayeen would use the UNEF to screen their operations. Israel hoped that the US would ask Hammarskjold not to press for immediate withdrawal from Gaza and Sharm el Sheikh and that further UN resolutions for withdrawal could be avoided. SecState replied that the US could not reach agreements with Israel concerning matters being handled by the UN Secretary General, whom the US was supporting in his efforts to reopen the Suez Canal and effect the withdrawal of troops. However, the US stood by its previous position that Israel was entitled to the use of the Suez Canal. The US agreed that the Gulf of Aqaba was an international waterway, but the solution regarding its use would have to be worked out by the UN Secretary General. Gaza was a complex problem, for which the US had no solutions to propose. The US agreed, said SecState, that Gaza was not Egyptian territory but neither was it on the Israeli side of the Armistice Line.

(S) Msg, SecState to New York, 481, 3 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received JCS 041634Z Jan 57.

28 Dec

Foreign Minister Malik of Lebanon told the US Ambassador in Beirut that the Lebanese proposal regarding a UN Force in Lebanon was, in effect, to make the country a "fire station," with the UN Force acting as its "fire brigade." This Force could be dispatched instantly to wherever a conflagration broke out or threatened, from the Turkish or Iraqi borders of Syria to the Pakistani borders of India or Afghanistan. Malik thought the Force could grow out of the existing UNEF and be financed in the same way. If proposed first in the Security Council and vetoed there, the Force could then be proposed in the General Assembly. Reporting Malik's remarks, the Ambassador commented that it would be "unwise tactics" to give a UN Force such wide geographical responsibility for the maintenance of peace as Chamoun and Malik contemplated. The logical next step, he believed, would be expansion of the existing Force into an instrument capable of stabilizing relations between Israel and her neighbors.

(S) Msg, Beirut (Heath) to SecState, 1611, 29 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 291354Z Dec 56. Received JCS 311937Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

28 Dec

The US Ambassador in Paris reported that, according to the French Foreign Office, 5,007 French citizens (both Christians and Jews) had been repatriated to France from Egypt between 2 November and 21 December. He added that the French had already placed in the hands of their UN Delegation a voluminous dossier on alleged mistreatment of French citizens in Egypt.

(S) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 3180, 28 Dec 56. Received State 281521Z Dec 56. Received JCS 291602Z Dec 56.

28 Dec The Assistant Naval Attache at Casablanca reported that [redacted] at that port considered ordinary supply through Casablanca would be possible in the near future for French troops in Morocco; however, arms and ammunition for these troops would have to be unloaded at Port Lyautey, even though the US position on Port Lyautey was understood. He said the logistic plans were long range and "clearly" showed that French policy was to maintain the French Army in Morocco.

(S) Msg, ASTALUSNA Casablanca to CNO, 281200Z Dec 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 291343Z Dec 56.

28 Dec (U) The official newspaper of Premier Janos Kadar's government party in Hungary appealed for technical as well as financial aid from the US, Britain, and the USSR. At the same time it admitted that Communist regimes had been lying to the Hungarian people for years to hide the higher living standards and technical and scientific advances made in the West. Deploring the flight to the West of many engineers, agricultural experts, physicians, and trade experts, it stated that Hungary could not stand this loss and the loss must be stopped, "legally or illegally."

AP Wire Service, 28 Dec 56. Received JCS 281500Z and 281532Z Dec 56.

28 Dec The State Department instructed the US Ambassador in Jidda to inform King Saud that, according to Nuri, an Iraqi petition for annexation of Jordan was the work of a Parliamentary group acting independently and without Nuri's support. The Department suggested that the Ambassador might point out to the King that this incident was an aspect of the unfortunate propaganda battle between Egypt, Syria, and Jordan on one side and Iraq on the other. Such a battle created antagonisms and instability benefiting no one; therefore the King might wish to use his influence to end this situation.

(S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Jidda, 455, 28 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 311637Z Dec 56.

28 Dec The State Department instructed the US Ambassador in Jidda to inform King Saud that President Eisenhower shared the King's desire for an early consultation and suggested a state visit in Washington beginning 23 January.

(S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Jidda, 457, 28 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 311637Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

23 Dec The State Department instructed the US Ambassador in Tel Aviv to inform Prime Minister Ben Gurion of the Department's serious concern over statements by officials of the Israeli Government that in their opinion recent events in the Middle East had invalidated the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement. Such statements, the Department warned, had dangerous

implications for the peace and stability of the area. The US Government felt that it was clearly in the interests of all signatories of the General Armistice Agreements to uphold the integrity of those Agreements; doing so would facilitate the transition toward Israeli-Arab peace.

~~TOP SECRET~~ Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Tel Aviv, 661, 28 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 311215Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

28 Dec The State Department informed the US Ambassador in London that the US Government was now in a position to begin implementing its commitment to provide Libya with equipment for a thousand-man Libyan Army and with a small MAAG possessing a training capability. Speed in carrying out the program was important because of the existing situation in Libya and reported offers of aid to Libya from the USSR and Egypt. However, the US wanted to coordinate its program with aid to be furnished by Britain; therefore the Department suggested that US-UK talks be held in London, starting 15 January.

~~TOP SECRET~~ Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy London, 4472, 28 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 301427Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

29 Dec In a conversation with the British and French Ambassadors in Washington, SecState Dulles, speaking in general terms, revealed that the Administration was formulating new Middle Eastern policies for presentation to Congress. Mr. Dulles said that details of the plan had not yet been completed, but that the President intended to ask Congress 1) for authority to expand US economic and military aid programs in the Middle East, and 2) for standby authority to use US military force in the event of armed Communist aggression in the Middle East. He explained that US armed forces would be employed only in consonance with the UN Charter, and would not be used in the Arab-Israeli dispute unless aggression occurred as a result of direct Communist involvement. The Secretary added that, although the US did not want to join the Baghdad Pact because of Saudi Arabian opposition and because of possible domestic pressure for similar arrangements with Israel, Congressional endorsement of the Administration's plan might make it possible for the US to participate in the activities of the Military Committee of the pact.

~~TOP SECRET~~ Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Paris, 2473, 29 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received JCS (No Time).

29 Dec The French Ambassador in Washington informed SecState that free elections would be held in Algeria as soon as possible. Local councils would be elected first, then representatives to the French National Assembly. With the latter group the French Government would discuss the future status of Algeria. The Ambassador asked if France could count on 1) US support of the French plan and 2) US influence to prevent passage

of any UN resolution condemning France. SecState replied that he could not give a commitment without further study.

(S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Paris, 2475, 29 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 311213Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

29 Dec According to Lebanese President Chamoun, the Syrian Army requested the Lebanese Government to permit Fedayeen to move through Lebanon from Syria into Israel. General Chehab, the Lebanese Defense Minister, summarily refused, saying such action would be contrary to the UN cease-fire and Lebanon's policy and interest. (S) Msg, Beirut (Heath) to SecState, 1634, 3 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State 041327Z Jan 57. Received JCS 042325Z Jan 57. SEEN by Adm Radford. (TS) Msg, Beirut (Heath) to SecState, 1641, 4 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State 041524Z Jan 57. Received JCS 042325Z Jan 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

29 Dec (U) The UN salvage team began clearing major obstructions from the Suez Canal.
AP Wire Service, 29 Dec 56. Received JCS 291242Z, 291406Z Dec 56.

29 Dec The US Ambassador in Cairo reported that the Egyptian Finance Minister was disappointed, even crushed, by the State Department's negative reply to his request to have the Egyptian funds unfrozen. The Minister challenged the right of the US in this action and pointed out that the examples cited for legal action were not applicable to the present instance. The Ambassador agreed to forward the Minister's new appeal to have Egypt's funds unfrozen but cautioned him not to expect favorable action.

(S) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 2082, 30 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 310128Z Dec 56. Received JCS 021537Z Jan 57.

29 Dec The US Ambassador in Damascus reported that "Syrian performance lags behind Nasser's urgent recommendation regarding IPC pipeline repair."
(S) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1585, 29 Dec 56. Received State 292020Z Dec 56. Received JCS 311938Z Dec 56.

29 Dec SecState instructed the US Ambassador in Beirut to invite the attention of Prime Minister Solh to evidence that the US was not in "wholesale support" of Nasser. The SecState emphasized that the US would continue to try to impress upon Egypt the self-defeating nature of many of its current activities and the need for Egyptian cooperation in restoring stability to the Middle East.

(S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Beirut, 2396, 29 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received JCS (No Time). SEEN by Adm Radford.

29 Dec

~~(S)~~ Msg, CIA to JCS, TDCS-3,630,280, 29 Dec 56,
DA IN 285201 (4 Jan 57). Received JCS 050631Z Jan 57.

30 Dec

Prime Minister Ben Gurion of Israel told the US Ambassador to Israel that: 1) The Government of Israel held that Egypt's eight years of willful and flagrant violations of the General Armistice Agreement as well as UN Security Council resolutions had invalidated the General Armistice Agreement; however, Israel did not claim that this established a juridical state of war. 2) Gaza could not be permitted to revert to Nasser, and Ben Gurion thought the UNEF, if sent there, would only provide cover for Fedayeen activity. He was happy that the US had admitted that Gaza was neither Egyptian nor Israeli territory. 3) Though Secretary Dulles had asserted that he was "immutably committed" to freedom of transit of international waters without discrimination, Israel's forces should stay on the Straits of Tiran until there were effective guarantees that the use of that waterway would be available to all. If the US would take a position against the blocking of the waterway similar to the position the US had taken on Formosa, this would serve the purpose. 4) He doubted Hammarskjold's good faith and impartiality; the UN Secretary General seemed to lean in favor of Egypt. 5) Israel's Sinai-Gaza campaign had been a matter of Israel's life or death. 6) If the US could see Tiran and Gaza as the imperatives of the Israeli position, Israel would endeavor to coordinate its policy with the US on all other Middle East questions.

~~(S)~~ Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 786,
31 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 011336Z Jan 57.
Received JCS 021537Z Jan 57.

30 Dec (U)

According to the AP, Premier Kadar's Government announced through the Communist Party's newspaper in Budapest that the Soviet Union had granted Hungary a \$50 million loan to help rebuild the nation's shattered economy. Much more money, as well as material aid, would be needed, the announcement in the Party newspaper said, and additional help was hoped for, not only from other Communist-bloc countries of Eastern Europe and from Communist China, but also from Western nations.

AP Wire Service, 30 Dec 56. Received JCS 302022Z Dec 56.


30 Dec

In a talk with Hammarskjold's assistant, Nasser 1) praised US policy in the crisis, 2) expressed satisfaction with the UNEF, 3) asserted emphatically that he wanted to expedite clearance of the Canal, 4) stated his readiness to proceed on the same basis

as before the attack in negotiating a settlement of the administration of the Canal, except that Egyptian conferees would not meet with the British and French, and 5) suggested, in regard to the Palestine question, that the UN cordon the Arab-Israeli frontier to assure peace as the prerequisite condition for an eventual settlement.

Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 2102, 31 Dec 56, DA IN 284440 (1 Jan 57). Received State 010833Z Jan 57. Received JCS 020026Z Jan 57.

30 Dec



Msg,

Received JCS 051027Z Jan 57.

30 Dec (U) General Wheeler estimated that the Suez Canal would be opened to ships of twenty-five foot draft, including oil tankers, in early March. He expected to have the passage clear in May for the largest type vessels adapted to its depth.

AP Wire Service, 30 Dec 56. Received JCS 302221Z Dec 56.

31 Dec STATE The British Government officially "welcomed" the US proposal for a US-UK conference concerning aid to Libya.

Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 3509, 31 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 010228Z Jan 57. Received JCS 021210Z Jan 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

31 Dec The US Ambassador in Cairo reported that the departure of the British-French forces from Egypt had removed a factor in uniting support behind Nasser and that divisive forces were now manifesting themselves more plainly. Nevertheless, Nasser and his regime appeared to be still firmly in power. The main problems confronting Nasser were economic; however, though the economic outlook was "grim," economic collapse was "not imminent." There seemed to be general acceptance among Egyptians that only the US could help Egypt through the economic trials ahead.

Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 2085, 31 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 011222Z Jan 57. Received JCS 021209Z Jan 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

31 Dec Ambassador Lodge forwarded a memorandum from the UN Secretary General which stated that Suez Canal salvage operations would get fully underway on 1 January.

According to the memorandum Hammarskjold's assistant had reported from Cairo that President Nasser had formally accepted the use of French and British ships and agreed to the "program phaseout."

Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 412, 31 Dec 56, DA IN 284438 (1 Jan 57). Received State 010055Z Jan 57. Received JCS 012400Z Jan 57.

31 Dec The Yemeni Minister in Cairo told the US Ambassador in that city that on Nasser's recommendation Yemen was purchasing arms from the USSR. He said that the decision to do so had been made reluctantly and only after Yemen had failed to obtain supply from western sources. He said aircraft were "not yet" included in the purchases, but the US Ambassador inferred from his manner that Soviet planes were either on order or were being negotiated for.

Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 2105, 2 Jan 57, CJCS files. Received State 021108Z Jan 57. Received JCS 022237Z Jan 57.

31 Dec (u) In an official call at the State Department the Syrian Ambassador stated that any use of US military force in the Middle East should be under UN command. Denying that there was a power vacuum in the Middle East, he asserted that as British and French influence in the area diminished, it was automatically replaced by the "duly constituted national authority" of Middle Eastern nations. He claimed that there had been no Soviet penetration of the area and charged that the real cause of tension between Arab nations and the West was "colonialist-Zionist policy." He denied that Syria had entered the Soviet orbit or that Soviet officers were commanding Syrian Army units.

AP Wire Service, 31 Dec 56. Received JCS 311757Z, 311826Z, and 311929Z Dec 56.

31 Dec The State Department cabled the US Ambassador in Moscow the text of President Eisenhower's reply to Premier Bulganin's "Declaration of the Soviet Government Concerning the Question of Disarmament and Reduction of International Tension," of 17 November 56. The reply stated that the US could not "accept the declaration's attempt to dismiss as 'slandorous campaign' the world's indignant reaction to the Soviet armed actions against the people of Hungary," and suggested that the Soviet Union could contribute toward the reduction of tension if it would respond to the resolutions of the UN in the same way as the parties to the dispute in the Middle East had done. To Bulganin's remark that the strategic situation in Western Europe favored the USSR, Eisenhower replied that "this statement does not seem calculated to relieve international tensions," adding that he considered NATO "fully capable of carrying out its mission of collective defense." The President said he would agree to a further meeting of heads of government, as suggested in the declaration, "whenever circumstances would make it seem likely to accomplish a significant result," but he believed that

"deliberations within the framework of the United Nations seem most likely to produce a step forward in the highly complicated matter of disarmament." He took hope from Bulganin's "apparent willingness to consider aerial inspection as a positive factor in the problem of armaments" but regretted that the USSR had not signified "willingness to seek agreement on the basic element of my Geneva proposal of averting surprise attack through aerial inspection of the centers of military power." The US would, the President said, "continue its efforts in behalf of effective control and reduction of armaments."

(U) Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Moscow, 791, 31 Dec 56, CJCS files. Text of the Soviet and US communications is in State Dept Bulletin, vol XXXVI, no 917 (21 Jan 57), pp. 89-93. Received JCS 011329Z Jan 57. SEEN by Adm Radford.

31 Dec

NOTE
The Assistant Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia told the US Embassy in Belgrade that he was concerned about reports of increasing opposition, "both among Catholics and in some other circles," to the projected but as yet unscheduled visit of Tito to Washington. The Embassy alerted the State Department to the possibility that criticism of the visit by the US public might reach a point at which Tito would feel the trip was too risky. The Embassy considered that cancellation of the trip could hardly avoid having a "most damaging effect on our relations" and would logically result in "wider repercussions favorable to [the] Soviets."

(U) Msg, Belgrade (Hooker) to SecState, 932, 31 Dec 56, CJCS files. Received State 311951Z Dec 56. Received JCS 022249Z Dec 56.

31 Dec (U)

Syrian Premier Asali formed a new 11-man Cabinet. Representing the leftist "National Front," the new Cabinet was expected, according to the AP, to follow more closely Syria's so-called "positive neutrality" policies. Bitar was again appointed Foreign Minister. Asali himself retained the important Interior Ministry.

AP Wire Service, 31 Dec 56. Received JCS 311552Z Dec 56.

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUPPLEMENT TO
CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
RELATING TO THE CURRENT WORLD CRISIS
DECISIONS AND ACTIONS TAKEN BY
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THIRD INSTALLMENT: 4 through 31 DECEMBER 1956

HISTORICAL SECTION
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
19 April 1957

~~TOP SECRET~~
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TOP SECRET
4 Dec ✓

The JCS, after reviewing the Report of the Joint Military Survey Team for Libya, concluded that 1) no requirement existed "at this time" for a Libyan Air Force or a Libyan airborne unit and 2) the establishment of a Military Assistance Program for Libya with training and advisory responsibilities divided between the US and the UK was unsound from a military point of view. They agreed to recommend to SecDef that:

1) An early agreement be made with the UK providing for (a) the equipping of the 1,035-man augmentation of the Libyan Army with US materiel, (b) the assumption by the US of responsibility for training this augmentation, and (c) the progressive relief of the UK by the US of all responsibility for equipping and training the Libyan Army.

2) After completion of the US-UK agreement, a bilateral agreement with Libya be reached, as required by the Mutual Security Act of 1954 as amended.

3) The Military Assistance Program Objectives for Libya be established as follows; (a) to assist in the development of an army possessing the capability of maintaining internal security and contributing to the national unity of the country, and (b) to assist in the creation of a combat force of one Army Independent Brigade, not exceeding the equivalent of a US-type RCT.

4) After completion of the US-UK agreement, a MAAG Libya, be established under USCINCEUR.

Since the JCS were divided on the question of whether a US Army or US Air Force officer should head the MAAG Libya, they agreed to submit the question to SecDef for resolution. [On 13 December 1956 the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) informed the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the Chief, MAAG Libya, would be an Army officer.]

The views and recommendations of the JCS were forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.

(S) Dec on JCS 2099/684, Note by Secys, "Report by the Joint Military Survey Team for Libya," 4 Dec 56, CCS 092 (8-22-46) (2) sec 37. (S) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Report of the Joint Military Survey Team for Libya," 4 Dec 56, same file. (S) Memo I-17633/6, Actg Asst SecDef (ISA) to CJCS, same subj, 13 Dec 56, same file.


7 Dec ✓

The JCS agreed to direct the JMEPC to develop plans for defense of the Middle East area under conditions of general war. Guidance was provided the JMEPC in SM-985-56, 11 December 1956, which specified that priority would be given to the development of a plan based upon both the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and the fact that the US was not a member of the Baghdad Pact Organization. Also, the plans were to provide for the maximum use of indigenous forces and resources contributing to the defense of the area; the specific forces, including US forces, necessary

to assure a successful defense of the area were to be earmarked.

(TS) Dec on JCS 1887/318, Note by Secys, Memo by CNO, "Middle East Atomic Plans," 11 Dec 56, CCS 381 E.M.M.E.A. (11-19-47) sec 50. (TS) Memo, SM-985-56, Secy JCS to JMEPC, "A Plan for the Defense of the Middle East Area Under Conditions of General War," 11 Dec 56, same file, sec 52.

7 Dec



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7 Dec ✓ The JCS agreed to:

1) Approve the return of the Tactical Air Command to a condition of normal readiness and training. (The Chief of Staff, USAF, was advised of this approval by SM-971-56, 7 December 1956.)

2) Direct the Strategic Air Command to revert to the status of normal readiness and training, and to continue to maintain an increased intelligence watch. (Done by JCS 914740, 8 December 1956.)

3) Forward to SecDef a memorandum informing him that they had authorized the Chief of Staff, USAF, to remove from alert status the heavy transport aircraft of the Tactical Air Command; this change of status would make the transport aircraft available to augment the Military Air Transport Service as required. (Done by memo, JCS to SecDef, 7 December 1956.)

() Dec on JCS 2066/25, Note by Secys, "Removal of Certain Transport Aircraft from Alert Status," 8 Dec 56, CCS 092 (9-14-49) sec 11.

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11 Dec ✓ The JCS agreed to dispatch to the Chief, Baghdad Pact Liaison Group, the message (see following item) in Enclosure "A" of JCS 1887/321, Report by JMEPC, "Definition of the Baghdad Pact Area," 3 December 1956.
(18) Dec on JCS 1887/321, Note by Secys, "Definition of the Baghdad Pact Area," 12 Dec 56, CCS 381 E.M.M.E.A. (11-19-47) sec 51.

12 Dec . The JCS cabled the Chief of the Baghdad Pact Liaison Group that, if he were requested by the Baghdad Pact Military Organization to define the Baghdad Pact area, he might state, with the understanding that no US commitment or obligation was implied, that the JCS considered:

1) The fixing of the area of the Baghdad Pact was basically a political matter, and the question should be settled within the Baghdad Pact Council.

2) In terms of general interest, the Baghdad Pact area should include Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and their contiguous waters.

3) In the event that other Middle East nations joined the Baghdad Pact, the Pact area should be extended to cover the territory and contiguous waters of the new members of the Pact.

(18) Msg, JCS to USARMA Baghdad (for Chief, BPLG), JCS 914861, 12 Dec 56, CCS 381 E.M.M.E.A. (11-19-47) sec 52.

20 Dec ✓ In accordance with a decision made by the JCS on 30 November 1956 (Dec on JCS 1887/312), the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded a memorandum to the Department of Defense Representative designated to attend the next meeting of the Baghdad Pact Military Committee outlining his terms of reference for the meeting. The most significant portions of these terms were as follows:

"You are authorized to support the concept of the determination of the United States to use nuclear weapons in resisting overt Communist aggression, and to present their effectiveness in defeating such aggression. In so doing, you should insure that the Baghdad Pact Military Committee also understands that the Pact countries themselves, as is the case with all of our allies and friends, must provide for their own defense to the maximum of their ability since the U.S. atomic contribution, while significant, cannot be the complete answer to free world security. In this connection, you are informed that the United States has provided training and information on atomic weapons for a limited number of Baghdad Pact planners.

"You may express views on Middle East defense which are in accord with, but not identified as derived from basic U.S. military objectives in the Middle East. You should avoid any implication of

a U.S. commitment to provide forces for the defense of the area, or to increase the scope of military aid being provided to the Pact members."

(On the previous day, 19 December, the JCS had forwarded similar terms of reference to the Department of Defense Representative designated to attend the next meeting of the Baghdad Pact Military Deputies.)
(S) Dec on JCS 1887/312, Note by Secys, Rpt by JMEPC, "U.S. Representation at the Next Baghdad Pact Military Meetings Presently Scheduled for December 1956 and January 1957," 30 Nov 56, CCS 381 E.M.M.E.A. (11-19-47) sec 49. (S) Memo, SM-1018-56, Secy JCS to Adm Boone, "Terms of Reference for the Department of Defense Representative at the Next Military Committee Meeting Presently Scheduled to be held in Karachi on 24 January 1957," 20 Dec 56, same file, sec 52. (S) Memo, SM-1017-56, Secy JCS to RAdm Henderson, "Terms of Reference for the Department of Defense Representative at next Military Deputies Meeting," 19 Dec 56, same file.

21 Dec ✓ The JCS approved, for dispatch by Chief of Staff, USA, a message cancelling the alert of a RCT in Europe for movement to the Middle East. This message, DA 915394, was dispatched to USCINCEUR on the same day.
(S) Memo, Secy JCS to Dir JS; "Alert Status of U.S. Military Forces," 27 Dec 56, CCS 381 E.M.M.E.A. (11-19-47) sec 52. (S) Msg, DA to USCINCEUR, DA 915394, 21 Dec 56, same file.

3

CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

RELATING TO

THE CURRENT WORLD CRISIS

THIRD INSTALLMENT:

1 NOVEMBER - 3 DECEMBER 1956

HISTORICAL SECTION
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
8 March 1956

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- 1 Nov A strong Israeli column drove two-thirds of the way across the Sinai Peninsula on the Awaja-Ismailia road. A second column struck west through central Sinai and was reportedly within 35 miles of the Suez Canal. A third column aimed at the capture of the Gaza Strip. Intelligence reports indicated that French-manned F-84's and Mysteres were operating from Lod airfield, near Tel Aviv, against Egyptian targets in Sinai.
(S) Msg, CINCLANT to COMICEDEFOR et al., 022151Z Nov 56. Received JCS 142337Z Nov 56.
- 1 Nov (U) During the morning, British and French bombers based on Malta and Cyprus joined naval planes from aircraft carriers to attack Egyptian air bases. Anglo-French headquarters on Cyprus said 50 Egyptian planes had been destroyed and 40 more seriously damaged in raids on nine airfields.
First reports were carried by the AP Wire Service, 1 Nov 56. Received JCS 011417Z Nov 56 and 011943Z Nov 56. More complete reports appeared in the NYT, 2 Nov 56, 1:8. Received JCS 021330Z Nov 56.
- 1 Nov ✓ Demonstrations occurred at Bahrein during the morning, causing 14 US dependents to be moved from Manama to the British Petroleum Company (BAPCO) compound at Awali. The BAPCO staff took anti-sabotage precautions and brought in 100 UK soldiers from Harja to protect company installations. The Arab union called a strike of indefinite duration, but the company planned to continue production on a reduced scale with European and Indian personnel.
(S) Msg, COMIDEASTFOR to CINCNELM, 011621Z Nov 56. Received JCS (No Time). (C) Msg, Rear Echelon CINCNELM to CNO, 020011Z Nov 56. Received JCS 020820Z Nov 56.
- 1 Nov (U) A Government spokesman in Tel Aviv said that Israeli forces in Sinai had encountered two full Egyptian divisions. A military source reported that Israeli planes had shot down nine Egyptian planes, including a MIG-17. Israeli forces reportedly had encircled the Gaza Strip.
NYT, 1 Nov 56, 1:3 (late edition). Received JCS approximately 011700Z Nov 56.
Later in the day, Israel claimed the capture of the bulk of the Sinai Peninsula.
AP Wire Service, 1 Nov 56. Received JCS 012037Z Nov 56.
- 1 Nov (U) The Egyptian Government broke off all relations with France and Britain.
AP Wire Service, 1 Nov 56. Received JCS 011354Z Nov 56.
The Egyptian Government also ordered the Finance Ministry to seize all British and French property in Egypt, including a British and a French oil company.
NYT, 2 Nov 56, 5:1 (late edition). Received JCS approximately 021700Z Nov 56.
- 1 Nov (U) In a speech over Cairo Radio, Nasser exhorted all Egyptians to defend Egypt against the Anglo-French invasion. Pledging total war, he vowed that Egypt would fight "from village to village, from house to house."
AP Wire Service, 1 Nov 56. Received JCS 011537Z Nov 56. NYT, 2 Nov 56, 5:2-5, 1:7. Received JCS 021330Z Nov 56.

1 Nov The US Consulate in Port Said reported that two large floating cranes, one salvage vessel, and one dredge had been blasted and sunk directly in front of the US Consulate in a position to block the Suez Canal.
(●) Msg, Port Said (Cuomo) to SecState, 94, 1 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 020806Z Nov 56. Received JCS 021700Z Nov 56.

1 Nov The Egyptian Home Service at noon broadcast an appeal by the Arab Labor Confederation to Arabs from Morocco to Masqat, on the Gulf of Oman, to sabotage oil installations, military bases, ships, and planes belonging to any nation attacking Egypt.
(U) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1248, 1 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 021510Z Nov 56. Received JCS 022010Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

The US Embassy in Cairo approached key Egyptian officials to point out that the radio broadcasts inciting the Arab world to mob action compromised Egypt's favorable position in the current crisis and offered no real advantage.

(●) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1258, 1 Nov 56, DA IN 266607 (4 Nov 56). Received State 032137Z Nov 56. Received JCS 040351Z Nov 56.

1 Nov (U) The Jordanian Government broke off diplomatic relations with France and considered a like break with the UK. The Government, in messages handed the British and French Ambassadors, strongly protested the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt, and warned Britain not to use its bases in Jordan for operations against Egypt.
AP Wire Service, 1 Nov 56. Received JCS 011756Z Nov 56. NYT, 2 Nov 56, 5:6. Received JCS 021330Z Nov 56.

1 Nov

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1 Nov

As Jordanian Chief of Staff Nuwar was unable to guarantee the security of the British military advisers with the Jordanian Army, all of them departed for Mafrag. The US Army Attache in Amman thought this probably meant the end of the British Military Mission to Jordan and might shorten the life of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty. The UK supply base at Aqaba, containing all military items necessary for complete mobilization of Jordanian forces, was turned over to the Jordanian Army.

(●) Msg, USARMA Amman to DEPTAR, C 167, 011300Z Nov 56, DA IN 265829 (2 Nov 56), CJCS files. Received JCS 022248Z Nov 56.

1 Nov

The Iraqi Government declared martial law throughout the country. The decree included no curfew or restriction on individual movement, but divided Iraq into four military districts for administrative purposes and established military courts. The

Government ordered full mobilization of Iraqi armed forces and announced that the Army was standing by for combined action with Jordan in the event of Israeli aggression against Jordan.

NYT, 2 Nov 56, 3:2. Received JCS 021330Z Nov 56.
(S) Msg, USAIRA Baghdad to CSAF, C 125, 030630Z Nov 56, CAF IN 88436 (6 Nov 56). Received JCS 070902Z Nov 56.

1 Nov

Iraqi Foreign Minister Bashayan told US Ambassador Gallman that the Iraqi Government was deeply shocked and greatly embarrassed by the British intervention in Egypt. In keeping with a resolution of the Council of Ministers, the "shock and bitter disappointment of Iraq" had been expressed by the Foreign Minister to the British Ambassador and French Charge d'Affaires. Bashayan said Iraq was very grateful to the US for the stand it had taken in the crisis.

(S) Msg, Baghdad (Gallman) to SecState, 724, 1 Nov 56. Received State 012233Z Nov 56. Received JCS 021709Z Nov 56.

1 Nov

[redacted] that the Iraqi First Division had already concentrated and was only awaiting a request from the Jordanian Government before moving into Jordan. He expected such a request by the end of the day.

[redacted] Received JCS 011551Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

Prime Minister Nuri told US Ambassador Gallman, however, that Iraqi troops would not cross the border until Jordan met Iraq's conditions on command arrangements. These conditions had recently been put to Jordan again, but no reply had been received.

(S) Msg, Baghdad (Gallman) to SecState, 730, 1 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 011834Z Nov 56. Received JCS 020018Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

Nuri was also perturbed by the US position on use of MDAP equipment by Iraqi troops in Jordan. He said that "if we go into Jordan, it will be in defense of Jordan against aggression." Nuri did not think there were any restrictions on use of MDAP equipment against aggression. Ambassador Gallman cabled the State Department that he could appreciate Nuri's confusion.

(S) Msg, Baghdad (Gallman) to SecState, 732, 1 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 020727Z Nov 56. Received JCS 022342Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

1 Nov

Syrian Premier Asali told US Ambassador Moose that the Syrian Army had been instructed to take all necessary measures to protect the oil pipelines running across Syria. A representative of the Iraq Petroleum Company informed the Ambassador that the company was evacuating dependents but all was quiet along the pipelines and Syrian authorities were cooperating fully.

(S) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1010, 2 Nov 56, DA IN 266129. Received State 021504Z Nov 56. Received JCS 030125Z Nov 56.

The New York Times, however, quoted an authoritative source in Beirut as saying that Nasser had

sent pleas to Iraq and Syria to sabotage the Iraqi oilfields and to blow up pipelines and refineries in both countries.

NYT, 2 Nov 56, 3:3 (late edition). Received JCS approximately 021700Z Nov 56.

1 Nov

The Prime Minister of Syria announced to Parliament that Syrian armed forces had been placed under the Egyptian-Syrian-Jordanian joint command.

(Offl Use Only) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1016, 2 Nov 56, DA IN 266081. Received State 021543Z Nov 56. Received JCS 030003Z Nov 56.

1 Nov

The US Ambassador to Syria, reporting a skirmish between Syrian and Israeli forces during the night of 31 October, suggested that the State Department consider seeking commitments from Israel and Syria that neither would attack the other.

(S) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1005, 1 Nov 56, DA IN 265690 (2 Nov 56). Received State 011941Z Nov 56. Received JCS 020526Z Nov 56.

SecState Dulles, in cables to the US Ambassadors in Damascus, Beirut, and Amman, replied that the State Department did not believe it possible to obtain meaningful non-aggression commitments from Israel and its Arab neighbors, but that US representatives should continue to counsel restraint and moderation.

(S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Damascus, 793, 1 Nov 56, DA IN 265876 (2 Nov 56). Received JCS (No Time).

1 Nov

[redacted] the Egyptian Military Attache in Tripoli had given the signal for implementing the Egyptian sabotage plan in Libya. Libyan authorities were informed, and King Idris immediately issued orders banning assembly, demonstrations, and strikes, and instituting exceptional security precautions. Wheelus AFB put defense plans into effect. A POL installation servicing both Wheelus Field and British military facilities was blown up during the evening.

(S) Msg, Tripoli (Tappin) to SecState, 273, 1 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 020045Z Nov 56. Received JCS 021446Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

1 Nov

(S) Msg, Tripoli (Tappin) to SecState, 290, 4 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 041741Z Nov 56. Received JCS 050614Z Nov 56.

1 Nov

The Saudi Arabian Press Minister conveyed [redacted] assurances that Americans would not be harmed. [redacted] highly approved President Eisenhower's radio speech of the night before. The Minister said the feeling in the streets was the highest ever known. Everyone was happy about the US position but people were saying that if the US did not protect the Saudi Arabians against the British, French, and Jews, the Russians would be welcomed.

(S) Msg, Jidda (Wadsworth) to SecState, 223, 1 Nov 56. Received State 060207Z Nov 56. Received JCS 062015Z Nov 56.

1 Nov

The US Ambassador in Rabat advised the State Department that French actions in Egypt, added to the French refusal to release the five Algerian resistance leaders, had heightened the growing conviction of the Moroccan Government that it must lessen its dependence on France by seeking aid from any other source. He asked for authorization to offer US economic, financial, and technical assistance to Morocco in the event the Government entered a formal request for such aid.

(S) Msg, Rabat (Cannon) to SecState, 257, 1 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 012257Z Nov 56. Received JCS 021708Z Nov 56.

1 Nov

(S) Msg, Athens (Allen) to SecState, 1502, 1 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 061613Z Nov 56. Received JCS 020109Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford. (S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Athens, 1634, 2 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 030959Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

1 Nov (✓)

Prime Minister Eden told the House of Commons that Britain and France would welcome eventual assumption of control of the Suez Canal by the UN, but only after Egyptian and Israeli forces had been separated and the situation stabilized. During a bitter debate in Commons, the Government won three separate votes of confidence by decisive majorities.

First reports appeared on AP Wire Service, 1 Nov 56. Received JCS beginning at 011719Z Nov 56. Complete reports were carried by the NYT, 2 Nov 56, 1:5. Received JCS 021330Z Nov 56.

1 Nov

(S) Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 2430, 1 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 011926Z Nov 56. Received JCS 020018Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

1 Nov (v) A spokesman for the British Foreign Office flatly denied British collusion with Israel, and pointed out that the military aims of Britain and France, defined on 30 October, were quite distinct from the aims of Israel.
NYT, 2 Nov 56, 1:8, 2:3. Received JCS 021330Z Nov 56.

1 Nov For the first time in nine days, there was no gunfire in Budapest. Soviet tanks and infantry had apparently been withdrawn from the capital.
AP Wire Service, 1 Nov 56. Received JCS 011412Z Nov 56.

However, Nagy sent a note to the US Legation in Budapest stating that new Soviet military units had entered Hungary. He had protested to the Soviet Ambassador and had demanded the withdrawal of these troops. Nagy had also told the Soviet Ambassador that Hungary repudiated the Warsaw Pact, proclaimed its neutrality, and called upon the UN and the four great powers to defend Hungarian neutrality.

The facts contained in this note were officially announced by the Hungarian Government and first reports were carried on the AP Wire Service, 1 Nov 56. Received JCS 011758Z Nov 56. A summary of the Hungarian note was cabled Washington in (C) Msg, Budapest (Barnes) to SecState, 208, 011942Z Nov 56, DA IN 265633, CJCS files. Received JCS 012224Z Nov 56. The text of the note was cabled in (C) Msg, Budapest (Barnes) to SecState, 213, 2 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 021003Z Nov 56. Received JCS 021700Z Nov 56.

In a cable to UN Secretary General Hammarskjold, Nagy reported that new Soviet troop units were entering Hungary, and asked that Hungary's case be placed before the "forthcoming General Assembly."

First reports were carried by the AP Wire Service, 1 Nov 56. Received JCS 012018Z Nov 56. A more comprehensive account appeared in the NYT, 2 Nov 56, 1:2-3, 15:3. Received JCS 021330Z Nov 56.

1 Nov UN Secretary General Hammarskjold presented an aide-memoire to US Ambassador Lodge in New York calling the attention of the US to the rapid deterioration of the situation in Gaza, the refusal of either Egypt or Israel to allow observation by the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), and the uncertain fate of the 217,000 refugees in the area for whom the UN had assumed responsibility.
(C) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 462, 1 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 020110Z Nov 56. Received JCS 021127Z Nov 56.

1 Nov

(U) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2120, 1 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 011211Z Nov 56. Received JCS (No Time). SEEN by Adm Radford.

(U) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2129, 012307Z Nov 56, DA IN 265648 (2 Nov 56). Received JCS 020054Z Nov 56.

1 Nov SecState Dulles provided guidance for US officers at all NATO posts on an Italian query whether or not an Egyptian attack on UK or French naval vessels in the Mediterranean would come under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Secretary said he did not believe it profitable to discuss this issue in the North Atlantic Council. Should the matter be raised again, however, the US would support the UK contention that the treaty was clearly not intended to cover this particular case.

(U) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Paris, 711, 1 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 021127Z Nov 56.

1 Nov ✓ In a broadcast by British radio stations in the UK and the Mediterranean area, the British Admiralty announced that all merchant ships were advised to keep out of "the area bounded by thirty-five North and the Egyptian coast between longitudes of thirty-seven degrees and thirty-five [sic, twenty-five] degrees East."

(U) Memo, DDI, to CJCS, "Establishment of Danger Zone by U.K.," 13 Nov 56, CJCS 091 Egypt (Sep 56-), CJCS files.

1 Nov The Prime Minister of Iran told the US Ambassador in Tehran that, in accordance with a suggestion by President Mirza of Pakistan, Iran had invited the Chiefs of State of Turkey and Iraq to meet with their Iranian and Pakistani counterparts in Tehran at the earliest possible date.

(U) Msg, Tehran (Chapin) to SecState, 684, 1 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 012148Z Nov 56. Received JCS 020536Z Nov 56.

1 Nov (U) President Chamoun of Lebanon called on all Arab Chiefs of State to meet and try to produce more effective cooperation in defense of their countries' interests. Egypt and Jordan responded favorably.

NYT, 2 Nov 56, 3:3. Received JCS approximately 021700Z Nov 56.

1 Nov The US Ambassador in Rabat reported that the French were preparing an official request for use of a wharf within the US Naval Base at Port Lyautey to unload French warships and commercial vessels carrying military cargoes. Although the local French naval commander had specified supplies only, both the Embassy and COMNAVACTS believed the French also envisaged landing military personnel within the base area to avoid the growing difficulties with Moroccan nationalists at Casablanca

and other ports. Unloading of either supplies or personnel, however, would be certain to attract the attention of Moroccan labor elements and cause complications for the US. The Ambassador feared that the deteriorating French position in Morocco was causing the French to examine the usefulness of all US bases in Morocco as possible supply points and sources of refuge, and he recommended an immediate attempt by the State Department to dissuade the French from carrying out their intention.

(S) Msg, Rabat (Cannon) to SecState, 252, 1 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 020045Z Nov 56. Received JCS 021701Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

1 Nov

In a conversation with the Counselor of the US Embassy in New Delhi, the Joint Secretary of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs emphasized that the Indian Government had not yet decided to make any move toward leaving the British Commonwealth. Britain's action in Egypt, he said, had "weakened but not snapped India's tie with the Commonwealth."

(S) Msg, New Delhi (Bartlett) to SecState, 1129, 1 Nov 56, DA IN 266060 (2 Nov 56). Received State 021305Z Nov 56. Received JCS 030324Z Nov 56.

1 Nov

In a discussion with the US Ambassador in Paris, French Foreign Minister Pineau described the background of the war in Egypt. From the beginning, he said, the French had believed Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal was more serious than the US thought, and that following the Menzies Mission and Dulles' SCUA proposal the divergence between France and the UK, on the one hand, and the US, on the other, became complete.

(S) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2123, 1 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 011711Z Nov 56. Received JCS 011810Z Nov 56. (S) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2150, 2 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 031142Z Nov 56. Received JCS 042126Z Nov 56. Both SEEN by Adm Radford.

(4) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2154, 3 Nov 56. Received State 040537Z Nov 56. Received JCS 041756Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

1 Nov (u) The formation of a new Communist Party, grounded on nationalist principles and including Nagy and Kadar in its leadership, was announced in Budapest.
NYT, 2 Nov 56, 1:2-3, 15:3 (late edition).
Received JCS approximately 021700Z Nov 56.

1 Nov. According to apparently reliable reports reaching the US Legation in Budapest, Tildy, Kovacs, and Maleter visited Cardinal Mindszenty to ask his unqualified support of the Nagy Government. Mindszenty replied that his price would be permission to head a Christian Democratic Party, but he refused to issue a statement for two days.

(1) Msg, Budapest (Barnes) to SecState, 212, 1 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 021122Z Nov 56. Received JCS 022010Z Nov 56.

1 Nov The US Ambassador to Austria reported that Hungarians still appeared to have almost no knowledge of the US position on the Hungarian revolution. He said he was preparing a Hungarian translation of the President's speech to be sent to Budapest with Minister-designate Wailes, and asked permission to send mimeographed copies to key West Hungarian towns with trucks carrying food and medical supplies.

(Offl Use Only) Msg, Vienna (Thompson) to SecState, 1032, 1 Nov 56. Received State 011900Z Nov 56. Received JCS 021112Z Nov 56.

- 1 Nov The US Legation in Budapest reported that Colonel Pal Maleter had been quoted as saying that Radio Free Europe was inciting the Hungarian populace at a time when it was of the utmost urgency that quiet be restored. Although the Legation knew little about Maleter, his evaluation on this matter coincided with that of the Legation.
(S) Msg, Budapest (Barnes) to SecState, 207, 1 Nov 56. Received State 011924Z Nov 56. Received JCS 021708Z Nov 56.
- 1 Nov (U) Moscow announced that Bulganin had sent President Eisenhower a message concerning the Middle East crisis. The New York Times correspondent reported strong indications that the USSR was calling upon the US for joint military action to halt the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt. The Foreign Ministry announced that letters from Bulganin to Nehru and from Voroshilov to Sukarno had urged that the Afro-Asian nations reconvene the Bandung Conference to condemn armed intervention in Egypt. In a talk with foreign diplomats, Shepilov described the official Soviet position. The USSR, he said, sought to "condemn aggression, end hostilities, and bring about withdrawal of foreign troops from Egyptian territory."
NYT, 2 Nov 56, 1:6. Received JCS 021330Z Nov 56.
- 1 Nov (U) The UN General Assembly was called to meet in special emergency session at 012200Z to discuss the Middle East crisis.
AP Wire Service, 1 Nov 56. Received JCS 011408Z Nov 56.

At the beginning of the all-night session, Egypt appealed to the Assembly to condemn the "aggression" of Britain, France, and Israel against Egypt.
AP Wire Service, 1 Nov 56. Received JCS 012329Z Nov 56.
- 2 Nov (U) The UN General Assembly, during the all-night session that convened at 012200Z November, approved the US resolution designed to meet the crisis in the Middle East. The resolution called for a cease-fire by all military forces engaged in hostilities and withdrawal to the armistice lines, recommended that all UN members refrain from introducing military goods into the area of hostilities, urged that steps be taken to reopen the Canal as soon as the cease-fire was arranged, requested the Secretary General to observe and report on compliance with the resolution, and extended the emergency session pending compliance with the resolution. The vote, announced at 020730Z, was 64 to 5, with the UK, France, Israel, Australia, and New Zealand opposing, and Belgium, Canada, Laos, the Netherlands, Portugal, and South Africa abstaining.
Most of this account appeared in the early edition of NYT, 2 Nov 56, 1:4, 6:1-8, 7:5. Received JCS 021330Z Nov 56. More complete reports appeared in the late edition of NYT, same date.
- 2 Nov At about 020445Z November, five Soviet-built IL-28's with Egyptian markings landed at Jidda, then left several hours later. Shortly thereafter, another

IL-28 and an IL-12 landed. Security guards were increased at the airport and no one was allowed on the ramp.

() Msg, Jidda (Wadsworth) to SecState, 225, 2 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 021450Z Nov 56. Received JCS 031628Z Nov 56.

2 Nov The city of Gaza fell to Israeli forces after a three-hour battle during the morning. A UN truce supervisor arranged the surrender of the Egyptian garrison. An Israeli armored column entered shortly afterward. At dawn, before the Israeli attack began, a US destroyer evacuated UN truce personnel from the Gaza beaches.

First reports were carried by the AP Wire Service, 2 Nov 56. Received JCS 021402Z Nov 56. A further report was contained in () Msg, Jerusalem (Cole) to SecState, 145, 2 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 030053Z Nov 56. Received JCS 030959Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford. A more complete report appeared in NYT, 3 Nov 56, 1:6, 3:5. Received JCS 031330Z Nov 56.

2 Nov (u) The Israeli Army announced that Israeli troops had entered El Arish, the main depot for Egyptian forces in the Sinai Peninsula. An Egyptian armored brigade, including about 150 Russian T-34 tanks, had been destroyed or captured and a corps headquarters isolated. NYT, 2 Nov 56, 1:6. Received JCS 021330Z Nov 56.

The Israeli Army also announced that Israeli forces had reached the Gulf of Suez at Tor. This gave Israel a base from which to block Egyptian shipping through the Gulf of Suez.

NYT, 4 Nov 56, 30:4 (Sunday).

2 Nov (u) Nasser declared martial law throughout Egypt and assumed all the extraordinary powers of a military commander.

AP Wire Service, 2 Nov 56. Received JCS 021553Z Nov 56.

Nasser also announced that Egyptian forces had completed their withdrawal from Sinai and were awaiting the British and French in the Delta. He said only suicide commandos had been left in Sinai. An Egyptian communique claimed that 14 Allied planes had been shot down in the day's air raids.

NYT, 3 Nov 56, 1:7, 3:2. Received JCS 031330Z Nov 56.

2 Nov The US Army Attache in Budapest reported that sporadic firing had broken out in the capital at 021730Z November. Hungarian Army units were in position facing the Soviets with 85-mm AA guns and 57-mm AT guns. All indications pointed to a clear-cut Soviet invasion of Hungary.

() Msg, USARMA Budapest to DEPTAR, B 238, 021900Z Nov 56, DA IN 266123, CJCS files. Received JCS 030016Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

2 Nov The US Consul in Port Said reported that the Egyptians had blasted and sunk more dredges and floating equipment at the Port Said entrance to the Suez Canal. The Canal was now completely blocked. Some 12 vessels

that had left Port Said southbound on 31 October were still in the Canal north of the Firdan Bridge.

(1) Msg, Port Said (Cuomo) to SecState, 95, 2 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 030054Z Nov 56. Received JCS 041615Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

Later in the day, the Consul reported that, according to American pilots coming from Suez, the Egyptian frigate Abukir had been deliberately sunk across the Port Tewfik entrance, and a vessel loaded with cement had been sunk in the Canal immediately south of Lake Timsah. At the same time, the Egyptians were making every effort to convince the world that these ships had been sunk by British and French bombers.

(1) Msg, Port Said (Cuomo) to SecState, 96, DA IN 266686 (4 Nov 56). Received State 031905Z Nov 56. Received JCS 041857Z Nov 56.

2 Nov ✓ COMSIXTHFLT asked Admiral Grantham, commanding the Anglo-French fleet, to confirm or deny reports that the approaches to Alexandria Harbor had been mined. Admiral Grantham, in reply, denied that the Allies had mined these waters, and repeated his guarantee that no form of attack would take place on Alexandria as long as US ships were in that port.

(1) Msg, COMSIXTHFLT to COMMEDSTA, 021040Z Nov 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 021252Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford. (1) Msg, CINCMED to COMSIXTHFLT, 021416Z Nov 56. Received JCS 021925Z Nov 56.

2 Nov (u)

In a second message to Hammarskjold, Nagy requested that members of the UN Security Council be informed that large Soviet units were pouring into Hungary from the east and marching on Budapest. Nagy requested Hammarskjold to call upon the great powers to recognize Hungarian neutrality and upon the Security Council to instruct the Soviet and Hungarian Governments to start negotiations immediately for withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.

(1) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 471, 2 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 030510Z Nov 56. Received JCS 031629Z Nov 56.

2 Nov

The State Department instructed the Minister-designate to Hungary, who was in Vienna preparing to leave for Budapest, not to present his credentials upon arrival in Budapest, but to await specific instructions from Washington. The State Department would continuously review the question of timing in light of the character of the government emerging from the revolution. Minister Wailes travelled to Budapest during the day.

(1) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Vienna, 1259, 2 Nov 56. Received JCS 022341Z Nov 56. (1) Msg, USARMA & USAIRA Budapest to DEPTAR, RRAPO-237, 021935Z Nov 56, DA IN 266168 (3 Nov 56), CJCS files. Received JCS 030226Z Nov 56.

2 Nov

The US Ambassador in London reminded the British Ministry of Defense of the requirement that US aircraft delivered to the UK under the Special Aircraft Program and OSP be used only for defense of the NATO area. He pointed out the necessity of strict observance of this stipulation in connection with Suez operations.

(1) Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 2456, 2 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 021536Z Nov 56. Received JCS 022317Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

2 Nov (U) RAF sources in London claimed that the British and French air raids on Egyptian airfields had destroyed or damaged more than a hundred Egyptian planes, a high proportion of which were Soviet-built MIG-15 jet fighters and Ilyushin-28 jet bombers. (At the outset of operations the Egyptian Air Force had 90 MIG's and 50 Ilyushins.) The Allies claimed that Egyptian airpower had been neutralized, and the air attacks were shifting to the Egyptian Army forces north and east of Cairo. Cairo Radio was put out of commission by bombing attacks, and a Cyprus station began broadcasting in Arabic near Cairo Radio's frequency. This station called on Egyptians to overthrow Nasser.

NYT, 3 Nov 56, 1:8, 2:3-5. Received JCS 031330Z Nov 56.

2 Nov (U) The State Department disclosed that shipments of military material to Israel had been stopped. The order involved small quantities of light arms and other minor equipment Israel had purchased in the US. The State Department based its action on the UN cease-fire resolution, which also called on members not to introduce military goods into the area of hostilities. First reports were carried on the AP Wire Service, 2 Nov 56. Received JCS 021644Z and 021807Z Nov 56. A complete account appeared in the NYT, 3 Nov 56, 4:3. Received JCS 031330Z Nov 56.

2 Nov

Teletyped Info Rpt, CIA to JCS,
Received JCS
082256Z Nov 56.

2 Nov Syria severed diplomatic relations with France and the UK.
(Offl Use Only) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1016, 2 Nov 56, DA IN 266081. Received State 021543Z Nov 56. Received JCS 030003Z Nov 56.

2 Nov (U) Following a meeting between the President, Secretary Dulles, and Under Secretary Hoover, the White House announced that the US was offering Hungary \$20 million worth of food and medical supplies to relieve the suffering in Hungary.
NYT, 3 Nov 56, 1:4-5. Received JCS 031330Z Nov 56.

2 Nov (U) At a press conference in London, the Israeli Ambassador to the UK stated that Israel would not withdraw from Egyptian territory until Egypt had given not only assurances on paper but tangible guarantees against future Egyptian attacks on Israel.
NYT, 3 Nov 56, 6:5. Received JCS 031330Z Nov 56.

2 Nov Two British cargo ships unloaded military supplies in Tripoli Harbor. The Libyan Prime Minister objected strenuously. He told the US Ambassador that this move would seriously compromise his efforts to keep the

Libyan people calm during the Egyptian crisis, and could well set off a wave of anti-British fanaticism fanned by the Egyptians. The US Ambassador discussed the problem with the British Ambassador and recommended to the State Department that the Embassy in London approach the Foreign Office on the matter.

(U) Msg, Tripoli (Tappin) to SecState, 275, 2 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 021414Z Nov 56. Received JCS 022010Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

2 Nov (U) The Syrian Embassy in Washington informed the State Department that, pursuant to the Arab tripartite pact, Syrian armed forces had been placed under the command of Egyptian General Hakim Amer.

NYT, 3 Nov 56, 1:8, 3:3. Received JCS 031330Z Nov 56.

2 Nov

that an Iraqi infantry division was ready to move into Jordan if requested, but would not do so until a decision was reached on a commander for the combined force. Iraq did not want its troops under Jordanian General Nuwar.

JCS 041340Z Nov 56.

Received

2 Nov (U) The Hungarian Government made three oral protests to the Soviet Ambassador in Budapest, complaining that Soviet troops were still pouring across the frontier. At the same time, Soviet tanks sealed off the main approaches to the Austro-Hungarian border. According to the "Revolutionary Committee of the Hungarian Army," Soviet forces had occupied every airfield and important railroad junction in Hungary and had established road blocks on every main highway. Nagy announced over the radio that he would reform his Cabinet, eliminating all members who had collaborated with the Soviets. Reports reached Budapest from all over Hungary that Soviet troops had no liking for their mission, had been misled concerning the true situation in Hungary, and in some instances were revolting or actually going over to the rebels.

NYT, 3 Nov 56, 1:5, 15:1. Received JCS 031330Z Nov 56.

2 Nov (U) The State Department invalidated all US passports for Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Syria. Passports held by US officials and dependents stationed in those countries and by persons already there were exempted.

(U) Msg, SecState to All Posts, Circular 350, 2 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 052313Z Nov 56.

2 Nov A US diplomatic convoy carrying dependents from Budapest to Vienna was halted and turned back by Soviet troops at 021530Z November.

NYT, 3 Nov 56, 1:4-5, 15:4. Received JCS 031330Z Nov 56.

The State Department summoned the Soviet Ambassador in Washington and inquired by what right Soviet troops in Hungary had interfered with Americans trying to leave the country. The Ambassador replied that he had no information but promised he would

telegraph Soviet authorities with a view to letting the convoy through.

(Offl Use Only) Msg, SecState to AmLegation Budapest, 2037, 2 Nov 56, DA IN 266349 (3 Nov 56). Received JCS 031654Z Nov 56.

2 Nov (U) Units of the Sixth Fleet completed the evacuation of Americans from Alexandria Harbor at 021400Z November. An estimated 1557 evacuees were aboard three transport vessels.

(U) Msg, Alexandria (Washburn) to SecState, 171, 2 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 030154Z Nov 56. Received JCS 030959Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

2 Nov During the evening, the Sixth Fleet on its own initiative sent two destroyers to Port Said to evacuate Americans who had elected to remain behind but subsequently changed their minds. However, Egyptian authorities refused clearance because of the uncertainties of the local situation. The US Embassy in Cairo attempted to obtain clearance but Cairo authorities refused to override the local commanders. The Embassy and Port Said Consulate decided not to pursue the project further.

(U) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1293, 3 Nov 56, DA IN 266456. Received State 031426Z Nov 56. Received JCS 032005Z Nov 56.

2 Nov The US Ambassador reported from Cairo that, despite 30 hours of air raids by the Anglo-French forces, the populace of Cairo had given no apparent signs of panic, unrest, or any other form of emotional reaction.

(U) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1282, 2 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 030307Z Nov 56. Received JCS 030959Z Nov 56.

2 Nov According to Libyan Prime Minister Ben Halim, he summoned the Egyptian Military Attache and Charge d'Affaires and told them that, while he could make no official charge, he knew they were organizing a campaign of sabotage and terror in Libya. Ben Halim confined the Egyptian diplomats to their Embassy and residences and assigned police to keep each member of the Embassy under surveillance.

(U) Msg, Tripoli (Tappin) to SecState, 283, 3 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 032005Z Nov 56. Received JCS 040603Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

2 Nov The Iraq Petroleum Company's pipeline in Syria was deprived of telephone and radio communications at 021500Z November and as a result pumping ceased five hours later.

(Offl Use Only) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1038, 3 Nov 56, DA IN 266809 (4 Nov 56). Received State 032110Z Nov 56. Received JCS 042156Z Nov 56.

2 Nov The Indonesian Charge d'Affaires in Moscow told the US Ambassador that his Government strongly supported the idea of a new Bandung Conference to consider the Middle East crisis. Ambassador Bohlen advised the State Department to make every effort to discourage

such a conference, for the USSR would undoubtedly attend and seek to organize the Asian-African bloc against Britain and France, and the West in general. (S) Msg, Moscow (Bohlen) to SecState, 1032, 2 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 021540Z Nov 56. Received JCS 022317Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

2 Nov (U) Eden rejected a demand by the British Labor Party that he comply immediately with the UN cease-fire resolution. Pineau, reportedly fearful lest Eden give in to pressure from the Laborites and from Secretary Dulles, flew to London to confer with Eden and Lloyd. High French officials expressed the fear that a premature halt in military operations would save Nasser, whose regime the French and British wished to liquidate. In London, Eden, Lloyd, and Pineau were reported to have agreed not to accept a cease-fire until Anglo-French troops had landed in Egypt. NYT, 3 Nov 56, 1:7, 6:1. Received JCS 031330Z Nov 56.

2 Nov According to the British Minister of Fuel and Power, the UK had POL stocks sufficient for four weeks. Although thought had been given to the need for rationing, the UK planned to try voluntary restraint on consumption first. UK planning to meet the anticipated shortages was based on the expectation of close cooperation with the US. (S) Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 2455, 2 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 021519Z Nov 56. Received JCS 022317Z Nov 56.

2 Nov The State Department provided the US Ambassador in Tehran with guidance to be used in discussing the proposed meeting of the Baghdad Pact powers in Tehran. The US hoped the members of the Pact would continue to support US efforts to settle the Middle East crisis in the UN. As the Baghdad Pact was formed for purposes other than resolving disputes such as the present one, and as the members had divergent views on the subject, the US believed the Baghdad Pact ought to avoid involvement as an organization. As for the suggestion for joint US-Pakistani-Iranian-Turkish mediation of the dispute, the US believed the UN offered the best hope of finding a solution. (S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Tehran, 863, 2 Nov 56. Received JCS 041755Z Nov 56.

2 Nov American pilots employed by the Saudi Airlines reported having flown Saudi Arabian troops from Taif to Tobuk, near the Jordanian border. (S) Msg, Jidda (Wadsworth) to SecState, 229, 3 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 041224Z Nov 56. Received JCS 041740Z Nov 56.

2 Nov In a background briefing of British newsmen in London, the Israeli Embassy stated that Israel, before the attack on Egypt, had received assurances from France and the UK that it would be protected in the UN Security Council and that France would furnish the military hardware. (S) Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 2451, 2 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 021552Z Nov 56. Received JCS 022317Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

The Assistant Press Attache of the Israeli Embassy in Paris told an officer of the US Embassy that, had the French not sent Israel great quantities of arms during the preceding few weeks, the Israeli action in Sinai would have been impossible.

➔ Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2133, 2 Nov 56, DA IN 266931 (5 Nov 56). Received State 031904Z Nov 56. Received JCS 050532Z Nov 56.

2 Nov _____
Lebanese Foreign Minister Lahoud told the US Ambassador in Beirut that his Government opposed an international police force for either the Arab-Israeli dispute or the Suez controversy.

➔ Msg, Beirut (Heath) to SecState, 1055, 2 Nov 56, DA IN 266293. Received State 030002Z Nov 56. Received JCS 031657Z Nov 56.

Later, Lahoud telephoned Ambassador Heath to express the hope that the US would oppose any motion in the UN to send an international force to Suez. Lebanon's chief objection, he said, was the seeming impossibility of barring Soviet participation. If Soviet troops could be definitely excluded, such a force could be justified only if it were large enough to protect the entire Arab-Israeli border.

➔ Msg, Beirut (Heath) to SecState, 1066, 3 Nov 56, DA IN 266403. Received State 031050Z Nov 56. Received JCS 031555Z Nov 56.

2 Nov _____
STATE
The US Ambassador in Tokyo reported that on 30 October the Counselor of the Egyptian Embassy in Tokyo had asked the Chief of the Middle and Near Eastern Section of the Japanese Foreign Office if Japan would mediate the Egyptian-Israeli dispute. This followed a similar approach by the Egyptian Foreign Minister to the Japanese Ambassador in Cairo, and like overtures by the Israelis the preceding June. The US Ambassador said Japan desired to offer its good offices by approaching Egypt with the recommendation that the US reconsider financing the Aswan Dam, that Egypt make some concessions to relieve friction with Israel, and that Egypt guarantee freedom to use the Suez Canal to all nations without exception. The Japanese believed such an approach had a chance of succeeding, but would not act without a prior confidential understanding with the US.

➔ Msg, Tokyo (Allison) to SecState, 1003, 2 Nov 56, DA IN 266015. Received State 021129Z Nov 56. Received JCS 042156Z Nov 56.

SecState Dulles cabled the US Ambassador in Tokyo that the US believed that the UN offered the best approach to terminating hostilities in the Middle East, although the decision was naturally one for Japan alone to make.

➔ Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Tokyo, 954, 2 Nov 56, DA IN 266440 (3 Nov 56). Received JCS 040045Z Nov 56.

2 Nov _____
The French delegation to the UN gave the US delegation a copy of a draft resolution on Hungary. The resolution would condemn "the flagrant violation by the Soviet Union of the independence and sovereignty of Hungary as well as of human rights and fundamental freedoms,"

invite the USSR to withdraw its forces from Hungary, call upon all governments to support this resolution "urgently and in the most pressing fashion" with the USSR, and invite all members to recognize and respect Hungarian neutrality.

(~~SECRET~~ Only) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 474, 2 Nov 56, DA IN 266477 (3 Nov 56). Received State 030509Z Nov 56. Received JCS 041802Z Nov 56.

2 Nov The State Department cabled Ambassador Lodge in New York his instructions for the night meeting of the Security Council. The Ambassador was to state that, as the Council lacked information about developments in Hungary, the Secretary General should be instructed to communicate urgently with the Hungarian Government for the purpose of getting Hungarian representation in the UN at the earliest possible moment. At the same time, every effort should be made to dissuade the French from tabling a resolution. If this failed, every effort should be made to defer the vote. Flexibility was essential in the present situation.

(C) Msg, SecState to USUN New York, 236, 2 Nov 56. Received JCS 040304Z Nov 56.

2 Nov (U) In New York, Hammarskjold appointed a three-man committee to check on how the UK, France, and Israel were responding to the cease-fire resolution. At the same time, Egypt notified Hammarskjold that it could not agree to a cease-fire if the Allied attack continued.

NYT, 3 Nov 56, 5:1 (late edition). Received JCS approximately 031700Z Nov 56.

2 Nov At the UN, Hammarskjold expressed to a member of the US delegation his conviction that the US was the logical agent to demand a cease-fire of Britain, France, Israel, and Egypt. If the US forced compliance with the resolution, said Hammarskjold, there would be far less resentment than if he tried to do the same thing. The resolution did not give him authority to do anything but observe the situation and report to the General Assembly and Security Council.

(C) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 477, 2 Nov 56. Received State 030842Z Nov 56. Received JCS 031800Z Nov 56.

2 Nov Ambassador Lodge reported from New York that statements of the

Lodge felt that either the USSR or India was certain to table a resolution condemning Britain and France. The vote on such a resolution would embarrass the US, which, because of its public stand on the issue, could neither oppose nor abstain. The Ambassador proposed, therefore, that the US take the initiative and draft its own resolution to deal with the problem.

(C) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 472, 2 Nov 56. Received State 030322Z Nov 56. Received JCS 031800Z Nov 56.

2 Nov At the request of the US, UK, and France, the Security Council met in emergency session during the evening to consider the Hungarian situation. All representatives

who spoke, except the Soviet delegate, appealed for international action against the reinforcement of Soviet units in Hungary. No decision was reached, but the Council members agreed to meet on 3 November to decide on a course of action.

(~~CONFIDENTIAL~~) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 478, 2 Nov 56, DA IN 266476 (3 Nov 56). Received State 030922Z Nov 56. Received JCS 041614Z Nov 56.

2 Nov At a reception in Moscow, Bulganin told the US Ambassador that a mixed Soviet-Hungarian commission was to be set up to consider the question of Soviet troop withdrawal from Hungary and other questions raised by Nagy with the Soviet Ambassador in Budapest. Bulganin denied that there had been any reinforcements from outside Hungary, although there had been much movement within the country.

(~~CONFIDENTIAL~~) Msg, Moscow (Bohlen) to SecState, 1044, 2 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received by State 022044Z Nov 56. Received JCS 030548Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

2 Nov The US Army Attache in Vienna reported that DIA the Soviets had officially protested breaches of Austrian neutrality. The protest, handed the Austrian Ambassador in Moscow, accused Austria of permitting the entrance of "Fascist and reactionary elements" into Hungary.

(~~CONFIDENTIAL~~) Msg, USARMA Vienna to DEPTAR, CX 178, 021637Z Nov 56, DA IN 266062. Received JCS 022222Z Nov 56.

2 Nov The US Ambassador to Austria reported that 1200 Hungarian refugees had entered Austria during the past three days, and this number was expected to increase significantly in view of the latest news from Budapest. Austrian refugee accommodations were completely filled, and the Minister of the Interior had appealed urgently for assistance.

(~~CONFIDENTIAL~~) Msg, Vienna (Thompson) to SecState, 1067, 2 Nov 56, DA IN 266404 (3 Nov 56). Received State 022339Z Nov 56. Received JCS 032218Z Nov 56.

2 Nov Following publication in Warsaw of the news of the influx of Soviet troops into Hungary and Nagy's denunciation of the Warsaw Pact, the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party issued a proclamation published in a special edition of Trybuna and broadcast over the radio. The proclamation labeled the Hungarian request for Soviet help a mistake but deplored "counter-revolutionary" exploitation of the situation and outside intervention. It warned Poles not to follow Hungary's example by agitating for withdrawal of Soviet troops, for they were in Poland in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement and to protect Poland's western frontier.

(~~CONFIDENTIAL~~) Msg, Warsaw (Jacobs) to SecState, 596, 031509Z Nov 56, DA IN 266453, CJCS files. Received JCS 031937Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

3 Nov Three pumping stations of the Iraq Petroleum Company in Syria, T-2, T-3, and T-4, were blown up and burned shortly after midnight on 3 November by uniformed Syrian personnel. The British staffs manning the

stations were conducted safely to Homs and turned over to the IPC. The manner in which the demolition was carried out indicated that it was a carefully planned military operation.

(S) Msg, Beirut (Heath) to SecState, 1093, 5 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 081539Z Nov 56. Received JCS 082326Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford. First reports by AP Wire Service, 3 Nov 56. Received JCS 031703Z Nov 56. NYT, 4 Nov 56, 1:4, 28:8 (Sunday).

The Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Syria assured the US Ambassador in Damascus that everything possible would be done to permit early repair of the IPC pumping stations and resumption of operations.

(S) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1035, 3 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 032200Z Nov 56. Received JCS 041740Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

3 Nov

A representative of the Trans-Arabian Pipeline in Syria informed the US Army Attache in Damascus that the Prime Minister (also acting as Military Governor of Syria) had ordered two Gendarmerie brigades to consult with Tapline officials and provide guards and patrol cars for all posts and installations belonging to Tapline.

(S) ~~Confidential~~ Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1042, 3 Nov 56, DA IN 266745 (4 Nov 56). Received State 032248Z Nov 56. Received JCS 041454Z Nov 56.

3 Nov (U)

France and the UK rejected the UN cease-fire resolution, but said they would be "most willing" to stop their military action against Egypt if three conditions were met: 1) Egypt and Israel agree to a UN force to protect the peace; 2) the UN decide to constitute and maintain such a force pending an Arab-Israeli peace settlement and "satisfactory arrangements" regarding the Suez Canal, both agreements to be guaranteed by the UN; and 3) Egyptian and Israeli acceptance of Anglo-French troops positioned between the combatants.

AP Wire Service, 3 Nov 56. Received JCS 031216Z, 031244Z, and 031346Z Nov 56.

3 Nov (U)

In London, Defense Minister Head announced that British and French planes had switched their attacks from Egyptian airfields to armored units building up around the Suez Canal.

AP Wire Service, 3 Nov 56. Received JCS 031646Z Nov 56.

3 Nov ✓

Navy intelligence estimated that the Anglo-French air attacks had destroyed 299 Egyptian planes, many of them Soviet-built.

(S) Msg, CINCNELM to COMSIXTHFLT, 041806Z Nov 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 052130Z Nov 56.

3 Nov (U)

A shakeup of the Nagy Government carried further a re-organization Nagy had instituted on 27 October to put popular non-Communists in some ministries and broaden the Government's base. The new Government appeared to represent all the traditional political parties in Hungary, and included Tildy, Kovacs, Szabo, Anna Kethly, Kadar, and others. The Defense Ministry went to General Pal Maleter.

AP Wire Service, 3 Nov 56. Received JCS 031329Z and 031438Z Nov 56.

3 Nov (u)

In Budapest, a Government spokesman announced that a Soviet-Hungarian military commission had begun discussing "technical details of the withdrawal of Russian troops from Hungary." Later, Radio Budapest announced that the Soviets had promised that no further Soviet reinforcements would enter Hungary, and the Hungarian Chief of Staff, General Kovacs, said that the Soviets had agreed to evacuate Hungary. Another conference was to be held in the evening.

AP Wire Service, 3 Nov 56. Received JCS 031457Z, 031636Z, and 031733Z Nov 56. (U) Msg, Budapest (Wailles) to SecState, 221, 3 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 031733Z Nov 56. Received JCS 040148Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

3 Nov

The State Department instructed the new US Minister in Budapest to present his credentials at once and seek to establish official contact at the highest levels of the Hungarian Government.

(S) Msg, SecState to AmLegation Budapest, 199, 3 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 041756Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

3 Nov (u)

According to an Israeli Government spokesman, Israeli patrols had penetrated the 10-mile buffer zone east of the Suez Canal defined in the Anglo-French ultimatum. The penetration was made in three places--El Qantara in the north, Ismailia in the center, and Suez at the southern terminus. The announcement may have been timed to coincide with rumors that the Anglo-French invasion had been deferred because of US pressure.

NYT, 4 Nov 56, 1:5, 30:4-6 (Sunday).

3 Nov

[redacted] were informed by Mohammed Heikel, Egyptian publisher and confidant of Nasser, that the Egyptian Government would make the following concessions in order to end hostilities: 1) UN police force to guarantee the Arab-Israeli border; 2) establishment of a UN body with full authority to investigate and enforce a solution of all outstanding problems in the area; 3) US or UN occupation of key points in the Canal Zone; and 4) an arms embargo throughout the area. The next day, Heikel reported that he had discussed these four points with Nasser, who had stated definitely that he would agree to them.

(S) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1314, 1315, 4 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 041716Z Nov 56. Received JCS 050030Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

3 Nov (u)

Israel requested the removal of six UN truce observers who had remained in Gaza to arrange the surrender of the Egyptian garrison, but asked for the return of a UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) team to administer emergency feeding of Arab refugees in Gaza. These 10 men were landed from the US destroyer that had evacuated UN personnel from the Gaza beaches on 2 November.

NYT, 4 Nov 56, 1:5, 30:4-6 (Sunday).

3 Nov (u)

An Anglo-French communique said that the Egyptians had further blocked the Suez Canal by demolishing the supports of the Firdan Bridge and toppling the structure into the Canal.

NYT, 4 Nov 56, 1:6, 17:1-6 (Sunday).

3 Nov Libyan Prime Minister Ben Halim told US Ambassador Tappin that the British, by staging militaristic displays in Libya, were making it extremely difficult for him to maintain security. He asked that the US do everything possible to keep the British from rocking the boat.

(S) Msg, Tripoli (Tappin) to SecState, 283, 3 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 032005Z Nov 56. Received JCS 040603Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

3 Nov

(S) Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 2479, 3 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 040238Z Nov 56. Received JCS 050022Z Nov 56.

3 Nov

The US Ambassador to Iran, in an interview with Foreign Minister Ardalan, presented the US position on the proposed meeting of Baghdad Pact Chiefs of State in Tehran, as outlined by the State Department in DEPTTEL 863, 2 November. Ardalan agreed that the best approach to terminating the hostilities lay through the UN, and that the Baghdad Pact was not an appropriate vehicle for resolving the present type of dispute. He said the meeting could be logically explained as one of four Middle Eastern leaders uniting for an exchange of views on a matter affecting their interests. Ardalan promised to make recommendations along these lines to the Shah.

(S) Msg, Tehran (Chapin) to SecState, 693, 3 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 031216Z Nov 56. Received JCS 031629Z Nov 56.

3 Nov

The Shah of Iran and President Mirza of Pakistan told the US Ambassador in Tehran that they hoped the US would join the Baghdad Pact following the US elections. Mirza said, and the Shah agreed, that if the US had joined the Pact a year previously certain Arab states would also have joined, and the present Suez crisis could never have arisen.

(S) Msg, Tehran (Chapin) to SecState, 700, 4 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 051303Z Nov 56. Received JCS 062004Z Nov 56.

3 Nov

Austrian Foreign Minister Figl told the US Ambassador in Vienna that he had protested to the Soviet Ambassador against the Moscow broadcast charging Austria with unneutral conduct in the Hungarian revolution. According to Figl, the Soviet Ambassador had taken cognizance of the protest but had warned Austrians not to pour oil on the flames.

(S) Msg, Vienna (Thompson) to SecState, 1095, 3 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 041628Z Nov 56. Received JCS 061806Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

3 Nov

Israeli Foreign Minister Meir told the US Ambassador in Tel Aviv that Syria's announced intention to invoke the Arab tripartite pact and move Syrian troops into Jordan was tantamount to a declaration that Syria intended to attack Israel. Mrs. Meir said it was

incumbent upon the US to make known its reaction to Syria's declaration.

(C) Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 485, 3 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 040415Z Nov 56. Received JCS 040917Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

3 Nov (U) In London, Defense Minister Head admitted that US mutual aid equipment was being used in the Anglo-French raids on Egypt.

AP Wire Service, 3 Nov 56. Received JCS 031657Z Nov 56.

3 Nov (U) Communist China warned Britain and France to withdraw from Egypt or face "inestimable grave consequences." NYT, 4 Nov 56, 19:1 (Sunday).

3 Nov (U) Sir Winston Churchill came out in support of Eden's Suez policy. He blamed Egypt for provoking war with Israel, criticized the US for failing to cooperate fully and promptly with the UK in the Middle East, and said national interest and world peace would benefit from Eden's "resolute" action.

NYT, 4 Nov 56, 1:6, 24:3-8 (Sunday).

3 Nov (U) Minister of State Anthony Nutting resigned from the Eden Government because of disagreement over the Anglo-French military action against Egypt. Eden accepted his resignation.

AP Wire Service, 3 Nov 56. Received JCS 031751Z Nov 56.

3 Nov ~~SECRET~~ In a conversation with an emissary from King Saud in Jidda, US Ambassador Wadsworth mentioned the seven Egyptian bombers that had arrived in Jidda on 2 November. The emissary said they had come to seek safety and King Saud had ordered them dispersed to interior airfields.

(S) Msg, Jidda (Wadsworth) to SecState, 230, 3 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 041332Z Nov 56. Received JCS 042125Z Nov 56.

3 Nov ~~SECRET~~ The US Ambassador reported from Paris that the Embassy's contacts on the working level at the Foreign Office were shaken by the Anglo-French action against Egypt and had expressed to US officials their strong disapproval of the Government's policy. Among reasons they gave, other than the damage to Franco-American relations, were the justification given the Soviets for crushing the Hungarian uprising, and the belief that intervention had made a martyr of Nasser, who would have been discredited by Egyptians if the Israelis had been permitted to finish alone the job they had started.

(S) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2159, 3 Nov 56, DA IN 266748 (4 Nov 56). Received State 032249Z Nov 56. Received JCS 041802Z Nov 56.

3 Nov ~~SECRET~~ The US Ambassador reported from Amman that Jordan had approached Syria to learn the possibility of receiving Syrian financial assistance, but had been told Syria had no money to spare.

(S) Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 434, 3 Nov 56, DA IN 266790 (4 Nov 56). Received State 032114Z Nov 56. Received JCS 042159Z Nov 56.

3 Nov

[] visited the Jordanian Prime Minister and reiterated Israel's pledge not to attack Jordan. He pointed out that Egypt was in no position to help if Jordan attacked Israel and such a venture could only be to Jordan's detriment. He strongly counseled that Jordan remain calm.

(S) Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 434, 3 Nov 56, DA IN 256790 (4 Nov 56). Received State 032114Z Nov 56. Received JCS (No Time).

3 Nov ✓

CINCNELM advised CNO that he considered the mass evacuation of Americans from Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria to be completed, although he anticipated that some people who had elected to remain would change their minds and request evacuation. CINCNELM was retaining operational control of USAF planes to meet such demands. The grand total of persons evacuated from all four countries, said CINCNELM, was 3,058.

(S) Msg, CINCNELM to CNO, 032216Z Nov 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 050255Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

3 Nov

The State Department instructed the US Ambassador in Tel Aviv to reiterate to the Israeli Government that military supplies purchased from the US under Mutual Security legislation were to be used for purposes of internal security and self-defense only.

(S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Tel Aviv, 456, 3 Nov 56, DA IN 266704 (4 Nov 56). Received JCS 041839Z Nov 56.

3 Nov

The US Legation in Budapest reported that a systematic and rapid build-up of Soviet forces in Hungary had occurred following the withdrawal of troops from downtown Budapest on 31 October. Soviet troops had saturated the provinces and surrounded important towns, military bases and airfields. Budapest was almost completely encircled by a strong force. The build-up was estimated by military observers to consist of 15 mechanized and four infantry divisions.

(S) Msg, Budapest (Wailes) to SecState, 219, 3 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 031505Z Nov 56. Received JCS 032152Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

3 Nov

that all Hungarian air fields were surrounded by Soviet troops, who refused to permit anyone to leave or enter.

(S) Received JCS 031949Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

3 Nov (U)

Soviet troops near the Austrian border in Hungary for the second time halted the convoy of American dependents en route to Vienna. In Washington, however, the Soviet Embassy informed the State Department that there were now no obstacles to the departure of this convoy from Hungary.

AP Wire Service, 3 Nov 56. Received JCS 031705Z and 032021Z Nov 56.

3 Nov

The US Embassy in Vienna reported that relief groups had virtually halted shipments of supplies from Austria

to Hungary because of a Soviet tank group on the main Vienna-Budapest road and an additional ring of tanks around Budapest.

(Offl Use Only) Msg, Vienna (Thompson) to SecState, 1098, 3 Nov 56, DA IN 266866 (4 Nov 56). Received State 041333Z Nov 56. Received JCS 050136Z Nov 56.

- 3 Nov (U) At a reception in Moscow honoring Syrian President Quwwatli, Voroshilov said the USSR was "ready to supply Syria with every necessary assistance to overthrow its last remaining vestiges of colonialism and complete its national independence."
AP Wire Service, 3 Nov 56. Received JCS 031849Z Nov 56.
- 3 Nov (U) Egypt formally requested an immediate meeting of the UN General Assembly to deal with the Anglo-French rejection of the UN cease-fire resolution. An emergency meeting was promptly scheduled for 040100Z November.
AP Wire Service, 3 Nov 56. Received JCS 031850Z and 031933Z Nov 56.
- 3 Nov (U) The White House announced that the US would file two new resolutions with the UN General Assembly, one aimed at establishing permanent peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors and the other at working out permanent arrangements for continued operation of the Suez Canal.
AP Wire Service, 3 Nov 56. Received JCS 031924Z Nov 56.
- 3 Nov The Iraqi Government announced officially that Iraqi troops had moved into Jordan.
AP Wire Service, 3 Nov 56. Received JCS 031124Z Nov 56.

According to a later report by the US Army Attache in Baghdad, elements of the Iraqi First Division began moving into Jordan during the evening. Advance units reached Mafrag, where the division took up a temporary position. A joint Jordanian-Iraqi defense council and international commander were established in Jordan.

(S) Msg, USARMA Baghdad to DEPTAR, AB 199, 041105Z Nov 56, DA IN 266816. Received JCS 041817Z Nov 56.

The New York Times reported that Syrian troops were also in Jordan, and that the Jordanian Government was distributing leaflets urging the people to be friendly to Syrian and Iraqi troops.

NYT, 4 Nov 56, 28:1 (Sunday).

- 3 Nov (U) In a radio-television speech, Eden said that if the UN would take over the police action in Suez the UK would welcome it. The British and French had only intervened in the first place because the UN could not move fast enough. Until a UN police force was on the spot, ready to take over, the UK and France would "go on with the job until the job is done." Once British and French troops had occupied the Canal, Eden said, the UK would insure that Israeli troops left Egyptian territory.
NYT, 4 Nov 56, 1:5, 28:2-7 (Sunday).

3 Nov At a Kremlin reception, Khrushchev told US Ambassador Bohlen that the Soviets had enough troops in Hungary to deal with the situation, but if not "we will add more and more if necessary."

(2) Msg, Moscow (Bohlen) to SecState, 1057,
3 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 032143Z Nov 56.
Received JCS 041350Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

3 Nov US Ambassador Bohlen reported from Moscow that there had undoubtedly been a great deal of discussion among Soviet leaders on whether to cut their losses in Hungary and withdraw their forces under the best face-saving cover that could be devised, or to return to the open use of force and in effect place Hungary under military occupation. He thought the basic decision to use force had been made.

(2) Msg, Moscow (Bohlen) to SecState, 1048,
3 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 040800Z Nov 56.
Received JCS 042101Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

4 Nov At its late night session, 3-4 November, the UN General Assembly adopted two resolutions to deal with the Middle East crisis. The first was a Canadian resolution requesting Hammarskjold to submit within 48 hours a plan for setting up an emergency international UN police force to secure and supervise cessation of hostilities in accordance with the cease-fire resolution of 2 November. The Assembly approved this resolution 57-0-19. The second resolution, sponsored by 19 Asian-African countries, called on the belligerents to comply immediately with the cease-fire resolution. It also authorized Hammarskjold to arrange for immediate cease-fire and for stopping the movement of military forces and arms into the area of hostilities, to report within 12 hours, and to obtain withdrawal of all forces to the armistice lines. The vote was 59-5. The US also introduced two resolutions but did not press for a vote. The first was to form a UN commission to seek a permanent settlement of the major outstanding problems between the Arabs and Israel. The second resolution proposed creating a special UN commission to prepare recommendations, in consultation with Egypt, France, and the UK, for restoring transit through the Canal and for operating and maintaining the Canal in accordance with the Convention of 1888 and the six principles agreed to by the Security Council and Egypt on 13 October.

(Offl Use Only) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 6, 4 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 051127Z Nov 56. Received JCS 052314Z Nov 56. NYT, 4 Nov 56, 1:2, 29:8 (Sunday).

(1) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2168, 4 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 040208Z Nov 56. Received JCS 041756Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

(1) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 2, 3 Nov 56 (040400Z), CJCS files. Received State 040424Z Nov 56. Received JCS 041756Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

4 Nov (U) The Soviet offensive against Budapest began at 040400Z. Nagy immediately announced the attack over Radio Budapest and appealed to Hammarskjold for UN action. Nagy called for Defense Minister Pal Maleter and Chief of Staff Kovacs, who had gone out the night before to negotiate with Soviet officers for withdrawal of Soviet troops, to return to their posts; but it was assumed they had been made prisoners. Shortly after Nagy's broadcast, Radio Budapest went off the air and was followed, one after another, by most of Hungary's freedom radios. By 040800Z overwhelming tank and infantry forces had stormed Parliament Building and made Nagy and most of his Government prisoners. The Hungarian news agency reported that Soviet troops had opened a general attack on everyone in Hungary. Kadar and two others had formed a new government during the night and started crushing the counter-revolution. Kadar, who went over to the Russians during the night, issued a proclamation from Szolnok, 60 miles east of Budapest, saying he had called on the Soviets for help.

NYT, 4 Nov 56, 1:8, 34:6-7 (Sunday). AP Wire Service, 4 Nov 56. Received JCS 041916Z Nov 56.

4 Nov The State Department established direct telex connection with the US Legation in Budapest at 040445Z November, just as the Soviet offensive was beginning. The exchange lasted until 041015Z. Among transmissions to the Department was a message from Hungarian Minister of State Bibo asking President Eisenhower to use his influence to end both Western intervention in Egypt and Soviet intervention in Hungary. Calling for political (as opposed to military) help, he predicted that the subjugation of Hungary would stop the liberation trend in the East European countries, "bankrupt" the US liberation policy, and create a "crisis of confidence" in the US among all East European peoples. The Legation also reported that it was giving refuge to Cardinal

Mindszenty, who appealed to the US and other powers for "forceful and speedy defense" of his country.

(Offl Use Only) Msg, Budapest (Wailles) to SecState, unnumbered, 4 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 041112Z Nov 56. Received JCS 042126Z Nov 56.

4 Nov (✓) At US request, the UN Security Council met at 040800Z to consider the Soviet attack on Budapest. Ambassador Lodge introduced the resolution on Hungary that had been temporarily shelved. The resolution called on the USSR to halt its armed intervention in Hungary, to stop reinforcing Soviet troops in Hungary, and to withdraw those troops already there. It affirmed the right of Hungary to an independent government, requested Hammarskjold to explore the need of Hungary for food and medicine, and called on UN members and national and international humanitarian organizations to cooperate in getting relief supplies to the Hungarian people. Although the USSR vetoed the resolution, nine nations voted for it. Yugoslavia abstained. Ambassador Lodge moved that the General Assembly be convened in emergency session, to take up the Hungarian question. The Council adopted the US motion, 10-1, and adjourned at 041024Z. NYT, 4 Nov 56, 35:2-6 (Sunday).

4 Nov (✓) An Israeli GHQ officer told correspondents that all operations in the Sinai Peninsula had ceased. Between two and three Egyptian divisions, including armored units, had been destroyed. NYT, 5 Nov 56, 3:3-4 (late edition). Received JCS approximately 051700Z Nov 56.

4 Nov (✓) British and French troops began embarking on ships off the coast of Cyprus. AP Wire Service, 4 Nov 56. Received JCS 041538Z Nov 56.

4 Nov (✓) French and British bombers pounded coastal and anti-aircraft installations in the Suez Canal area in a continued softening-up process prior to an actual invasion attempt. AP Wire Service, 4 Nov 56. Received JCS 042012Z Nov 56.

4 Nov

() Msg, CIA to JCS, Received JCS 051011Z Nov 56.

4 Nov


[() Teletyped Info Rpt, CIA to JCS,
no date, DA IN 268253 (8 Nov 56). Received JCS
090355Z Nov 56.]

4 Nov STATE The Libyan Foreign Minister told an officer of the
US Embassy in Tripoli that France's proposal for
withdrawal from Fezzan was unacceptable because it
called for token forces to remain at Ghat and Ghadames
until rectification of the border could be completed.
() Msg, Tripoli (Tappin) to SecState, 295, 5 Nov
56, DA IN 267170. Received State 051512Z Nov 56.
Received JCS 060354Z Nov 56.

4 Nov STATE According to subsequent indications, Soviet troops
may have been deployed on the Yugoslav frontier
shortly before the second Soviet intervention in
Budapest on 4 November. A Yugoslav official said
this movement had produced a "slight panic" in Maribor
and Murska-Sobota.
() Msg, Belgrade (Riddleberger) to SecState, 774,
4 Dec 56, DA IN 277528 (5 Dec 56). Received State
042338Z Dec 56. Received JCS 051632Z Dec 56.

4 Nov STATE In Lebanon, Tapline stopped loading tankers for Britain
and France as a precaution against sabotage of its
installations.
() Msg, Beirut (Heath) to SecState, 1085, 5 Nov
56, CJCS files. Received State 051159Z Nov 56.
Received JCS 051856Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

4 Nov



1-301 (U)
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12065

4 Nov STATE The Polish Press Agency announced that the US Ambassador
in Warsaw, in a conversation with Deputy Foreign
Minister Winiewicz on 25 October, had expressed US
readiness to extend economic assistance to Poland
insofar as Poland requested it. According to the
press release, the Minister's reply was that Poland was
ready to negotiate with the US for suitable credits
but could not accept the conditions of grant aid.
() Msg, Warsaw (Jacobs) to SecState, 614, 4 Nov
56, DA IN 266820. Received State 041438Z Nov 56.
Received JCS 042015Z Nov 56.

4 Nov According to the Lebanese Foreign Office, President Chamoun's call of 31 October for a meeting in Beirut of Arab Chiefs of State had been accepted by Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Syria. No replies had been received from Yemen and Sudan.

(S) Msg, Beirut (Heath) to SecState, 1076, 4 Nov 56, DA IN 266834. Received State 041226Z Nov 56. Received JCS 050146Z Nov 56.

4 Nov The US Embassy in Syria said that it had no information on Syrian troop movements into Jordan.

(S) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1046, 4 Nov 56, DA IN 266870. Received State 041649Z Nov 56. Received JCS 042227Z Nov 56.

4 Nov According to information received by the US Embassy in Damascus, members of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Syrian Parliament met Jordanian and Iraqi representatives in Beirut to urge that Jordan sever relations with Britain, and that Iraq break with Britain and France.

(S) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1072, 6 Nov 56, DA IN 267795 (7 Nov 56). Received State 061625Z Nov 56. Received JCS 071357Z Nov 56.

4 Nov Syrian President Quwwatli returned to Syria from Moscow. In a press statement, he said his trip had been more successful than anticipated, and assured the populace that the Soviets would help them.

(S) Msg, CIA to JCS, 070338Z Nov 56, DA IN 267774. Received JCS (No Time).

4 Nov [redacted] reported that the number two man in the Jordanian Army was slated to become commander of a combined Syrian-Jordanian-Iraqi force in Jordan in order that Iraqi troops would not have to serve under Jordanian Chief of Staff Nuwar. This commander would report directly to a joint defense council, and would have Iraqi and Syrian deputies.

[redacted] Received JCS 042354Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

4 Nov The Sudanese Government proclaimed a state of emergency to permit use of the army for police duty. Strong guards were stationed at oil installations and the airport. The Prime Minister assured the US and British Ambassadors that security could and would be maintained.

(S) Msg, Khartoum (Richey) to SecState, 232, 5 Nov 56, DA IN 267474 (6 Nov 56). Received State 061124Z Nov 56. Received JCS 062154Z Nov 56.

4 Nov The US Ambassador in Cairo reported that the temper of the Cairo populace was rising but that there had been no incidents of unruly mob behavior and the government's grip on internal security appeared firm.

(S) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1321, 4 Nov 56, DA IN 267285 (6 Nov 56). Received State 052316Z Nov 56. Received JCS 061122Z Nov 56.

4 Nov

The Premiers of Iran and Iraq and the Foreign Ministers of Pakistan, Iran and Iraq met in Tehran to consult on a common Suez policy. The US Ambassador had been told that they were contemplating issuance of a four-nation (including Turkey) statement calling for a complete cease-fire. President Mirza, Nuri, and the Shah, indicating firm opposition to occupation of Egypt by the invading powers, asked the US Ambassador for information on the proposed international police force. Mirza strongly condemned the British attack on Egypt, which he and the Shah agreed had obscured "more vital" events in Hungary.

(1) Msg, Tehran (Chapin) to SecState, 699, 4 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 051406Z Nov 56. Received JCS 061313Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

4 Nov

According to the US Ambassador in Jidda, the number of IL-28s reliably reported to be at Jidda totaled 13. Local speculation was that the aircraft were using Jidda as a refueling base, flying light to Taif, loading ammunition and returning to Jidda for refueling and flight to Damascus, Tel Aviv, or Red Sea areas. Fifty-seven military vehicles, a large majority of them heavily loaded with troops, departed Jidda north on the Medina road during the day. A reliable Taif source reported that half of the Eleventh Infantry Regiment was in Tobuk, presumably air lifted.

(2) Msg, Jidda (Wadsworth) to SecState, 232, 4-Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 050322Z Nov 56. Received JCS 051632Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

4 Nov

King Saud told an Aramco official that he had given permission for Egyptian military planes to come to Saudi Arabia on the condition that they be grounded there under guard and that Egyptian pilots leave the country.

(3) Msg, Jidda (Wadsworth) to SecState, 236, 5 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 052134Z Nov 56. Received JCS 060608Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

4 Nov

(4) Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 488, 4 Nov 56, DA IN 266869. Received State 041740Z Nov 56. Received JCS 042233Z Nov 56.

(5) Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Tel Aviv, 463, 4 Nov 56, DA IN 266992 (5 Nov 56). Received JCS 051256Z Nov 56.

4 Nov (U)

A high official of the Israeli Foreign Office told correspondents Israel would tolerate no meddling by the UN or outside powers in negotiations to end the Egyptian-Israeli fighting, which Israel wished to accomplish by negotiation with Egypt.

NYT, 5 Nov 56, 3:1. Received JCS 051330Z Nov 56.

This same official also said that Eden had no right to promise that Israeli forces would be withdrawn from Sinai. In fact, he said, Israel would never permit Egypt to re-create a military base in Sinai.

NYT, 5 Nov 56, 3:1-2 (late edition). Received JCS approximately 051700Z Nov 56.

4 Nov (U) Breaking nine days of official silence on the Hungarian situation, Tito came out in support of the Kadar regime. The Government circulated a commentary from the official news agency understood to reflect Tito's views. The statement regretted that the Kadar Government had to call on Soviet troops for help, but explained that the intervention was necessary because "reactionary elements" were about to bring down the whole Socialist structure in Hungary.

NYT, 5 Nov 56, 12:4-5 (late edition). Received JCS approximately 051700Z Nov 56.

~~SECRET~~
4 Nov The State Department instructed the US Ambassador in Tel Aviv to inform the Israeli Foreign Minister that the US had no information to support her fears that Syria intended to attack Israel. The Ambassador was also to reiterate the US hope that Israel would take no action that might further imperil the situation, but instead would turn to the UN for settlement of its differences with Syria and Jordan. State assumed that Foreign Minister Meir was in touch with General Burns and would transmit through him to Syria and Jordan assurances of Israel's peaceful intent.

(S) Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Tel Aviv, 461, 4 Nov 56, DA IN 266786. Received JCS 041617Z Nov 56.

When the US Ambassador conveyed these views to Mrs. Meir, she complained that the US was putting Israel rather than "hostile Syria" in the position of defendant. Declining to give Jordan and Syria assurances of peaceful intent through General Burns, she declared that instead the US should seek such assurances from Jordan and Syria.

(S) Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 491, 4 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 091040Z Nov 56. Received JCS 091701Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

4 Nov (U) Israel told the UN General Assembly that Syrian and Iraqi troops had moved into Jordan and declared that this had aroused Israeli concern "for the cause of peace."

AP Wire Service, 4 Nov 56. Received JCS 042119Z Nov 56.

4 Nov In New York, US Ambassador Lodge told Hammarskjold that the US was extremely alarmed over information that Israel was attempting to provoke Jordan, and urged him to use all possible pressure on Israel.

(S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 4, 4 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 040035Z Nov 56. Received JCS 051432Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

4 Nov The State Department instructed the new US Minister to Hungary not to present his credentials.
(Offl Use Only) Msg, SecState to AmLegation
Budapest, 200, 4 Nov 56. Received JCS 052337Z Nov 56.

4 Nov (U) Following a meeting with top Administration officials, President Eisenhower sent an "urgent personal message" to Bulganin. The note expressed shock at the apparent reversal of the announced Soviet policy of withdrawing from Hungary, and urged Bulganin to recall Soviet forces from Hungary immediately and "permit the Hungarian people to enjoy and exercise the human rights and fundamental freedoms affirmed for all peoples by the United Nations Charter."

NYT, 5 Nov 56, 1:6, 23:3-7. Received JCS 051330Z Nov 56. NYT, 6 Nov 56, 10:4-5 (text of message). Received JCS 061330Z Nov 56. AP Wire Service, 4 Nov 56. Received JCS 042022Z Nov 56.

4 Nov (U) The UN General Assembly convened in special session, pursuant to a decision by the Security Council at its early morning session, to consider the Hungarian situation. Ambassador Lodge introduced a US resolution similar to the resolution introduced in the Security Council and vetoed by the USSR earlier in the day. The new resolution, however, also called upon Hammarskjold to investigate the Hungarian situation and send observers to Hungary. The US resolution, strengthened by a French amendment defining the "situation in Hungary" as caused directly by the intervention of foreign troops, was adopted late in the evening by a vote of 50-8-15. The Soviet bloc voted against it, and many Arab-Asian nations abstained.

NYT, 5 Nov 56, 1:7, 15:3-6, 16:1-8, 17:7-8. Received JCS 051330Z Nov 56. AP Wire Service, 4 Nov 56. Received JCS 042142Z, 042217Z, and 050112Z Nov 56.

4 Nov

4 Nov (U) Anna Kethly, the only member of the Nagy Government still at liberty, left Vienna for New York to plead Hungary's case before the UN. Kethly, leader of the Hungarian Social Democratic Party, had been in Vienna attending a meeting of the Socialist International when Nagy, on 3 November, named her Minister of State in his reorganized Cabinet.

NYT, 5 Nov 56, 12:6. Received JCS 051330Z Nov 56.

4 Nov (U) Hammarskjold made an urgent appeal to Britain, France, Egypt and Israel to stop fighting. He urged them to act immediately in compliance with the cease-fire recommendation of the General Assembly.

AP Wire Service, 4 Nov 56. Received JCS 041925Z Nov 56.

4 Nov

(S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 4, 4 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 050035Z Nov 56. Received JCS 051432Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

- 4 Nov (U) Moscow Radio broadcast a 15-point program of the new Kadar Government. This program promised Hungarians unconditional independence and full sovereignty, defense of the Communist system, cooperation with all other nations, improved living standards, and negotiations on the status of Soviet troops in Hungary once order had been restored. Kadar refused to consider free elections, a multiparty system, and Hungarian neutrality. In an open letter to the Hungarian people, Kadar said Nagy had come under reactionary influence.
NYT, 5 Nov 56, 1:8, 21:1-2. Received JCS 051330Z Nov 56.
- 4 Nov (U) Gomulka told the Polish people that "iron discipline" was necessary if Poland were to avoid a fate like Hungary's. Gomulka warned that no rioting or demonstrations would be tolerated, and it was necessary for all Poles to "obey strictly the party and the Government." This appeal was backed by Cardinal Wyszynski in his first public sermon since his release from detention.
NYT, 5 Nov 56, 1:5, 18:3. Received JCS 051330Z Nov 56.
- 4 Nov (U) In sharp notes delivered to Britain and France, the Soviet Union called for a halt to Anglo-French intervention in the Middle East. Specifically, the USSR protested British and French naval activities in the Mediterranean and Red Seas. The Soviet note charged the two countries with setting up a blockade of Egypt and other Mediterranean states, thus violating the principle of freedom of navigation on the open seas. The note also stated that the establishment of zones closed to navigation in effect blocked the Suez Canal and violated the Convention of 1888.
AP Wire Service, 4 Nov 56. Received JCS 042315Z Nov 56. NYT, 5 Nov 56, 1:4, 8:3-6. Received JCS 051330Z Nov 56.
- 4 Nov SECRET According to the Austrian Army, 7,000-8,000 refugees, including 1,500 Hungarian soldiers, had entered Austria in the preceding 24 hours. The flow was continuing unabated.
received JCS (No Time).
- 4 Nov (U) In London, a crowd shouting "no war" marched on 10 Downing Street as Eden met there with his cabinet discussing the Suez and Hungarian crises. Police blocked the march, but for hours upwards of 20,000

persons tied up Trafalgar Square as Labor Party orators cried "Eden must go."

AP Wire Service, 4 Nov 56. Received JCS 042320Z Nov 56.

4 Nov (U) French Foreign Minister Pineau, in a television and radio address, declared that France regretted that the UN and certain governments had been preoccupied by the Suez crisis instead of aiding Hungary.

AP Wire Service, 4 Nov 56. Received JCS 042220Z Nov 56.

4 Nov Following delivery of an urgent personal message from the US Ambassador in Moscow to Foreign Minister Shepilov, the Soviet Foreign Office telephoned the US Embassy to say that Soviet military forces had been ordered to permit "immediate" passage of the convoy of US citizens that had been delayed in Hungary.

() Msg, Moscow (Bohlen) to SecState, 1066, 4 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 041718Z Nov 56. Received JCS 042102Z Nov 56. (Offl Use Only) Msg, Moscow (Bohlen) to SecState, 1065, 4 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 041241Z Nov 56. Received JCS 041640Z Nov 56.

5 Nov At the UN General Assembly's night session of 4-5 November, Hammarskjold submitted a report recommending creation of a UN police force, built around General Burns' UNTSO and drawing contingents from member nations exclusive of the permanent members of the Security Council.

Accordingly, Canada, Norway, and Colombia introduced a resolution to authorize a UN police force. The General Assembly passed the resolution, 57-0-19, shortly after midnight. During this session, Hammarskjold also submitted a report on compliance by the combatants with the UN resolution of 2 November and a report on developments in the Middle East.

NYT, 5 Nov 56, 1:5, 11:2-4. Received JCS 051330Z Nov 56. () Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 8, 5 Nov 56. Received State 050728Z Nov 56. Received JCS 052337Z Nov 56.

5 Nov (U) Just before dawn, British and French paratroopers took off from airfields on Cyprus, and within 90 minutes had been dropped in the Port Said area. Earlier, RAF planes had dropped leaflets on Cairo urging the people to accept Anglo-French proposals regarding the Suez Canal.

NYT, 5 Nov 56, 1:8, 4:3-5 (late edition). Received JCS approximately 051700Z Nov 56.

The British 16th Parachute Brigade and two French parachute battalions were dropped in the vicinity of Port Said during the morning. The initial objectives were the Gamil airfield, taken by the British, and two bridges spanning the Canal backwaters south of

Port Said, captured intact by the French. The Anglo-French front was widened by a second French parachute drop near Port Faud. The forces were supplied during the day by airdrop. During the evening, the Egyptian commander at Port Said first accepted and then rejected the Allied surrender terms.

NYT, 6 Nov 56, 1:6, 3:1-4 (late edition). Received JCS approximately 061700Z Nov 56. AP Wire Service, 5 Nov 56, carried continuous reports, beginning at 051337Z Nov 56, on the progress of fighting.

5 Nov (U) Britain and France announced that they would cease all military action in Egypt as soon as Israel and Egypt accepted the UN plan for an international police force to act as a shield between Egypt and Israel pending a Palestine settlement and solution of the Suez problem.

AP Wire Service, 5 Nov 56. Received JCS 051345Z Nov 56.

5 Nov (U) In Moscow, the USSR released the texts of messages sent by Bulganin to Eisenhower, Eden, Mollet, and Ben Gurion, and from Shepilov to the UN Security Council. The messages to Eden and Mollet bluntly accused the UK and France of unprovoked aggression on Egypt, rejected as "completely unacceptable" the reasons given for the intervention, and warned that the USSR was "fully determined" to stop the war on Egypt through the use of force. The messages hinted that Britain and France might find themselves attacked by all modern weapons, including rockets. A similar threat was delivered to Ben Gurion, together with notice that the Soviet Ambassador in Tel Aviv was being recalled. The message to Eisenhower condemned Britain and France for launching aggression in the Middle East to restore colonial rule, and proposed that the US and USSR join forces and, "backed by a United Nations decision," put an end to the Israeli and Anglo-French aggression by military force. A White House statement, issued on receipt of this message, labeled the Soviet proposal an "unthinkable suggestion" contrary to the UN cease-fire resolution. The statement also called attention to Soviet actions in Hungary. The message from Shepilov to the UN Security Council asked that the Council be convened immediately to consider a Soviet draft resolution. The resolution would call on the US and USSR, in the name of the Security Council, to give armed and other aid to "the victim of aggression," Egypt, unless Britain, France, and Israel complied with the cease-fire order within 12 hours.

NYT, 6 Nov 56, 1:3, 8, 10:2-6. Received JCS 061330Z Nov 56. AP Wire Service, 5 Nov 56, carried continuous reports on these developments beginning at 051751Z Nov 56.

5 Nov (U) The Israeli Army announced that Israeli troops had captured Sharm El Sheikh, at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba. This was the first official announcement of operations aimed at opening the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping.

AP Wire Service, 5 Nov 56. Received JCS 051351Z Nov 56.

5 Nov

Anticipating a request through the Oil Committee of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation for US action to counter the oil shortage expected to result from the closure of the Suez Canal, the State Department provided guidance for the US Ambassadors in Paris, London, and Rome. Because of its stand on the Suez crisis, the US wanted to avoid any action or consultation that gave the impression of tripartite US-UK-French action. The State Department preferred that any US action be in response to the initiative of countries suffering the consequences of the Anglo-French intervention, and that the prime emphasis be on the question of relieving general European distress rather than offsetting shortages caused by the British and French military effort.

() Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Paris, TOPOL 738, 5 Nov 56, DA IN 267281 (6 Nov 56). Received JCS 061111Z Nov 56.

5 Nov

CIA

() Msg, CIA to JCS, Received JCS 071713Z Nov 56.

5 Nov

According to an official in the Yugoslav Ministry of the Interior, about 150 Hungarian soldiers and armed civilians had sought Yugoslav asylum by 5 November. Yugoslavia was accepting all refugees, disarming them, and sending them to reception centers. The official denied rumors that some refugees had been turned back.

() Msg, Belgrade (Riddleberger) to SecState, 628, 6 Nov 56, DA IN 268086 (7 Nov 56). Received State 070539Z Nov 56. Received JCS 081709Z Nov 56.

5 Nov

The Lebanese Chief of Staff told the US Army Attache in Beirut that Lebanon would not under any circumstances allow Syrian troops to enter its territory.

() Msg, Beirut (Heath) to SecState, 1107, 6 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 070055Z Nov 56. Received JCS 072338Z Nov 56.

5 Nov

The US Embassy in Beirut reported that tanker loadings at Banias had been stopped by Syrian military decree and that the IPC pipeline had been blown up in Lebanon at a point five to eight miles from Tripoli, Lebanon.

() Msg, Beirut (Heath) to SecState, 1093, 5 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 081539Z Nov 56. Received JCS 082328Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

5 Nov

The US Ambassador in Tehran expressed to the Shah of Iran and President Mirza of Pakistan disappointment that the Arab States had abstained on a US resolution in the UN General Assembly condemning the Soviet attack on Hungary. Mirza, who like the Shah had not been aware of the abstention, promised to tell Arab representatives in Iran of his own disappointment

at the action.

(U) Msg, Tehran (Chapin) to SecState, 714,
6 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 072031Z Nov
56. Received JCS 081038Z Nov 56.

5 Nov The State Department instructed the US Ambassadors
in Moscow and Paris to obtain the agreement of
representatives of NATO countries not to attend
Soviet anniversary celebrations on 7 November.

(U) Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Moscow, 550,
5 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 061629Z Nov 56.
SEEN by Adm Radford.

5 Nov The State Department instructed the US Ambassador
in Karachi to tell Prime Minister Suhrawardy that
the US would regard Pakistan's withdrawal from the
Commonwealth, the Baghdad Pact, or SEATO as a serious
setback to the security of the free world.

(U) Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Karachi,
1076, 5 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 061629Z
Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

5 Nov The US Ambassador in Paris, alluding to Pineau's
radio-TV address of 4 November, expressed to Director
General Joxe of the Foreign Office the concern of the
US about the French attitude

Joxe replied that
the French Government realized the seriousness with
which the US viewed events in Hungary, but added
that it had been shocked by the attitude of Asiatic
nations, especially India.

(U) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2185,
5 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 051951Z Nov 56.
Received JCS 062014Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

5 Nov In conversation with the US Ambassador in Paris, a
spokesman of the French Foreign Office confirmed
that the Franco-Libyan Treaty had been placed before
the National Assembly but was extremely pessimistic
about its chances of ratification. Because no
decision on it was possible before 30 November, he
said that there was no chance that French troops
would be withdrawn from Fezzan by that date.

(U) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2203,
5 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 060905Z Nov
56. Received JCS 070007Z Nov 56.

5 Nov (U) In a speech in New Delhi before the UNESCO general
conference, Nehru made his first public reference
to the Hungarian situation. He said that in both
Egypt and Hungary human dignity and freedom were
being outraged by the force of modern arms.

NYT, 6 Nov 56, 1:2, 26:3-6. Received JCS
061330Z Nov 56.

5 Nov (U) A New York Times correspondent reported from El
Arish that the Israelis were taking steps to integrate
the Gaza Strip into Israel. Railroad tracks were
being laid into Gaza and preparations were being made
to change from Egyptian to Israeli currency.

NYT, 6 Nov 56, 6:1-2 (late edition). Received
JCS approximately 061700Z Nov 56.

5 Nov

Israel, in an initial reply to the UN Secretary General's cable of 4 November asking for acceptance of a cease-fire, sought clarification of Egypt's position on a cease-fire, peace negotiations, Fedayeen raids, and the blockade of Israeli shipping. In two messages received by Hammarskjold, one dated 4 November and the other 5 November, Egypt unconditionally accepted the UN cease-fire resolution of 2 November and the UN resolution of 5 November authorizing a UN police force. During the evening, the Israeli delegation notified Hammarskjold that Israel agreed unconditionally to a cease-fire.

(~~Use Only~~) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 15, 6 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 060816Z Nov 56. Received JCS 061230Z Nov 56.

5 Nov (u)

The convoy of Americans, twice turned back by Soviet tanks and forced to spend two nights in a schoolhouse near Magyarovar, Hungary, finally reached Vienna after being escorted to the Austrian frontier by a Soviet armored column.

NYT, 6 Nov 56, 27:1-2. Received JCS 061330Z Nov 56.

5 Nov (u)

The Gomulka regime, apparently to counteract growing internal resentment at Poland's stand with the Soviet bloc in the UN debate on Hungary, replaced 32 Soviet officers in the Polish armed forces with Polish officers.

NYT, 6 Nov 56, 1:8. Received JCS 061330Z Nov 56.

5 Nov

~~Use Only~~ reported that his earlier reports that the First Division had concentrated for movement into Jordan appeared inaccurate, although the force in Jordan was apparently to be built around the First Division. The 19th Brigade, however, was in Jordan, and one battalion was in the vicinity of Mafrag. The Second Division was regrouping for an internal security role.

added that there was considerable anti-Nuri and anti-British sentiment within the Iraqi Army and the [redacted] had remarked that if the Army were ordered to protect Nuri and the British they might not obey.

Received JCS 052115Z

Nov 56.

that Syrian and Iraqi troops were in Jordan on the east bank. A decision to move them to the west bank had not yet been made. Nuwar was to remain chief of the combined General Staff. Under him an Iraqi would command Iraqi forces and General Hayari would command the Jordanians. The Syrian command was not settled. said that Jordan was attempting to protect pipelines in its territory from demolition. In addition to affording military protection, the Government was spreading the rumor that British wanted the pipelines sabotaged.

Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 447, 5 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 051737Z Nov 56. Received JCS 052314Z Nov 56.

5 Nov King Saud gave US Ambassador Wadsworth categorical assurances that he had given refuge to some 25 Egyptian military aircraft, that the crews had been returned to Egypt, and that the aircraft were under Saudi military guard. Saud denied that these planes had flown attack missions against British shipping from Saudi bases.
(S) Msg, Dhahran (Carrigan from Wadsworth) to SecState, 193, 6 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 062104Z Nov 56. Received JCS 070305Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

5 Nov (u) British Foreign Secretary Lloyd, in a speech before the House of Commons, repeated Eden's declaration of 3 November that Britain intended to insure the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Egyptian territory. A spokesman for the Israeli Embassy in London said his Government had reached no decision on how it would react to any Anglo-French attempt to compel such a withdrawal, but reiterated that the Israeli position remained that Egypt and Israel should enter direct negotiations for a settlement without any prior conditions.

NYT, 6 Nov 56, 16:1. Received JCS 061330Z Nov 56.

According to Israeli sources, Foreign Minister Meir told the British Ambassador that Israel refused to withdraw its armies from the Sinai Peninsula. Observers in Tel Aviv believed Israel would do everything in its power to hold Sinai for bargaining purposes at any future peace talks with Egypt.

NYT, 7 Nov 56, 32:8. Received JCS 071330Z Nov 56.

5 Nov Spokesmen of three Arab countries in the UN told a member of the US delegation that the Indian representative had urged the Asian-African bloc to abstain on the US resolution on Hungary because "we have it on good authority" that the whole Hungarian revolt was a CIA plot in which SecState Dulles was implicated.

(S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 14, 2 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 060738Z Nov 56. Received JCS 061629Z Nov 56.

5 Nov The US Minister in Budapest reported that fighting continued in the capital, with increased use by the Soviets of mortars and artillery. The secret police were back in uniform and, under the protection of Soviet troops, had begun searching houses and arresting people.

(S) Msg, Budapest (Wailles) to SecState, 234, 5 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 051819Z Nov 56. Received JCS 052314Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

5 Nov The US Legation in Budapest reported that it had again been deprived of normal communications for more than a day and requested that consideration be given to the denial of equivalent facilities to the Soviet Embassy in Washington.

(S) Msg, Budapest (Wailles) to SecState, 236, 5 Nov 56. Received State 051839Z Nov 56. Received JCS 052337Z Nov 56.

5 Nov Soviet troops fired on the Yugoslav Legation in Budapest, killing one younger diplomat and wounding several others.

(C) Msg, Budapest (Wailes) to SecState, 239, 5 Nov 56, DA IN 267282 (6 Nov 56). Received State 052335Z Nov 56. Received JCS 061604Z Nov 56.

5 Nov (U) At Soviet request, the UN Security Council convened during the evening to consider the Soviet resolution calling for joint Soviet-American military action against Britain, France, and Israel in the Middle East. The Council rejected the Soviet proposal, 4-3-4. Iran and Yugoslavia supported the Soviet move, while the US, UK, France, and Australia opposed it.

NYT, 6 Nov 56, 1:4, 14:3. Received JCS 061330Z Nov 56.

6 Nov (U) Following attacks by Allied jet fighters on Egyptian troops in the vicinity of Port Said, the British landed a brigade of commandos at Port Said to exploit gains made by British and French parachute troops on 5 November.

NYT, 6 Nov 56, 1:6-7, 3:1-6 (late edition). Received JCS approximately 061700Z Nov 56.

French paratroopers and commandos swarmed ashore at Port Faud. Their landing was unopposed, and they found in the city only a small, demoralized garrison of Egyptian soldiers who promptly surrendered. British forces, landing 300 yards to the west with Port Said as their objective, encountered serious resistance from Egyptian troops defending that city.

NYT, 8 Nov 56, 12:3. Received JCS 081330Z Nov 56. AP Wire Service, 6 Nov 56, carried continuous reports on the fighting beginning at 061331Z Nov 56.

6 Nov (U) The Israeli Government announced that the campaign in Sinai had ended shortly after midnight, and all Israeli units had been instructed to observe the cease-fire scrupulously. The Sinai front had been quiet since the morning of 5 November.

NYT, 6 Nov 56, 5:3-5 (late edition). Received JCS approximately 061700Z Nov 56.

6 Nov (U) An official statement issued by the Egyptian Government said Egypt had sent messages "to all nations of the world" appealing for arms and volunteers "to repel British, French, and Israeli aggression."

NYT, 6 Nov 56, 1:7 (late edition). Received JCS approximately 061700Z Nov 56.

6 Nov (U) Moscow Radio broadcast the Egyptian appeal for volunteers and aid in the fighting against the British and French.

AP Wire Service, 6 Nov 56. Received JCS 061602Z Nov 56.

6 Nov (U) The Swiss Government invited the Big Four powers and India to hold an immediate "Summit Conference" in Switzerland to meet the danger of a third world war.

AP Wire Service, 6 Nov 56. Received JCS 061331Z Nov 56.

6 Nov The French commandant at Port Lyautey informed COMNAVACTS that the French Army intended to commence construction of military storage facilities in the American section of Port Lyautey immediately, to place guards and patrols in the area, and to increase French military strength in Port Lyautey city. The commandant said the decision had been made by General Cogny. The US Ambassador in Rabat reported that the French were apparently intent upon developing the Port Lyautey naval base as a protected landing point for military supplies and possibly troops, and reiterated his recommendation of 1 November that the State Department deal with the matter promptly.

Msg, Rabat (Cannon) to SecState, 274, 6 Nov 56, DA IN 267833 (7 Nov 56). Received State 061849Z Nov 56. Received JCS 081454Z Nov 56.

6 Nov Mobs of demonstrators, believed by the US Ambassador to have been organized by Soviet authorities, attacked the French and British Embassies in Moscow. However, no damage was reported as of 061337Z.

Msg, Moscow (Bohlen) to SecState, 1090, 061337Z Nov 56, DA IN 267446, CJCS files. Received JCS 061750Z Nov 56. SBEN by Adm Radford.

6 Nov In an interview with the US Ambassador in Beirut, Lebanese President Chamoun expressed the view that Nasser had learned his lesson and would now agree without delay to international participation in the operation of the Suez Canal. In any event, the US was in such a strong position with the Arabs that it could frankly lay down the law to Nasser. Chamoun thought he and King Saud were the only Arabs Nasser would listen to, and he offered to go to Egypt and tell Nasser what must be done if the US thought such a mission desirable.

Msg, Beirut (Heath) to SecState, 1116, 6 Nov 56, DA IN 268146 (7 Nov 56). Received State 070547Z Nov 56. Received JCS 080803Z Nov 56.

6 Nov In an interview with Syrian Prime Minister Asali, the US Ambassador in Damascus pointed out that the circumstances surrounding the sabotage of the IPC pipelines were certain to arouse suspicion in Washington and elsewhere that the operation had been carried out with the connivance if not the active participation of the Syrian Government. Asali said he had accused the Army Chief of Staff and Lt Col Serraj, G-2, of complicity in the sabotage or of gross incompetence. Describing this interview in a cable to the State Department, the Ambassador commented that Asali seemed to have little real authority. Moreover, all evidence pointed to the conclusion that the sabotage was executed by trained agents in the labor syndicates, aided by Serraj, and directed by the Egyptian Military Attache in Damascus.

Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1071, 6 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 062025Z Nov 56. Received JCS 071624Z Nov 56.

6 Nov The Libyan Government requested that Colonel Ismail Sadiq, the Egyptian Military Attache in Tripoli, leave the country because of his activities in inciting Libyan mobs to violence.

Msg, Tripoli (Tappin) to SecState, 305, 7 Nov 56, DA IN 268100. Received State 071346Z Nov 56. Received JCS 080258Z Nov 56.

Msg, CIA to JCS, Received JCS 101612Z Nov 56.

6 Nov According to US intelligence sources, intimate advisors of Nasser said that Egypt had not asked for Soviet help but could not issue a statement rejecting the Soviet offer. For the immediate dispatch of the Sixth Fleet as the only hope of forestalling the Soviets, who, believed, were prepared to intervene even with the knowledge that they would be risking a world war.

Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1350, 061955Z Nov 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 070103Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

6 Nov The State Department instructed the US Ambassador in Cairo to ask the Egyptian Government to make clear that it would not welcome unilateral Soviet intervention, which all UN members, including the US, would have the duty to oppose.

Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Cairo, 1457, 6 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 061622Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

The following day, the Ambassador replied that it would be inadvisable to bring this matter to Nasser's attention because

Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1376, 7 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 080221Z Nov 56. Received JCS 082350Z Nov 56.

6 Nov The US Ambassador in Tehran cabled the State Department a draft communique drawn up on 5 November by the representatives of Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey meeting in Tehran. The communique called for an immediate cease-fire in Egypt, withdrawal of French, British, and Israeli troops, a guarantee that the territorial integrity of Egypt would be respected, a definite settlement of the Israeli border, and release of all POW's. Pending final concurrence by Turkey, whose President had not yet arrived in Tehran, the participants hoped to obtain British acceptance of these proposals. If Britain rejected them, the four Muslim members suggested that Britain should withdraw from the Baghdad Pact or that a new four-member pact should be formed instead.

Msg, Tehran (Chapin) to SecState, 709, 6 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 061509Z Nov 56. Received JCS 070008Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

The State Department advised the US Ambassador in Tehran that the Baghdad Pact leaders, instead of their draft communique, should issue a statement supporting UN efforts and calling upon the hostile parties to comply with pertinent UN resolutions.

(S) Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Tehran, 894, 6 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 080239Z Nov 56.

6 Nov (U) In answer to the Soviet charge that US sponsored elements were fomenting the Hungarian rebellion from Austrian soil, the State Department issued a statement labeling the accusation "grossly false." The statement also said that any violation of "the territorial integrity or internal sovereignty" of Austria would be "a grave threat to the peace." The statement was made to reassure the Austrians, who were said to be alarmed by the Soviet charges.

AP Wire Service, 6 Nov 56. Received JCS 061829Z Nov 56.

6 Nov Saudi Arabia severed diplomatic relations with Britain and France and forbade supply and loading of all British and French ships, as well as other ships bound for British or French ports, with Saudi petroleum products.

(S) Use Only - Msg, Jidda (Wadsworth) to SecState, 244, 6 Nov 56, DA IN 267796 (7 Nov 56). Received State 061849Z Nov 56. Received JCS 071010Z Nov 56.

6 Nov King Saud told the US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia that he had just agreed that Saudi army units stationed near the Jordanian frontier might enter Jordan if and when invited by Jordan, and that after their entry they would be under the command of Jordanian Chief of Staff Nuwar.

(S) Msg, Dhahran (Carrigan from Wadsworth) to SecState, 194, 6 Nov 56, DA IN 267830 (7 Nov 56). Received State 061659Z Nov 56. Received JCS 071713Z Nov 56.

6 Nov (U) Cairo radio announced that Saudi Arabian troops had entered Jordan in support of Egypt.

AP Wire Service, 6 Nov 56. Received JCS 061416Z Nov 56.

6 Nov According to a report received by SHAPE from a "completely reliable" NATO nation source, a Canberra was shot down at 45,000 feet near Damascus, indicating that Syria had become a base for modern Soviet jet fighters and radar equipment.

(S) Msg, USNMR SHAPE to COMSIXTHFLT, 071832Z Nov 56. Received JCS 081719Z Nov 56.

6 Nov [redacted] that unidentified aircraft, suspected of being Soviet, had been observed flying over northeast Iraq.

Received JCS 062233Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

~~TOP SECRET~~

6 Nov (U) In a victory speech at Sharm El Sheikh, Major General Moshe Dayan, Israeli Army Chief of Staff, said Israeli forces had lost 150 killed and 20 captured in their offensive against Egypt. The Egyptians had lost two divisions and armored units destroyed, and 5000 Egyptians were prisoners of war. Dayan read a message from Ben Gurion saying the Red Sea port of Elath would once again be Israel's main southern port, and the island of Tiran would also be restored to Israel.
NYT, 7 Nov 56, 34:6 (late edition). Received JCS approximately 071700Z Nov 56.

~~TOP SECRET~~
6 Nov General Burns received a letter from the Israeli Government stating that it required the withdrawal of UN truce supervision personnel from Gaza and Beersheeba.

(S) Msg, Jerusalem (Cole) to SecState, 159, 6 Nov 56. Received State 072023Z Nov 56. Received JCS 081845Z Nov 56.

6 Nov (U) Diplomatic reports received in Vienna indicated that the Hungarian revolutionists were still fighting in parts of the country. Although Soviet power had eliminated resistance in most of Hungary, fighting continued around Pecs, Szombathely, and in sectors of Budapest. Official radios in these cities combined threats with appeals to the rebels to stop fighting.
NYT, 7 Nov 56, 31:1. Received JCS 071330Z Nov 56.

6 Nov The US Minister in Budapest reported that, contrary to statements in the UN, the situation in Budapest was entirely clear. The Soviets were systematically cleaning up the city. Slaughter of men, women, and children had been continuous for three days, with hospitals and clinics included among the targets. Notwithstanding, resistance had not been entirely broken.

(S) Msg, Budapest (Wailles) to SecState, 242, 6 Nov 56, DA IN 267592. Received State 061654Z Nov 56. Received JCS 070122Z Nov 56.

6 Nov At a meeting in Paris, Chancellor Adenauer and Foreign Minister von Brentano urged Premier Mollet to accept an immediate cease-fire in Egypt rather than wait 24 hours in order to permit reinforcements to reach Port Said. Mollet consulted Eden by telephone and decided in favor of an immediate cease-fire. His decision, in the opinion of the German Foreign Office, was considerably influenced by Adenauer and von Brentano.

(S) Msg; Bonn (Conant) to SecState, 1784, 8 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 090129Z Nov 56. Received JCS 100350Z Nov 56.

6 Nov (U) After a noon conference on the Middle East situation with top Government officials, President Eisenhower talked to Eden by telephone to urge him to end the fighting in Egypt. Eden said the decision to accept the cease-fire resolution had already been taken by the UK and France. The President expressed his delight at the decision.
AP Wire Service, 6 Nov 56. Received JCS 062306Z Nov 56. NYT, 7 Nov 56, 31:4, 35:6-7. Received JCS 071330Z Nov 56.

- 6 Nov Prime Minister Eden informed the House of Commons that the UN cease-fire order had been accepted by France and the UK. Eden read a message he had sent Hammarskjold stating that the UK was prepared to stop further military operations if Hammarskjold could "confirm that the Egyptian and Israeli Governments have accepted an unconditional cease-fire and that the international force to be set up will be competent to secure and supervise the attainment of the objectives" defined in the UN cease-fire resolution. The message said the UK was ordering a cease-fire to become effective at 062400Z. The note also pointed out the urgency of restoring transit through the Canal, and offered the Anglo-French force to begin work on this task immediately. Eden also read to Commons his reply to Bulganin's threatening note of 5 November. This note described the UK's latest position on the Middle East, repeated Eden's message to Hammarskjold, and emphasized that the Soviet accusations of Anglo-French "barbarism" could hardly be sincere in view of Soviet actions in Hungary.
- ~~Msg~~ Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 2534, 2635, 6 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 062130Z Nov 56. Received JCS 070304Z Nov 56. AP Wire Service, 6 Nov 56. Received JCS 061811Z and 061927Z Nov 56.
- 6 Nov (u) With British and French troops apparently in firm possession of Port Said and Port Faud, Allied mechanized units moved south along the Canal causeway toward El Qantara. Late in the evening, the French Defense Ministry announced that Anglo-French forces had occupied the Canal over "most of its length."
- AP Wire Service, 6 Nov 56. Received JCS 061832Z and 062248Z Nov 56. NYT, 7 Nov 56, 33:3-8. Received JCS 071330Z Nov 56.
- 6 Nov (u) After receiving reports that fighting still continued in Budapest, Gyor, and other Hungarian cities, the UN General Assembly called a special meeting for 072000Z November. Some delegates thought another session might provide an opportunity to obtain Soviet agreement to allow UN observers in Hungary pursuant to the resolution passed by the Assembly on 4 November. Other delegates, less optimistic, wanted to get Soviet refusal on the record.
- NYT, 7 Nov 56, 31:2, 36:6. Received JCS 071330Z Nov 56.
- 6 Nov (u) At the UN, 19 Afro-Asian nations drafted a resolution demanding immediate withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli troops from Egypt. The 19-nation bloc twice summoned the General Assembly to introduce the resolution, but both times the meeting was cancelled to await the cease-fire Britain and France promised would go into effect at midnight. Earlier, Hammarskjold had circulated among UN members his plan for a UN police force and reported he had now received offers of troops from Canada, Colombia, Pakistan, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and New Zealand. He said the UN command would

not attempt to enforce a withdrawal of foreign forces from Egypt but would confine its activities to securing and supervising the cessation of hostilities. Seven states drafted a joint resolution that would have the Assembly approve Hammarskjold's plan and set it in motion. The General Assembly was scheduled to meet at 071530Z November.

NYT, 7 Nov 56, 31:5, 34:2-5. Received JCS 071330Z Nov 56.

7 Nov (u) Cairo Radio announced that a cease-fire had become effective at 062400Z November, but warned the Egyptian people and armed forces to resume fighting "if the enemy shoots at anyone or advances one inch."

AP Wire Service, 7 Nov 56. Received JCS 071414Z Nov 56.

7 Nov (u) In a speech before the Israeli Parliament, Ben Gurion spelled out his Government's policy in the conflict with Israel. Regarding a UN police force, Ben Gurion stated that, "On no account will Israel agree to the stationing of a foreign force, no matter how called, in her territory or in any of the areas occupied by her." Ben Gurion also said the 1949 armistice with Egypt was "dead and buried and cannot be restored," and proposed direct negotiations with Egypt and other Arab countries. The Parliament gave Ben Gurion an 88-3 vote of confidence on this stand.

AP Wire Service, 7 Nov 56. Received JCS 071429Z Nov 56. NYT, 8 Nov 56, 1:2, 6:2-8. Received JCS 081330Z Nov 56.

7 Nov See Following Ben Gurion's speech to the Israeli Parliament, the UN Secretary General in New York protested to Israeli Ambassador Eban and demanded an immediate clarification of the willingness of Israel to withdraw all forces to the armistice lines. Hammarskjold also brought to Eban's attention a report from General Burns stating that Israel was apparently preparing to expel the Military Armistice Commission from the Gaza Strip.

(u) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 23, 7 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 072328Z Nov 56. Received JCS 081713Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

7 Nov (u) President Eisenhower conferred during the morning with SecState Dulles at Walter Reed Hospital, then sent a cablegram to Ben Gurion urging him to comply with the UN resolution calling for withdrawal of Israeli forces from Egypt.

NYT, 8 Nov 56, 1:2-3, 4:3-4. Received JCS 081330Z Nov 56.

7 Nov (u) Eden told the House of Commons that France and Britain had no intention of withdrawing their troops from Egypt unless and until there was a UN force to take over from them. Earlier, a Foreign Office spokesman reiterated "Britain's intention that Israeli forces should speedily withdraw from Egyptian territory." In a speech broadcast during the evening, Foreign Secretary Lloyd again repeated this position.

NYT, 8 Nov 56, 1:3, 12:4-5. Received JCS 081330Z Nov 56.

7 Nov (u) The UN General Assembly convened at 071530Z November to consider the 19-nation Asian-African resolution again calling on Britain, France, and Israel to withdraw their forces from Egypt. The Assembly adopted the resolution 65-1-10. Israel cast the only dissenting vote, while the abstainers included Britain and France. The Assembly also adopted, 64-0-12, a seven-power resolution to rush completion of the UN police force to supervise the armistice. Egypt, Israel, and the Soviet bloc abstained. During the debate, Egypt and Syria took the position that British, French, and Israeli troops should be withdrawn from Egypt before the UN command moved in.

AP Wire Service, 7 Nov 56. Received JCS 071713Z and 071938Z Nov 56. NYT, 8 Nov 56, 1:1, 8:1-8, 9:3-4. Received JCS 081330Z Nov 56.

7 Nov A representative of Saudi Arabia at the UN told a US delegate that representatives of the USSR were urging Arab delegations to hold out in Egypt for the arrival of Soviet volunteers. The Soviets claimed that Israel had no intention of returning to the armistice lines but that the USSR would be able to provide sufficient volunteers to drive the Israelis back.

~~(S)~~ Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 28, 7 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 080757Z Nov 56. Received JCS 081744Z Nov 56.

7 Nov An official of the French Foreign Office complained to the US Ambassador in Paris about a breakdown of communication between the French and US delegations at the UN. Stating that Ambassador Lodge had been inaccessible to the French delegate, the official asked for a resumption of normal contacts.

~~(S)~~ Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2269, 8 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 081143Z Nov 56. Received JCS 082009Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

7 Nov A French Government spokesman, in conversation with the US Ambassador in Paris, asked the cooperation of the US in transferring consideration of major outstanding problems in the UN from the General Assembly to the Security Council, and in concentrating in Hammarskjold's hands general responsibility for setting up the international police force. French policy, he said, was aimed at minimizing inflammatory debate that could contribute to a breakdown of the cease-fire.

~~(S)~~ Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2242, 7 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 071346Z Nov 56. Received JCS 072001Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

7 Nov (u) In an address in Moscow's Red Square, Marshal Zhukov called on the UN to end the "armed aggression" of Britain, France, and Israel against Egypt, and offered Soviet troops to help do the job.

AP Wire Service, 7 Nov 56. Received JCS 071357Z Nov 56.

7 Nov (u) Bulganin replied to President Eisenhower's note of 4 November expressing concern at Soviet actions in Budapest. Bulganin said that the problem of Soviet withdrawal from Hungary "comes completely and entirely

under the competence of the Hungarian and Soviet Governments." The note referred to the announced program of the new Kadar regime and the Soviet declaration of 30 October on satellite relations as containing all the information the President might require. The text of Bulganin's message was made public in a broadcast over Moscow Radio on 9 November.

NYT, 9 Nov 56, 15:4-5 (late edition). Received JCS approximately 091700Z Nov 56.

7 Nov ✓

CHMAAG Iraq, with the concurrence of the US Ambassador in Baghdad, cautioned the Defense Department that the US ran the risk of losing prestige in Iraqi military circles because of its reluctance to substitute US for British influence. Now that the UK was discredited and the US in a favorable position because of its stand in the Middle East crisis, CHMAAG recommended that the US play a more active role in Iraqi military affairs.

He also recommended that the US begin immediately to train more Iraqi officers in the US.

Msg, CHMAAG Iraq to OASD/ISA, Iraq 9-192, 070700Z Nov 56, DA IN 267958. Received JCS 071512Z Nov 56.

7 Nov

received an unconfirmed report from a reliable source that a Turkish tank battalion equipped with M-36's had left Ankara on 5 November and was moving to the Syrian border.

Received JCS 101851Z Nov 56.

7 Nov

Ambassador in Cairo reported that the Egyptians were reverting to the technique of presenting their case in terms of US competition with the USSR.

Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1387, 7 Nov 56. Received State 091343Z Nov 56. Received JCS 091949Z Nov 56.

7 Nov

Protests organized by the Chinese Communist Government against the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt assumed the proportions of a major propaganda campaign comparable in scale to the "liberate Taiwan" movement of 1954.

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The US Consul-General in Hong Kong believed this tactic part of the continuing effort to sell the concept of Asian-African solidarity and identify Communist China as the leader of the anti-colonial world.

(S) Msg, Hong Kong (Drumright) to SecState, 831, 7 Nov 56, DA IN 268149. Received State 071230Z Nov 56. Received JCS 080945Z Nov 56.

7 Nov

[] informed that Iraqi troops stationed at Mafrag, Jordan, would be withdrawn because Jordan insisted that Iraq help defend Syria in the event of an Israeli attack.

[] Received JCS 081616Z Nov 56.

7 Nov

(S) Msg, Ankara (Warren) to SecState, 105, 7 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 080159Z Nov 56. Received JCS 081037Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

7 Nov

According to the US Embassy in Beirut, a meeting in Beirut of Arab heads of state, originally scheduled for 8 November, had been postponed until early the following week because of King Faisal's reluctance to leave Iraq before the return of Premier Nuri Said.

(S) Msg, Beirut (Heath) to SecState, 1135, 7 Nov 56. Received State 091544Z Nov 56. Received JCS (No Time).

7 Nov

CHMAAG France, referring to the French deployment of 60 F-84's and 20 RF-84's to the Suez area, reported that the French Air Force had submitted requisitions for spare parts for these aircraft. Recent cables, said CHMAAG, were not clear on whether the US was altering support policies as a result of the Middle East situation, and he requested a statement of policy to be followed in processing FAF requisitions. (On 8 November, ASD/ISA replied that no spare parts would be supplied for planes operating in the Middle East.)

(S) Msg, CHMAAG France to CSUSAF, MAAG 001283, 071030Z Nov 56, DA IN 267934. Received JCS 081805Z Nov 56.

7 Nov (U)

French Premier Mollet replied to Bulganin's note of 5 November to the UK and France. Mollet stated his doubt that "the present situation can be clarified by the use of threats and reminders of the possibilities of long-range weapons." He defended Anglo-French intervention and questioned Bulganin's "authority to bewail the spilling of 'innocent blood'" when the Soviets were

spilling streams of blood in Hungary. Mollet, in a speech to the National Assembly, praised President Eisenhower for his prompt warning to the USSR following receipt by the UK and France of Bulganin's letters, and stated his conviction that the US understood that, despite the independent Anglo-French action, the three countries were united by common objectives and ideals.

NYT, 8 Nov 56, 12:3-4 (late edition). Received JCS approximately 081700Z Nov 56.

7 Nov (U) An Indian Government spokesman said that India would accept the Swiss invitation to a top level Geneva Conference.

NYT, 8 Nov 56, 4:1. Received JCS 081330Z Nov 56.

7 Nov (U) In Washington, London, Moscow, and other world capitals Western diplomats boycotted Soviet anniversary celebrations in protest against Soviet actions in Hungary. Anti-Soviet demonstrations took place before Soviet UN headquarters in New York. Demonstrators in Paris set fire to the headquarters of the French Communist Party.

NYT, 8 Nov 56, 1:3-5, 12:5-6, 16:4-5. Received JCS 081330Z Nov 56.

7 Nov (U) Egyptian diplomats in Moscow and Hong Kong said that Soviet reserve officers and 250,000 Red Chinese were volunteering to help Egypt.

AP Wire Service, 7 Nov 56. Received JCS 072003Z Nov 56.

7 Nov (U) Soviet troops pressed the campaign to put down the Hungarian revolution. Diplomatic reports reaching Vienna said the battle of Budapest ended at 071400Z as the rebels ran out of ammunition and Soviet troops broke through the last pockets of resistance. Preliminary estimates placed casualties during the last few days of fighting at 6,500 killed and 3,000 wounded. Resistance also collapsed throughout the rest of Hungary, although bitter fighting was reported still in progress around Gyor during the evening. The Soviets threw more than 300 tanks against the 14,000-man rebel force defending Gyor. At 071400Z the radio at Dunapentele appealed for help directly to President Eisenhower, then went off the air.

NYT, 8 Nov 56, 1:4, 15:3. Received JCS 081330Z Nov 56.

7 Nov (U) The special meeting of the UN General Assembly scheduled for the afternoon to deal with the Hungarian question was postponed until 081530Z November to allow further debate on the Middle East situation. The UN Secretariat received a message signed by Kadar asserting that Nagy's calls for UN help "have no legal force and cannot be considered as requests emanating from Hungary." The Kadar Government objected to any discussion of the Hungarian situation by either the Security Council or General Assembly.

NYT, 8 Nov 56, 17:2. Received JCS 081330Z Nov 56.

7 Nov During the night, Fedayeen raided along the length of the Jordanian border and the Jerusalem corridor, and

in the Negev and Gaza areas. []
 reported that the scope of Fedayeen activity could provide an excuse for Israel to commence hostilities against Jordan.

Received JCS 082141Z

Nov 56.

8 Nov ✓ Nicosia Radio broadcast a British Admiralty announcement modifying the danger zone established on 1 November. The northern boundary of latitude 35 degrees N was changed to 34 degrees N. This modification lowered the northern boundary to a point north of Beirut, Lebanon, and made the Mediterranean oil ports of Tripoli and Baniyas easily accessible to all merchant shipping.
 (S) Msg, CNO to CINCLANTFLT et al., 082345Z Nov 56. Received JCS 090733Z Nov 56.

8 Nov (U) President Eisenhower ordered "extraordinary measures" by the administrators of the Refugee Relief Act to get 5,000 Hungarian refugees admitted to the US before the expiration of the law on 31 December 1956.
 NYT, 9 Nov 56, 1:4. Received JCS 091330Z Nov 56.

8 Nov
 General Burns arrived in Cairo to make preparations for the arrival of the proposed UN police force. He told a press conference that Egypt had agreed to admit a team of 10 UN observers to watch over the cease-fire until the arrival of the UN police force. At the UN, preliminary planning for this force was under way, and the following countries were prepared to supply troops: Colombia, 1200; Sweden, 300-400; Norway, 200; Denmark, 300; Finland, 200; Canada, 1000-1500; for a total of 3200-3800. An advance party of 50-100 Canadians was set to move and another, of 50-100 Scandinavians, was being readied. In Cairo, meanwhile, Nasser told the US Ambassador he needed time before making a final decision on the UN force, and that several questions would have to be answered before he was satisfied.

AP Wire Service, 8 Nov 56. Received JCS 081634Z Nov 56. (S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 32, 8 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 090150Z Nov 56. Received JCS 090609Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford. (S) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1404, 8 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 090348Z Nov 56. Received JCS (No Time). NYT, 9 Nov 56, 1:7. Received JCS 091330Z Nov 56.

8 Nov
 At the second emergency special session of the UN General Assembly, Italy, Cuba, Ireland, Pakistan, and Peru introduced a joint resolution calling on the USSR to withdraw forces from Hungary without further delay. The resolution also declared that free elections should be held in Hungary under UN auspices as soon as law and order were restored. The repression undertaken by Soviet forces was termed a violation of the UN Charter, the Hungarian Peace Treaty, and the Genocide Convention. During the all-day discussion, Yugoslavia joined in the growing condemnation of the Soviets. In the afternoon, Hammarskjold asked the new Hungarian Government to admit UN observers to its territory to report on Soviet military intervention.

(S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 38, 8 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 090804Z Nov 56. Received JCS 091238Z Nov 56. (U) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 34, 8 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 090222Z Nov 56. Received JCS 091022Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford. (An earlier, brief report of the UN session was received in JCS over AP Wire Service at 081844Z Nov 56.)

8 Nov The Chinese Communists denounced the US for rejecting the Soviet proposal for joint US-Soviet military cooperation in Egypt and declared this showed the US was actually attempting to establish its own control over Egypt. A Chinese People's Committee to support Egypt's resistance against aggression was formed, and Peiping declared its willingness to assist Egypt with material aid. The Egyptian Ambassador in Peiping announced that 250,000 Chinese had declared their desire to "volunteer."

(S) Msg, Hong Kong (Calkins) to SecState, 857, 9 Nov 56, DA IN 269506 (10 Nov 56). Received State 100602Z Nov 56. Received JCS 110140Z Nov 56.

8 Nov Soviet troops in Budapest mopped up isolated pockets of resistance as the situation in the city gradually became stabilized. Radio Budapest said the Soviet commander had called for the surrender of all arms by 091600Z November, promising severe punishment for violators of this order and no prosecution for those who complied with it. Beginning at 081930Z November there was a steady movement of tanks and other motorized equipment out of Pest through Buda and toward the West.

JCS 090232Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford. Received (TS)

Received JCS 090042Z Nov 56. AP Wire Service, 8 Nov 56. Received JCS 081441Z Nov 56.

8 Nov In a Moscow speech, Communist party chief Khrushchev urged that "the aggressors" against Egypt be severely punished. He also appealed for strengthening of the Soviet Army and unceasing support of Egypt.

NYT, 10 Nov 56, 1:8. Received JCS 101330Z Nov 56. (Offl Use Only) Msg, Moscow (Bohlen) to SecState, 1145, 10 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 101656Z Nov 56. Received JCS 110351Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

8 Nov [] reported that Syria, while maintaining the pretense of normal government, was actually a military dictatorship. Lt Col Serraj was the power behind Nizan Al-Din, the commanding general. Next to Serraj in power appeared to be the Egyptian representative of Col Nasser, Col Hammad. Everything of importance had to be approved by Serraj, including any matters dealing with US actions or requests. The army was "ill-tempered" and confused by rumors and lies, and was "ready to go off in any direction."

(S) Received JCS 090613Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

8 Nov The Premiers of Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq, and Iran, concluding their conference in Tehran, issued a joint communique substantially the same as the draft reported by the US Ambassador in Tehran on 6 November. In addition, the communique condemned Israeli "aggression" and included a strong statement supporting UN efforts

in the Middle East. Later the four Premiers personally made a strong plea to the US Ambassador for the US to join the Baghdad Pact.

(U) Msg, Tehran (Chapin) to SecState, 727, 8 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 081651Z Nov 56. Received JCS 082328Z Nov 56. (S) Msg, Tehran (Chapin) to SecState, 731, 9 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 090611Z Nov 56. Received JCS 091700Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

8 Nov

A spokesman for the Egyptian Embassy in Moscow said the flood of Soviet "volunteers"--mainly Army reservists--was continuing to rise, although no arrangements had been made yet to incorporate them into the Egyptian armed forces. He stated that negotiations for Soviet material assistance to Egypt were being conducted in Cairo. Meanwhile, the State Department informed US representatives abroad that it had received no substantiated reports of the arrival in the Near East of Soviet personnel or materiel during the present crisis.

NYT, 9 Nov 56, 1:6-7. Received JCS 091330Z Nov 56. (U) Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Baghdad, Circular 382, 8 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 091238Z Nov 56.

8 Nov

The Foreign Affairs Committee of the French National Assembly urged a heads-of-government conference of the US, UK, and France to recement the policy of the three and to seek peace in the Middle East. Similar to the conference proposed by the Swiss on 6 November, this meeting would prepare the way for a larger international conference, to include the leaders of the USSR and India.

NYT, 9 Nov 56, 11:1 (late edition). Received JCS approximately 091700Z Nov 56. (S) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2306, 9 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 091828Z Nov 56. Received JCS 100232Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford. (S) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2311, 9 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 091719Z Nov 56. Received JCS 100232Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

8 Nov

The US Ambassador in Tripoli reported that he did not think the Libyans would start a war if the French failed to withdraw forces from Fezzan by the 30 November deadline, but he knew "for positive fact" that they would "take other action."

(U) Msg, Tripoli (Tappin) to SecState, 315 8 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 081748Z Nov 56. Received JCS 082328Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

8 Nov (U)

The Eden Government defeated an Opposition move of censure on the Suez question by an evening vote of 320-262. Foreign Secretary Lloyd then told a meeting of Conservatives that the UK and France would withdraw unconditionally from Egypt when adequate UN forces arrived.

NYT, 9 Nov 56, 10:4-5. Received JCS 091330Z Nov 56. (An earlier report of Eden's victory was received in JCS over AP Wire Service at 082222Z Nov 56.)

8 Nov

In separate notes to the UN and to President Eisenhower, Israeli Premier Ben Gurion agreed to withdraw troops from Egypt as soon as "satisfactory arrangements" were made about the proposed UN police force. He asked the UN to call on Egypt to "abandon its policy of boycott and blockade," to halt Fedayeen raids, and to enter into direct peace negotiations with Israel. In a special broadcast at 2230Z, announcing this to Israel, Ben Gurion said his country had not abandoned hope of "liberating" the Gaza Strip.

(U) Msg, USARMA Tel Aviv to DEPTAR, CX 424, 082252Z Nov 56, DA IN 268739 (9 Nov 56), CJCS files. Received JCS 090605Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford. (U) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 36, 8 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 090446Z Nov 56. Received JCS 091022Z Nov 56. (U) Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 561, 9 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 090506Z Nov 56. Received JCS 091021Z Nov 56. NYT, 9 Nov 56, 1:8, 2:3. Received JCS 091330Z Nov 56. (Earlier reports of Ben Gurion's willingness to withdraw troops were received in JCS over AP Wire Service beginning at 081959Z Nov 56.)

9 Nov

Israeli Army headquarters said that Arab commando bands from Jordan and Syria had staged hit-and-run raids on Israel for the second successive night. Six raids were made during the night and in the early morning. A Syrian [redacted] denied these raids had come from Syria, and in Jordan [redacted] said they were carried out by Egyptians crossing through Israel into Jordan.

AP Wire Service, 9 Nov 56. Received JCS 091439Z Nov 56. NYT, 10 Nov 56, 10:4. Received JCS 101330Z Nov 56. (S)

Received JCS 110138Z and 111720Z Nov 56. (C)

Received JCS 122152Z Nov 56.

9 Nov

The US Ambassador in Tel Aviv forwarded "evidence" that Israel intended to keep the Gaza Strip and probably to incorporate it into Israel: 1) Israel was rushing to open a rail link to Gaza City on the Haifa Line, although the Gaza Strip link had been abandoned since the Palestine war. (A reliable informant told the Embassy that Israel hoped to deliver UN food and supplies via this route.) 2) A field survey was under way to add Gaza to the local water network. 3) Israel was making it clear that it thought the UN Truce Supervisory Organization no longer had reason to function in Gaza. 4) Ben Gurion's letter of 8 November to President Eisenhower "would seem" to limit his agreement on withdrawal of troops to those in Sinai. The Ambassador commented that Israel might actually be intending to use Gaza as a bargaining point in peace negotiations.

(U) Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 577 [corrected to 567], 9 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 100534Z Nov 56. Received JCS 102045Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

9 Nov

[Iraq would not accept him as commander of the combined Iraqi-Jordanian armies and that Iraq insisted Jordan terminate the Egyptian-Syrian-Jordanian military pact.] that

[joint staff arrangements were abandoned and] expected Iraqi troops to phase out of Jordan. He stated further that Soviet influence was increasing in Jordan and that the country would go Communist if the US did not assist it with military and economic aid sufficient to compensate for similar British aid that would soon end. [] commented that [] was definitely dealing with the Communists and that this was probably an attempt to play both sides.

(TS)
Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 477, 9 Nov 56. (S) Msg, CJCS files. Received State 091718Z Nov 56. Received JCS 100232Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

9 Nov (v)

In a speech to Commons, Eden reiterated that UK and French troops would be withdrawn from Egypt as soon as a "competent" UN force could take over. He stated that British air and ground forces would be redeployed in the eastern Mediterranean. The Cyprus and Malta air bases would be maintained so that they could receive bomber and fighter squadrons "in a matter of hours."

(S) Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 2605, 9 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 091416Z Nov 56. Received JCS 091951Z Nov 56. NYT, 10 Nov 56, 1:4. Received JCS101330Z Nov 56. (An earlier, incomplete report of the speech was received in JCS over AP Wire Service at 091335Z Nov 56.)

9 Nov

Iraq severed diplomatic relations with France and announced she would boycott any Baghdad Pact meetings attended by the UK. A communique said the two decisions had been taken because of Anglo-French actions in the Middle East. The US Ambassador in Baghdad commented that this move came on the heels of mounting anti-British and anti-Nuri feeling in Iraq. By "sacrificing" France and keeping the UK out of Baghdad Pact meetings, he wrote, Nuri apparently hoped to save his government and at the same time obviate a break with the UK.

(S) Msg, Baghdad (Gallman) to SecState, Unnumbered, 9 Nov 56, DA IN 699894. Received State 091708Z Nov 56. Received JCS 100800Z Nov 56. (U) Msg, Baghdad (Gallman) to SecState, 803, 10 Nov 56, DA IN 700401 (11 Nov 56). Received State 101606Z Nov 56. Received JCS 110702Z Nov 56. (S) Msg, Baghdad (Gallman) to SecState, 804, 10 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 101708Z Nov 56. Received JCS 102318Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

9 Nov

The US Ambassador in Damascus summarized information on the subject of Soviet penetration in Syria: 1) Soviet military equipment had been arriving in substantial quantities for 10 months. President Quwwatli said he had obtained a promise of more arms during his recent

Moscow visit. 2) There was no confirmation of the presence of Soviet military personnel other than three radar technicians and possibly a few others. 3) Eighteen Syrian pilots were being trained in MIG's in Egypt, but the present whereabouts of pilots and MIG's was unknown. 4) There was no confirmation that Soviet planes were using Syrian bases. The US Army and Air Attaches doubted the feasibility of such use. 5) The Prime Minister asserted he still looked to the UN rather than only to the USSR for a solution to the Middle East crisis, but Syrian decisions might ultimately be in the hands of Army elements whose attitudes and activities were "disquieting."

(8) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1121, 9 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 101224Z Nov 56. Received JCS 102010Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

9 Nov

(8) Msg, CINCNELM Rear Echelon to CNO/CINCNELM/COMSIXTHFLT, 092153Z Nov 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 131406Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

9 Nov

The State Department informed the US Ambassadors in Ankara and Paris that US intelligence sources had no information to confirm reports of Soviet overflights of Turkish territory. Meanwhile, the President of

the Syrian Air Force had asked him for information on an unusual type of jet fuel, not previously purchased by Syria.

wanted delivery as soon as possible. that this was the first concrete indication of the presence of Soviet aircraft in Syria.

(7) Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Ankara, 1058, 9 Nov 56. Received JCS 102043Z Nov 56. (S)

Received JCS 092010Z and 101037Z Nov 56.

9 Nov

Hammarskjold announced that the first units of the UN Middle East police force would fly to an Italian staging area "probably within 24 hours." In Cairo, meanwhile, Nasser told General Burns and the US Ambassador that while he agreed in principle to the entry of the UN force, he still had several reservations concerning its composition, mission, and length of stay in Egypt.

AP Wire Service, 9 Nov 56. Received JCS 092030Z Nov 56. (8) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1415, 9 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 100431Z Nov 56.

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Received JCS 101236Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford. (S) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1418, 9 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 101329Z Nov 56. Received JCS 102045Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford. (S) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1420, 9 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 100330Z Nov 56. Received JCS 101235Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

9 Nov The UN General Assembly approved resolutions introduced previously by the US and others that called on the USSR to withdraw from Hungary, allow free elections under UN auspices, and end interference with relief supplies destined for Hungary. The US Ambassador to the UN reported a "dramatic change of attitude" toward the USSR as a result of its armed intervention in Hungary.

NYT, 10 Nov 56, 1:8. Received JCS 101330Z Nov 56. (Offl Use Only) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 52, 9 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 100826Z Nov 56. Received JCS 102010Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford. (C) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 486, 9 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 092209Z Nov 56. Received JCS 102010Z Nov 56.

9 Nov The Israeli Army began screening all male civilians in the Gaza Strip in order to find an estimated 4,000 armed Egyptians and Palestinians believed in hiding. The screening proceeded smoothly in Gaza City, but ran into passive and active opposition in Rafah, where 500 soldiers and Fedayeen were caught with ID cards and "about 30," according to the Israelis, were killed. The total roundup yielded 800 to 1,000 additional prisoners.

(S) Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 615, 16 Nov 56, DA IN 272584 (19 Nov 56). Received State 191411Z Nov 56. Received JCS 192234Z Nov 56.

9 Nov Eden said he was ready to take part in a new "Summit Conference" to deal with dangers in Europe and the Middle East. At the same time the Quai d'Orsay was preparing a basic paper setting forth French views for presentation at such a conference, and Premier Mollet said he intended to visit Washington soon.

AP Wire Service, 9 Nov 56. Received JCS 092210Z Nov 56. (TS) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2336, 10 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 101834Z Nov 56. Received JCS 102318Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford. NYT, 10 Nov 56, 1:6. Received JCS 101330Z Nov 56.

9 Nov The Chief of the US mission to NATO reported increasing evidence in NATO meetings that the recent world crises had given a new sense of urgency to efforts to increase the solidarity of the alliance. He felt that, despite differences over Suez, recent events had brought home the cardinal fact that NATO was the keystone to the maintenance of peace and security in the NATO area. Fuller and franker discussions of fundamental problems were taking place and there was evidence of a strong desire to maintain NATO strength.

(S) Msg, Paris (Perkins) to SecState, POLTO Circular 2, 9 Nov 56, DA IN 269606 (10 Nov 56). Received State 101020Z Nov 56. Received JCS 110409Z Nov 56.

- 9 Nov - Budapest was generally quiet and, in the evening, Budapest Radio announced that "in general the shooting has ended." The Government decreed the establishment of a new national police force with the specific task of disarming and arresting "Fascists and looters." It also ordered confiscation of all stocks of gasoline, diesel fuel, and motor oil. The New York Times correspondent in Vienna reported that the Kadar regime's "back-to-work" appeal seemed to have had little or no effect, and that Kadar had failed to gain public confidence. Active armed resistance seemed to be continuing in some parts of Hungary.
(S) Msg, Budapest (Wales) to SecState, 255, 9 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 092020Z Nov 56. Received JCS 100259Z Nov 56. NYT, 10 Nov 56, 1:7. Received JCS 101330Z Nov 56. (S) Msg, CINCUSAREUR to DEPTAR, SX 2997, 091650Z Nov 56, DA IN 269442 (10 Nov 56). Received JCS 110006Z Nov 56.
- 10 Nov (u) The Soviet Union said it would permit "volunteers" to go to Egypt to fight "aggressors" if the UK, France, and Israel refused to withdraw their forces from Egyptian territory. A government statement charged that the UK and France seemed to be refusing to withdraw their troops "under various pretexts." Radio Moscow said large numbers of requests had been received from "volunteers" who wished to go to Egypt.
NYT, 11 Nov 56, 1:8 (late edition) (Sunday).
(An earlier, incomplete report was received in JCS over AP Wire Service at 101630Z Nov 56.)
- 10 Nov (u) President Eisenhower rejected proposals for a new summit conference and said the US preferred to deal with current international crises in the UN.
AP Wire Service, 10 Nov 56. Received JCS 101626Z Nov 56.
- 10 Nov (u) Israeli Foreign Minister Meir told a political rally that the Gaza Strip was an integral part of Israel. She stated that, as far as this area was concerned, Israel had no intention of obeying the UN demand to withdraw forces to the 1949 armistice line.
NYT, 11 Nov 56, 1:6-7 (late edition) (Sunday).
- 10 Nov - General Burns conferred with Egyptian officials, attempting to clear up questions raised by Egypt on the UN truce force, but was unable to reach a solution. In the opinion of UN representatives in Cairo, the delay was caused by failure to resolve two major points: 1) just how long UN forces would stay in the Suez Canal area, and 2) the question of the use of Canadian troops, who might be seen as merely another type of UK troops.
(S) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1437, 11 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 111820Z Nov 56. Received JCS 112301Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.
- 10 Nov (u) The first contingent of the UN police force bound for Egypt reached Naples in USAF aircraft shortly before 2300Z. This group and a second one were scheduled to continue their flight to Cairo on the morning of 12 November.
NYT, 11 Nov 56, 1:4 (late edition) (Sunday).

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[redacted] at the UN told the US Ambassador that the Egyptians had sunk 23 ships in the Suez Canal. The US Navy Attache in Cairo reported that 12 vessels were stranded in the Canal, including one US-owned tanker of Liberian registry. He said that the length of time required to place the Canal in operation depended on the cooperation of Egypt and the availability of equipment. Canal pilots estimated that the actual clearing operation would take only 15 days once the necessary equipment arrived and an unhindered operation began.

(Lmt'd Offl Use) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 55, 10 Nov 56. Received State 110322Z Nov 56. Received JCS 111701Z Nov 56. (C) Msg, ALUSNA Cairo to CNO, 101300Z Nov 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 142015Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

10 Nov

The Syrian Foreign Minister summoned the US Ambassador in Damascus and denied reports that 125 Soviet aircraft had arrived in Syria. He stated there were in Syria both Syrian and Egyptian aircraft of Soviet manufacture, but denied there were any Soviet aircraft or Soviet personnel flying Syrian planes. The Egyptian Chief of the Joint Syro-Egyptian Staff made similar statements. He also denied any delivery of Soviet aircraft in the preceding 10 days.

(S) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1133, 10 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 102122Z Nov 56. Received JCS 112301Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

Received JCS 111944Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford. (TS) Msg, USAIRA Damascus to CSAF, C-147, 102154Z Nov 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 111914Z Nov 56.

10 Nov

Strong rumors of Soviet overflights of Iraq and Iran to Syria persisted. The US Air Attache in Baghdad reported that the Iraqi Chief of the General Staff, with the concurrence of Premier Nuri, had made a plea to him for US radar units and US aircraft manned by USAF crews. The Air Attache endorsed the request for US radar units and suggested that three mobile radar units be deployed in Iraq and tied into the Turkish radar net. He believed this would provide the Iraqi sector with air surveillance capability and materially assist towards closing the gap in the NATO air defense system. The US Ambassador in Baghdad concurred in forwarding this proposal.

(S) Msg, USAIRA Baghdad to CSAF, C-138, 101330Z Nov 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 110117Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

10 Nov

The situation in Budapest was generally quiet, although some scattered fighting apparently continued and the local populace had not yet returned to work. The Hungarian Government announced that the final deadline for voluntary surrender of the rebels had passed, and declared that all insurgents believed guilty of murder, arson, or looting would be put before a firing squad. In New York, Secretary General Hammarskjold received an official message from Budapest saying that the Hungarian regime was "weighing" his request that UN observers be permitted to enter the country.

AP Wire Service, 10 Nov 56. Received JCS 101747Z Nov 56. (Lmt'd Offl Use) Msg, Budapest (Wailles) to SecState, 262, 10 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 110843Z Nov 56. Received JCS 112021Z Nov 56. The

copy SEEN by Adm Radford was received JCS 121332Z Nov 56. (S) Msg, SACEUR to CINCNORTH et al., SH 31753, 101454Z Nov 56, DA IN 270574 (14 Nov 56). Received JCS 141836Z Nov 56. NYT, 11 Nov 56, 1:5,6, (late edition) (Sunday).

11 Nov

[redacted] told the US Army Attache in Damascus that an Israeli platoon had attacked a Syrian position three to four kilometers inside Syria the previous midnight. A 15-minute fire fight resulted; the Syrians said they had suffered no casualties and inflicted none on the Israelis.

Received JCS 112233Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

11 Nov (U)

An exchange of fire between British and Egyptian forces on the Port Said-Ismailia road broke the unofficial cease-fire in Egypt. Egyptian troops opened fire before dawn, but ceased after British forces began to return the fire.

NYT, 12 Nov 56, 4:3. Received JCS 121330Z Nov 56. (An earlier, brief report was received in JCS over AP Wire Service at 111948Z Nov 56.)

11 Nov

From Moscow, the US Ambassador reported that the Soviet propaganda campaign gave no real indication of possible Soviet courses in the Middle East, but he felt it probable that Soviet assistance would go to Syria, and possibly Jordan and Iraq, rather than Egypt, with Israel, rather than Britain and France, as the principal target. In general, the USSR had been confronted with an "important major reverse" in its Middle East policy through inability or unwillingness to protect Egypt against the virtual destruction of her military strength, built up over a year by Soviet arms deliveries. In order to salvage as much as possible in the Middle East, the USSR would continue to pose as the champion of the Arabs, with Israel as the logical target for Soviet pressure.

(S) Msg, Moscow (Bohlen) to SecState, 1157, 111911Z Nov 56, DA IN 269984 (12 Nov 56), CJCS files. Received JCS 121816Z Nov 56.

11 Nov (U)

Moscow Radio said Premier Bulganin had informed the Swiss Government that the Soviet Union would be willing to take part in a conference of heads of government of the Big Four and India.

AP Wire Service, 11 Nov 56. Received JCS 112000Z Nov 56.

11 Nov

Egyptian UN Ambassador Loutfi saw Hammarskjold in the afternoon and raised questions concerning the composition of the UN police force and the length of its stay in Egypt. A conditional, but not final, agreement was reached on the entry of the UN force, pending clarification of these issues. Hammarskjold cabled Nasser he would come to Egypt with the first troops in order "to straighten out what I must consider a misunderstanding of our efforts."

(S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 58, 11 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 120306Z Nov 56. Received JCS 121006Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

(U) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 59, 11 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 120307Z Nov 56. Received JCS 121006Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

11 Nov

Sporadic fighting continued in Hungary, but the Soviets tightened their grip on the nation. In an attempt to gain popular support, Premier Kadar conferred with Imre Nagy and made a conciliatory radio speech promising a national program that embodied concessions to the Hungarian people.

AP Wire Service, 11 Nov 56. Received JCS 112036Z and 112124Z Nov 56. (U) Msg, Budapest (Wailes) to SecState, 264, 11 Nov 56; DA IN 269930 (12 Nov 56). Received State 111642Z Nov 56. Received JCS (No Time). NYT, 12 Nov 56, 1:4, 19:2. Received JCS 121330Z Nov 56. (C) Msg, Moscow (Bohlen) to SecState, 1184, 13 Nov 56, DA IN 271105 (15 Nov 56). Received State 150202Z Nov 56. Received JCS 152319Z Nov 56.

11 Nov

The Chinese People's Committee to Support Egypt's Resistance Against Aggression announced the establishment of registration centers throughout Red China to register military, medical, engineering, transportation, and other personnel wishing to volunteer for Egypt.

(U) Msg, Hong Kong (Drumright) to SecState, 869, 14 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 140740Z Nov 56. Received JCS 141638Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

11 Nov (U)

The British naval officer in charge of clearance operations at Port Said said that about 50 craft had been sunk in the Suez Canal and that it would take months to clear the Port Said end of the canal alone. NYT, 12 Nov 56, 9:1 (late edition). Received JCS approximately 121700Z Nov 56.

11 Nov

[redacted] in Syria informed the US Embassy in Damascus that Syria was pressing foreign distributors to import sufficient gas, oil, and kerosene to fill the gap between Syrian requirements and what was available from local refineries, as well as to agree to handle supplies brought in from "other sources." [redacted] believed that refusal of foreign distributors to import from Western sources or handle Soviet-bloc petroleum products entailed the risk of Syria's requisitioning the facilities and bank accounts of the distributors.

(U) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1167, 14 Nov 56, DA IN 271028 (15 Nov 56). Received State 141011Z Nov 56. Received JCS 151622Z Nov 56.

11 Nov (U)

According to a delayed AP story, Egypt issued orders that classed British and French citizens as "enemy nationals," provided for confiscation of their assets, and prohibited business transactions with them. This was part of a process of "Egyptianization," aimed at removing all British and French financial, cultural, and other influences from the country. Managers and auditors of British- and French-controlled firms were

replaced by Egyptians, and these firms were denied the right to sue in Egyptian courts. British and French doctors, dentists, lawyers, pharmacists, engineers, and architects were barred from working in Egypt. British and French technicians were dismissed from the Ministry of Communications. British and French schoolbooks were being screened and replaced.

AP Wire Service, 30 Nov 56. Received JCS 301354Z, 301410Z, and 301422Z Nov 56.

11 Nov (U) According to a New York Times report, Polish Communist sources said that Mao Tse-tung had renewed Communist China's encouragement of Polish demands for independence from Soviet political domination. This had come in a secret message to Warsaw differentiating between Communist China's attitude toward Hungary--where Peiping supported Soviet intervention--and that on Poland.

NYT, 12 Nov 56, 1:2. Received JCS 121330Z Nov 56.

11 Nov In a speech at Pula, not released until 15 November, Yugoslav President Tito termed the Soviet intervention in Hungary a "fatal error" but one made "necessary" by the Stalinist attitude, ascendant in the Kremlin, toward the states of eastern Europe. The Soviet intervention, he said, had "saved socialism in Hungary," and was therefore a lesser evil than the Anglo-French-Israeli action. However, Tito emphasized that the intervention would never have been necessary if the Soviet leadership had followed his advice and allowed Hungary more freedom. The Hungarian events, he declared, had dealt a "terrible blow" to Socialism. He criticized Stalinist elements in the Kremlin for their "lack of confidence in the socialist forces" of the eastern European states, and looked forward toward the possibility of a future victory of the anti-Stalinist group.

AP Wire Service, 15 Nov 56. Received JCS 151850Z, 151853Z, 151930Z, 151934Z, and 151939Z Nov 56. NYT, 16 Nov 56, 1:3. Received JCS 161330Z Nov 56. (C) Msg, Belgrade (Riddleberger) to SecState, 688, 17 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 180029Z Nov 56. Received JCS 181239Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

12 Nov All Israeli Army units and personnel previously demobilized were recalled during the night of 11-12 November and in the morning of 12 November, with the exception of a few personnel holding key positions. The remobilization also included transportation that had been released. Reporting this, the US Army, Air, and Naval Attaches in Tel Aviv commented that they believed this recall was primarily for the purpose of hurriedly removing as much captured materiel and damaged Israeli materiel as possible before the arrival of the UN truce force in the Suez Canal zone. (U) Msg, USARMA, USAIRA, and ALUSNA Tel Aviv to DEPTAR, CX 433, 121304Z Nov 56, DA IN 270104 (13 Nov 56). Received JCS 130418Z Nov 56.

12 Nov The only major pocket of rebel resistance left in Budapest was at the nation's biggest industrial complex at Csepel Island, where workers had barricaded

themselves in one of the factories. Other rebel pockets still held out throughout Hungary. Despite the near elimination of major active resistance, there was little sign of increased cooperation by the Hungarian people with the new regime. In Budapest, only a few workers had returned to their jobs, and industrial laborers remained on strike. According to a story by New York Times correspondent Gruson,

[redacted] a delegation of 12 Soviet leaders had arrived in Budapest, supposedly to try to enlist the cooperation of Imre Nagy. Nagy was reported to have taken refuge in the Yugoslav Legation in Budapest.

AP Wire Service, 12 Nov 56. Received JCS 121353Z Nov 56. (u) Msg, SACEUR to CINCNORTH et al., SH 31790, 121705Z Nov 56, DA IN 270168 (13 Nov 56), CJCS files. Received JCS 130927Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford. (Offl Use Only) Msg, Budapest (Wailes) to SecState, 273, 12 Nov 56; CJCS files. Received State 130140Z Nov 56. Received JCS 130934Z Nov 56. NYT, 13 Nov 56, 1:7. Received JCS 131330Z Nov 56. (u) Msg, CIA to JCS, [redacted] 16 Nov 56, DA IN 271999 (17 Nov 56). Received JCS 172109Z Nov 56.

12 Nov (u)

The Hungarian Government refused to allow UN observers to enter Hungary. In a message to the UN, the Budapest Government insisted that recent events in Hungary were an internal affair and that the intervention of Soviet troops was at the invitation of the Hungarian Government. The Hungarian message, however, did open the way for the world to send food and medicine to the Hungarian people, and the first Red Cross truck convoy reportedly reached Budapest. A second, much larger convoy was being assembled in Austria, and more were planned. Meanwhile, UN Secretary General Hammarskjold expressed a willingness to go to Hungary after his Cairo visit if it appeared such a trip would be useful.

AP Wire Service, 12 Nov 56. Received JCS 121648Z and 122328Z Nov 56. NYT, 13 Nov 56, 1:5, 20:3. Received JCS 131330Z Nov 56.

12 Nov

After General Burns made a special flight from Jerusalem to talk with Nasser, agreement was reached between the UN and Egypt on the composition of the UN force to be sent to Suez. Nasser agreed to accept Norwegian and Danish contingents, which he had previously refused on grounds that those nations were NATO members. Hammarskjold, in turn, agreed to include Yugoslav troops. The question of Canadian troops would be taken up on Hammarskjold's arrival in Cairo. Accordingly, Hammarskjold announced that Egypt had agreed to the entry of UN troops and that the first group would reach Egypt within a few days. He, himself, would leave for Cairo on 13 November.

AP Wire Service, 12 Nov 56. Received JCS 121348Z, 121629Z, 121633Z, and 122343Z Nov 56. (u) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 65, 12 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 121949Z Nov 56. Received JCS 130257Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford. (u) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 68, 12 Nov 56, DA IN 270225 (13 Nov 56). Received State 130521Z Nov 56. Received JCS 131232Z Nov 56. The copy SEEN by Adm Radford was received JCS 131625Z Nov 56. (u) Msg,

New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 69, 12 Nov 56, DA IN 270222 (13 Nov 56). Received State 130510Z Nov 56. Received JCS 131251Z Nov 56. (S) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1467, 12 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 131338Z Nov 56. Received JCS 132025Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

12 Nov (u) An Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman said his country had accepted Secretary General Hammarskjold's invitation to open talks on "the technical aspects" of withdrawal from Egyptian territory.
NYT, 13 Nov 56, 8:1. Received JCS 131330Z Nov 56.

12 Nov The State Department informed the US Ambassadors in Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, Iran, France, and the UK that, while the US would continue to support the Baghdad Pact, the time was not propitious for US membership and the "overall interests of the free world" would be best served by US abstention.
(S) Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Ankara, 1059, 12 Nov 56. Received JCS 131622Z Nov 56.

13 Nov The flight of the first UN police troops to the Suez Canal Zone was halted when Nasser withdrew his consent and reopened the question of how long these forces would remain in Egypt. He declared that Hammarskjold had not made clear Egypt's right to withdraw her consent at any time to the stationing of UN troops in that country, and said he could not allow UN forces to enter Egypt until the matter was straightened out. In a message replying to this, Hammarskjold denied he had ever questioned that the entry and presence of foreign forces in Egypt depended on her consent. However, he felt that, once having admitted the UN force, a withdrawal of that consent before the task of that force was accomplished would "go against" Egypt's acceptance of the basic resolution of the General Assembly. The Secretary General requested Nasser to allow the UN force to proceed to Egypt without further delay. Meanwhile, a small team of UN observers, rushed to Egypt to supervise the cease-fire, took up positions in no man's land between the Anglo-French and Egyptian lines.

AP Wire Service, 13 Nov 56. Received JCS 131224Z, 131342Z, and 131500Z Nov 56. (S) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1483, 13 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 131713Z Nov 56. Received JCS 132325Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford. (S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 82, 13 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 140104Z Nov 56. Received JCS (No Time). SEEN by Adm Radford.

13 Nov In a message to the UN, Hungary said it would not permit UN observers to enter but would be willing to have the UN administer relief operations. Hammarskjold said this could not be done without UN personnel being able to enter Hungary. He offered to go there himself to work out details.

(S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 77, 13 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 132141Z Nov 56. Received JCS 140950Z Nov 56. NYT, 14 Nov 56, 1:6-7. Received JCS 141330Z Nov 56.

(C) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 88, 14 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 141811Z Nov 56. Received JCS 150036Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

13 Nov

Foreign Minister Pineau told the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French Senate that his government did not plan to withdraw French troops from Fezzan in the absence of ratification of the Franco-Libyan treaty. However, he indicated the French might remove some of the soldiers now in Fezzan in order to assuage the Libyans somewhat. Pineau said the government was as yet undecided what attitude to take if the Libyans raised the issue in the UN.

(C) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2357, 13 Nov 56, DA IN 270738 (14 Nov 56). Received State 140526Z Nov 56. Received JCS 142339Z Nov 56.

13 Nov (U)

The Hungarian people clung grimly to their general strike, despite alternate threats and pleas by the Kadar regime. Csepel Island remained the only center of active resistance in Budapest.

AP Wire Service, 13 Nov 56. Received JCS 131354Z and 132023Z Nov 56.

13 Nov

The US Minister in Budapest reported that the Legation had received its first substantiation of the much circulated reports that the Soviets were deporting Hungarians to the USSR on a significant scale. Some of these deportees were apparently picked at random, others were members of revolutionary groups.

(C) Msg, Budapest (Wailes) to SecState, 281, 13 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 140050Z Nov 56. Received JCS 140950Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

13 Nov

In a shake-up that saw three members of the Council of State and several heads of Ministries replaced, Soviet Marshal Rokossovsky was replaced as Polish Minister of Defense and Commander in Chief. He had gone "on leave" late in October. His successor was General Marian Spychalski who, until the return of Gomulka, had been in disgrace.

(C) Warsaw (Jacobs) to SecState, 673, 14 Nov 56, DA IN 271103 (15 Nov 56). Received State 142051Z Nov 56. Received JCS 152319Z Nov 56. NYT, 14 Nov 56, 1:8. Received JCS 141330Z Nov 56. (An earlier, brief report was received in JCS over AP Wire Service at 131918Z Nov 56.)

13 Nov

In response to an offer of US aid made on 25 October, a Polish Foreign Ministry official, Joseph Winiewicz, told the US Ambassador that Poland could not accept any assistance from the US that carried an implied or expressed political connotation or significance and/or provided controls to be exercised by American controllers in Poland over the final use of such aid. However, Winiewicz said Poland would like to get short-term credits or loans for grain, fats and oils, cotton, fertilizer, and coal-mining machinery.

(C) Msg, Warsaw (Jacobs) to SecState, 670, 13 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 122218Z Nov 56. Received JCS 140951Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

TOP SECRET
13 Nov

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(S) Msg, CIA to CSUSA, 160608Z Nov 56,
DA IN 271519. Received JCS 162051Z Nov 56.

13 Nov

Representatives of nine Arab states met in Beirut for talks believed aimed at keeping the Soviet Union out of the Middle East while at the same time defending Arab rights against the West. The Kings of Jordan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia and the Presidents of Syria and Lebanon were present. Libya, Yemen, the Sudan, and Egypt were also represented. At the meeting, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq reportedly opposed the idea of Soviet "volunteers."

NYT, 14 Nov 56, 6:4-5. Received JCS 141330Z Nov 56.

Lebanese President Chamoun told the US Ambassador that he had been under heavy pressure at the meeting to break relations with Britain and France, but that he was holding out against it. He said the heaviest pressure came from Syria, which was "absolutely pro-Soviet."

(S) Msg, Beirut (Heath) to SecState, 1198,
13 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 140228Z Nov 56.
Received JCS 141235Z Nov 56.

13 Nov

Iraq called for the removal of Israel from the Middle East as "the only practicable method to secure peace and order." These views were outlined in a memorandum to all diplomatic missions in Baghdad and to Arab leaders meeting in Beirut.

NYT, 14 Nov 56, 11:5. Received JCS 141330Z Nov 56.
(S) Msg, Baghdad (Gallman) to SecState, 851, 14 Nov 56,
DA IN 271560 (16 Nov 56). Received State 151719Z
Nov 56. Received JCS 162249Z Nov 56. (An earlier report of this was received in JCS over AP Wire Service at 132019Z Nov 56.)

13 Nov

The US Army Attache in Tel Aviv reported that the

amounts of materiel and supplies captured by the Israelis were not indicative in any way of Soviet stockpiling for future use, but only of Egyptian intent to launch an attack with 80,000 troops next summer. No unconventional weapons were found.

(S) Msg, USARMA Tel Aviv to DEPTAR, CX 435,
131316Z Nov 56, DA IN 270413. Received JCS 140341Z
Nov 56. (The information in this message was summarized for Adm Radford in a memorandum from Brig Gen Richard Collins, DDI, JS, dated 14 Nov 56, CJCS files. SEEN by Adm Radford.)

13 Nov

Syrian Army G-2 Serraj and Minister of Public Works Jabiri informed Trans-Arabian Pipeline officials that unless Tapline and affiliated companies agreed to furnish all of Syria's oil requirements the pipeline

would be blown up and Iraqi and Saudi Arabian oil fields sabotaged. Tapline was given 48 hours in which to make a decision.

(S) Msg, USARMA Beirut to DEPTAR, CX 140, 140720Z Nov 56, DA IN 270661, CJCS files. Received JCS 141156Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford. (S) Msg, Beirut (Heath) to SecState, 1203, 14 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 141539Z Nov 56. Received JCS 150152Z Nov 56. (S) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1175, 14 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 151805Z Nov 56. Received JCS 171226Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

13 Nov

TOP SECRET

The US Ambassador in Paris reported a series of French approaches on the subject of greater French use of, or role in Moroccan bases. These included: 1) proposals for use of Port Lyautey as an off-loading point; 2) pressure for greater participation in air defense; and 3) new proposals to USAFE authorities for use of US air bases as safe havens in case of emergency. The Ambassador felt the time had come for a frank discussion on these matters with the French, to convince them of the adverse effect on base negotiations of their efforts to upset the status quo in their role on bases. He planned to speak with the French along the following lines: 1) The US continued to regard the Franco-American agreements of 1950 and 1951 as the valid legal basis for Moroccan bases. 2) Increased French use of these bases might jeopardize US relations with the Moroccans over future base negotiations. 3) The US, consequently, while not opposing in principle the French proposals, felt that caution should be exercised on any steps that would arouse strong Moroccan reactions contrary to US interests in base negotiations. 4) The US had already received a strong demarche from the Moroccans on the subject of French use of Port Lyautey. Therefore, the French should not expand their use of the port. 5) The US was prepared to study carefully the question of further French participation in Moroccan air defense, and was ready to hold talks on the technical level. However, the US felt the time was inopportune to actually increase the number of French personnel in air defense. 6) The US considered that under the base agreements, the French had the full right of decision on the use of US bases as a safe haven for French civilians in case of a local emergency. If the US had the right of decision in this matter, it would not refuse access to bases for any person seeking refuge in an emergency.

(S) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2356, 13 Nov 56, DA IN 270724 (14 Nov 56). Received State 140226Z Nov 56. Received JCS 142249Z Nov 56.

13 Nov

TOP SECRET

The Chief and Deputy Chief of the Iraqi General Staff repeated to the US Army Attache in Baghdad the plea for US radar units and US aircraft manned by USAF crews that the Chief of Staff had made earlier to the US Air Attache. They also suggested US adherence to the Baghdad Pact and a possible US loan. Commenting on the danger stemming from Soviet influence in Syria, the Chief of Staff said, "only speedy US action can save

Iraq now." Otherwise, he declared. "the communists will soon have the whole Arab world."

Without US support, he said, the Iraqi Army might lose its capability even to maintain internal security.

CHMAAG and the US Ambassador concurred in the message.

(S)

Received JCS 171352Z

Nov 56.

14 Nov (u) President Eisenhower said at his news conference that the US would oppose in the UN any Soviet military intervention in the Middle East. He condemned Soviet actions in Hungary and threats of intervention in Egypt, but indicated he planned no dramatic unilateral action by the US on either question. He emphasized that the first thing to be done was to ease tensions in Egypt and relieve the suffering of the Hungarian people. The UN, he said, could do more than merely pass resolutions to oppose aggression.

NYT, 15 Nov 56, 1:8. Received JCS 151330Z Nov 56. (An earlier, brief report was received in JCS over AP Wire Service at 141607Z and 141616Z Nov 56.)

In an apparent answer to charges that the US had stirred up revolt in Hungary and then done nothing to support the rebels, the President told the news conference that US policy was to: 1) Do everything possible to keep alive the spirit of freedom and hope in captive nations. 2) Not advocate open rebellion by unarmed people against superior force. 3) Do everything possible to relieve suffering in the satellites.

NYT, 15 Nov 56, 26:1. Received JCS 151330Z Nov 56.

14 Nov

Turkish Prime Minister Menderes gave the US Ambassador in Ankara a memorandum on the "systematic attempts of Soviet Russia . . . to establish a hold in the Middle East," to be considered at the highest level of the US Government. Turkey believed the Soviet aim was: 1) To destroy the Baghdad Pact; 2) to surround and isolate Turkey; 3) to make satellites out of at least one or two Middle East countries; and 4) to drive the US and UK out of the Middle East. The memorandum continued that the Soviets had "effectively set foot" in Egypt and Syria, and provided those nations with arms and supplies. Moreover, Soviet activities in Afghanistan "must not be ignored." The situation was "extremely delicate and serious," with the Soviet policy of "encircling and isolating" Turkey full of danger for the Turks. This threat to Turkey was pointed up by: 1) The flight of Soviet aircraft over Turkey, which the Turks intended to protest and, in the future, resist; 2) the systematic conversion of Syria into a Soviet military base; and 3) the weakness of Iran in the face of a Soviet attack. The danger to Turkey, said the memorandum, was ipso facto a danger to the southeastern flank of NATO. The Turkish Government called for the US Government, at the highest level, to consider promptly and carefully these points and to furnish Turkey with "views and information" to help it determine its own course of action.

Msg, Ankara (Warren) to SecState, 1123, 14 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State (Sec 1) 151624Z, (Sec 2) 150711Z, and (Sec 3) 150709Z Nov 56. Received JCS 160144Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

- 14 Nov (u) Polish Communist Party chief Gomulka and a delegation of Polish leaders, including Premier Cyrankiewicz, left for Moscow to discuss future Polish-Soviet relations. Gomulka was reportedly seeking more independence for Poland, including a reduction of the number of Soviet troops stationed in the country. On entering the Soviet Union at Brest, he was received with honors.
AP Wire Service, 14 Nov 56. Received JCS 141439Z, 141640Z, and 142329Z Nov 56.
- 14 Nov /
Eden met with French Acting Foreign Minister Gazier in London to work out further measures to be taken jointly in the Middle East, according to a report forwarded by the US Ambassador in Paris. France and the UK viewed the role of the UN force to be: 1) To maintain the cease-fire. 2) To arrange withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces, which they held should not take place until the UN force was strong enough to maintain order in the occupied area. 3) To remain in Egypt until free transit of the Canal was assured. In the Anglo-French view, the third point meant not only the restoration of transit, but also the establishment of an effective regime to ensure there would be no Egyptian interference with this free transit.
(S) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2412, 15 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 161530Z Nov 56. Received JCS 162345Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.
- 14 Nov (u) The Prime Ministers of India, Indonesia, Burma, and Ceylon closed a three-day meeting at New Delhi by denouncing the attacks against Egypt and Hungary. The meeting had been convened at the suggestion of Indonesia to consider Israel's attack on Egypt and Anglo-French operations in the Suez Canal zone.
AP Wire Service, 14 Nov 56. Received JCS 141443Z, and 141603Z Nov 56. NYT, 15 Nov 56, 1:8. Received JCS 151330Z Nov 56.
- 14 Nov (u) The New York Times correspondent in London reported that the British Government, despite some misgivings, had decided to seek its policy objectives in the Middle East through the UN. The Times story, apparently based on a statement by a Foreign Office spokesman, pointed out that this represented an important change in British policy.
NYT, 15 Nov 56, 1:7. Received JCS 151330Z Nov 56.
- 14 Nov /
In a luncheon with the US Ambassador in Amman, General Nuwar again raised the question of the US supplanting the UK as a source of outside assistance to Jordan. He said offers of both economic aid and arms had been made by the USSR, but he did not wish to accept them if possible. Reporting this, the US Ambassador commented that public opinion in Jordan had "turned completely against" the UK.
(S) Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 487, 14 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 141624Z Nov 56. Received JCS 150152Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.
- 14 Nov /
Radio Budapest said Soviet troops were deporting Hungarians to the east in sealed railway cars in an effort to get the workers back to work. According to the US Minister in Budapest, as well as reports from refugees reaching Austria, these deportations were on a large scale and included women and children. Refugees said the deportations began in several towns simultaneously on 10 November. Attempts by the rebels to halt the trains were unsuccessful. The US Minister estimated that

deportations from Budapest alone amounted to at least 16,000 persons.

AP Wire Service, 14 Nov 56. Received JCS 141659Z, 141713Z, 141732Z, and 142022Z Nov 56. (S) Msg, Budapest (Wailles) to SecState, 285, 14 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 141348Z Nov 56. Received JCS 150036Z Nov 56.

14 Nov (U) The last pocket of resistance in Budapest was eliminated when workers in the Csepel industrial district surrendered. However, the workers declared they would not go back to work so long as the Soviets were in Hungary and the Kadar Government in office. They also called for the release of Major General Pal Maleter, revolutionary leader who was Minister of Defense in the short-lived Nagy Government. At the same time, the workers councils of the industrial area of Buda issued a manifesto offering to go back to work in return for: 1) Reorganization of the Kadar Government to meet the will of the people. 2) Free elections in which those parties that had declared their readiness to accept "Socialist" achievements should participate. 3) Release of Nagy and his colleagues and all insurgents. 4) Immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest and negotiation for their orderly withdrawal from the whole of Hungary.

NYT, 15 Nov 56, 1:5. Received JCS 151330Z Nov 56. (Earlier reports were received in JCS over AP Wire Service at 142022Z, 142049Z, and 142238Z Nov 56.

14 Nov

The Austrian Government reported that 5,000 Hungarian refugees had entered the country in the 18-hour period ending at 1100Z, bringing the official total of refugees to 25,500. Other refugees, not officially counted, were estimated by the US Embassy in Vienna to have swelled the total as high as 30,000, a figure confirmed by the AP. The Austrians were reported to be "snowed under" by the flood of refugees. The Foreign Office told the US Ambassador it was necessary to hasten the removal of the refugees from Austria, since their continued influx threatened to bring about chaos in the country.

AP Wire Service, 14 Nov 56. Received JCS 142331Z Nov 56. (S) Msg, Vienna (Thompson) to SecState, 1309, 14 Nov 56, DA IN 271389 (16 Nov 56). Received State 151529Z Nov 56. Received JCS 161917Z Nov 56. (C) Msg, Vienna (Thompson) to SecState, 1316, 14 Nov 56, DA IN 270908 (15 Nov 56). Received State 142131Z Nov 56. Received JCS 150443Z Nov 56. (S) Msg, Vienna (Thompson) to SecState, 1317, 14 Nov 56, DA IN 271380 (16 Nov 56). Received State 151547Z Nov 56. Received JCS 162010Z Nov 56.

14 Nov

At the high-level meeting of nine Arab nations at Beirut, Syria reportedly pressed for a break with France and the UK and a declaration of friendship with the Soviet Union. Iraq, Libya, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Sudan were said to have opposed this, and Syria almost walked out of the conference over this disagreement.

NYT, 15 Nov 56, 13:1. Received JCS 151330Z Nov 56. (S) Msg, CIA to DEPTAR.

(an earlier, incomplete report was received in JCS over AP Wire Service at 150032Z Nov 56.)

14 Nov UN Secretary General Hammarskjold ordered the first units of the UN police force to move from Naples to Egypt on 15 November. His action came after Egypt notified him that it would allow entry of the troops on the basis of Hammarskjold's message of 13 November. The Secretary General left New York for Naples, intending to reach Cairo with the first contingents of UN troops.

AP Wire Service, 14 Nov 56. Received JCS 141920Z, 141922Z, and 141927Z Nov 56. (S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 92, 14 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 150244Z Nov 56. Received JCS 151556Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford. NYT, 15 Nov 56, 1:6. Received JCS 151330Z Nov 56.

14 Nov The Egyptian Government denied publicly as well as to the US Ambassador in Cairo a report that it already had asked the Soviet Union to send "volunteers" to Egypt. It said the UN cease-fire made such action unnecessary for the time being. However, it also stated that Egypt "naturally" had not repudiated any offers of aid, and implied that "volunteers" might come to Egypt if Nasser felt they were necessary.

NYT, 15 Nov 56, 1:7 (late edition). Received JCS approximately 151700Z Nov 56. (C) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1512, 15 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 151142Z Nov 56. Received JCS (No Time). SEEN by Adm Radford. (First reports that Egypt had asked for volunteers were received in JCS over AP Wire Service at 141607Z, 141620Z, and 141626Z Nov 56.

14 Nov In the Gaza Strip, the Israeli Army turned over routine duties to the local civil government and police. According to the US Ambassador in Tel Aviv, local government personnel were pro-Nasser, but Israel had decided that cooperation with this group was necessary in order to achieve its primary objective of a swift return to normal in the Gaza Strip.

(C) Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 615, 16 Nov 56; DA IN 272584 (19 Nov 56). Received State 191411Z Nov 56. Received JCS 192234Z Nov 56.

14 Nov The Soviet Union rejected a suggestion by UN Secretary General Hammarskjold that it try to persuade the Hungarian Government to allow the entry of UN observers. Meanwhile, the Hungarian UN representative told Hammarskjold he was still awaiting a reply from Budapest on the Secretary General's proposed trip to Hungary.

AP Wire Service, 14 Nov 56. Received JCS 150026Z Nov 56. (S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 93, 14 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 150324Z Nov 56. Received JCS 150941Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

14 Nov CINCNELM Rear Echelon reported that the number of wrecks known to be in the Suez Canal now numbered 29. From The Hague, the US Ambassador reported that Netherlands salvage experts, who were forming a consortium with the Danes for Suez Canal clearance at UN request, believed that passage for shipping

could be cleared in "considerably less" than the four-to-six months' time estimated in London. This Dutch estimate was based on being able to obtain "unfettered working conditions."

(C) Msg, CINCNELM REAR ECHELON to CNO, CINCNELM, CINCUSAFE, 141726Z Nov 56. Received JCS 160020Z Nov 56. (d) Msg, The Hague (Matthews) to SecState, 748, 14 Nov 56, DA IN 271696 (16 Nov 56). Received State 160059Z Nov 56. Received JCS 170350Z Nov 56.

14 Nov The State Department directed US representatives in Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia to inform those governments of the Syrian threat to blow up the Tapline and instruct them, in their own interests, to take all necessary steps to assure protection of the pipeline and oil installations. A similar approach was made in Washington to representatives of Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.

(S) Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Amman, 574, 14 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 151935Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

14 Nov Lebanese Prime Minister Yafi and Minister of State Salam presented their resignations to President Chamoun in the evening. Their reason, reportedly, was Chamoun's refusal to break diplomatic relations with France and the UK. Chamoun accepted the resignations, but was withholding announcement of this until the conclusion of the conference of Arab heads of states.

(C) Msg, Beirut (Heath) to SecState, 1225, 15 Nov 56, DA IN 271695 (16 Nov 56). Received State 160517Z Nov 56. Received JCS 170023Z Nov 56.

(S) Msg, CIA to CSUSA, Received JCS 161721Z Nov 56. (An earlier, incomplete report was received in JCS over AP Wire Service at 151527Z Nov 56.)

15 Nov (U) The first units of the UN Emergency Force arrived in Egypt via Swiss airliners. Agreement on the exact mission of the force and on where and how long it would function in Egypt apparently remained to be worked out by UN Secretary General Hammarskjold, who was already en route from New York to Rome and Cairo.

AP Wire Service, 15 Nov 56. Received JCS 151405Z and 151448Z Nov 56.

15 Nov Nasser told the US Ambassador in Cairo that British news reports had greatly exaggerated the amount of Soviet materiel Egypt had lost and that he would welcome an investigation. As to Soviet volunteers, Nasser said that he could have had them for the asking but he had preferred Egypt's taking certain losses without volunteers to risking a third world war and far greater losses with them. He had been agreeably surprised by the UN's action under US leadership, but hoped the UN force would not be used to police the Canal area. To permit the British and French withdrawal to be delayed and conditioned on establishment of such policing, he said, would be to promote the

cause of British and French power politics. He hoped the US would not seek to internationalize the Canal; he was willing to negotiate on the basis of the six principles formulated before hostilities began.

(S) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1536, 16 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 170511Z Nov 56. Received JCS 171649Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

15 Nov

[redacted] an estimate, based on various "reliable" sources, of the extent of Communist influence in Syria. He reported that: 1) Communism was making dangerous headway among politically naive young officers, most of whom were adherents of Serraj, because they believed it would mean "Arabs flying Soviet planes and using Soviet guns" against Britain, France, and any other enemies; 2) Serraj, who appeared to be running the army, had shown that he was powerful enough to jail with impunity a member of parliament in violation of parliamentary immunity; 3) the quasi-military training of the youth movement resembled Communist "mobilization training"; 4) the army controlled absolutely the press and radio, which made full use of Soviet propaganda releases; 5) international mail was censored and the sale of Western newspapers prohibited.

[redacted] since the present Government of Syria was unable or unwilling to stop the trend, Syria's becoming a Soviet puppet was a matter of time unless the trend was stopped from outside.

Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

15 Nov

President Chamoun of Lebanon stated that he was doing everything possible to ensure the safety of the Tapline in his country and that he would try to restrain the Syrians; he did not expect to have much effect on the Syrians, however, because the Syrian Government had no control over Serraj. Chamoun thought Serraj was taking orders from Moscow. He said that two days before the IPC pumping stations had been destroyed by the Syrian Army, the Government of Syria had assured the Government of Lebanon that the IPC lines would be protected.

(S) Msg, Beirut (Heath) to SecState, 1241, 16 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 161941Z Nov 56. Received JCS 172002Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

15 Nov

The Syrian Minister of Public Works informed the US Ambassador in Damascus that he was drafting a letter for the signature of Syrian President Quwwatli asking King Saud to request Aramco and its component companies to supply gasoline and "gas oil" needed by Syria. In reporting this, the Ambassador commented that the US State Department or Tapline officials, or both, ought to point out to Saud the reduction in his revenues that would result from any interference with the Tapline and suggest that he use his influence with his "Arab brothers" to protect the Tapline and Aramco.

(S) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1187, 16 Nov 56, DA IN 271664. Received State 161349Z Nov 56. Received JCS 162058Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

15 Nov

(S) Msg, Dhahran (Carrigan) to SecState, 227,
16 Nov 56. Received State 162225Z Nov 56. Received
JCS 172022Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

15 Nov

The nine-nation meeting of the Arab League concluded its deliberations in Beirut by issuing a communique. In person, the Heads of Government of Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Libya, and the Sudan, and President Nasser of Egypt through his Ambassador to Lebanon, had unanimously agreed, the communique announced, that if Britain, France, and Israel refused to withdraw their troops immediately and unconditionally in compliance with UN resolutions, or if their attitude should lead to a resumption of military operations, then those three nations would be held responsible for the continuation of aggression. In such case each state represented at the conference would take action under Article 41 of the UN Charter and Article 2 of the Arab Collective Security Pact. Article 41 of the UN Charter calls for a partial or complete breaking off of economic and diplomatic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraph, and radio communications with an aggressor. Article 2 of the Arab Collective Security Pact defines an attack on one Arab nation as an attack on all and calls for the signatories of the Pact to take all action, separately or collectively including force, necessary to repel the aggression.

AP Wire Service, 15 Nov 56. Received JCS
151633Z and 151811Z Nov 56.

Unconfirmed reports reaching the US Embassy indicated that during the conference there had been sharp differences of opinion between President Quwwatli of Syria on the one hand and King Faisal of Iraq, King Saud of Saudi Arabia, President Chamoun of Lebanon, and Prime Minister Ben Halim of Libya on the other, regarding 1) breaking diplomatic relations with France and Britain, boycotting their products, and nationalizing their enterprises, 2) Iraqi withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact, and 3) Soviet volunteers. Epithets reportedly exchanged between the conferees included "liar," "imperialist stooge," and "Communist agent." An Embassy officer had learned from Chamoun's private secretary that Quwwatli and Faisal were not on speaking terms by the conclusion of the conference. The indications were that Egyptian Ambassador Chaleb, representing Nasser, had played a minor role, and that Quwwatli had lost stature because of his failure to persuade the other leaders to adopt the extreme positions he had advocated.

(S) Msg, Beirut (Heath) to SecState, 1248,
16 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 162355Z
Nov 56. Received JCS 172251Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm
Radford.

15 Nov

The Iraqi

that the principal issue in the conference of Arab leaders at Beirut had been economic boycott of Britain and France. Syria, supported by Egypt and Jordan, had advocated the boycott. Iraq had been bitterly opposed to it because it would have meant financial ruin, and had finally been supported, somewhat, by Saudi Arabia. Syria had stipulated as a condition of compromise that under no circumstances would she permit reflow of oil through the IPC pipeline. Iraq could be expected to press for "changes in Syria" if Syria persisted in this attitude toward the pipeline.

Received JCS 180051Z

Nov 56.

15 Nov (u)

A Polish delegation headed by Gomulka arrived in Moscow to negotiate concerning future Soviet-Polish relations. The delegation was met at the railway station in the Soviet capital by Khrushchev, Bulganin, Voroshilov, and other high Soviet officials.

AP Wire Service, 15 Nov 56. Received JCS 151413Z Nov 56.

15 Nov

The State Department instructed the US Ambassador in Paris to inform the French Foreign Office that the US was opposed to French off-loading of supplies at the US base at Port Lyautey and to French construction of warehousing there. Such action by the French, the Department said, could only harm both US and French interests. At the same time the Department instructed the US Ambassador at Rabat to make a similar approach to the French Embassy in that city, and to inform the Government of Morocco of continuing US efforts to settle the matter with the French.

(4) Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Paris, 1847, 15 Nov 56, DA IN 271549 (16 Nov 56). Received JCS 170023Z Nov 56.

15 Nov

Soviet Premier Bulganin sent new notes on the Suez situation to Britain, France, and Israel. The notes to Britain and France dropped the menacing language of Bulganin's notes of 5 November but put new obstacles in the way of a settlement. Bulganin said that Egypt should be compensated for the damages she had sustained from the aggression and that the UN troops should not be stationed in the Suez Canal zone but along the armistice line between Egypt and Israel. The note to Israel, in addition to a repetition of these demands, contained stern language.

AP Wire Service, 15 Nov 56. Received JCS 151919Z, 152040Z, 152041Z, 152351Z, and 160057Z Nov 56. (C) Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 623, 19 Nov 56. Received State 200020Z Nov 56. Received JCS 201704Z Nov 56.

15 Nov

US Ambassador Lodge reported that the UN Secretary General had received offers of troops and assistance from 23 countries and had accepted offers of troops

from the following countries as of 15 November:
Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India, Norway,
Sweden, Yugoslavia.

(C) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA
103, 15 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 160059Z
Nov 56. Received JCS 161216Z Nov 56. SEEN by
Adm Radford. (C) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState,
DELGA 104, 15 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State
160151Z Nov 56. Received JCS 161008Z Nov 56. SEEN
by Adm Radford.

15 Nov The US Ambassador in Cairo talked with Nasser in the
evening of 15 November concerning reported Syrian
threats to the Tapline. Nasser said it was difficult
to believe the reports were true because damage to
the Tapline would be so ill-advised at that particular
time, but agreed to make his views known to Serraj
through military channels. Nasser gave the impression
that his advice to Serraj would amount to a command.
(C) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1530, 15 Nov
56, DA IN 271665 (16 Nov 56). Received State 161255Z
Nov 56. Received JCS 162211Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm
Radford.

16 Nov (v) UN Secretary General Hammarskjold met with Nasser,
amid indications that the task of prescribing the
role of the UN police force in Egypt had become
difficult. Shortly before Hammarskjold's arrival
a Cairo newspaper had published an editorial written
by one of Nasser's close associates declaring that
Egypt alone would "dictate" the terms of the British,
French, and Israeli withdrawal from Egypt.
AP Wire Service, 16 Nov 56. Received JCS 161557Z
Nov 56.

16 Nov The US Ambassador in Tel Aviv reported that the
Israelis were in a "hastened even if unrepentant
mood" and probably would be willing to relinquish
some of the fruits of their military victory if they
could be assured of their principal objectives---
security, and freedom of transit of the Suez Canal.
Denied these objectives, they would not withdraw
their forces except under "massive international
pressure."
(C) Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 614,
16 Nov 56, DA IN 272745-S (20 Nov 56). Received State
191146Z Nov 56. Received JCS 201858Z Nov 56.

16 Nov The director of Socony Mobil told the US Army Attache
in Beirut that Syria had scarcely more than three
days' reserve of kerosene, diesel oil, and "gas oil"
for its "kerosene economy." Under the Tapline
convention Syria had the right, till now unexercised,
to buy 200,000 tons of crude per year, an amount that
would about cover the anticipated fuel shortage for
the winter. Mobil had agreed to try to supply this
crude, which could be refined in Tripoli or Italy,
with fuel oil being returned to Syria. Although
Mobil's director had "reliable" information that the
USSR had also promised to make up the Syrian fuel
shortage, he believed the Syrian Army preferred

US to Soviet supply because 1) it would be quicker, speed being important to forestall popular riots that might result from a prolonged shortage, and 2) the Syrians hoped to maintain some freedom of action.

Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford. Received JCS 171407Z

16 Nov Through a memorandum handed the US Ambassador in Ankara, the Turkish Government called the attention of the US to the fact that Turkey had stocks of fuels for its armed services sufficient for only 10 days of warfare, whereas the NATO military authorities had decided that each member country should maintain a 90-day supply. A detailed list of Turkey's needs was enclosed, with an implied request that the US furnish the necessary supplies.

(S) Msg, Ankara (Warren) to SecState, 1153, 16 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 170931Z Nov 56. Received JCS 172002Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

16 Nov The US Ambassador in Ankara cabled a list of "alert or semi-alert measures" taken, up to 16 November, by the Turkish Army, Navy, and Air Force because of the Suez situation. These included cancellation of leave and of training activities incompatible with immediate operational readiness in all services, call of some reservists to active duty, 24-hour daily manning of anti-aircraft guns, and round-the-clock operation at all Turkish airfields. The Ambassador had noted no "jitteriness," however, among either officials or the general public.

(S) Msg, Ankara (Warren) to SecState, 1156, 16 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 171003Z Nov 56. Received JCS 181714Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

16 Nov (U) UN Secretary General Hammarskjold cabled Budapest from Cairo, turning down the Hungarian offer to send representatives to meet with him in Rome to discuss UN aid to Hungary. He said he had offered to discuss the matter in Budapest because of the value of a broader personal contact with those who would be directly concerned on the Hungarian side. Under the circumstances, he would take up the matter up with the Hungarian Foreign Minister upon his return to New York. AP Wire Service, 16 Nov 56. Received JCS 170058Z Nov 56.

17 Nov [reported their opinion that a threat to the Tapline must be considered to exist because of the irresponsible character of many Syrians, including Serraj. However, they said, it appeared from available information that the present pressures were mostly a form of political blackmail aimed at the oil company, with no grave threats directed at US Government officials. The

Assistant G-2 of the Syrian Army had expressed to the US Army Attache a definite awareness of the value to the Arab cause of continued operation of the Tapline.

Received JCS 182147Z Nov 56.

17 Nov

President Chamoun of Lebanon told the US Ambassador in Beirut that he had no doubt the Soviet Union was building up stocks of armaments in Syria for the use of Soviet "volunteers" at a later date. Part of the Syrian Army was massed on the northern Lebanese border, Chamoun said, and though he did not believe Syria meant to invade Lebanon for the time being, this maneuver was alarming and he would like the US to furnish immediately the armaments Lebanon had tried to purchase a year earlier. Chamoun said that he had been urged by President Quwwatli of Syria to accept armaments from the Soviet Union; Quwwatli had said that Lebanon would not have to pay for this materiel until after 10 years, or even longer. Quwwatli had also said that Syria itself could let Lebanon have armaments from its stock, since Syria was still receiving a supply from the Soviet Union. Chamoun told the US Ambassador that he was glad the US was expediting a shipment of recoilless rifles, but the Lebanese Army very definitely needed other items also. He admitted that he had made the same request for armaments to Britain.

(S) Msg, Beirut (Heath) to SecState, 1281, 19 Nov 56. Received State 200841Z Nov 56. Received JCS 211636Z Nov 56.

18 Nov

Nasser informed the US Ambassador in Cairo that Serraj had denied saying or doing anything threatening the Tapline and that Serraj would seek means to reassure Tapline officials.

(S) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1556, 18 Nov 56, DA IN 272429. Received State 181902Z Nov 56. Received JCS 190003Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

18 Nov (u)

Hammarskjold ended his talks in Cairo. A spokesman for Hammarskjold announced that the Egyptian Government had asked for UN help in clearing the Canal and that the Secretary General had agreed "in principle." Egyptian Foreign Minister Fawzi afterwards questioned the UN role in the Canal clearing, but subsequent reports from Cairo indicated he may have been wanting to emphasize that Egyptians would direct the operation. Fawzi insisted to newsmen that the talks between Hammarskjold and Nasser "have been profitable, though they did not reach any definite conclusions."

AP Wire Service, 18 Nov 56. Received JCS 190005Z and 190400Z Nov 56.

18 Nov

Mustafa Amin, a special emissary from Nasser, called at the State Department with Egyptian Ambassador Hussein to present Nasser's views, to be conveyed to President Eisenhower. Amin said that Nasser had

given the Soviets no promise of base rights in Egypt, and had not responded to repeated Soviet urging that Egypt request Soviet volunteers. Further, Nasser was aware that the Soviets were trying to take advantage of his difficult position. He did not believe the Soviet Ambassador's assurance that the USSR was willing to wage war on behalf of Egypt, and did not want Egypt to become a second Korea or an excuse for a third world war.

(S) Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Cairo, 1615, 18 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 191641Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

18 Nov

Nasser's chief political aide, Ali Sabri, said in an AP interview: 1) The British and French had no right to set conditions for the withdrawal of their troops or to wait for the UN force to replace them but should start withdrawals at once. 2) The US should back up UN moral authority with economic and, if necessary, military pressure to ensure the troop withdrawals. 3) After the troop withdrawals, the UN force should move from its temporary station in the Canal zone to Egypt's eastern border. 4) The only alternative to the troop withdrawals was a resumption of hostilities in which Egypt would have big-power (i.e., Soviet) support, including volunteers. 5) Egypt should be paid compensation for the aggression. 6) The Egyptian-Israeli armistice should be restored as the best settlement that could be hoped for in the immediate future. The US Ambassador in Cairo interpreted Sabri's remarks as a policy statement of the Egyptian Government.

(S) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1571, 19 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 200507Z Nov 56. Received JCS 211637Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

(S) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1582, 19 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 201124Z Nov 56. Received JCS 202304Z Nov 56.

18 Nov

(S) Msg.

Received JCS 211226Z Nov 56.

On 20 November, CIA learned that the request for the troop withdrawal had been sent. According to a Reuters dispatch in the New York Times on 9 December, the request was made by memorandum on 18 November and was refused.

(S) Msg.

Received JCS 271032Z Nov 56. NYT, 9 Dec 56, 1:2 (Sunday).

indicated that Jordan had sent three requests to Iraq for withdrawal of the troops and that all had been refused.

(S) Msg.

Received JCS 012304Z Dec 56.

18 Nov

The State Department instructed the US Ambassador in Saudi Arabia to try to impress King Saud with the fact that the mounting oil-supply crisis, especially in Western Europe, caused by the closing of the Suez Canal and the IPC pipeline, would now require emergency collaboration between US oil companies and their European counterparts, in spite of US reluctance thus far to do anything that would seem to bailing the British and French out of the consequences of their action in Egypt. The US, while keeping Saud's interests in mind, hoped that requests he might make to restrict shipments to Britain and France could be held to a minimum. He should be reminded that his own interests were deeply involved in the continued operation of the Tapline, and he could be assured that the US would "strenuously" support UN efforts to effect the withdrawal of foreign troops from Egypt as soon as the UN police force could be established there.

(S) Msg, Actg SecState to AmConsul Dhahran, 182, 18 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 191641Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford. (S) Msg, Actg SecState to AmConsul Dhahran, 185, 19 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 201706Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

18 Nov

The US Ambassador in Damascus cabled the request of Shaikh Yusuf Yassin of Saudi Arabia, speaking on behalf of King Saud, that President Eisenhower be informed of the King's perturbation over a report given him by the Government of Syria that Israeli forces, aided by British and French squadrons, were planning an air attack on Damascus and other points in Syria. When the Ambassador had cast doubt on the rumor, Shaikh Yusuf had said he was inclined to believe this one. Later the same day Syrian Foreign Minister Bitar had told the Ambassador that the report of the planned air attack had come from New York and Bitar personally doubted its accuracy.

(S) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1201, 18 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 181644Z Nov 56. Received JCS 182306Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

18 Nov (U)

The AP reported that Premier Ben Gurion had rejected the Soviet demand that Israel pay Egypt compensation for the Israeli invasion. Ben Gurion had said in a note delivered to the Soviet Charge d'Affaires in Jerusalem that, if compensation were due anyone, it was due Israel for the thousands of deaths caused by the Egyptian invasion of 1948, for the economic boycott and maritime blockade maintained by Egypt against Israel in defiance of the UN Charter and Security Council resolutions, and for the murder of hundreds of Israeli citizens by the Fedayeen. Ben Gurion had added that Israel was ready to negotiate a settlement with Egypt, as well as with other Arab states, under Article 33 of the UN Charter.

- AP Wire Service, 18 Nov 56. Received JCS 182239Z and 190026Z Nov 56.

18 Nov (U)

Gomulka signed with the Soviet Union a joint declaration that kept Poland firmly within the Communist family of nations but provided recognition of its sovereignty

and equality as well as a measure of control over the stationing of Soviet troops within Polish borders. The agreement also provided for liberal Soviet economic aid to Poland and for the repatriation of possibly half a million Polish citizens still in the Soviet Union as a result of deportations that started in 1939.

AP Wire Service, 18 Nov 56. Received JCS 181952Z, 192217Z, and 200045Z Nov 56.

18 Nov (U) A new government was formed in Lebanon with Sami Solh as premier for the fourth time since 1952. Solh was chosen by President Camille Chamoun to succeed Abdullah Yafi, who had resigned because of Chamoun's refusal to break diplomatic relations with Britain and France.

AP Wire Service, 19 Nov 56. Received JCS 191507Z Nov 56.

19 Nov

Msg,

Received JCS 200356Z Nov 56.

19 Nov

(S) Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Beirut, 1810, 19 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 201706Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

19 Nov An Egyptian official spokesman announced that Egypt would accept foreign volunteers if fighting were renewed.

JCS 200821Z Nov 56. Received

19 Nov (U) Between 30 and 50 per cent of Budapest's industrial workers ceased their general strike and reported to the factories; however, they did little, if any, work, substituting a slow-down for the general strike.

AP Wire Service, 19 Nov 56. Received JCS 191542Z and 191548Z Nov 56.

19 Nov The US Ambassador in Damascus held a conversation with Shaikh Yusuf Yassin of Saudi Arabia on Syrian threats against the Tapline. Shaikh Yusuf said that

US Ambassador Heath in Beirut had brought the matter to the attention of King Saud on 18 November. Saud had questioned President Quwwatli of Syria, who had said he could hardly believe the report. Saud had sent Shaikh Yusuf to ask Ambassador Heath the origin of the report, but the Ambassador had declined to say. Shaikh Yusuf had talked on 18 November with Serraj, who had flatly denied that he had either asked the Tapline Company for oil or had threatened it. Serraj had declared he would determine the origin of the report. The US Ambassador in Damascus had replied to Shaikh Yusuf that it was his understanding the Syrian authorities had been pressuring various US oil companies, already hampered by sabotage in Syria, to supply Syrian oil requirements forthwith; this, together with the Syrian Government's failure to protect the IPC pipeline and the Syrian Army's mining of the Tapline, was enough to alarm the oil companies, whether Serraj had made specific threats or not.

(4) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1202, 19 Nov 56, DA IN 272575. Received State 191342Z Nov 56. Received JCS 192009Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

19 Nov According to information received at the US Embassy in Damascus, Socony, Esso, and Caltex had advised the Government of Syria that they could furnish 12,000 to 13,000 tons of "gas oil," this being normally their proportional share of the Syrian market for this fuel and two-thirds of Syrian requirements.

(4) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1227, 20 Nov 56, DA IN 273184 (21 Nov 56). Received State 210144Z Nov 56. Received JCS 210507Z Nov 56.

19 Nov Referring to his previous pleas for action, the US Ambassador in Tripoli expressed great concern at the delay of the US Government in helping to expand the Libyan Army by providing equipment for 1,000 men during the US fiscal year 1957. The Ambassador had, on instructions from the State Department, committed the US on 4 April 1956 to furnish this aid.

(4) Msg, Tripoli (Tappin) to SecState, 349, 19 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 210302Z Nov 56. Received JCS 220359Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

19 Nov (u) The AP reported that the Middle East crisis had forced a shutdown of the US's multimillion-dollar Point Four technical-assistance operations in Egypt. Officially, the operations were only "temporarily suspended," and Admiral Harold R. Stevens, USN (Ret), the mission director, was hoping regular activities could be resumed "in the not distant future." However, a slow-down in the program had begun at the time the US withdrew its offer to help finance the Aswan Dam, and all personnel except Admiral Stevens, two executive officers, and a secretary had been evacuated under the State Department's 29 October order for all the Department's nonessential personnel to leave Egypt.

AP Wire Service, 19 Nov 56. Received JCS 191729Z Nov 56.

19 Nov

UN Secretary General Hammarskjold told Ambassador Lodge the result of his talks in Cairo with Nasser, Egyptian Foreign Minister Fawzi, and Nasser's chief political aide, Ali Sabri. Nasser had insisted that the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) must not be considered an enforcement measure against Egypt and Hammarskjold had agreed, on the thesis that Egypt's consent was necessary for entry of the force into Egypt and its continuation there. However, Hammarskjold told Lodge, Britain and France did regard the UNEF as an enforcement measure against Egypt, and this had to be considered in working out its duration and functions. Since Egypt regarded Britain as its chief adversary, Nasser had felt that the use of Canadian troops in the UNEF in the Canal zone would be misunderstood by the Egyptian public and might get the UNEF operation off to a bad start. Hammarskjold thought Canadian troops could be used along the armistice lines later. He said Nasser had taken the position that the UNEF would have no further function in the Canal zone after non-Egyptian forces had been withdrawn.

It had been agreed that Egypt would request UN assistance in clearing the Canal, whereupon the UN would do this work "in cooperation with Egypt." This followed logically from the fact that the UNEF was in Egypt with Egypt's consent; under the circumstances, the UNEF could not initiate clearance as an enforcement measure, as urged by the British. Hammarskjold said he had told Fawzi he expected the clearance teams, which would start work after foreign troop withdrawals, to ask for protection. Hammarskjold proposed then to request Egypt to let this protection be provided by the UNEF; this could be accepted by Egypt and would serve to keep the UNEF in the Canal zone.

There had been no evidence of Soviet activity in Cairo, and Nasser had expressed appreciation for the quick, energetic action of the General Assembly, which had made it unnecessary for him to ask for "volunteers."

Hammarskjold said that he considered it too late to talk of internationalizing the Canal, and that it was impossible to discuss with Egypt that country's attitude on Israeli shipping so long as Israel had not withdrawn from Gaza or the islands in the Gulf of Aqaba.

Nasser had asked that UN forces proceed to Port Said, even though the British and French had not left that place, because the presence of UN troops would prevent new action by the British and French. Hammarskjold told Lodge that he considered the stationing of UN troops at Port Said and the withdrawal of the British and the French as the key to the situation; all else would follow from that. He was going to query Britain, France, and Israel that day on their withdrawal plans and report their replies to the General Assembly later in the week.

() Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 127, 19 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 200020Z Nov 56. Received JCS 201706Z Nov 56.

19 Nov (✓) Syria lodged a protest with the President of the UN Security Council alleging that British, French, and Israeli planes had been violating Syria's air space from the beginning of the invasion of Egypt.
AP Wire Service, 19 Nov 56. Received JCS 192144Z Nov 56.

19 Nov (✓) In a speech to the UN General Assembly in New York, Soviet Foreign Minister Dimitri Shepilov warned that any move to send a UN police force to Hungary would "endanger" peace. Shepilov blamed the non-Communist world, especially the US, for the Hungarian uprising. Claiming that the situation in Hungary was rapidly returning to normal, he insisted that the UN should keep out. He called the alleged deportation of Hungarians to the Soviet Union "a myth" and "a slanderous fabrication."
AP Wire Service, 19 Nov 56. Received JCS 191727Z Nov 56.

20 Nov The four Moslem-nation members of the Baghdad Pact (i.e., all Baghdad Pact nations except Britain), at a meeting in Baghdad 19-20 November, "decided to send Crown Prince Abdul Ilah of Iraq to Washington immediately" to present the views of the four nations on the urgency of the US joining the Pact. The Crown Prince, requesting the US Ambassador in Baghdad to notify Washington at once of this action, stated that he was ready to leave at a moment's notice.
(S) Msg, Baghdad (Gallman) to SecState, 889, 20 Nov 56. Received State 201953Z Nov 56. Received JCS 211636Z Nov 56. (S) Msg, Baghdad (Gallman) to SecState, 890, 20 Nov 56. Received State 201226Z Nov 56. Received JCS 201936Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

20 Nov The Iraqi Finance Minister told US Embassy officers in Baghdad of Iraq's attempts to get oil flowing again through the IPC pipeline. King Faisal of Iraq had approached President Quwwatli of Syria at the Beirut conference of Arab Chiefs of State (13-15 November), requesting prompt repairs to permit a minimum flow while the pumping stations were being rebuilt. Quwwatli, however, had asked that the matter be held in abeyance for a week. When the question was later raised with the Syrian Foreign Minister, he suggested three to four months' postponement.
(S) Msg, Baghdad (Gallman) to SecState, 891, 20 Nov 56, DA IN 273383 (21 Nov 56). Received State 210906Z Nov 56. Received JCS 220301Z Nov 56.

20 Nov ✓ The Chief of the Turkish General Staff met with the Chief of JAMMAT to request additional radars, help in completing communications lines, arrangements for the sending of a night interceptor unit to Turkey whenever necessary, and more modern aircraft for the Turkish Air Force.
(S) Msg, USCINCEUR Paris to DEPTAR, EC 9-6412, 241103Z Nov 56, DA IN 274285. Received JCS 250157Z Nov 56.

- 20 Nov (U) The Jordanian Parliament voted unanimously that King Hussein should break the Jordanian alliance with Britain and establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and Red China.
AP Wire Service, 20 Nov 56. Received JCS 210034Z Nov 56.
- 20 Nov An Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman declared that there was no truth to reports that the French Air Force or any other branch of the French armed forces had participated in the Sinai campaign. In transmitting this statement, the US Ambassador in Tel Aviv detailed the circumstantial evidence in his possession showing French-Israeli collaboration. On the basis of this evidence, he said, the Embassy was convinced there had been a certain amount of French-Israeli collaboration within Israel, but how far it had gone was undeterminable. The Embassy had no evidence of British-Israeli collaboration.
(U) Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 641, 21 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 221847Z Nov 56. Received JCS 231709Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.
- 20 Nov (U) The British Government announced that the existing 10 per cent reduction in fuel allowances for nonindustrial central heating would be more than doubled as of 1 December and that rationing of gasoline and oil for motor vehicles would start on 17 December. The Netherlands and Turkey put gasoline-saving measures into effect, and Italy appealed to the US for aid in meeting an urgent oil shortage.
AP Wire Service, 20 Nov 56. Received JCS 201517Z, 201545Z, 201557Z, 201632Z, 201739Z, and 201820Z Nov 56.
- 20 Nov The US Ambassador in Ankara reported information, received from the Turkish Foreign Office, on behind-the-scenes developments at the meeting of Arab chiefs of state in Beirut. According to the Turkish Foreign Office, President Chamoun of Lebanon had informed Turkey that Syria had been "all out for Soviets." Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon had violently opposed the Syrian policy. Saudi Arabia had straddled the fence. President Mirza of Pakistan was proceeding to Saudi Arabia to try to convince King Saud that Syria was wrong; he hoped to win Saudi Arabia away from Syria and Egypt.
(U) Msg, Ankara (Warren) to SecState, 1192, 20 Nov 56, DA IN 272749 (23 Nov 56). Received State 220559Z Nov 56. Received JCS 231635Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.
- 20 Nov (U) Prime Minister Eden sent a brief note in reply to Premier Bulganin's letter of 15 November. Ignoring Bulganin's demand that Britain compensate Egypt for damage caused by the British invasion, Eden stated that Britain's intervention had been to limit the effects of the conflict between Israel and Egypt. He said he had advocated the sending of a UN force to the scene as early as 1 November and was glad the force was now present. He commented that the world would welcome

similar action by the Soviet Government in Hungary.
AP Wire Service, 20 Nov 56. Received JCS
201737Z Nov 56.

20 Nov

(U) Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Beirut, 1830,
20 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 211204Z Nov 56.
SEEN by Adm Radford.

20 Nov

The US State Department instructed the US Embassy in Baghdad to inform the Iraqi Crown Prince and appropriate officials that early adherence of the US to the Baghdad Pact was unlikely for several reasons, none of which connoted lack of interest in the Pact. The Department commented that an abortive effort to persuade the US to join would be seized upon by enemies of the Pact in an attempt to cause serious embarrassment to present members; also, the Prince's own domestic position would suffer if his mission to the US produced no tangible results. Nevertheless, if the Prince should insist on coming, the US Government would be happy to receive him.

(U) Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Baghdad,
872, 20 Nov 56. Received JCS 211636Z Nov 56.

20 Nov (U)

Widespread violence broke out in Beirut, and the Lebanese Army was called on to restore order. In Washington, the State Department said it had received no reports of the violence or any word that Americans might be in danger. It said some 200 Americans who had left Jordan and Syria might still be in Beirut.

AP Wire Service, 20 Nov 56. Received JCS 202226Z
and 202346Z Nov 56.

21 Nov

[redacted] reported that eight arrests of terrorists had been made since the previous evening and that the Lebanese Army expected a total of 20 to 30 arrests by the morning of 22 November. One of those arrested the night of 20 November was the Egyptian Military Attache's chauffeur, who was found in a car containing explosives. There was positive proof, [redacted] that the Egyptian Assistant Military Attache was the leader of the terrorists. The Beirut Chief of Police had told [redacted] that a security force of 3000, including Lebanese Army troops, was on duty in the city.

Received JCS 221746Z Nov 56.

21 Nov

(S) Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 2853,
25 (sic; properly 21) Nov 56, DA IN 273778 (23 Nov 56).
Received State 220117Z Nov 56. Received JCS 231539Z
Nov 56.

21 Nov (U) According to AP reports, Hungarian workers called an official three-day strike in Budapest, exempting only the food industry. When government forces prevented a scheduled meeting of the National Council of Workers in the Budapest Sports Hall, members of the Budapest Council met elsewhere and voted the strike. Budapest workers, who had largely ignored the Budapest Council's call to end the general strike earlier in the week or had sat idly in their factories, greeted the new strike call enthusiastically. In a resolution that included the strike call, the Council called on the government to recognize the National Workers' Council as the sole negotiating agent for the workers and demanded an affirmative answer by the next day.
AP Wire Service, 21 Nov 56. Received JCS 211806Z and 212221Z Nov 56.

21 Nov The US Consul General in Hong Kong reported that the Chinese Communists were apparently following the line adopted by Kadar and the Soviet Union in explaining the Hungarian unrest, but with an added perplexing note. This was the repeated warnings against "great-nation chauvinism" and the repeated mention of the five principles of coexistence that should be the basis of relations among socialist states. The criticism implied in the making of these points was perplexing in view of Peiping's previous statements strongly supporting the Soviet Union.
(S) Msg, Hong Kong (Drumright) to SecState, 932,
21 Nov 56, DA IN 273762 (23 Nov 56). Received State 220952Z Nov 56. Received JCS 240415Z Nov 56.

21 Nov President Mirza of Pakistan met with King Saud of Saudi Arabia in Riyadh. According to the subsequent report of the US Ambassador in Jidda (based on a conversation with the Pakistani Ambassador, who had been present), Mirza devoted the major portion of his remarks to a forthright attack on Nasser's irresponsible ambition and dangerous Soviet ties. Saud had made no attempt to defend Nasser, but had explained that he had treaty obligations with Egypt and Syria that he could not ignore.
(S) Msg, Jidda (Wadsworth) to SecState, 295,
25 Nov 56. Received State 252033Z Nov 56. Received JCS 261929Z Nov 56.

21 Nov (U) Major General Burns, commander of the UN Emergency Force, told newsmen at the UN staging area at Capodichino, Italy, that the UNEF had not gone into Egypt to fight but was prepared to defend itself if

necessary. Enough troops had been offered by UN member nations to do the job confronting the Force. He also stated that the clearing of the Suez Canal was not part of his mission and, after the Israeli troops had withdrawn from the Sinai, the UN troops would be stationed along the demarcation line.

AP Wire Service, 21 Nov 56. Received JCS 211740Z and 211810Z Nov 56.

21 Nov (U) Farid Zeinneh, the Syrian Delegate to the UN, interrupted the General Assembly's debate on the Hungarian situation to read a message from his government charging that Britain, France, and Israel were massing troops on the borders of Syria and Jordan with aggressive intent. British sources promptly denied it, and Abba Eban, the Israeli Delegate, told the Assembly it was a "fabrication" designed to divert the Assembly's attention from the debate on Hungary.

AP Wire Service, 21 Nov 56. Received JCS 211833Z and 212232Z Nov 56.

21 Nov ~~SECRET~~
The UN General Assembly approved a resolution calling on the Soviet Union and Hungarian authorities to cease deportation of Hungarians and to return those already deported; it also approved a resolution urging Hungary to co-operate with the Secretary General to clarify the situation in this regard.

Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 154, 21 Nov 56, DA IN 273681 (22 Nov 56). Received State 220932Z Nov 56. Received JCS 251730Z Nov 56. (An earlier, incomplete report on AP Wire Service was received JCS 212122Z Nov 56.)

21 Nov (U) UN Secretary General Hammarskjold reported to the General Assembly that he and Nasser had worked out certain broad principles on the use of the UN Emergency Force in Egypt. If the Assembly approved, he said, he and Nasser would proceed immediately "to explore jointly concrete aspects of the functioning of the UNEF, including its stationing and the question of the lines of communication and supplies." Two major principles would form the basis of the negotiations: 1) Egypt's sovereignty would be recognized in matters concerning the presence and functioning of the UN Force, and 2) the UN would maintain the Force in Egypt until the completion of its task of supervising the cease-fire and the withdrawal of troops. Hammarskjold said the functioning of the Force had been hampered because no withdrawals had taken place in accordance with the resolutions of the General Assembly adopted 2 and 7 November; he had asked Britain, France, and Israel for information about their plans to withdraw and would report their replies to the Assembly when received. In a separate report he requested of the Assembly authority to make initial financial commitments in the name of the UN for clearance operations in the Canal pending detailed cost estimates, which he would report when they were available; but he agreed with Egypt that no such

operations should begin until after withdrawal of "non-Egyptian" forces from Port Said and the Canal area. A spokesman for Hammarskjold said that security in the Canal area was one of the subjects for negotiation between the UN and Egypt.

AP Wire Service, 21 Nov 56. Received JCS 211603Z, 211606Z, 211628Z, and 211642Z Nov 56.

21 Nov President Quwwatli of Syria told the US Ambassador in Damascus that his visit to Moscow had had no purpose except to secure arms for the defense of Syria, that no secret agreements had been concluded, and that Syria had no liking for Communism and would abandon the USSR as a source if the US would supply arms on equally favorable terms. The Ambassador commented to the State Department that the Syrians had no more money with which to pay for arms and were reported to have more Soviet materiel already than they could use.
[redacted] Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1240, 22 Nov 56. Received State 230424Z Nov 56. Received JCS 240026Z Nov 56.

21 Nov General Nuwar informed the US Ambassador in Amman that the Jordanian Government did not plan to carry out immediately either of the recommendations voted unanimously by the Jordanian Parliament--i.e., to abrogate the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty and to recognize the Soviet Union and Red China. An eventual break with Britain was considered inevitable. Delay in this, the Jordanian Government hoped, would permit arrangements to be made for US aid to be substituted for the British financial subsidy. Jordan, Nuwar said, did not want Soviet aid, either directly or through Syria.
[redacted] Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 528, 22 Nov 56. Received State 221751Z Nov 56. Received JCS 231707Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

21 Nov (U) A Syrian Foreign Ministry spokesman said that oil from Iraq for Western Europe would not flow across Syria until British, French, and Israeli troops had been withdrawn from Egypt.
AP Wire Service, 21 Nov 56. Received JCS 220116Z Nov 56.

21 Nov (U) A 190-man Norwegian unit, the first UN troops to be deployed from Abu Suweir into an area occupied by invading forces, arrived at Port Said, still held by the British and French. A UN announcement said that the move had the approval of the British, French, and Egyptians, was for the purpose of easing tension between the foreign troops and Egyptians at Port Said, and had nothing to do with any withdrawal of British-French forces.
AP Wire Service, 21 Nov 56. Received JCS 211348Z and 211951Z Nov 56.

21 Nov (U) Radio Moscow reported that Molotov had been appointed "Minister of State Control of the USSR." The

appointment seemed to indicate a gain for the Stalinists in the Kremlin power struggle.

AP Wire Service, 21 Nov 56. Received JCS 211757Z and 211816Z Nov 56.

21 Nov

The Acting SecState cabled US Embassies in the Middle East that the situation in that area, resulting from the "abortive British-French military action against Egypt," was such that only the US could provide the leadership needed to "combat Soviet influence and revive and strengthen Near Eastern ties with the West." Therefore, US Ambassadors concerned were instructed to make clear informally to the governments to which they were accredited, and to their peoples, that the US was accepting this responsibility and would be guided by the following general principles: 1) The US fully supported the intense desire of the peoples of the Middle East for full independence free of any foreign domination. 2) The US was convinced that the peoples of the Middle East must recognize the natural economic interdependence between their area and Western Europe. 3) The US was further convinced that the solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute was a prerequisite to political stability and economic and social progress in the Middle East. 4) The US considered that close ties with the USSR were a source of peril to any Middle Eastern state, as illustrated most recently in Hungary. 5) The US supported, and would continue to provide leadership in, UN efforts to establish peace, security, and stability in the Middle East. 6) The US remained ready to cooperate with the peoples of the Middle East in promoting economic and social progress in the area, with no political strings attached.

~~(S)~~ Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Baghdad et al., Circular 426, 21 Nov 56. Received JCS 231714Z Nov 56.

21 Nov

Ambassador Lodge cabled an unofficial translation of a document received from the French UN Delegate, listing Egyptian war materiel captured by Israeli forces. As of 4 November, according to the document, the list included the following: 1,500 4-wheeled motorized vehicles, between 60 and 80 6-wheeled motorized carriers of Soviet mark, 60 17-pound cannons on wheels, 40 Sherman tanks, 30 T-34 Soviet tanks, 10 Soviet cannons mounted on self-propelled vehicles, 200 cannons of diverse origin and model, 700 tons of munitions, and 200 antitank recoilless cannons of Czech make. Important quantities of damaged materiel were still dispersed in the Sinai and could not be inventoried until later. From quantities and categories of captured supply stocks, it was apparent that the needs of a large-scale campaign, far from the principal bases in Egypt, had been foreseen.

~~(S)~~ Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 148, 21 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 220227Z Nov 56. Received JCS 231709Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford. (S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 149, 21 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 220304Z Nov 56. Received JCS 231709Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

22 Nov

The US Ambassador in Baghdad informed the four Moslem members of the Baghdad Pact that early US adherence to the pact was out of the question. At the same meeting the Turkish Premier informed the Ambassador that Turkey would, as a gesture of solidarity with Iraq, withdraw its Ambassador from Israel. This step was not, however, to constitute the breaking of diplomatic relations.

(S) Msg, Baghdad (Gallman) to SecState, 911, 23 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 231337Z Nov 56. Received JCS 241750Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

22 Nov

(S) Msg, Tripoli (Tappin) to SecState, 355, 22 Nov 56. Received State 221830Z Nov 56. Received JCS 241747Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

22 Nov (U)

UN Secretary General Hammarskjold sent to the UN General Assembly letters from the UK, France, and Israel formally announcing the withdrawal of some troops from Egypt. France, reported the Secretary General, had withdrawn approximately one-third of the forces it had landed in the Suez Canal area. The UK was withdrawing at once one battalion as a token measure pending further mobilization of the UN police force. Israel had moved its troops back varying distances along the whole Egyptian front. All three governments indicated that the complete withdrawal of their forces would be delayed until they were fully satisfied with arrangements for the UNEF to carry out its supervisory functions.

AP Wire Service, 22 Nov 56. Received JCS 221655Z Nov 56.

22 Nov

(S) Msg,

Received JCS 230505Z Nov 56.

22 Nov

Ambassador Lodge cabled SecState that Foreign Secretary Lloyd had informed Hammarskjold that the UK wished to continue its clearance operations at Port Said.

(S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 165, 22 Nov 56. Received State 222129Z Nov 56. Received JCS 230324Z Nov 56.

22 Nov

[(S) Msg,]

Received JCS 231611Z Nov 56.

The US Embassy in Paris discussed the Port Lyautey situation with the French Foreign Office. The US representatives emphasized the possible grave consequences of jeopardizing the use of Moroccan workers at a critical time. French officials responded that the Moroccans were constantly urging France to confine its forces and their activities to bases. To comply with this demand, they were obliged to utilize bases (for example, Port Lyautey) for loading and unloading supplies.

(S) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2539, DA IN 273842 (23 Nov 56). Received State 221943Z Nov 56. Received JCS 231323Z Nov 56.

22 Nov (U) R. A. Butler, British Lord Privy Seal and Deputy Prime Minister, stated in the House of Commons that it was the firm intention of Her Majesty's Government to remain in Egypt until it was clear that the UN could furnish a force competent to 1) guard the uneasy peace between Egypt and Israel, 2) insure action to restore "secure freedom of navigation" through the canal, 3) achieve unhindered use of the canal by world shipping under the six principles adopted in October by the Security Council.

AP Wire Service, 22 Nov 56. Received JCS 222041Z Nov 56. NYT, 23 Nov 56, 11:1. Received JCS 231330Z Nov 56.

22 Nov Ambassador Lodge informed Foreign Secretary Lloyd that the US considered withdrawal to be the key element to the Suez situation. Once withdrawal had begun, progress could be made on the settlement of the remaining issues. Lloyd replied that UK withdrawal would proceed as the UN force became effective. The UK believed, stated Lloyd, that the canal could be opened up in four weeks if clearance operations began at once, but it might take six months to clear the canal for big tankers. If, however, the UN General Assembly refused to authorize emergency clearance operations, the UK might have to reconsider its position on withdrawal. Finally, Lloyd made a strong plea for a US statement in the General Assembly supporting the UK position on emergency clearance of the canal and expressing confidence in the announced intention of the UK to withdraw its forces from the area.

(S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 172, 22 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 230529Z Nov 56. Received JCS 231709Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

22 Nov (U) The Syrian Government announced that the Damascus airport would be reopened, and flights by "some

foreign planes" over Syria would be permitted for 10 hours each day.

AP Wire Service, 22 Nov 56. Received JCS 222233Z Nov 56.

22 Nov

The Yugoslav Foreign Secretariat issued a communique stating that Nagy and other political refugees had "by their own decision returned to their homes." According to the communique, the refugees had left the asylum of the Yugoslav Embassy after Yugoslavia had received written assurances from the Kadar government that no measures would be taken against them.

AP Wire Service, 22 Nov 56. Received JCS 222301Z Nov 56. (S) Msg, Belgrade (Riddleberger) to SecState, 714, 23 Nov 56, DA IN 274304 (24 Nov 56). Received State 240433Z Nov 56. Received JCS 250756Z Nov 56.

22 Nov

Ambassador Lodge held a conversation with Egyptian Foreign Minister Fawzi, during which it became "perfectly clear beyond any doubt" to the Ambassador that, until every British, French, and Israeli soldier had left Egypt, the Egyptians would not participate in the settlement of any long-range Middle East problems. Further, according to Fawzi, all Anglo-French forces must be withdrawn before Egypt would agree to the commencement of canal clearance operations.

(S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 179, 23 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 231502Z Nov 56. Received JCS 241805Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

22 Nov

(S) Msg, Dhahran (Carrigan) to SecState, 245, 26 Nov 56. Received State 262111Z Nov 56. Received JCS 271639Z Nov 56.

22 Nov

According to the New York Times, the Polish delegation to the UN indicated that it hoped that its independence in abstaining from a vote with the Soviet bloc on the Hungarian question would be of assistance in conditioning US public opinion to the idea of granting economic and financial aid to Poland.

NYT, 23 Nov 56, 4:1. Received JCS 231330Z Nov 56.

Ambassador Lodge cabled SecState that the Polish delegate had informed the US Delegation that Poland was

still interested in obtaining US economic assistance, providing "no strings" were attached to the aid.
[redacted] Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 170, 22 Nov 56. Received State 230622Z Nov 56. Received JCS 231706Z Nov 56.

22 Nov Meeting with the US Ambassador in Paris, the Secretary General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Joxe, stated that fuel shortages in France would be more serious than had been expected, and would result in unemployment and considerable discomfort. In turn, the Ambassador expressed concern over the widespread belief that the US, if it desired to do so, could make up the entire shortage from the Western Hemisphere. Such was not the case and the public should be educated on this subject, so that the blame for the difficulties certain to arise would not be placed on the US. Joxe agreed that the French Government should begin a campaign to educate the public on the forthcoming difficulties. He promised to devote his energies to the matter, for the alternative would be the "most violent outburst of anti-American feeling in all French history."

(S) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2542, 22 Nov 56. Received State 230608Z Nov 56. Received JCS 241748Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

23 Nov The US Ambassador in Damascus reported that the Embassy had no evidence that Syria intended to attack Lebanon.

(S) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1252, 23 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 231625Z Nov 56. Received JCS 240010Z Nov 56.

23 Nov

[redacted]
(S) Msg, Beirut (Heath) to SecState, 1334, 24 Nov 56, DA IN 274395 (25 Nov 56). Received State 241513Z Nov 56. Received JCS 251317Z Nov 56.

President Chamoun of Lebanon presented the US Ambassador in Beirut with a "sizable" list of military equipment that Lebanon desired to obtain. Chamoun informed the Ambassador that Turkey had intimated that it would be glad to supply from Turkish stocks, "by arrangements with US," the equipment desired by Lebanon.

(S) Msg, Beirut (Heath) to SecState, 1329, 23 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 241155Z Nov 56. Received JCS 251334Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

The Acting SecState instructed the US Ambassador in Beirut to inform President Chamoun that the US was urgently reviewing Lebanon's request for arms.

█ Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Beirut, 1880, 23 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 241750Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

23 Nov In a conversation with the US Ambassador in Beirut, President Chamoun spoke caustically of the Syrian charge that British, French, and Israeli forces were concentrated on the Syrian border. Actually, said Chamoun, Syrian troops were concentrated on the northern borders of Lebanon, and Syria was constantly sending Fedayeen into Israel, mainly through Lebanese border territory.
(█) Msg, Beirut (Heath) to SecState, 1330, 23 Nov 56, DA IN 274335 (24 Nov 56). Received State 240905Z Nov 56. Received JCS 250056Z Nov 56.

23 Nov The US Ambassador in Moscow cabled SecState that for the moment he was inclined to believe that the Soviets were not contemplating any direct action against any members of the Baghdad Pact. In his view, however, the situation in Syria was particularly dangerous and could lead to a "flare-up" which would radically change the picture. Under the circumstances the Ambassador was not convinced that unilateral US assistance to Iran or other members of the Baghdad Pact was really necessary or even desirable.
(█) Msg, Moscow (Bohlen) to SecState, 1292, 23 Nov 56. Received State 231848Z Nov 56. Received JCS 240016Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

23 Nov The Acting SecState instructed the US Embassy in Jordan to convey to King Hussein and General Nuwar the US view that Jordan's decisions not to recognize the USSR and Communist China and to defer consideration of the abrogation of the UK-Jordan treaty were "eminently sound and sensible" in the light of the critical circumstances existing in the Near East.
(█) Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Amman, 619, 23 Nov 56. Received JCS 241804Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

23 Nov The Acting SecState cabled the US Consul General in Dhahran that the Jordanian Chamber of Deputies had voted to recommend 1) the establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR and Communist China and 2) the abrogation of the UK-Jordan treaty.

The Acting SecState requested that the Consul General discuss with King Saud the possibility of authority disintegrating in Jordan, with subsequent Communist exploitation. He also requested that the Consul General suggest to King Saud that Saud might wish to use his influence to strengthen authority in Jordan and to avoid the creation of a situation detrimental to the security of Jordan and the whole Near East.

(█) Msg, Actg SecState to AmCon Gen Dhahran, 192, 23 Nov 56. Received JCS 241804Z Nov 56.

23 Nov

In a long cable the Department of State provided its Chiefs of Mission with information and guidance concerning US policy in the Near East crisis. Briefly, the Department stated that the closure of the Suez Canal and severance of the IPC pipeline had created serious problems in Western Europe and certain Afro-Asian countries. Although these events had seriously weakened Western European countries whose strength was most important to common defense against the Soviet menace, the US had considered it unwise, pending an understanding on British and French withdrawal from Egypt, to take any steps that would indicate the US was giving extraordinary support to France and the UK. The US wished to preserve the influence it had garnered from its adherence to principle in the Middle East crisis. The effect of the US stand was that the US could not render maximum assistance to other friendly countries not responsible for the oil shortages. If the UK and France agreed to withdraw, and the withdrawal progressed satisfactorily, it should be possible for the US to undertake special measures to meet the oil crisis. When the withdrawal was completed, the US planned to make an all-out effort to provide the necessary oil. Moreover, it was inevitable that financial aid would have to be given to several European countries, including the UK, in order to avert a major catastrophe for the free world. Such a departure from the current policy would probably lead to claims that the US was "rewarding" aggressors and that the US had only pretended to oppose British and French action in Egypt. It was of the utmost importance that the US avoid as much as possible the harmful effects of such charges. Therefore, efforts should begin at once to prepare Arab leaders for the US moves in the offing. Simultaneously, efforts should be made in Afro-Asian countries to obtain full support for these moves, and to "elicit pressures" for the undertaking of energetic measures to reopen the canal and pipeline. No opportunity to play up the role of the US as a peacemaker should be lost. The Chiefs of Mission should also point out that the US attached the greatest importance to the strength of Western Europe and to the continued capacity of these countries to contribute to the security and economic stability of the free world. Also prolongation of the unfortunate consequences of the recent Near East crisis would seriously impair not only the interests of the European countries but those of the Arab States and other countries. European and Afro-Asian consumers of Near East oil, and users of the canal, should not be made to suffer for the actions of the UK, France, and Israel. In Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran special emphasis might be placed upon the obvious interest of these nations in moving as great a quantity of their oil as possible. Approaches by the Chiefs of Mission should take into account the likelihood that US financial aid would be given to Western European countries, particularly the UK and France, after compliance with UN resolutions was assured. The mission chiefs might discreetly raise the point, especially in the Arab States, that unnecessary prolongation of policies detrimental to those

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countries relying on Near East oil and use of the canal would inevitably lead to anti-Arab feeling and jeopardize relations between the Arab States and other free countries.

(S) Msg, State Dept to Chiefs of Mission, Circular 435, 23 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 260551Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

23 Nov (U) The Commander of British-French forces in Egypt ordered the withdrawal, "almost immediately," of one battalion of troops from Port Said. He stated that as fast as UN troops arrived, British and French troops would withdraw.

AP Wire Service, 23 Nov 56. Received JCS 231354Z Nov 56.

23 Nov (U) Budapest Radio announced that the Budapest Workers' Council had called off its strike after reaching "partial agreement" with the Hungarian Government.

AP Wire Service, 23 Nov 56. Received JCS 231403Z Nov 56.

23 Nov According to the AP, Yugoslavia protested to the Hungarian Government that Nagy and his associates, who had left asylum under written guarantees, had not yet returned to their homes. The AP also reported that, according to "reliable sources," although the Hungarian Government had pledged itself not to act against Nagy, no such pledge had been exacted from the Soviets. The AP further stated that a Hungarian Government spokesman had announced that Nagy and his party had left Hungary to live in Rumania, "a People's Democratic Country."

AP Wire Service, 23 Nov 56. Received JCS 231447Z, 231531Z, 231859Z, and 232040Z Nov 56.

The Vice President of Yugoslavia confirmed to the US Ambassador in Belgrade that Nagy had been kidnapped by the Soviets and sent to Rumania. The Vice President also stated that this Soviet step meant that 1) the Stalinist wing was now dominant in the Kremlin, 2) the Soviets were now trying to discredit Yugoslavia, 3) the Hungarian revolt would be hopelessly crushed.

(S) Msg, Belgrade (Riddleberger) to SecState, 724, 24 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 251121Z Nov 56. Received JCS 252246Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

23 Nov (U) The four Moslem nations of the Baghdad Pact issued a communique summing up the results of their four-day conference in Baghdad. In the communique the four governments reaffirmed the recommendations of their Tehran communique, and stated that these recommendations remained the only basis for a just, peaceful, and lasting settlement of Middle East problems. They also stated that they viewed with anxiety and alarm the rising tide of subversion in the area; they had decided to take all the measures, in harmony with the UN Charter, necessary to meet this threat.

AP Wire Service, 23 Nov 56. Received JCS 231514Z Nov 56.

23 Nov The US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia presented to King Saud the US plan for meeting the world oil shortages. King Saud stated that he approved the plan for the redistribution of oil, and Saudi Arabia would welcome the plan after withdrawal of British-French forces in accordance with UN resolutions.
(S) Msg, Dhahran (Carrigan) to SecState, 243, 26 Nov 56. Received State 262011Z Nov 56. Received JCS 271639Z Nov 56.

23 Nov

(S) Msg, Dhahran (Carrigan) to SecState, 246, 26 Nov 56. Received State 261955Z Nov 56. Received JCS 271639Z Nov 56.

23 Nov

(S) Msg, Dhahran (Carrigan) to SecState, 248, 26 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 261112Z Nov 56. Received JCS 271216Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

23 Nov

Hammarskjold announced that investigations conducted by the UNTSO had brought to light no evidence to support the Syrian allegation that Israeli, British and French troops were massing on the Israel-Syria and Israel-Jordan borders.

(S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 183, 23 Nov 56, DA IN 274269 (24 Nov 56). Received State 240852Z Nov 56. Received JCS 250423Z Nov 56.

23 Nov

Egyptian Foreign Minister Fawzi indicated to a member of the US Delegation to the UN that there was no chance that Egypt might still accept Soviet volunteers. "Please tell your President," he said, "that we have in Cairo no illusions about the danger of using Russian volunteers." Fawzi stated, too, that it was not the time for the US even to consider joining the Baghdad Pact. He saw no reason why negotiations on the Suez question could not proceed while the canal was being cleared.

(S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 184, 23 Nov 56. Received State 240827Z Nov 56. Received JCS 241759Z Nov 56.

23 Nov

The Israeli Minister to Turkey called on the US Ambassador in Ankara and informed him that, according to a radio broadcast, Turkey had decided to break relations with Israel. The Minister asked that the US use its influence with Turkey to avoid the break.
(S) Msg, Ankara (Warren) to SecState, 1221, 23 Nov 56. Received State 232348Z Nov 56. Received JCS 241747Z Nov 56.

23 Nov

The US Commander of Naval Activities in Port Lyauzey reiterated to the French Commandant his "general objections" to French use of the US Navy dock. The

Commander also requested the Commandant to inform his superiors that the US Command considered that the French Army should cease its construction activities in the dock area until the question was settled on the higher levels.

(S) Msg, COMNAVACTS to CNO, 261625Z Nov 56.
Received JCS 271348Z Nov 56.

24 Nov

(S) Msg, Ankara to (Warren) to SecState, 1240, 26 Nov 56. Received State 261202Z Nov 56. Received JCS 270010Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

24 Nov

The Pakistani Ambassador to Iraq informed the US Ambassador in Baghdad that President Mirza of Pakistan was impressed with King Saud's awareness of the Communist threat, but uneasy about the blindness to this threat within the King's entourage. Mirza had the impression that if the US adhered to the Baghdad Pact, Saud would bring Saudi Arabia into the Pact. The Pakistani Ambassador also stated that Prime Minister Suhrawardy believed that if the US joined the Pact, President Chamoun would bring Lebanon into the Pact.

(S) Msg, Baghdad (Gallman) to SecState, 920, 24 Nov 56. Received State 241445Z Nov 56. Received JCS 261715Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

24 Nov

The Turkish Director General, Second Department, confirmed to a US Embassy representative in Ankara that the proposed action by Turkey against Israel would be limited to the recall of the Turkish Minister in Tel Aviv.

(S) Msg, Ankara (Warren) to SecState, 1229, 24 Nov 56. Received State 241502Z Nov 56. Received JCS 261717Z Nov 56.

- 24 Nov The US Ambassador in Paris cabled SecState that the US Embassy had again approached the French Foreign Office on the Port Lyautey situation. The Embassy had been informed, said the Ambassador, that although the French now planned to discontinue warehouse construction near the US-built wharf, they intended to go on unloading military supplies.
(S) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2580, 24 Nov 56, DA IN 274390. Received State 241900Z Nov 56. Received JCS 251458Z Nov 56.
- 24 Nov The Acting SecState informed the US Ambassadors in Baghdad, Ankara, Moscow, and Paris that the US was giving urgent consideration to measures that might be taken to strengthen US support of certain member nations of the Baghdad Pact. In this context he asked for the Ambassadors' comments on supplying mobile radar training teams, with equipment, to Iraq, an increase in number of Iraqi pilots to be trained in the US, and the stationing of US fighter aircraft in Turkey.
(S) Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Baghdad, et al. 898, 24 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 261240Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.
- 24 Nov In response to a query from the State Department General Norstad cabled his views on Soviet penetration into the Middle East. In his view such penetration, with the attendant threat to the Suez Canal and Middle East oil sources, "would materially weaken the NATO military position, not only in Turkey but also in Europe." It was General Norstad's belief that the improvement of Turkey's air defense capabilities should be expedited.
STATE
(TS) Msg, USNMR Paris (Norstad) to DEPTAR for OSD, ALO 1261, 241245Z Nov 56, DA IN 274249 (24 Nov 56). CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) (2) sec 69. Received JCS 272000Z Nov 56.
- 24 Nov Ethiopia declared the Egyptian Military Attache in Addis Ababa persona non grata. The US Ambassador in Addis Ababa believed the reason for this action was the Attache's efforts to spread subversive propaganda, to solicit volunteers and funds for Egypt, and to persuade Ethiopian army officers to desert.
STATE
(S) Msg, Addis Ababa (Simpson) to SecState, 378, 26 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 271837Z Nov 56. Received JCS 281250Z Nov 56.
- 24 Nov The Department of State advised the US Embassy in London that, as a result of consultation with UK representatives in Washington, it had learned that the UK had also received from Turkey a communication along the lines of the memorandum of 14 November from the Turkish Government to the US. In reply to a British suggestion of consultation on the matter, the State Department had stated that the question was being studied, and that the US hoped soon to exchange ideas with the UK.
(TS) Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy London, 3718, 24 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 261710Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

- 24 Nov The Acting SecState instructed the US Ambassadors in Damascus, Beirut, Baghdad, Jidda, Amman, Tripoli, and Khartoum, at their discretion, to inform the governments to which they were accredited of the recent Egyptian subversive activities in Lebanon, Libya, and Syria.
(S) Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Damascus et al., 973, 24 Nov 56, DA IN 274510 (25 Nov 56). Received JCS 252207Z Nov 56.
- 24 Nov (U) The General Assembly of the UN adopted by an overwhelming majority an Afro-Asian resolution reiterating its calls of 2 and 7 November for France, the UK and Israel to withdraw their forces from Egypt. The US voted with the majority.
NYT, 25 Nov 56, 1:8 (Sunday).
- 24 Nov The US Ambassador in Moscow cabled SecState that under the new circumstances of the cease-fire in the Suez area he did not favor putting pressure on the UK, France, and Israel for an immediate withdrawal. For, if the US succeeded in bringing about such a withdrawal, the USSR would gain a major political victory, and the success of long-range Soviet plans for the Middle East would be dangerously enhanced.
(S) Msg, Moscow (Bohlen) to SecState, 1309, 24 Nov 56. Received State 250007Z Nov 56. Received JCS 261715Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.
- 24 Nov The Hungarian Government formally protested that the US was operating an "illegal" radio transmitter from the US Legation in Budapest. Admitting that the US had operated a shortwave transmitter from riot-torn Budapest, the Department of State said that the transmitter had been used for only a few days during the period when chaotic conditions in Budapest had shut down all normal communications.
AP Wire Service, 24 Nov 56. Received JCS 241335Z and 241842Z Nov 56.

The Department of State instructed the US Minister to inform the Hungarian Government that 1) there were now no transmitters in operation in the US Legation, 2) the protest had been delivered to the US Government and 3) he would deliver promptly any US response to the protest.
(S) Msg, Actg SecState to AmLegation Budapest, 286, 24 Nov 56. Received JCS 252125Z Nov 56.
- 24 Nov (U) The Yugoslav Government delivered notes of protest to Soviet and Hungarian representatives in Belgrade on the seizure of Nagy. Yugoslavia demanded that Nagy be allowed to return to his home or come to Yugoslavia.
AP Wire Service, 24 Nov 56. Received JCS 242213Z Nov 56.
- 24 Nov (U) The General Assembly of the UN adopted a resolution broadening the Secretary General's powers concerning the "functioning" of UN forces. The same resolution authorized Hammarskjold to make arrangements for clearing the Suez Canal.
NYT, 26 Nov 56, 1:5. Received JCS 261330Z Nov 56.
- 24 Nov The Damascus press published the statement of a Syrian military spokesman charging Iraq with shipping large

quantities of heavy arms into Syria for use against the Syrian Government. The Government of Iraq replied with a note to Syria protesting such press reports.

AP Wire Service, 24 Nov 56. Received JCS 250354Z Nov 56. AP Wire Service, 26 Nov 56. Received JCS 261449Z Nov 56. (C) Msg, Baghdad (Gallman) to SecState, 944, 27 Nov 56, DA IN 275549 (29 Nov 56). Received State 281140Z Nov 56. Received JCS 290800Z Nov 56.

24 Nov In a discussion with the US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Royal Counselor Khalid described the financial plight of Saudi Arabia, and asked for US arms, not only because they were needed, but because they would provide a concrete manifestation of US cooperation and justification for the continued use by the US of Dhahran airfield.

(S) Msg, Dhahran (Carrigan) to SecState, 251, 26 Nov 56. Received State 262240Z Nov 56. Received JCS 271957Z Nov 56.

25 Nov In conformance with instructions from the Acting SecState (see item DEPTTEL 973, 24 November 56), the US Ambassador in Damascus informed the Syrian Prime Minister concerning Egyptian subversive activities in Libya, Syria, and Lebanon. The Prime Minister "professed amazement" at the activity of the Egyptian Military Attache in Libya but ignored the Ambassador's reference to the military group controlled by the Egyptian Military Attache in Syria, and "explained" Egypt's activities in Lebanon.

(S) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1330, 30 Nov 56. Received State 301306Z Nov 56. Received JCS 03200 Z 7 Dec 56.

25 Nov The Egyptian Counselor in Damascus informed the US Embassy that Nasser had advised President Quwwatli not to "lean too far to one side" in his attitudes toward the USSR and US. According to the Counselor, Quwwatli was prepared to accept this advice.

(S) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1281, 26 Nov 56. Received State 261139Z Nov 56. Received JCS 271639Z Nov 56.

25 Nov / The US Commander, Middle East Force, cabled CNO that Aramco was now permitted to bunker and load British and French ships not destined for British or French ports or for ports of countries opposing UN censure of UK-French action in Egypt. He also reported that King Saud had directed Aramco to supply crude oil to two Egyptian refineries, and Aramco had agreed to do so.

(S) Msg, COMIDEASTFOR to CNO, 251609Z Nov 56.

25 Nov (U) The New York Times correspondent in Tel Aviv reported that despite continued uncertainty about Israel's intentions vis-a-vis the Gaza Strip area, the Ben Gurion Government had announced the resumption of municipal civil administration and the continuation of "progressive" withdrawals of Israeli troops in the area.

NYT, 26 Nov 56, 3:1. Received JCS 261330Z Nov 56.

26 Nov - The US Ambassador in Damascus reported that he had been informed by the Speaker of the Syrian Parliament that the report of Israeli troops massing on the Syro-Jordanian frontiers had originated with the Tass Agency.

(S) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1280, 26 Nov 56. Received State 270013Z Nov 56. Received JCS 271539Z Nov 56.

- 26 Nov The US Ambassador in Amman reported that the Turkish Ambassador to Jordan, following a meeting with the Turkish Prime Minister, had informed him that both the UK and Turkey would supply small arms to Lebanon. (S) Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 545, 26 Nov 56, DA IN 274850 (27 Nov 56). Received State 261550Z Nov 56. Received JCS (No Time).
- 26 Nov The US Ambassador in Cairo cabled that, although he agreed with the views of the US Ambassador in Moscow on the desirability of preventing the Soviets from capitalizing on the British-French withdrawal (see item 24 November, Moscow Embtel 1309), the Cairo Embassy had concluded that an early withdrawal was preferable not only from the standpoint of US versus Soviet prestige, but also to reduce the possible development of the existing "nervousness" into a new crisis. (S) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1562, 26 Nov 56. Received State 261105Z Nov 56. Received JCS 271640Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.
- 26 Nov The US Ambassador in Damascus reported that to the best of the Embassy's knowledge the IPC pipeline had been sabotaged by the Syrian military acting on guidance from Cairo or Moscow, or both, without the participation or knowledge of Quwwatli or Bitar. Under the existing circumstances the military would probably decide when and under what conditions the pipeline would be repaired. (S) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1287, 26 Nov 56, DA IN 275141 (28 Nov 56). Received State 261543Z Nov 56. Received JCS 280953Z Nov 56.
- 26 Nov The Prime Minister and the Crown Prince of Iraq informed the US Ambassador in Baghdad that the four Moslem countries of the Baghdad Pact still urgently desired the Crown Prince to go to Washington as their spokesman and report on their recent deliberations in Tehran and Baghdad and on their appraisal of the situation in the Middle East. The Prime Minister earnestly requested that the US receive the Prince. (S) Msg, Baghdad (Gallman) to SecState, 930, 26 Nov 56. Received State 261627Z Nov 56. Received JCS 262409Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.
- 26 Nov The UK Permanent Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs informed the US Ambassador in London that the UK Foreign Minister had been authorized to tell Hammarskjold that the British were prepared to establish a definite schedule for the withdrawal of their troops from Egypt. This action was projected on the assumption that the UN would at the same time "seriously move ahead" on clearing the Suez Canal, using the available British equipment. The UK further assumed that Hammarskjold was in a position to obtain Egyptian agreement to immediate canal clearance operations. (S) Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 2915, 26 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 261633Z Nov 56. Received JCS 262350Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.
- 26 Nov The US Ambassador in Cairo reported that he understood that Nasser was sending a representative to Saudi Arabia to conduct direct negotiations for petroleum products, much needed by Egypt. The Ambassador also reported that the USSR had not only resumed shipping POL products to the Egyptian Government, but had accelerated the delivery of these shipments. (S) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1664, 26 Nov 56, DA IN 275230 (28 Nov 56). Received State 262119Z Nov 56. Received JCS 281110Z Nov 56.

- 26 Nov Disturbed by recurrent rumors that Turkey was preparing to attack Syria, the US Ambassador in Ankara cabled that Turkey was "extremely unlikely" to take such a step without appropriate consultation with the US and, probably, with NATO and Baghdad Pact authorities.
(~~28~~) Msg, Ankara (Warren) to SecState, 1264, 26 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 262238Z Nov 56. Received JCS 271638Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.
- 26 Nov The French Foreign Office informed the US Embassy in Paris that France had not made its final decisions on the Port Lyautey situation. Information received from the French Embassy in Rabat, according to the Foreign Office, confirmed its earlier impression that the seriousness of the situation had been exaggerated. According to this information, the unloading of French military supplies had produced no reaction among the Moroccans. The French position was that barracks would not be constructed near the wharf, but the question of building shelters for supplies was still unsettled.
(~~3~~) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2602, 26 Nov 56, DA IN 274886 (27 Nov 56). Received State 270028Z Nov 56. Received JCS 271501Z Nov 56.
- 26 Nov (U) Ankara Radio charged that Egypt, with Communist help, was instigating large-scale trouble in the Arab states. The broadcast also bitterly attacked Syria for accepting Soviet arms, imposing martial law, and concentrating troops along the Lebanon-Syria border.
AP Wire Service, 26 Nov 56. Received JCS 261440Z Nov 56.
- 26 Nov King Idris I announced that his government would review the UK-Libya 20-year pact which permitted the British to maintain land and air bases in Libya in return for aid. The King, addressing the Libyan Parliament, also criticized British-French intervention in Egypt, and declared that Libya would increase its armed strength, partly with US aid.
AP Wire Service, 26 Nov 56. Received JCS 261546Z Nov 56.
- The Prime Minister of Libya informed the US Ambassador in Tripoli that he planned to press for the revision of the Anglo-Libyan treaty along the following lines:
1) Reduction of British troops in Libya with a parallel increase in size of Libyan Army. 2) Acceleration of the removal of British troops from population centers.
(~~8~~) Msg, Tripoli (Tappin) to SecState, 364, 26 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 261304Z Nov 56. Received JCS 271016Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.
- 26 Nov ✓ British officials announced that the Suez Canal channel at Port Said had been opened to ships under 10,000 gross tonnage and 25-foot draft.
AP Wire Service, 26 Nov 56. Received JCS 262146Z Nov 56. (~~8~~) Msg, CINCNELM Rear Echelon to CNO & CINCNELM, 261732Z Nov 56. Received JCS 271658Z Nov 56.
- 26 Nov (U) Iraq formally requested "more defensive arms," including planes and antiaircraft guns, from the US. In presenting this request, the Iraqi Ambassador in Washington stated that his Government desired to modify the US-Iraq aid agreement of 1954 in order to permit additional arms deliveries. State Department officials stated that the Iraqi request would receive prompt attention.
AP Wire Service, 26 Nov 56. Received JCS 261834Z and 262205Z Nov 56.
- 26 Nov ✓ The US Commander, Middle East Force, cabled CNO that Aramco production in the Dhahran-Bahrein area had dropped

from over 1,000,000 barrels per day to 650,000 barrels per day. All refineries were operating, but at reduced capacity. He also reported that the Aramco-Bahrain pipeline "will not reopen."

(S) Msg, COMIDEASTFOR to CNO, 262003Z Nov 56.
Received JCS 271344Z Nov 56.

26 Nov (U) The AP reported that the Budapest Workers' Council was promoting a back-to-work movement, but also was insisting that the Hungarian Government meet popular demands for the return of Nagy to power and for the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

AP Wire Service, 26 Nov 56. Received JCS 262021Z Nov 56.

26 Nov The Iraqi Cabinet authorized the Foreign Office to deliver a second strong protest to Syria against repeated charges by Damascus Radio that Iraq was conspiring against the Syrian regime. The note, delivered on the same day, protested the subversive and general anti-Iraq policy of Syria, and expressed concern over army interference in Syrian political life.

AP Wire Service, 26 Nov 56. Received JCS 262211Z Nov 56. (S) Msg, Baghdad (Gallman) to SecState, 944, 27 Nov 56, DA IN 275549 (29 Nov 56). Received State 281140Z Nov 56. Received JCS 290800Z Nov 56.

26 Nov The Acting SecState cabled the US Ambassador in Ankara that according to the Israeli Ambassador, Turkey had indicated it was under pressure, primarily from Iraq, to break off or weaken diplomatic relations with Israel. The US Ambassador was requested to suggest to the Turkish Foreign Office that Turkey might wish to defer a decision on the matter pending further developments.

(S) Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Ankara, 1200, 26 Nov 56. Received JCS 271640Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

26 Nov (U) Turkey issued a communique announcing its decision to recall the Turkish Ambassador to Israel, with the condition that he would not return to his post until the question of Palestine was settled by a "just and final decision."

AP Wire Service, 27 Nov 56. Received JCS 270001Z Nov 56. (S) Msg, Ankara (Warren) to SecState, 1261, 27 Nov 56. Received State 280943Z Nov 56. Received JCS 291956Z Nov 56.

26 Nov From Port Said a New York Times correspondent reported the first departures of Europeans being deported by Egypt. The refugees in this group numbered 311 persons, including women and children. Meanwhile in Cairo Colonel Hatem, director of the Egyptian Information Department, denied that refugees had been ill-treated and stated that British and French nationals had been permitted to leave Egypt "at their own discretion" to "save them from the wrath" of the Egyptian people.

NYT, 27 Nov 56, 18:3, 19:1. Received JCS 271330Z Nov 56.

The US Embassy in Cairo was informed that Nasser had issued orders to correct the overzealous application of the policy to "encourage" the departure of stateless Jews from Egypt. The Embassy was also informed that there would be no discrimination against Egyptian citizens because of religion.

(S) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1682, 27 Nov 56. Received State 281731Z Nov 56. Received JCS 291639Z Nov 56.

27 Nov The Foreign Minister of Syria informed the US Ambassador in Damascus that Syria was reluctant to accept aid from either the US or the USSR, but ready to accept assistance from the UN.

(S) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1307,

28 Nov 56, DA IN 275574 (29 Nov 56). Received State 281341Z Nov 56. Received JCS 290800Z Nov 56.

27 Nov

In an aide-memoire presented to the US Embassy in Damascus the Syrian Foreign Office asserted that Syria had become an object of Anglo-French imperialist policy. Certain states, the Foreign Office said, had recently embarked on a campaign to delude world opinion, and particularly the US, into believing that Syria had "sided with one of two world camps." These states had placed organized pressure on Syria by disseminating rumors that there were foreign volunteers and technicians in Syria, by massing on Syria's borders, by violating Syrian skies, and by organizing conspiracies in Syria to overthrow its government.

Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1321, 29 Nov 56, DA IN 276205 (30 Nov 56). Received State 292036Z Nov 56. Received JCS 010354Z Dec 56.

27 Nov

The Foreign Minister of Pakistan, in conversation with the Acting SecState, urged early US adherence to the Baghdad Pact, change of the Pact and SEATO into NATO type organizations, additional military aid to Iran, and the isolation of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan as being nations under Communist influence.

Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Karachi, 1289, 29 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 031651Z Dec 56.

27 Nov

STATE
The Acting SecState cabled the US Ambassador in Tunis that Premier Bourguiba had called at the State Department and discussed Tunisia's development and need for support. The Premier had emphasized the pressing problems of French troops in Tunisia, economic troubles, and the conflict in the neighboring state of Algeria. The State Department had assured Bourguiba of US support for Tunisia's sovereignty and internal security, but had also pointed out that the US could not intervene directly in Tunisia's "bilateral military problems."

Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Tunis, 214, 27 Nov 56. Received JCS 290045Z Nov 56.

27 Nov

STATE
In reply to a question posed by the French Foreign Minister, the US Ambassador in Paris stated that the US fully intended to make a maximum effort to supply Europe's oil needs for the coming winter. The US was waiting only for a substantial withdrawal by French and British forces from Suez before taking the appropriate steps to meet these needs.

Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2620, 27 Nov 56. Received State 271738Z Nov 56. Received JCS 280243Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

27 Nov

STATE
The Acting Foreign Minister of Turkey called on SACEUR (General Norstad), and expressed deep concern over the "principle" of Soviet penetration into Syria and its possible consequences. He stated that he had received reports of recent arrivals of equipment and Soviet personnel in Syria, but as yet had no proof of these arrivals. He believed that Soviet arms were coming into Syria on commercial vessels. The US, he said, should supply Turkey with better planes under "expedited aid programs." Finally he urged in the strongest

terms that the US join the Baghdad Pact.

(S) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2653,
28 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 290312Z Nov 56.
Received JCS 291639Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

27 Nov

The US Ambassador in Cairo reported that a "confidante" of Nasser had informed the Embassy that Egypt felt increasingly isolated from the remainder of the Arab world. Nasser feared that Syria might be frightened by recent events into taking some action, such as a request for Soviet volunteers, which could have disastrous consequences. In the recent increase of tension between Israel and Syria, stated the "confidante," Nasser and General Amer had both telephoned Syria and urged caution.

(U) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1694, 27 Nov 56. Received State 281849Z Nov 56. Received JCS 292357Z Nov 56.

27 Nov

President Nasser of Egypt sent word indirectly to the US Embassy in Cairo that Syria had uncovered an Iraqi plot to overthrow the Syrian Government. When Syria had discovered the plot, officers in charge of the Syrian Army had wanted to engage in large-scale arrests, but Nasser had dissuaded them, explaining that the US might construe the arrests as a Communist coup. Nasser's spokesman said that, if Iraqi activities continued and the situation deteriorated further, Syria might turn to the Soviets. Nasser urged that the US use its influence to restrain Turkey and Iraq.

(U) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1710, 28 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 291054Z Nov 56. Received JCS 292332Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

27 Nov (U)

The office of Israeli Premier Gen Gurion released the text of a letter sent by President Eisenhower to the Premier. The letter referred to the impending visit to Israel of Attorney General Jacob Javits of New York, and expressed the President's "earnest confidence" that it would "be possible to solve the present difficulties by means of peace."

AP Wire Service, 27 Nov 56. Received JCS 271508Z Nov 56.

27 Nov (U)

Prime Minister Nabulsi of Jordan announced his Government's determination to end its treaty of alliance and friendship with the UK, contingent only upon Egyptian, Syrian, and Saudi Arabian fulfillment of an offer to substitute Arab aid for the 33 million dollar British subsidy. In the same speech Nabulsi denounced the Baghdad Pact as a danger to the whole Arab world. He also stated that his Government was studying a recent recommendation by the Jordanian Parliament that diplomatic relations be established with the Soviet Union and "other states."

AP Wire Service, 27 Nov 56. Received JCS 271657Z Nov 56. (U) Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 555, 28 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 281815Z Nov 56. Received JCS 292056Z Nov 56.

27 Nov (U) In a press conference State Department Press Officer Lincoln White stated that the USSR had been shipping arms into Syria. These shipments, including small arms, trucks, and other light equipment, had been moved into Syria since the 4 November 56 UN resolution which called on all countries to avoid introducing any new arms into the Middle East. White was unable to "answer flatly" that any heavy arms had been shipped to Syria.

AP Wire Service, 27 Nov 56. Received JCS 271849Z Nov 56.

27 Nov (U) Premier Sami Solh's new cabinet received an overwhelming vote of confidence from the Lebanese Parliament. Before the vote, the Premier had called for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli forces from Egypt. Also, Solh had promised to reopen negotiations with the Iraq Petroleum Company and the Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company on the basis of an income-tax provision that would permit Lebanon to receive a share of oil-company profits in lieu of taxes.

AP Wire Service, 27 Nov 56. Received JCS 280126Z Nov 56.


27 Nov (U) At the UN, "delegation sources" reported that Hungary had advised UN Secretary General Hammarskjold that it was "considering" his offer to go to Budapest.

NYT, 28 Nov 56, 4:5. Received JCS 281330Z Nov 56.

27 Nov (U) The New York Times correspondent in Vienna reported that from 50 to 80 per cent of Budapest workers had returned to their jobs. Outside of Budapest, however, the strike went on unabated. Meanwhile leaders of the Budapest Workers' Councils continued to negotiate with the Hungarian regime for the release of Nagy and the withdrawal of Soviet troops.


NYT, 28 Nov 56, 4:3. Received JCS 281330Z Nov 56.

27 Nov



Received JCS 281924Z Nov 56.

28 Nov



(23) Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 558, 28 Nov 56. Received State 281634Z Nov 56. Received JCS 291639Z Nov 56.

TOP SECRET
28 Nov

The US Ambassador in Tel Aviv reported that Israel had in the past few days further reduced the strength of both combat and service IDF units. The total strength of these units was now estimated to be 100,000 men. The Embassy believed that for the time being this level of strength would be maintained.

(S) Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 677, 28 Nov 56, DA IN 276219 (30 Nov 56). Received State 291942Z Nov 56. Received JCS 010032Z Dec 56.

28 Nov

The US Ambassador in Ankara called on Prime Minister Menderes and presented him with the views of the US on Turkish-Israeli relations (see item of 26 November, DEPTTEL 1200). Menderes emphasized that the withdrawal of Turkey's Minister to Israel did not mean that commercial or economic relations would be broken. There were no unfavorable feelings in Turkey against Israel. The withdrawal had been ordered to prevent a "debacle" in the area. This measure would cause no harm to Israel, and might even be helpful to that country.

(S) Msg, Ankara (Warren) to SecState, 1275, 29 Nov 56. Received State 301819Z Nov 56. Received JCS (No Time).

28 Nov

The UK Permanent Undersecretary of State confirmed to the US Ambassador in London that the British cabinet had, on 27 November, decided that UK and French forces would be withdrawn from Suez without delay. Pineau was coming to London on 29 November to coordinate French action with the British. The British Government would announce to Commons on 3 December the definite decision to withdraw its troops within 15 days. The text of Lloyd's statement to Commons had been drafted, but was still subject to change.

(S) Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 3006, 28 Nov 56. Received State 291802Z Nov 56. Received JCS 292358Z Nov 56.

28 Nov

The Executive Assistant to the Secretary General of the UN "revealed" that arrangements had been worked out among Hammarskjold, Lloyd, and Fawzi for "withdrawal-clearance operations." First, Hammarskjold was to release a statement indicating that the UK was generally satisfied with the UN Emergency Force, and thus able to arrange for the withdrawal of its forces. Then, on 29 November, Lloyd would express satisfaction with the UN force and probably hint that the Suez settlement talks were to be resumed. Lloyd's statement was to be followed by a statement from Cairo taking note of UK intentions and indicating Egypt's readiness to cooperate in arrangements for the prompt clearance of the canal. The Cairo announcement would in turn be followed by a report by the Secretary General concerning arrangements for clearing the canal. He would also report that clearance could begin on 15 December, and that salvage vessels were proceeding to the canal area.

(S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 214, 28 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 290227Z Nov 56. Received JCS 291639Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

28 Nov (U) The New York Times correspondent in Vienna reported that, as of 28 November, more than 95,000 Hungarians had fled to Austria and that less than a fourth had moved on to other countries.

NYT, 29 Nov 56, 20:1. Received JCS 291330Z Nov 56.

28 Nov The US Ambassador in Paris cabled that the nationalization of the Suez Canal, following Nasser's fomenting of rebellion in North Africa, had been the last straw in a series of French defeats and humiliations going back to 1940. It was not easy for France to adjust to the status of a second- or third-rank power. The extreme psychological tension gradually built up in France had found violent release in the military action against Egypt. The failure of this action had produced even more extreme frustration, humiliation and rage, for the French recognized that their position in the Middle East was gone. Further, they now believed that the Soviets were irretrievably established in that area and Soviet incursion into French North Africa was imminent. The UN and US were the favorite scapegoats for the situation. The French had an ambivalent attitude toward the US, for although they wanted to cooperate with the US as in the past, the French blamed the US for humiliating them by pursuing popularity with the Afro-Asian states, by underestimating the Soviet threat to the Near East, and by abandoning its oldest and staunchest ally. If the US did not act soon to collaborate with France to solve French political and economic problems, stated the Ambassador, the US might well be confronted before long with a French Government whose potential for damaging Western security would be "infinitely greater than Nasser's."

(U) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2649, 28 Nov 56. Received State 291133Z Nov 56. Received JCS 292358Z Nov 56.

28 Nov In regard to French press reports of a possible substantial increase in oil shipments to France from the USSR, a French trade official informed the US Embassy that Franco-Soviet trade negotiations had been suspended since 3 November 56.

(U) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2686, 29 Nov 56, DA IN 276217. Received State 300251Z Nov 56. Received JCS 010744Z Dec 56.

28 Nov President Chamoun of Lebanon expressed great concern to the US Ambassador in Beirut over Jordan's intention to terminate the UK-Jordan treaty, and to rely upon Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and "presumably" the USSR for aid. Chamoun stated that Nasser's "line," the turn to the left of the Syrian Army, and Communist inroads in Jordan spelled danger for his country. It was urgent that Lebanon receive arms with a minimum of delay. He also asked if the US could make wheat and cotton available to Lebanon.

(U) Msg, Beirut (Heath) to SecState, 1391, 28 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 290750Z Nov 56. Received JCS 291631Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

28 Nov

The Israeli Knesset adopted a resolution demanding that the UN General Assembly "halt the persecution of Jews in Egypt."

AP Wire Service, 28 Nov 56. Received JCS 281551Z Nov 56.

Israeli Foreign Minister Meir appealed to the President of the UN General Assembly asking that he intercede with Egypt on behalf of the more than 30,000 Jews facing deportation from that country.

AP Wire Service, 28 Nov 56. Received JCS 281431Z Nov 56.

The Acting SecState cabled the US Ambassador in Cairo that, unless the Ambassador perceived strong objections, he should point out to the Egyptian Government that repressive measures against Jews in Egypt would have an extremely serious effect on US public opinion. Furthermore, such treatment of individuals did not conform with the principles of the UN Charter, principles that Egypt itself had invoked in the past.

(9) Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Cairo, 1731, 28 Nov 56. Received JCS 291639Z Nov 56.

28 Nov (U) The French Delegate to the UN General Assembly announced that France had withdrawn, "in the past week," one infantry company and a naval commando unit from Egypt and was preparing to withdraw additional forces.

AP Wire Service, 28 Nov 56. Received JCS 281836Z Nov 56.

28 Nov (U) The State Department announced in Washington that the US Ambassador to Syria, James R. Moose, Jr., had on instructions from his Government expressed "concern" over "substantial shipments" of Soviet arms to Syria.

AP Wire Service, 28 Nov 56. Received JCS 281830Z Nov 56.

In Damascus Syrian Premier Asali denied to press representatives that Soviet arms were being delivered to Syria. He also stated that notes had been delivered by his Government to both US and Soviet representatives explaining Syria's "independent policy."

AP Wire Service, 28 Nov 56. Received JCS 282140Z Nov 56. NYT, 29 Nov 56, 8:4. Received JCS 291330Z Nov 56.

UK sources in the UN stated that, according to their information, the Soviet bloc had, by 10 November 1956, delivered approximately 400 million dollars worth of aircraft, tanks, self-propelled guns, etc., to Egypt in the preceding 13 months, and approximately 60 million dollars worth of tanks, self-propelled guns, munitions, etc., to Syria in the past year.

AP Wire Service, 28 Nov 56. Received JCS 282138Z Nov 56.

US Government officials in Washington stated that more than 30 million dollars worth of Soviet weapons, including tanks, artillery, mortars, machine

guns, armored cars, and munitions, had been delivered to the Syrian armed forces in the past year.

AP Wire Service, 28 Nov 56. Received JCS 282207Z Nov 56.

to [redacted] admitted continuing to receive Soviet equipment. He insisted, however, that this equipment was being sent to Syria on the basis of Soviet-Syrian agreements made before the 29 October Israeli attack on Egypt. He also expressed great concern over reports that Turkish troops were massing on the Syrian border.

(S) [redacted] Received JCS 011436Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

28 Nov The Acting SecState cabled the US Embassy in Paris that in light of the recent events in Hungary the US had reviewed its policy of contacts with the USSR and Soviet satellites and reached the following decisions: 1) Officially approved exchanges with the USSR would be suspended. 2) Soviet attendance at non-governmental international conferences in the US would not be encouraged. 3) With regard to programs concerning Soviet satellites, the US would endeavor to accelerate the program with Poland, carry on, unchanged, the program with Czechoslovakia, and initiate no exchanges with Rumania for the time being.

(S) Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Paris, 912, 28 Nov 56, DA IN 275672 (29 Nov 56). Received JCS 291713Z Nov 56.

28 Nov [redacted] that Jordanian Premier Nabulsi's announcement on the breaking of the UK-Jordan pact had been expected. The spokesman further stated that the UK did not believe the announcement had the support of King Hussein.

(S) [redacted] Msg, USARMA London to DEPTAR, 281650Z Nov 56. DA IN 275443 (28 Nov 56). Received JCS 292023Z Nov 56.

28 Nov [redacted] (S) Teletyped Info Rpt, CIA to JCS, [redacted] Received JCS 070906Z Dec 56.

29 Nov The US Ambassador in Warsaw was informed that the Polish Government desired to send three economic experts to Washington in the near future to discuss trade and credit matters.

(S) Memo, Exec Officer, Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) to OCB, "United States Economic Aid to Poland," 17 Dec 56, CCS 092 (9-14-49) sec 11.

- 29 Nov (U) The arrival of the first ship-borne troops (721 Yugoslavs) of the UN Force brought the total of the UN Force in Egypt to 2,353 officers and men.
AP Wire Service, 29 Nov 56. Received JCS 291449Z, 292135Z, 292137Z Nov 56.
- 29 Nov (U) Efforts of Soviet troops in Hungary to stop the flow of refugees into Austria drastically reduced the number of refugee crossings. The troops were reportedly shooting refugees and mining the border at major crossing points.
AP Wire Service, 29 Nov 56. Received JCS 291954Z and 292131Z Nov 56. NYT, 30 Nov 56, 15:2. Received JCS 301330Z Nov 56.
- 29 Nov Foreign Secretary Lloyd told the House of Commons that he would make a statement on 3 December concerning withdrawal of British forces from Suez. A decision had to await consultations with French Foreign Minister Pineau, who was arriving in London 30 November. Lloyd stated that British forces were always ready to leave when the UN Police Force became effective. Veteran observers expected Lloyd to announce a "phased withdrawal" on 3 December.
AP Wire Service, 29 Nov 56. Received JCS 291614Z, 291628Z, 291709Z Nov 56. (S) Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 3023, 29 Nov 56, DA IN 276057. Received State 292130Z Nov 56. Received JCS 301413Z Nov 56.
- According to an AP report Lord Salisbury, Government leader in the House of Lords, later told the House of Lords that "Our policy is that of a phased withdrawal."
AP Wire Service, 29 Nov 56. Received JCS 292024Z Nov 56.
- 29 Nov (U) The State Department released a statement reaffirming US support for the collective efforts of the four Middle Eastern nations of the Baghdad Pact to maintain their independence. The statement concluded with the words: "A threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of the members would be viewed by the United States with the utmost gravity." Responsible officials, however, were reported as stating that "at this time" the US did not contemplate joining the alliance.
AP Wire Service, 29 Nov 56. Received JCS 292141Z, 292146Z, 292213Z Nov 56. For complete text of statement see State Dept, Bulletin, vol XXXV, no. 911 (10 Dec 56), p. 918.
- 29 Nov The State Department instructed the US Ambassador in Paris to bring to the attention of the French Government the concern of the US Government over the increasingly violent press campaigns in Europe attacking the US and the President. The Ambassador was to make it clear that the US desired to aid France, but that aid would be possible only after the French Government had made public a clear intention to comply with the UN Resolution and withdraw from Suez.
(S) Msg, Actg SecState to AmEmbassy Paris, 2053, 29 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 010026Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

~~TOP SECRET~~
29 Nov

The State Department transmitted to all US Embassies and Legations the text of a press release, to be issued at 1700Z, 30 November, stating that fifteen US oil companies would be authorized to coordinate shipments to countries whose oil supply problem had resulted from the closing of the Suez Canal and some Middle East pipelines. According to the press release, the major problem was one of transportation, chiefly the shortage of tankers.

(S) ~~Only~~ Msg, State Dept to all Embassies and Legations, Circular 451, 29 Nov 56. Received JCS 301953Z Nov 56.

29 Nov

The US Ambassador to the UN reported that the Israeli and Turkish representatives at the UN had expressed to him, separately, the great concern of their nations over the Soviet penetration of Syria and the influx of Soviet arms and personnel into that country.

(S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 228, 29 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 300251Z Nov 56. Received JCS 301651Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

29 Nov

The Acting Foreign Minister of Morocco handed the US Ambassador a strongly worded note protesting the use by the French, on 17 and 20 November, of a part of the US sector of the Port Lyautey base for unloading war materials. The note stated that the Government of Morocco had expressed reservations concerning the Franco-American base agreement and that the situation required re-examination of the matter of bases by the US and Moroccan Governments. The US was requested to take immediate measures to end the "expanded French military use" of the Port Lyautey base.

(S) Msg, Rabat (Cannon) to SecState, 340, 30 Nov 56, DA IN 276393 (1 Dec 56). Received State 301801Z Nov 56. Received JCS 010621Z Dec 56.

29 Nov


(S) Msg, CIA to JCS, TDCS 111207, 1 Dec 56, DA IN 276407. Received JCS 011142Z Dec 56.

29 Nov (u)

Gomulka opened the "election campaign" in Poland by declaring that there would be no freedom for bourgeois parties in Poland, although "the scope of democratization can be steadily widened provided the bourgeoisie and reactionaries do not exploit it." His program for the coming elections called for an internal policy of building socialism, but only with Polish forces, and an external policy of peaceful cooperation with all nations.

AP Wire Service, 29 Nov 56. Received JCS 291859Z Nov 56. NYT, 30 Nov 56, 1:5. Received JCS 301330Z Nov 56.

29 Nov (u)

The French Council of the Republic completed action on the treaty with Libya providing for French withdrawal from the Fezzan. This step was the final act in approving the treaty, signed 10 August 1955.

NYT, 30 Nov 56, 10:4. Received JCS 301330Z Nov 56.

- 30 Nov (u) The total number of Hungarian refugees to reach safety in Austria passed the 100,000 mark, despite reported use of tanks and mines by Soviet troops attempting to stop the flow.
AP Wire Service, 30 Nov 56. Received JCS 301442Z Nov 56.
- 30 Nov The Prime Minister of Iraq, during a conversation with the US Ambassador in Baghdad, stated that he intended to move to adjourn parliament for one month on 2 December. He also made another urgent plea for the US to receive the Crown Prince at an early date.
(S) Msg, Baghdad (Gallman) to SecState, 966, 30 Nov 56, DA IN 276246. Received State 301537Z Nov 56. Received JCS 010028Z Dec 56.
- 30 Nov (u) President Eisenhower, in a move to provide oil for European nations faced with oil shortage, authorized the Director of the ODM to request the Secretary of the Interior to permit coordination among US oil companies in supplying such nations. The Interior Department later announced that the Middle East Emergency Committee (MEEC), composed of 15 major US oil companies, would meet on 3 December to complete schedules for redeployment of tanker fleets to speed oil to Western Europe. Anti-trust laws were waived to allow for pooling of transportation resources, although all schedules prepared by the MEEC were to be subject to approval by the Interior Department. Despite such measures it was not expected that all of Western Europe's oil requirements could be met.
AP Wire Service, 30 Nov 56. Received JCS 301629Z, 301648Z, 301636Z, 301653Z, 301732Z, 301934Z, 302026Z, Nov 56.
- 30 Nov (u) French Foreign Minister Pineau consulted in London with Lloyd and other officials of the British Government to work out the details of the withdrawal from Suez. Following the conference, British diplomatic officials reportedly let it be known that the UK had advised the US of the British-French decision to withdraw. Formal announcement of the decision, however, was to be made on 3 December.
AP Wire Service, 30 Nov 56. Received JCS 301741Z, 301748Z, 302043Z, 302049Z Nov 56. NYT, 1 Dec 56, 1:6. Received JCS 011330Z Dec 56.
- 30 Nov (u) UN troops began moving into the no man's land between the British-French and Egyptian forces. There was some delay owing to Egyptian refusal to cede front line positions and the UN troops eventually occupied positions in front of the Egyptian lines. By nightfall the UN Forces occupied a sector of the front 600 yards wide.
AP Wire Service, 30 Nov. Received JCS 301745Z, 302023Z Nov 56 and 010033Z Dec 56.
- 30 Nov (u) Secretary General Hammarskjold reported to the General Assembly that his efforts to obtain permission for UN observers to enter Hungary had been fruitless, as had his attempt to gain entry himself. The Hungarian


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Government had not even replied to his recent requests, nor had he received any information that the Soviet or Hungarian Governments were complying with the UN demand for evacuation of Soviet forces.

AP Wire Service, 30 Nov 56. Received JCS 302113Z Nov 56. NYT, 1 Dec 56, 1:4. Received JCS 011330Z Dec 56.

30 Nov


(•) Msg,

Received JCS 041211Z Dec 56.

30 Nov

The French Minister in Rabat, having received a note similar to that received by the US protesting French use of the Port Lyautey base, called on the Moroccan Minister of National Economy to protest. In the course of the conversation the French Minister was told that the Government of Morocco had no intention of negotiating the base problem directly with the US Government.

(•) Msg, Rabat (Cannon) to SecState, 344, 1 Dec 56, DA IN 276746. Received State 011628Z Dec 56. Received JCS 021440Z Dec 56.

30 Nov

The US Consul General in Alexandria reported that trade and commerce in that city was at a standstill and rapidly deteriorating. The situation was being worsened by Egyptian sequestration of foreign firms and assets. It was apparent that the Egyptian "grab" was based on plans drawn up long before and only awaiting a pretext for implementation. The Government of Egypt was apparently willing to see its economy ruined in order to eliminate foreign participation. The general view of the responsible business community was that the Egyptian economy was wide open to Soviet penetration unless the US stepped in with substantial economic aid.

(•) Msg, Alexandria (Washburn) to SecState, 259, 30 Nov 56, DA IN 276696. Received State 302210Z Nov 56. Received JCS 021110Z Dec 56.

1 Dec

The top civil servant in the Libyan Ministry of Defense informed the Chief of the British Military Mission that the USSR had offered, through the Soviet Military Attache, to equip, train, and maintain a Libyan Army of 10,000.

(•) Msg, Tripoli (Tappin) to SecState, 384, 3 Dec 56. Received State 031649Z Dec 56. Received JCS 041625Z Dec 56.

1 Dec

The US Ambassador in Ankara reported on continuing precautionary alert measures being taken by the Turkish armed forces in regard to the Syrian situation.

(•) Msg, Ankara (Warren) to State Dept, 1299, 1 Dec 56, DA IN 276757 (2 Dec 56), CJCS files. Received State (No Time). Received JCS 020743Z Dec 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

1 Dec

[] reported that there were no known unreported indications of a Turkish attack on Syria. In his opinion it was only remotely possible that Turkey would commit unprovoked aggression on Syria without either US or UK support although Turkey had the capability alone to defeat the Syrian armed forces with the units then stationed on the border. He had received Turkish assurances that all dispositions were only precautionary against Syrian forces augmented by Soviet personnel and equipment.

Received JCS 041526Z Dec 56.

1 Dec (U)

President Eisenhower announced that the number of Hungarian refugees to be admitted to the US would be increased from 5,000 to 21,500.

AP Wire Service, 1 Dec 56. Received JCS 011357Z Dec 56.

1 Dec (U)

King Faisal II suspended for a month the regular session of the Iraqi Parliament that he had just opened. The move was made at the request of Prime Minister Nuri Said's government.

AP Wire Service, 1 Dec 56. Received JCS 011506Z Dec 56.

1 Dec

The US Ambassador in Tunis reported that the detente in Franco-Tunisian relations had been ended by an incident involving the strafing by French Air Force planes of a Tunisian crowd. On 28 November the crowd had surrounded a group of Frenchmen working on a radar relay station. The incident was due to poor relations between the French Embassy and the French district commanders, leading to the dispatch of the work party without knowledge of the Embassy and coordination with the Tunisian Government.

Msg, Tunis (Jones) to SecState, 272, 1 Dec 56. Received State 011654Z Dec 56. Received JCS 022129Z Dec 56.

1 Dec (U)

The UN Secretary General received a telegram from the Syrian Foreign Minister charging that the UK, France, Israel, Turkey, "and others," were preparing armed aggression against Syria. It also asserted that this constituted a direct threat to the peace and that the matter should be brought before the General Assembly. One of the main reasons given for the threatened aggression was that it was to divert attention from the fact that British, French, and Israeli forces were remaining in Egypt against the wishes of the UN.

NYT, 2 Dec 56, 1:7 (Sunday).

1 Dec (U)

Israel announced at the UN that by 3 December no Israeli forces would remain within 35 miles of the Suez Canal.

NYT, 2 Dec 56, 1:7 (Sunday).

1 Dec

British Foreign Secretary Lloyd called in the US Ambassador to say that as a result of the British-French talks the UN Secretary General would be notified of the following course of action: Lloyd would

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announce in Commons on 3 December that British and French forces would be withdrawn from Suez "without delay." Withdrawal was premised on the fact that an adequate UN force was being built up, the UN was proceeding with canal clearance, and the UN Secretary General had taken steps to facilitate further negotiations looking towards the future operation of the canal.

() Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 3062, 2 Dec 56. Received State 021509Z Dec 56. Received JCS 031720Z Dec 56.

2 Dec (U) Meeting with the press after a two hour luncheon conference with President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Dulles told newspaper men that he and the President were in agreement that the prospects of Middle Eastern peace were reasonably good. However, the Secretary of State continued, he did not minimize the problems of dealing with international Communism.

Mr. Dulles also indicated that the US was continuing to espouse a policy of peaceful liberation for those nations under Soviet domination and denied that the US had any responsibility for the uprising in Hungary.

The press was also told that the US reaffirmed its offer of economic aid to Poland, but would not make a similar offer to Hungary because the US had no "satisfactory evidence that those who profess to be the Government of Hungary in fact are responsive to the wishes and desires of the people to a degree which would make it profitable for us to talk about such matters with them."

Touching on the breach in the Atlantic Alliance, Mr. Dulles conceded that the NATO system had been severely strained as a result of the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt, but, he asserted, these "misunderstandings" were being ironed out.

With respect to Syria and the recent reports of that country's receiving extensive Soviet aid, the Secretary said that he did not believe that the situation there had reached such a stage as to endanger the peace of the area. He refused, however, to make a more detailed appraisal of the situation there, ascribing his refusal to comment more extensively to his recent absence from office and consequent unfamiliarity with the details he would want if he were to make an evaluation.

NYT, 3 Dec 56, 1:8. Text of Statement on 10:2. Received JCS 031330Z Dec 56.

2 Dec The US and thirteen other UN members submitted to the UN Secretariat, for distribution on 3 December, a draft resolution noting that UN observers had not been permitted to enter Hungary and requesting that

the USSR and Hungary consent to such observers not later than 7 December.

(C) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, DELGA 250, 2 Dec 56. Received State 030332Z Dec 56. Received JCS 030518Z Dec 56.

3 Dec The US Ambassador in Beirut was called for by the Foreign Minister, who said that he and the Lebanese Government had been surprised by Secretary Dulles' statement on 2 December that the US did not regard the situation in Syria as a threat to the peace. Lebanon, on the basis of very considerable information, considered the situation in Syria as a "very grave threat" to the peace of the Near East. Lebanon, according to the Foreign Minister, was in grave danger of losing its independent existence, especially if Nuri Said were overthrown in Iraq. If the US favored continued existence of Lebanon it must be prepared to grant political and probably economic aid.

(S) Msg, Beirut (Heath) to SecState, 1446, 4 Dec 56, DA IN 277800 (6 Dec 56). Received State 051422Z Dec 56. Received JCS 061216Z Dec 56.

3 Dec (U) UN troops took over one quarter of Port Said from the British and French.
AP Wire Service, 3 Dec 56. Received JCS 031425Z Dec 56.

3 Dec (U) Representatives of the 15 oil companies forming the MEEC met in New York with federal officials to complete plans for rushing oil to Europe.
AP Wire Service, 3 Dec 56. Received JCS 031744Z Dec 56.

3 Dec (U) The State Department announced that the cultural exchange program with the USSR had been suspended "in view of recent developments." The decision had been made following the Soviet use of force in Hungary.
AP Wire Service, 3 Dec 56. Received JCS 031820Z Dec 56.

3 Dec The Yugoslav Acting Foreign Secretary told the US Ambassador in Belgrade that a reply had been received from Hungary regarding the Yugoslav protest on the Nagy kidnapping. The reply had been unsatisfactory, describing the incident as an internal affair of Hungary.
(S) Msg, Belgrade (Riddleberger) to SecState, 763, 3 Dec 56. Received State 032201Z Dec 56. Received JCS 041926Z Dec 56.

3 Dec (U) Foreign Secretary Lloyd announced that the British and French Governments had decided that they could now withdraw their troops from Egypt without delay. He also called for Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.
AP Wire Service, 3 Dec 56. Received JCS 031549Z Dec 56.

Lloyd's statement was followed by a similar announcement by French Foreign Minister Pineau in the National Assembly.

AP Wire Service, 3 Dec 56. Received JCS 031724Z Dec 56.

Later in the day UN Secretary General Hammarskjöld presented the formal commitment of the British and French to the General Assembly, stating that he felt that the two nations might get their troops out within the next two weeks. He also stated that he had instructed the commander of the UN Force in Egypt to be ready to take over responsibilities in the Port Said area by the middle of December.

AP Wire Service, 3 Dec 56. Received JCS 040356Z Dec 56.

3 Dec (U) The State Department released a statement, approved by the President, calling for the prompt reopening of the Suez Canal in view of the announced intention of the British and French to withdraw from Egypt.

AP Wire Service, 3 Dec 56. Received JCS 032219Z, 032222Z Dec 56.

3 Dec (U) The Press Chief of the Hungarian Government admitted to reporters that scattered armed bands of rebels were still roaming the countryside. He also admitted that some rebels had been deported to the USSR but stated that all had since been returned.

AP Wire Service, 3 Dec 56. Received JCS 031851Z, 031909Z Dec 56.

3 Dec (U) The Hungarian Government formally rejected the UN request to send observers into Hungary. It stated, however, that the UN Secretary General would be welcomed in Budapest "at a later date appropriate for both parties."

NYT, 4 Dec 56, 18:8. Received JCS 041330Z Dec 56.

3 Dec The Saudi Arabian Ambassador, in an interview with the Deputy Under Secretary of State, read a message from King Saud referring to "anti-Syrian campaign raging in US and Europe." The King stated that the Saudi Arabian Government had investigated and could report no Russian bases or centers in Syria. Also, the Syrian President and other officials had assured King Saud that Syria had no agreements with USSR. The King hoped the US would use its good offices to stop aggression against Syria threatened by Turkey, Britain, and France, supporting Israel. The Ambassador was told that the only concern of the US was that Syrian cooperation with the Communists would lead to more trouble in the area. The Syrian attitude, Communist influence, sabotage of pipelines, restrictions on US personnel, and parallel lines of Radio Damascus and Radio Moscow, were troubling the US. Also, the US had no evidence of aggressive intent against Syria and would oppose renewal of hostilities by any side in the area.

(S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Jidda, 406, 4 Dec 56. Received JCS 041611Z Dec 56.

3 Dec

The US Ambassador in Damascus called on the Syrian Prime Minister to direct the attention of the Syrian Government to President Eisenhower's statement of 29 November. He also assured the Prime Minister that the US Government had no evidence that Syria was in danger of being attacked by other nations.

(C) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 1355, 4 Dec 56, DA IN 277894 (6 Dec 56). Received State 042311Z Dec 56. Received JCS 061526Z Dec 56. NYT, 5 Dec 56, 23:3. Received JCS 051330Z Dec 56.

3 Dec

The SecState requested the US Ambassador to Iraq to inform the Crown Prince and the Premier that the US would welcome a visit from the Crown Prince, as suggested by Iraq and Asian members of the Baghdad Pact, but that the time was inopportune. If the Crown Prince and Premier persisted, they were to be asked to consider postponement of the visit until after the first of the year.

(R) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Baghdad, NIACT 948, 3 Dec 56. Received JCS 041925Z Dec 56.

SUPPLEMENT TO
CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
RELATING TO THE CURRENT WORLD CRISIS
DECISIONS AND ACTIONS TAKEN BY
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
SECOND INSTALLMENT: 10 NOVEMBER through 3 DECEMBER 1956

HISTORICAL SECTION
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
28 December 1956

OASD(PA) DFOISR 81-TS-103
CYR-6

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

14 Nov

The Chairman, JCS, authorized the Chief of Staff, USAF, to direct the Strategic Air Command to take the following measures:

Under Alert Condition No. 1:

- (a) A standdown of all tactical aircraft.
- (b) All bomber aircraft combat loaded except for bombs.
- (c) Removal of takeoff weight restrictions on tanker aircraft.
- (d) Cancellation of all leave and temporary duty except for personnel at B-47 and B-52 schools.
- (e) All tanker aircraft units placed on one-hour alert and bomber aircraft units on three-hour alert.

14 Nov

The JCS submitted to SecDef their comments and recommendations on the draft policy statement entitled "Interim U.S. Policy on Developments in Poland and Hungary (NSC 5616/1)," a revision of "U.S. Policy on Developments in Poland and Hungary." The new draft statement had been rewritten to bring the paper up to date and incorporate additional courses of action.

Under GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS, that portion pertaining to Poland was unchanged, but the portion concerned with Hungary was drastically revised. Among the changes was a review of the events which had occurred in Hungary since the issuance of the original draft statement and, significantly, the elimination of the discussion concerned with the two, and possibly three, immediate courses of action open to the U.S.

Under COURSES OF ACTION the portion pertaining to Poland remained substantially the same, except for the inclusion of an additional course of action, i.e., in the event that the USSR used military force to repress the Gomulka regime or to reverse the Polish trend toward national independence, the U.S. should initiate and be prepared to support any UN action necessary to prevent the USSR from successfully reimposing its control over Poland. This U.S. action was to be contingent upon Polish resistance to Soviet military intervention and a "timely request to the UN" by Poland.

The greatest changes in the new draft statement occurred in the courses of action with respect to Hungary. Of the eight courses of action pertaining to Hungary in the original draft paper, four were either replaced or altered substantially. The course of action in the earlier draft calling for the encouragement of Austria to continue assisting Hungarian refugees was broadened to include the encouragement of Yugoslavia to adopt a similar policy. The three remaining revisions, since the objections of the JCS were limited exclusively to these three courses of action, deserve full description. They were as follows:

1. "In pursuing our immediate objective of terminating harsh Soviet measures of repression and retaliation, mobilize

all appropriate pressures, including UN action, on the USSR against such measures [while reassuring the USSR that we do not look upon Hungary or the other Satellites as potential military allies]. Such appropriate pressures might include the following as required:

a. Maintain constant pressure in the UN and elsewhere on the USSR for compliance with the UN Resolution of November 4, 1956.

b. Initiate or support UN action designed to achieve free elections in Hungary under UN auspices, as soon as law and order have been restored.

c. In the event of continued Soviet defiance of UN Resolutions, consider:

(1) Initiating or supporting UN action for an embargo by member nations on all trade with the USSR.

(2) Initiating UN action or action with other nations outside the UN or unilateral action to obtain agreement to sever diplomatic relations with the USSR.

2. "[Foster and facilitate Soviet withdrawal of its armed forces from Hungary by indicating now the willingness of the United States to consult with NATO on the probable withdrawal of some U.S. forces from Western Europe if the Soviet does withdraw all of its forces from Hungary, thereby maximizing world-wide pressures for such withdrawal and at the same time providing to the Soviet a face-saving formula for doing so.]

3. "[a. If the USSR withdraws the Red Army from Hungary the U.S. should consider the desirability of a new meeting of heads of governments after appropriate preparatory negotiations assuring a minimum success for such a session.]

[b. Support within the UN a police force composed of small nation units to enter Hungary on consent of the USSR and Hungary to facilitate a transition from the Red Army rule to a stable Hungarian government.]"

In their comments the JCS stated that the phrase in 1., above, "while reassuring the USSR that we do not look upon Hungary or the other Satellites as potential military allies," should be deleted. Repeating the objection made to the same phrase in their memo of 31 October, the JCS stated that such assurances would tend to undermine any influence the U.S. might have on a future Hungarian government, and could operate to the military disadvantage of the U.S. The JCS also objected to 2., above. A version of this proposal had also been included in the earlier draft statement; the JCS made the same objection to the new proposal as they had made to the old one. On previous occasions, stated the JCS, the Soviets had proposed the withdrawal of Soviet forces from East Germany if the U.S. would do the same from the Federal Republic of Germany. These proposals had been rejected. To propose now a partial withdrawal of U.S. forces from unspecified areas could invite renewed efforts on the part of the Soviets to expand the proposal to bring about the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe. Such action, concluded the JCS, would be detrimental to the best interests of the U.S. and its European Allies.

Finally, the JCS objected to both paragraphs of 3., above. It appeared unwise to the JCS to condition a meeting of the heads of state at this time on an event as unlikely as the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary. Concerning the second paragraph, the JCS felt the proposal was unnecessary, for, if such a police force were to be created, the U.S. "would naturally support it."

In conclusion the JCS recommended that, "subject to the foregoing," SecDef concur in the adoption of the U.S. policy statement toward developments in Poland and Hungary.

(S) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Interim U.S. Policy on Developments in Poland and Hungary (NSC 5616/1)," 14 Nov 56; (S) NSC 5616/1, Encl to Note by ExecSecy NSC to NSC, same subj, 13 Nov 56. Both in CCS 092 (9-14-49) sec 10. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "U.S. Policy Toward Developments in Poland and Hungary (NSC 5616)," 31 Oct 56; (S) NSC 5616 Encl to Note by ExecSecy NSC to NSC, same subj, 31 Oct 56. Both in CCS 092 (9-14-49) sec 9. (TS) Dec On JCS 2066/19, Note by Secys, "Interim U.S. Policy on Developments in Poland and Hungary (NSC 5616/1)," 14 Nov 56, CCS 092 (9-14-49) sec 10.

19 Nov ✓ JCS dispatched a message to CINCEUR stating that they had reviewed U.S. readiness for military action in the event of a renewal or threatened renewal of open warfare in the Arab-Israeli dispute. Airlift for a fully manned and equipped RCT could be provided by Troop Carrier and MATS resources, if directed by JCS, but a requirement for an airlift of this magnitude was considered unlikely to arise. CINCEUR's plans should include provisions for (a) airlifting a portion of a RCT, appropriately armed and equipped for the specific mission of protecting U.S. interests and assisting in the evacuation of U.S. nationals and (b) airlifting the advance party and phasing deployment, by use of a combined airlift and sealift, of the remainder of the RCT, fully manned and equipped for other missions in the Middle East. CINCEUR was to coordinate his plans with CINCNELM.

(S) Msg, JCS to CINCEUR, JCS 913687, 19 Nov 56. CCS 381 E.M.M.E.A. (11-19-47) sec 49. (S) Dec on JCS 1887/306, Note by Secys JCS, "Movement of an Army Regimental Combat Team from Europe to the Middle East," 19 Nov 56, CCS 381 E.M.M.E.A. (11-19-47) sec 48.

16 Nov ✓ The JCS agreed to forward to SecDef a memo, together with its Annex, reflecting the conclusions of a study by CNO on "Courses of Action Open to the United States to Prevent the Landing of Communist Bloc 'Volunteers' into Egypt and Other Arab States." (This memo was not forwarded, for, in view of an address at the UN by Under Secretary of State Hoover on the same day, the Chairman, JCS, felt that "much of the action proposed by the memorandum had been overtaken by Mr. Hoover's presentation.")

(S) Dec on SM-916-56, sgd Wentworth, "Courses of Action Open to the U.S. Designed to Prevent the Landing of Communist Bloc 'Volunteers' into Egypt and other Arab States," 16 Nov 56, CCS 335.14 (6-6-42) sec 36; (U) Memo, Williams to Rowden, 17 Nov 56, CCS 381 E.M.M.E.A. (11-19-47) sec 49.

27 Nov ✓ The JCS agreed to dispatch to CINCONAD the message in the Appendix to JCS 1899/301, "Readiness Status of Continental Air Defense Command." (See following item.)

(S) JCS 1899/301, Note by Secys, "Readiness Status of Continental Air Defense Command," 30 Nov 56, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 67.

30 Nov ✓ The JCS authorized CINCONAD to revert to a state of normal preparedness. However, CINCONAD was to remain in a condition of increased intelligence watch.

(S) Msg, JCS to CINCONAD, JCS 914288, 30 Nov 56, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 67.

30 Nov ✓ The JCS noted the memo in the Enclosure to JCS 1887/320 and agreed to provide copies to SecDef and the Chairman, U.S. Delegation to the United Nations Military Staff

Committee. The memo outlined the general procedure being followed in processing UN requests for assistance, and made this procedure a matter of record. (This decision was implemented on 1 December 1956 by memos from JCS to SecDef and the Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the UN Military Staff Committee.)

(U) Dec on JCS 1887/320, Note by Secys, "U.S. Assistance to the United Nations Emergency Force," 1 Dec 56; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 1 Dec 56; (U) Memo, JCS to Chm, U.S. Del UN Mil Staff Cmte, SM-953-56, same subj, 1 Dec 56. All in CCS 381 E.M.M.E.A. (11-19-47) secs 50 and 51.

30 Nov ✓

The JCS submitted to SecDef their views "on the desirability of U.S. adherence to the Pact in the light of present and foreseeable developments within, and in the general area of, the Baghdad Pact."

After pointing out that they had consistently urged U.S. adherence to the Pact, the JCS stated that previous State Department objections, based in turn on Israeli objections, to U.S. adherence might no longer hold. Recent events might lead Israel to the conclusion that U.S. adherence at this time would offer the greatest opportunity for the U.S. to exert its influence in the Middle East with resultant advantage to Israel.

"As of now," stated the JCS, the continued effective existence of the Pact was at stake. It was vital as a regional organization against Soviet aggression in the Middle East. The collapse of the organization would be an "irretrievable loss" to the best interest of the United States. Egypt, Syria, and Jordan had "made the beginnings" of an alliance against Israel, and there was growing evidence that the USSR was working towards the establishment of such an alliance with the expectation of controlling it. Since the West had no defense arrangement to counteract such an alliance, U.S. adherence to the Baghdad Pact would provide the U.S. with the opportunity to establish a military position in the area, should it later prove desirable.

The JCS also stated that U.S. adherence to the Pact would neither increase the responsibilities nor, materially, the costs that the U.S. had already assumed in the Middle East. In fact, failure to join the Pact might actually prove more costly. Further, the U.S. had made friends of many influential military leaders of the Moslem countries of the Pact. By joining the Pact, the U.S. would become the military leader in the area and have the opportunity both to establish a secure military position in the Middle East and influence political and military developments to the advantage of the U.S. In addition, there was evidence that Saudi Arabia and Lebanon were fearful of Communist expansion and secretly disposed against Nasser and his friendship with the Soviets. Therefore, if the U.S. joined the Pact, the fears of the two countries could probably be exploited to urge the adherence of Saudi Arabia and Lebanon to the Pact. An important additional result of prompt U.S. adherence to the Pact would be the "checking and eventual downgrading of Nasser's gains." But, without tangible evidence of U.S. strength in the Middle East, continued the JCS, "it is a certainty that Nasser will end up with greater prestige than before and that Soviet penetration in the area will become an accomplished fact."

According to the JCS, the U.S. statement of 29 November on any threat to Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan did not go far enough. In fact, the statement might well be interpreted by the Baghdad Pact powers as evidence that, while the U.S. was willing to "talk support" it was

unwilling to take the "forthright and logical" action the U.S. position suggested.

In conclusion, the JCS stated that, while from the military point of view they were in full accord with the current U.S. policies making maximum use of the UN, they believed that a U.S. policy predicated solely upon UN settlement of the major issues in the Middle East would prove to be inadequate to the attainment of essential U.S. objectives in that area. Indeed, certain factors present in the UN rendered such a policy "hazardous," for Soviet penetration would be complete before UN solutions could be expected to materialize, even if UN-sponsored courses of action could be controlled so that they would be largely consistent with U.S. interests.

(S) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "U.S. Adherence to the Baghdad Pact," 30 Nov 56, CCS 381 E.M.M.E.A. (11-19-47) sec 51. (TS) Dec on JCS 1887/313, Note by Secys, "U.S. Adherence to the Baghdad Pact," 30 Nov 56, CCS 381 E.M.M.E.A. (11-19-47) sec 49.

30 Nov

The JCS submitted to SecDef their views and recommendations on "Turkish and Iraqi Request[s] for U.S. Support." The requests, stated the JCS, should be considered in relation to U.S. military objectives in the Middle East as well as to the situation existing in that area. The security of NATO's right flank was such an objective, and, should Syria be reduced to a Soviet satellite, this security would be greatly jeopardized. Also, it would be to the military advantage of the U.S. to provide a "psychological lift" to the Turks and Iraqis, and, at the same time, increase U.S. knowledge of Soviet air activity in the area.

The JCS believed that it was feasible to deploy to Adana, Turkey, "three mobile radars" [on 3 December 1956 the JCS corrected the three words quoted to read "one mobile radar"] and twelve all-weather interceptor aircraft. Both aircraft and radar would be manned and operated by U.S. pilots and crews. It was the opinion of the JCS that this deployment would produce "little political repercussion." Furthermore, it should greatly augment Turkish detection and interception capabilities, and indicate to Turkey that the U.S. intended to expedite the permanent improvement of Turkish air defense.

With respect to Iraq, the JCS considered that three mobile radars and twelve interceptor aircraft, with U.S. pilots and crews, could be deployed under the guise of a training mission. The aircraft, radar units, and all allied equipment would carry Iraqi markings. And although Iraq would assume political responsibility for the actions of the aircraft, stated the JCS, they were aware that from a political point of view the movement of U.S. equipment and personnel into Iraq was potentially dangerous.

The JCS also pointed out that:

- 1) U.S. membership in the Baghdad Pact would help to dispel the political problems associated with the deployment
- 2) The logistic problem posed by prompt deployments to Turkey and Iraq could be alleviated by the use of airlift.
- 3) If it should be decided to execute the deployments, Turkey and Iraq should be advised of the decision as soon as practicable.
- 4) The deployments "should be on temporary basis only to meet an emergency situation."

Finally, the JCS stated that they believed the deployments could be accomplished by approximately one week after completion of political arrangements. They recommended that these arrangements be expedited.

(S) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Turkish and Iraqi Request for U.S. Support," 30 Nov 56; (S) Memo, JCS to SecDef,

same subj. 3 Dec 56. Both in CCS 381 E.M.M.E.A. (11-19-47) sec 51. (S) Dec on JCS 1887/319, Note by Secys, "Turkish and Iraqi Request for U.S. Support," 3 Dec 56, CCS 381 E.M.M.E.A. (11-19-47) sec 50.

3 Dec. The JCS agreed to forward to SecDef an amended version of the memo in the Enclosure to JCS 2066/23, "U.S. Policy Toward Developments in Poland." They also agreed to direct an "appropriate committee" to prepare detailed plans for U.S. participation in the event of UN military intervention in Poland. (By SM-968-56 the JSPC was directed, on 5 December 1956, to prepare these plans.) (S) Dec on JCS 2066/23, Note by Secys, "U.S. Policy Toward Developments in Poland," 5 Dec 56, CCS 092 (9-14-49) sec 10.

3 Dec ✓
~~TOP SECRET~~ The JCS forwarded to SecDef the memo noted above, in which they stated that under certain conditions and assumptions they considered it feasible for the UN to intervene by military action in Poland. They also stated that the U.S. should participate in such intervention to the extent necessary to achieve the UN objective,

(S) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "U.S. Policy Toward Developments in Poland," 3 Dec 56, CCS 092 (9-14-49) sec 10.

3 Dec ✓ The JCS agreed that the Director, Joint Staff, should advise SecDef as follows:
"The Joint Chiefs of Staff point out to the Secretary of Defense that authority to use TAC Heavy Troop Carrier force to replace MATS capability diverted to the Hungarian airlift will necessitate removal of the Heavy Troop Carriers from alert status and from availability for emergency use on short notice."

Subject to the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff interposed no objection to the airlift. SecDef was informally advised of this JCS view on the same day.

(S) JCS 2066/24, Note by Secys, "Airlift of Hungarian Refugees," 3 Dec 56, CCS 092 (9-14-49) sec 10.

3 Dec ✓ The JCS forwarded to SecDef a memo on "Alert Status of U.S. Military Forces," together with two attachments. One attachment listed the "Actions Taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff During the Period 26 October 1956 to 7 November 1956 to Improve [U.S.] Over-all Military Readiness in the Light of the Israeli-Egyptian Situation." The other listed the "Actions Taken by the Services with the Approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Maintain Conditions of Readiness Over a Protracted Period of Time." In their memo the JCS stated that special measures still in effect permitted, "insofar as practicable," return to normal operations while maintaining a special state of readiness particularly with respect to U.S. air-strike, air-defense, airlift, and antisubmarine warfare capabilities. The JCS summarized these special measures as follows:

"a. CINCNELM is embarked in the USS POCONO in the Mediterranean and the SIXTH FLEET is operating between Sicily and Crete. Although visits to certain selected ports in Italy and Greece are permitted, special precautions are being taken. For example,

one attack carrier with suitable escorts is maintained at sea when the other units of the Fleet are in port, and the antisubmarine group is remaining with the SIXTH FLEET.

"b. One RCT in CINCEUR's area and all Tactical Air Command heavy troop carrier wings are still alerted for possible movement

"c. [REDACTED]

On 1 December this group was directed to return to the United States.

"d. The Continental Air Defense Command is maintaining an increased intelligence watch in all units down through joint air defense divisions. The Command can assume a defined state of 'Increased Readiness' in three hours.

"e. Additional submarine surveillance patrols are being maintained.

"f. From the SEVENTH FLEET two amphibious ships with one Marine battalion landing team embarked are enroute to the Arabian Sea for possible reinforcement of the Middle East Force.

"g. The Strategic Air Command is maintaining a state of increased readiness."

(S) Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Alert Status of U.S. Military Forces," 3 Dec 56, CCS 381 E.M.M.E.A. (11-19-47) sec 51. (S) JCS 1887/323, Note by Secys, "Alert Status of U.S. Military Forces," 3 Dec 56, same file.

CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

RELATING TO

THE CURRENT WORLD CRISIS

SECOND INSTALLMENT: 23 - 31 OCTOBER 1956

HISTORICAL SECTION
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
28 December 1956

OASD(PA) DFOISR ~~81-TS-103~~
CYR-6

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
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22 Oct

In a speech at a farewell dinner for General Gruenther, in Paris, Premier Mollet placed great emphasis on the importance of common global policies, stressing that "solidarity is something which cannot be divided." He alluded to French bitterness over the hesitations and fluctuations of American policy on Suez, but assigned "immense importance" to the fact that ever since the first London conference the US "has been and remains in complete agreement with us as to objectives to be attained" in the Suez dispute. Mollet said France intended to raise the lesson pointed up by Suez developments--the importance of unity of action--at the next meeting of the North Atlantic Council as well as to discuss it directly with the US and UK. Ambassador Dillon thought Mollet's views, echoed during recent weeks by other French officials, indicated that another cycle of French pressure for global planning and solidarity was beginning.

Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 1903, 23 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 250848Z Oct 56. Received JCS 251845Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

23 Oct

The US Ambassador to Jordan reported from Amman that a military mission headed by the Egyptian and Syrian Commanders in Chief, Major General Abdul Hakim Amer, and Major General Tawfiq Nizamad-din, was due to arrive in Jordan on 23 October, presumably to co-ordinate Egyptian and Syrian offers of increased military assistance to Jordan.

Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 369, 23 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 231630Z Oct 56. Received JCS 241155Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

23 Oct

The Embassy in Warsaw reported that, as of 0800Z 23 October, no reports had been received to confirm unusual military activity in Poland. The ordinary Warsaw citizen seemed content to play the role of "interested observer" rather than to participate actively in the contest between the Soviet and Polish leadership. There had been considerable tension in high party ranks since 18 October, and the majority seemed to support Gomulka and the flexible program as opposed to Soviet domination and hard policies. The regime's main concern now was to consolidate support among party, worker, and youth elements on behalf of resistance to Soviet pressures.

Msg, Warsaw (Jacobs) to SecState, 500, 23 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 231504Z Oct 56. Received JCS 241156Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

23 Oct

cabled that reports of an increasing number of Soviet combat ships in the Mediterranean area, ostensibly for transfer to Egypt, had caused him to feel that this might be a Soviet method of building up its strength in the area without being obvious. Egypt had two Skory-class DD's, while two Soviet submarines had been reported as probably for delivery to Egypt. Delivery of two additional DD's and three additional submarines, as reported through-US channels, would give Egypt five submarines and four Skory-class DD's.

23 Oct The US Legation reported a mass demonstration in Budapest in which thousands of students and others rallied round the monument of a Polish General who had aided Hungary in 1848; they had voiced demands for withdrawal of Soviet troops, return of Nagy to leadership, and democratic political reforms. Cries of "Let's follow Poland's example" and "Out with the Soviet Army" were heard. (Only [redacted] Only) Msg, Budapest (Barnes) to SecState, 153, 23 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 232101Z Oct 56. Received JCS 241156Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

23 Oct [redacted] reported that a reconnaissance of the Israeli Central Command area disclosed very heavy military traffic, with some small units moving southward. Communications wire was being laid and bridges built. The 11th Armored Infantry Brigade seemed to be combat-loading preparatory to moving out. By contrast, the Northern Command area disclosed no Israeli military action.

Received JCS 240152Z Oct 56.

23 Oct The US Ambassador in Warsaw reported that Western correspondents might be sending out stories, apparently some based on leaks from party leaders, containing such items as: 1) Rokossovsky was due to lose his position as vice-premier and soon would probably also be displaced as defense minister and as commander of the armed forces, and 2) Gomulka and other Polish leaders talked by telephone with the Kremlin most of the night of 22 October and were expected to fly to Moscow to resume the conversations begun in Warsaw the previous week, although resumption of talks was perhaps contingent on withdrawal of Russian military threats. A Western colleague of the Ambassador confirmed that Soviet naval units present in the Gdansk region on 22 October had disappeared by noon on 23 October, and Western service attaches, who had been making a thorough coverage of Poland since 20 October, had so far discovered no unusual military activity, Polish or Russian.

(C) Msg, Warsaw (Jacobs) to SecState, 504, 23 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 232242Z Oct 56. Received JCS 241155Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

23 Oct The US Ambassador in Jordan reported that the Embassy's evaluation of the recently completed national election indicated an anti-West trend and the "now more likely" development of closer relations of Jordan with Egypt and Syria. The "weak" pro-West members of the new parliament would be outnumbered by anti-West members 19 to 12, but the 9 neutrals would hold the balance of power.

(C) Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 371, 23 Oct 56. Received State 240110Z Oct 56. Received JCS 241842Z Oct 56.

23 Oct The State Department informed the Ambassador in Paris that the Moroccan Charge d'Affaires had called at the Department the previous afternoon and had left an aide-memoire requesting US good offices in securing release of the Algerian leaders seized by the French on 22 October. State instructed Ambassador Dillon to raise the matter with appropriate French officials and discuss the possible consequences in North Africa, particularly to US strategic interests. The Ambassador was also asked to find out

whether the action resulted from a policy decision by the French Government or from a decision at lower levels, and to ascertain what the French intended to do now that Morocco and Tunisia had reacted so sharply.


(S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Paris, 1459, 23 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 241155Z Oct 56.

23 Oct

Commenting on reports that the Moroccans and Tunisians were soliciting US intervention with France on behalf of the Algerian rebels seized by the French on 22 October, the US Ambassador in Paris warned it would be a serious error to plead for persons the French considered common criminals who had organized large-scale killing of Frenchmen. Such action, he said, "would cause unpredictable damage to our relations with this country and to NATO framework."

(S) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 1894, 23 Oct 56. Received State 231808Z Oct 56. Received JCS 241842Z Oct 56.

23 Oct



Also, the Moroccan foreign office issued an official statement declaring that the French action was a definite provocation to both Tunisia and Morocco and that a solution to the fighting in Algiers was not possible now.

(S) Msg, [redacted] Received JCS 240531Z Oct 56.

23 Oct

A Naval intelligence report from Port Lyautey summarized Moroccan reaction to the arrest by the French of the five Algerian rebel leaders on 22 October. The Moroccans had called a general strike that had spread to all US bases by 231300Z October. A union delegate had assured the US command in Port Lyautey that the strike was directed against the French, not the Americans. All workers were to return to their jobs on 24 October. The French Navy at Port Lyautey had cancelled liberty and seemed to be fully mobilizing. American Air Force and Navy commands had adopted security measures and imposed travel restrictions in anticipation of possible violence against the French. Further Moroccan retaliation depended on the Sultan's reaction to the apparent French insult to his person and sovereignty.

(S) Msg, COMNAVACTS Port Lyautey to CNO, 231945Z Oct 56. Received JCS 240429Z Oct 56.

23 Oct

The State Department transmitted to New Delhi a personal message from Secretary Dulles to Nehru, dated 18 October, in reply to one from Nehru dated 5 October. Mr. Dulles discussed his own and Shepilov's roles in the Suez dispute and expressed the hope that Nehru would help in every way possible to facilitate a solution.

(S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy New Delhi, 1014, 23 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 241520Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

23 Oct (U)

The AP reported from Warsaw that defiantly anti-Russian demonstrations had erupted in three cities. A mass rally of Polish Air Force personnel in Warsaw linked the Polish Air Force with other Polish military men in support of Gomulka and called for an Army shakeup. Also, the Defense Ministry, long a center of Moscow and Stalinist strength, was shaken up; Rokossovsky seemed scheduled for eventual dismissal.

AP Wire Service, 23 Oct 56. Received JCS 232005Z Oct 56.

23 Oct

The US Legation in Budapest cabled SecState that Nagy had given a "moderating talk" to a Hungarian crowd demonstrating outside the Parliament. While waiting for Nagy's talk the crowd had demanded the removal of the Government and the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Nagy had called upon the demonstrators to wait for "natural developments," which he stated would lead to the democratization of Hungary.. Nagy's plea for moderation had been received coolly by the crowd. Gero had given a radio talk, brief and unconciliatory. Late in the evening fighting had broken out between students and populace on one hand and AVH and Army troops on the other. Tanks had been seen in the city, but Soviet forces had not yet been observed. Rumors placed the number of killed between 30 and 60. The Legation had received a "second-hand report" that Hungarian troops had refused to fire on the public. The Legation strongly urged that "media refrain from taking any kind of stand on Imre Nagy for the time being."

() Msg, Budapest (Barnes) to SecState, 154, 23 Oct 56. Received State 250832Z Oct 56. Received JCS 251849Z Oct 56.

23 Oct

Egypt had accepted Hammarskjold's invitation to meet with Britain and France at Geneva on 29 October.

() Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1156, 24 Oct 56. Received State 242053Z Oct 56. Received JCS 251547Z Oct 56.

23 Oct

The Jordanian delegate to the UN, Rifa'i, explained to Ambassador Lodge his action of 19 October calling for economic sanctions against Israel. The Israelis, he said, were now wedded to retaliation as a deliberate policy and, although he realized a resolution specifying economic sanctions could not pass, his Government felt something stronger than mere condemnation would have to be devised. Rifa'i pointed out that Yugoslavia and the USSR were requesting urgent meetings on the problem before 25 October, and he thought the US should be ready with an answer. Lodge recommended to Washington that the US join with France and the UK to invite General Burns to the 25 October meeting for questioning.

() Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 392, 23 Oct 56. Received State 240026Z Oct 56. Received JCS 241521Z Oct 56.

23 Oct

() Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1160, 24 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 242044Z Oct 56. Received JCS 251209Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.


23 Oct

[
] (S) Msg, CIA to JCS, 23 Oct 56, DA IN 262473 (24 Oct 56). Received JCS 241813Z Oct 56.

- 23 Oct (U) Beginning at noon, students, writers, office workers, Communist youth, and soldiers marched through the streets of Budapest demanding that Imre Nagy be placed at the head of the Hungarian Government. A crowd tried to tear down a statue of Stalin.
NYT, 24 Oct 56, 1:1. Received JCS 241230Z Oct 56.
- 23 Oct (U) New York Times correspondent Sydney Gruson, citing "reliable accounts," reported from Warsaw that night-long telephone conversations between Soviet and Polish Communist leaders led to a reported agreement for an end to all Soviet military measures in Poland by the evening of 25 October. Agreement had also been reached for a three-man delegation, consisting of Gomulka, Cyrankiewicz, and Ochab, to go to Moscow for talks on the crisis in Soviet-Polish relations.
NYT, 24 Oct 56, 1:2-3. Received JCS 241230Z Oct 56.
- 23 Oct (U) In Paris, Premier Mollet disclosed to the National Assembly that France 1) would accuse Egypt before the UN Security Council of having sponsored illegal arms traffic with North African rebels, and 2) had already recalled the French Ambassador from Cairo following Nasser's failure to explain Egyptian actions in the case of the intercepted arms ship Athos.
NYT, 24 Oct 56, 1:3. Received JCS 241230Z Oct 56.
- 23 Oct (U) President Eisenhower suggested that the US would give aid to Poland and other "freedom-loving" satellites if they "need and want and can profitably use" it.
NYT, 24 Oct 56, 1:7. Received JCS 241230Z Oct 56.
- 23 Oct (U) At a meeting in London on the night of 23 October, Eden and Pineau agreed to reject the cautious and indefinite Egyptian advances toward the reopening of negotiations over the Suez crisis. Following the conference, they said that no proposal put forward by the Egyptian Government could be seriously considered by the British and French Governments. The meeting followed receipt, during the day, of information from the UN and Egyptian sources that Nasser was ready to negotiate on guarantees for efficient and unrestricted use of the Suez Canal.
NYT, 24 Oct 56, 1:6. Received JCS 241230Z Oct 56.
- 23 Oct Staff members of the US Legation in Budapest observed Hungarian tanks at the demonstrations in front of the Hungarian broadcasting studio. The commander had assured the crowd that the tanks would not fire on Hungarians. Truckloads of Hungarian troops were observed in this vicinity. Some soldiers were neutral and some actually turned over their weapons to the demonstrators. The main fighting (with the AVH) took place around the radio studio, although the press building of Szabad Nep was also attacked as well as Soviet book stores. Rumors that Soviet troops had entered Budapest began spreading about 2200Z.
(Lmt'd Offl Use) Msg, Budapest (Barnes to SecState, 156, 24 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 251147Z Oct 56. Received JCS 251844Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

23 Oct President Quwwatli of Syria announced that he would leave for Moscow on 30 October, but that no serious negotiations would take place there. Although the visit might be called one of courtesy, he said, he was in fact unable to avoid it.
(~~err~~) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 910, 24 Oct 56, DA IN 262773. Received State 241616Z Oct 56. Received JCS 251250Z Oct 56.

23 Oct



23 Oct

24 Oct The Polish radio on the evening of 23 October and TRYBUNA on 24 October announced dismissal of Witaszewski as Vice Minister of National Defense and appointment in his place of Gen Spychalski, a Gomulka supporter.
(Lmtd Offl Use) Msg, Warsaw (Jacobs) to SecState, 509, 24 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 241808Z Oct 56. Received JCS 251208Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford. (An earlier copy, DA IN 262758, was received in JCS 250523Z Oct 56.)

24 Oct (U) According to Budapest Radio, the Hungarian Government had decreed martial law and had appealed to Soviet troops stationed in Hungary to help restore order in Budapest. The broadcast followed quickly an earlier one announcing that Nagy would become Hungary's new premier. Nagy himself broadcast an appeal to the rebels to lay down their arms by 1500Z (later reports said 1300Z), but a government announcement later extended the deadline to 1700Z.
AP Wire Service, 24 Oct 56. Received JCS 241133Z and 241334Z Oct 56. NYT, 24 Oct 56, 1:1 (late edition). Received JCS approximately 241600Z Oct 56.

24 Oct

Received JCS 252036Z Oct 56.

7

24 Oct In Amman, King Hussein told correspondents that the future of the Anglo-Jordanian defense treaty was "essentially a matter for parliamentary decision," but he thought it possible that the treaty would be revised

and "other things brought up to date." He said that the existence of the treaty was "not necessarily" incompatible with Arab nationalism. Ambassador Mallory commented that the King's remarks coincided with a statement recently made to an Embassy officer by the National Socialist leader (soon to become premier), Suleiman Nabulsi. The Ambassador said there was a widespread feeling in Amman that any talks with the British over revision of the treaty would probably spell its end.

Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 375, 25 Oct 56, DA IN 263174 (26 Oct 56). Received State 251657Z Oct 56. Received JCS 262258Z Oct 56.

24 Oct The US Ambassador in Baghdad reported that he had talked with the Foreign Minister of Iraq, Bashayan, at the Foreign Minister's request. The Ambassador had been informed that Bashayan had earlier in the day protested to France the arrest of the five Algerian leaders, and asked for their release. The Foreign Minister had expressed the hope that the US would also work for their release; he intended to ask the British to do the same.

Msg, Baghdad (Gallman) to SecState, 684, 24 Oct 56. Received State 250145Z Oct 56. Received JCS 261555Z Oct 56.

24 Oct [redacted] forwarded information that four Soviet divisions had moved from south of Berlin to northeast Germany just west of Stettin. All military hospitals in East Germany were being cleared of patients who could be moved, and the Soviet Navy was effecting a blockade of the Polish coast.

Received JCS 250901Z Oct 56.

24 Oct The US Ambassador in Warsaw reported that, [redacted] Khrushchev phoned Gomulka on 23 October to say that Soviet troop concentrations in Poland would be "relaxed" and that Soviet fleet units off the Polish coast would be withdrawn. The Ambassador commented that "Western military information here" had not confirmed any Soviet troop concentrations in Poland other than normal.

Msg, Warsaw (Jacobs) to SecState, 515, 24 Oct 56, DA IN 262817 (25 Oct 56). Received JCS 250558Z Oct 56.

24 Oct Soviet troops, with tanks and anti-tank guns, entered Budapest at 1530Z. Members of the US Legation staff counted 36 tanks, while reports reaching the Legation from other sources numbered Soviet tanks on one street alone at 80. The Legation estimated the Soviets had at least one tank regiment in the city. The streets were full of demonstrators and firing was still to be heard. [redacted] Msg, Budapest (Barnes) to SecState, 156, 24 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 251147Z Oct 56. Received JCS 251844Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

24 Oct The US Ambassador in Tripoli expressed his belief that the prospect of the French withdrawing from Fezzan by 30 November, as scheduled, was dim, and it was likely that an appeal to the UN on the issue would be made by the Arab-Asian bloc and supported by the Communist bloc. Unless the US made clear its refusal to support France on the Fezzan problem, the US could expect to see "a large hole blown in reservoir of goodwill here in Libya." The Ambassador added that a noisy but orderly strike, protesting the French arrest of the Algerian rebel

leaders on 22 October, was even then in progress in Tripoli. Crowds were shouting anti-British, anti-American, and pro-Soviet, pro-Algerian slogans.

Msg, Tripoli (Tappin) to SecState, 240, 24 Oct 56, DA IN 262775. Received State 241544Z Oct 56. Received JCS 251155Z Oct 56. Another copy, received in JCS at 251207Z Oct 56, was SEEN by Adm Radford.

24 Oct

The US Legation in Hungary cabled SecState to urge that a "highest level" statement condemning Soviet action in Hungary be released by the US. The Legation suggested the statement call attention to the Hungarians' "willingness [to] give their lives" to gain freedom, the ruthlessness of Soviet reaction to Hungary's effort to attain liberty, and the Soviet demonstration of the fact that the USSR considered Hungary "merely a colonial possession." Further, the Legation recommended that urgent consideration be given to a diplomatic protest from the US to the USSR on the continuing presence of Soviet troops in Hungary. Some action was urgent, for the Hungarians were demanding US arms and diplomatic assistance.

Msg, Budapest (unsigned) to SecState, Unnumbered, 3 p.m., 24 Oct 56. Received State 242225Z Oct 56. Received JCS 251547Z Oct 56. Another copy, received in JCS at 251844Z Oct 56, was SEEN by Adm Radford.

24 Oct

forwarded order of battle information he considered significant on the development of Syrian armored units. Some of these had Soviet tanks. He also forwarded reports of large shipments of Soviet-bloc heavy artillery and ammunition.

JCS 252300Z Oct 56.

Received

24 Oct

Egypt, Syria, and Jordan on 24 October concluded a military alliance in Amman. The agreement called for concentrating military efforts, coordinating plans, exchanging military aid, and placing all forces under the unified command of Egyptian MajGen Hakim Amer, in case of attack on any signatory. A combined staff was to be set up in Jordan. Egypt had furnished Jordan with small-arms ammunition and promised heavy equipment soon. Syria had provided small arms ammunition, 16 Sherman tanks, eight 105-mm howitzers, and 60 Bren gun carriers and promised more soon. Both states agreed to furnish Jordan with training personnel. Commenting on this agreement, Ambassador Mallory said that Jordan was now solidly in the camp of Egypt and Syria, while Iraqi military influence in Jordan had descended to its lowest level. The agreement also placed the Anglo-Jordanian treaty in jeopardy because of the unlikelihood that the British would place their troops under Egyptian command. Alluding to the recently elected anti-Western parliament, Mallory said any Western dealings with Jordan would now be most difficult, and perhaps impossible for the UK. He concluded that Gen Nuwar, as a result of Egyptian and Syrian aid, was now riding higher than ever.

Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 390, 27 Oct 56, DA IN 263974 (29 Oct 56). Received State 272142Z Oct 56. Received JCS 291209Z Oct 56.

24 Oct (U)

Two German businessmen arriving at the Austro-Hungarian frontier said they had seen dozens of Russian tanks rolling through Budapest, firing at buildings in the midst of heavy street fighting.

AP Wire Service, 24 Oct 56. Received JCS 241359Z Oct 56.

24 Oct

The US Ambassador in Paris reported that all French officials were under categorical orders not to discuss the details of how the seizure of the Algerian rebels was organized. The Ambassador learned from "well-informed political sources," however, that the plan was hatched at the last minute at subordinate levels and, although Lacoste knew about it, Mollet did not. Mollet was, nonetheless, firmly supporting the action, which had proved immensely popular with the French people and with the National Assembly. From the information provided by Ben Bella and the documents he carried, the French expected to learn the full story of the organization of the Algerian rebellion. Preliminary indications were that Tunisian Premier Bourguiba and the Sultan of Morocco were deeply involved, as well as some prominent French politicians and the Egyptian Government. Mollet now seemed to be convinced that the Sultan's open and gala reception of the leaders, and his apparent intent to convert the conference in Tunis into a meeting of the leaders of three independent nations, were intolerable and some action had been necessary.

() Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 1911, 24 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 241614Z Oct 56. Received JCS 251206Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

24 Oct

() Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 2242, 24 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 242116Z Oct 56. Received JCS 251207Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

24 Oct

The Iranian Foreign Minister told the US Ambassador in Tehran of highly secret talks that he had had with the Lebanese Foreign Minister. They had decided that peace and stability in the Middle East could best be promoted by inducing other Arab states to join the Baghdad Pact. Saudi Arabia was the key to the situation. The Iranian Foreign Minister intended to send a personal message to King Saud, while the Shah would make strong representations to him during a visit in December. The Lebanese Foreign Minister hoped to win the support of Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Libya. Together with Iraq and Lebanon, they could control the Arab League Political Committee.

() Msg, Tehran (Chapin) to SecState, 637, 24 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 241707Z Oct 56. Received JCS 251516Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

24 Oct

In a speech to a crowd in Warsaw during the afternoon, Gomulka declared that each of the socialist countries should be independently self-governed. No misunderstandings should be permitted to arise among them, but no interference should be allowed in their internal affairs. Gomulka emphasized the need for a sincere friendship between Polish and Soviet peoples not merely at the political level but at all levels. Khrushchev had given assurances that "Soviet troops in Poland, drawn here, will return to their regular stations," but Gomulka pointed out that, so long as NATO and "the Wehrmacht" threatened Polish borders, Soviet troops would remain in East Germany. In these circumstances, Gomulka said, the USSR was Poland's best friend. He promised, however, that Poland would decide whether and where Soviet specialists would remain to advise Polish military forces.

The US Ambassador reported that the crowd reacted with stolid calm to this speech, confirming his earlier impression that, while the people were glad the Communist regime now shared their view that Poland must have internal sovereignty, they felt the regime deserved little credit for taking so long to see the light.

() Msg, Warsaw (Jacobs) to SecState, 518, 24 Oct 56, DA IN 262843 (25 Oct 56). Received State 242225Z Oct 56. Received JCS 250934Z Oct 56. Another copy, received in JCS at 251208Z Oct 56, was SEEN by Adm Radford. (An earlier report of highlights of the Gomulka speech was received in JCS over AP Wire Service at 242024Z Oct 56.)

24 Oct

24 Oct

The US Ambassador in Tripoli reported that, following demonstrations on the morning of 24 October that were anti-French in particular and anti-West in general, the Prime Minister of Libya had made a strong plea for US intervention with France for release of the intercepted Algerian nationalist leaders. He had also handed the Ambassador a formal note on this subject, of which the Ambassador included a condensed translation.

() Msg, Tripoli (Tappin) to SecState, 242, 24 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 250107Z Oct 56. Received JCS 251208Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

24 Oct

In London the Foreign Office, at 1700Z, informed the US Embassy that the British Legation in Budapest reported all US personnel safe. There were, however, no communications between the US Legation and the outside world. The Foreign Office said that their Legation could add nothing to press reports of what was happening in Budapest.

() Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 2246, 24 Oct 56, DA IN 262756. Received State 241903Z Oct 56. Received JCS 250245Z Oct 56.

24 Oct

In response to instructions from the State Department, the Embassy in Paris approached the Foreign Office to express the serious concern of the US over possible effects in North Africa, especially Morocco, of the French kidnapping of the five Algerian rebels, and to inquire what France now intended to do.

() Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 1932, 24 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 242129Z Oct 56. Received JCS 251207Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

24 Oct

Received JCS 251305Z Oct 56.

- 24 Oct (u) In New Delhi the Government of India released a revised plan, drawn up by Krishna Menon, for operation of the Suez Canal. Egypt would control, maintain, and develop the canal, but would recognize a users' association whose functions would be limited to "consultation and liaison." Disputes would be settled by the UN or the International Court of Justice.
 NYT, 25 Oct 56, 4:3. Received JCS 251230Z Oct 56.
- 24 Oct (u) At a press conference held in Amman, following talks between Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian military leaders, the Jordanian Chief of Staff, Gen Nuwar, declared that Jordan had accepted the principle of over-all Egyptian command in case of war. However, this applied to strategic command rather than field command inside Jordan. Nuwar said Egypt had promised Jordan fighter planes, which would arrive soon. He also confirmed reports that Egypt and Saudi Arabia had promised to provide Jordan with financial aid if the Anglo-Jordanian treaty were abrogated.
 NYT, 25 Oct 56, 5:1. Received JCS 251230Z Oct 56.
- 24 Oct (u) The Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist Party, in the early morning, advanced Imre Nagy to the premiership, but retained Gero as party first secretary. Nagy immediately promised the people broad democratization, achievement of a Hungarian road to socialism, and improved living standards, and called for restoration of order. Late in the day, the amnesty deadline of 1700Z having passed, Soviet troops continued their efforts to stamp out the revolt, and Janos Kadar, newly elected to the Politburo, warned over Radio Budapest that the rebels "must capitulate or we will crush them."
 NYT, 25 Oct 56, 1:8. Received JCS 251230Z Oct 56.
- 24 Oct During the evening crowds of demonstrators, in which youth predominated, marched through the streets of Warsaw chanting slogans recalling the Katyn massacres and demanding Rokossovsky's return to Moscow. The demonstrations were peaceful and the public attitude was neither ugly nor tense. Militia and police at length dispersed the crowds through gentle persuasion.
 (u) Msg, Warsaw (Jacobs) to SecState, 524, 25 Oct 56, DA IN 263157 (26 Oct 56). Received State 251503Z Oct 56. Received JCS 260600Z Oct 56.
- 24 Oct Polish Prime Minister Cyrankiewicz, in a public address, said that within two days Soviet troops would return to three bases established by the Warsaw Pact to guard the Polish western frontier against German "revisionism."
 (u) Msg, Warsaw (Jacobs) to SecState, 532, 25 Oct 56, DA IN 263344 (26 Oct 56). Received State 260020Z Oct 56. Received JCS 261901Z Oct 56.
- 24 Oct Budapest stated that by the early hours of 24 October the crowds had smashed the Soviet bookstore and burned its books in the street. Stalin's statue, already toppled,

had been hauled to a main intersection. Fighting around the radio station continued, and with the arrival at 0330Z of heavily armed Soviet troops, estimated at one mechanized division, the intensity of fire increased. At 0500Z the radio began announcing the imposition of martial law and a curfew. The curfew was initially set at 0800Z, then 1300Z, and then 1700Z, as heavy fighting continued in the radio-station area, along the bridges, and elsewhere throughout the city. Five Soviet MIG-17's were observed in the air, probably on reconnaissance missions.

SEEN by Adm Radford.

Received JCS 251839Z Oct 56.

24 Oct

The US Ambassador to Egypt reported that on 24 October he had talked to Foreign Minister Fawzi on the Suez question. Fawzi had confirmed Egypt's acceptance of Hammarskjold's invitation to confer with the British and French. He had stated that British and French demands for specific Egyptian proposals were unreasonable, since the two countries had "ample material on which to negotiate. If they persisted in their demands, it would indicate bad faith on their part, and there would be little reason to resume negotiations. Egypt, according to Fawzi, could face the prospect of not resuming negotiations without being unduly perturbed. Queried by the Ambassador concerning the Menon Plan, the Foreign Minister had "shrugged shoulders," and stated that Egypt always appreciated the efforts of "well-intentioned persons" to be of assistance, but that the Menon Plan, "as such," was not under active consideration. However, certain ideas in the plan might be useful.

Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1166, 25 Oct 56. Received State 252123Z Oct 56. Received JCS 261555Z Oct 56.

24 Oct (u)

Polish militiamen fired tear gas into a crowd threatening to attack Soviet army installations in Legnica. According to New York Times correspondent Gruson, Soviet troops based in this area were brought in from East Germany during the recent political crisis. Although the official Polish news agency announced that "Soviet units in Poland have either already withdrawn to their bases or are in the course of doing so," Gomulka and Khrushchev had apparently reached an understanding that the Soviet divisions brought in from Germany and based at Legnica would remain.

NYT, 26 Oct 56, 1:4-5. Received JCS 261230Z Oct 56.

24 Oct

Msg, CIA to JCS

Received JCS 271831Z Oct 56.

24 Oct ✓

According to a report by CINCUSAREUR, as of 24 October, the bulk of the Soviet line divisions moved to the East German-Polish border on 18-19 October had returned to their home stations. However, engineer bridging equipment still remained near the Oder, indicating that, if Polish unrest heightened, Soviet units might still be moved into Poland.

Msg, CINCUSAREUR to DEPTAR, SX 2719, 261652Z Oct 56, DA IN 263520 (27 Oct 56). Received JCS 291827Z Oct 56.

25 Oct

reported that Egypt was scheduled that day to present Jordan with five UK Vampire jets. He noted that the gifts of military equipment from Egypt and Syria were becoming a problem to Jordan because of untrained personnel.

Received JCS 260450Z Oct 56.

25 Oct

The State Department established contact with the Legation in Budapest at 1030Z. During a telecon the Legation reported, among other things, that Soviet tanks were firing on the Hungarians in Budapest and Soviet troops and equipment were to be seen in heavy strength throughout the city. Some units were believed to have come from outside Hungary. Crowds were assembling in front of the Legation calling for US help. Some Russians seemed reluctant to fire on the Hungarians, while others appeared to have gone over to the rebels. The Legation summarized a radio speech by Nagy, in which he had promised that as soon as the insurgents laid down their arms, Soviet troops would be withdrawn to their former posts and negotiations would be started for total withdrawal of Soviet forces.

(~~CONFIDENTIAL~~) Msg, Budapest (unsigned) to SecState [Budapest-Washington telecon], unnumbered, 25 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State beginning 251030Z Oct 56. Received JCS 251844Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

25 Oct

reported that at 0800Z people began returning to work, more traffic was moving, the Soviet Embassy remained under guard by an estimated six tanks, and some HPA tanks were being used to control the crowd. At 0930Z received a report that the Soviets had turned over some tanks to the Hungarian people. At 0935Z a large crowd marched by the US Legation, asking for help, and it could be seen that a Soviet armored car had been taken over by the crowd. Later, a Soviet tank passed the Legation, manned by Hungarians, flying the old Hungarian flag, and followed by insurgents. At 0945Z, reported that 76 Soviet trucks, loaded with armed troops, had passed her residence. Their markings indicated these trucks might have come from Rumania.

Received JCS 251839Z Oct 56.

SEEN by Adm Radford.

25 Oct

reported that at 1000Z the heaviest fighting yet observed, marked by machine-gun, tank, and AA-gun fire, took place near the US Legation and Parliament.

Received JCS 300014Z Oct 56.

25 Oct (u)

Radio Budapest announced that Kadar had replaced Gero as First Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party.

AP Wire Service, 25 Oct 56. Received JCS 251341Z Oct. 56.

25 Oct

The Soviet press, in its first reports on events in Hungary, described the uprisings as the "failure" of an "anti-popular adventure" by a "reactionary organization" engaged in a "counter-revolutionary mutiny." It blamed forces of "foreign reaction," "released Fascist youth," "bandits," and "counter-revolutionists" for "criminal activities" against "legal authorities." Ambassador Bohlen commented from Moscow that this set the official Soviet line, interpreting events as strictly counter-revolutionary and inspired from abroad. In a further

comment on both Poland and Hungary, Ambassador Bohlen said that in Poland Gomulka would receive a general if not specific Soviet blessing. Once the USSR had decided against the use of force it had little choice but to go along with the new Polish regime, however unpalatable it might be to Khrushchev and his associates. Because of the different nature of events in Hungary, however, uprisings there would be treated as an attempt at counter-revolution, and Soviet intervention would be presented as assistance to a "brotherly socialist" regime that had asked for help to restore order. Ambassador Bohlen believed, however, that because the BBC version of the events was being received in USSR, the Soviet Government would still have to clarify its position in a more authoritative manner. This clarification, he thought, might be deferred until the scheduled 6 November speech by a member of the Presidium, which would be of unusual significance.

Msg, Moscow (Bohlen) to SecState, 937, 25 Oct 56, DA IN 263229 (26 Oct 56). Msg, Moscow (Bohlen) to SecState, 939, 25 Oct 56, DA IN 263237 (26 Oct 56), CJCS files. Received State (937) 251931Z, (939) 252106Z Oct 56. Received JCS (937) 270953Z; (939) 270959Z Oct 56. Msg No. 939 SEEN by Adm Radford.

25 Oct

From Warsaw, the US Ambassador reported that at 252000Z October, [redacted] had informed him that: 1) Three or four divisions of Soviet troops had entered Poland from East Germany several days earlier. They were staying in Poland, since the Gomulka-Khrushchev agreement did not cover their return to East Germany. 2) The Gomulka visit to Moscow had been postponed, with no new date set, because of the disturbances in Hungary. The visit would be for twenty-four hours to sign a communique giving Soviet approval to the recently adopted Polish party line.

Msg, Warsaw (Jacobs) to SecState, 536, 25 Oct 56, DA IN 263343 (26 Oct 56). Received State 260145Z Oct 56. Received JCS 261900Z Oct 56.

25 Oct

SecState cabled the US Ambassador to Yugoslavia, requesting that, unless he had strong objection, the Ambassador request of Popovic "or possibly Tito" a Yugoslav assessment of developments in Hungary and information on whether or not Yugoslavia planned to issue an official statement. SecState empowered the Ambassador to say that under the circumstances the US desired to minimize bloodshed, keep the Nagy-Kadar regime from taking reprisals, and, assuming the regime still had some good will among the populace, encourage it to proceed with rapid democratization. Such a course might be more easily achieved if Yugoslavia gave signs of support of such a policy, and was willing to use its influence with the Soviets to the "same ends."

Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Belgrade, 313, 25 Oct 56. Received JCS 261555Z Oct 56.

25 Oct

The State Department instructed the US Ambassadors in London, Canberra, Wellington, New Delhi, Pretoria, Ottawa, Belgrade, and Paris to ascertain the views of the Governments to which they were accredited concerning two courses the US had in mind for taking the Hungarian situation to the UN. One would be to address a letter to the President of the Security Council inviting attention to employment of Soviet troops against the Hungarian people, which was a violation of the UN Charter and the Hungarian peace treaty. The other would be to introduce a resolution in the Security Council establishing a committee to investigate the situation and report to the Security Council. State

left to the discretion of the US Ambassador in Belgrade the manner of approaching the Yugoslav Government, as Tito might find it awkward to join such a move in view of the discussions in Yalta.

Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy London, 2981, 25 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 261553Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

25 Oct The State Department instructed the US Ambassador in Paris to express to French officials "at highest level as appropriate" US concern over the situation developing in Tunisia and Morocco as a result of the French seizure of the five Algerian rebels. The US feared that deterioration in France's relations with these countries would undermine the moderate leaders in Tunis and Rabat, strengthen the extremist elements, and create a situation favorable to foreign exploitation. Such developments would be a threat to the security of the important strategic installations of the US in this area.

Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Paris, 1494, 25 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 261553Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

25 Oct (v) In reply to Jordan's complaint against Israel in the UN, Ambassador Eban told the Security Council that Israel would never start a war with its Arab neighbors, but warned that it could not "sit back and suffer the consequences of a unilateral Arab belligerency."
NYT, 26 Oct 56, 1:4. Received JCS 261230Z Oct 56.

25 Oct (v) President Eisenhower, in a statement released by the White House, denounced the use of Soviet forces in Hungary and expressed American sympathy for the Hungarian people. He said that Soviet troops should have been withdrawn from Hungary in accordance with the peace treaty, and their use to suppress the revolt proved that they were there to protect Soviet rather than Hungarian interests.

NYT, 26 Oct 56, 1:6. Received JCS 261230Z Oct 56.

25 Oct (v) Mikoyan arrived in Budapest from Moscow and departed later with Suslov.
AP Wire Service, 25 Oct 56. Received JCS 261247Z Oct 56.

25 Oct The King of Jordan opened Parliament. The newly elected Speaker, National Socialist Hikmat Al-Masri, said the nation had called for "liberating this country from imperialism, from the British grant, and for marching in company with liberated Arab States." The House of Representatives unanimously approved and sent to the Cabinet for action a proposal that Jordan sever diplomatic relations with France.

Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 385, 26 Oct 56, DA IN 263629 (27 Oct 56). Received State 261739Z Oct 56. Received JCS 272228Z Oct 56.

25 Oct

CIA Teletyped Info Rpt,

302135Z Oct 56.

Received JCS

26 Oct A leaflet signed by "new provisional revolutionary Hungary Government and civil defense committee" was distributed in parts of Budapest (including one to the US Legation), listing 17 concessions the rebels demanded of the Nagy regime. Among them were withdrawal of Soviet troops, free and secret parliamentary elections with participation of several parties, prosecution of Stalinists and freedom of speech, press, and radio.
 (S) Msg, Budapest (Barnes) to SecState, 161, 26 Oct 56, DA IN 264376 (30 Oct 56). Received State 292240Z Oct 56. Received JCS 310056Z Oct 56.

26 Oct [] reported that during the night of 25-26 October there was considerable truck movement toward the south; workshops and bivouacs were set up in the Tel Aviv area, and many individuals were mobilized. He commented that this mobilization was apparently confined to the Tel Aviv area and probably consisted of two brigades and auxiliary units. He could not determine which units were involved but their ultimate destination was apparently to the south.
 (S) Received JCS 261913Z Oct 56.

26 Oct Commenting on reports of Iraqi troop movements, [] stated that the total number of Iraqi troops on the Jordanian border was estimated to be about 6,000, with another 3,000 one day's march away. With maneuvers cancelled, the Iraqi Army would probably be devoting most of its time to the Jordanian and Syrian situation.
 (S) Received JCS 262159Z Oct 56.
 SEEN by Adm Radford.

26 Oct The US Ambassador in Tel Aviv reported that reservists and civilian vehicles were being mobilized "on considerable scale" in Tel Aviv and vicinity as far south as Rehovoth. This action, having begun the morning of 25 October, was still in progress at noon 26 October. There was wide knowledge of the movement among the local press and public, and a good deal of speculation that "something big may happen," with increasing mention in public and private circles of a community of interests between Israel and France.
 (S) Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 415, 26 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 261357Z Oct 56. Received JCS 261840Z Oct 56.

26 Oct [] reported large call-ups of vehicles and engineer construction equipment, as well as personnel. Reliable information reaching him indicated this was a "very large scale" mobilization. []
 [] all Israeli units, posts, camps, and stations were on standby alert. There were very heavy concentrations of personnel and material noted in the Lydda-Ramle-Rehovoth area, below Tel Aviv. At least two troop trains reached Tel Aviv from the north, with personnel then continuing south by motor. [] commented that available sources seemed to indicate, with some credibility, that Eilat might be a key point, and that the French might be working with the Israelis.
 (S) Received JCS 261913Z Oct 56.

26 Oct [] reported that [] covered Poland during the

preceding forty-eight hours. Soviet-Polish border-crossing points and East German-Polish border crossing points showed no unusual activity. All Soviet airfields were visited and nothing unusual was noted. In southwest Poland, Soviet tanks were seen returning to their bases. [] commented that the military situation seemed to be stable.

Received JCS 301458Z Oct 56.

25 Oct

[] reported that no Soviet ships were observed in the Gdynia area on 25 October or at 0700Z 26 October. There had been normal activity in the Szczecin and Gdynia-Gdansk areas in the preceding three days and no unusual activity was noted along the Polish-Soviet and Polish-East German border zones in the preceding five days. The only movement of Soviet troops was observed in southwest Poland, near Legnica, where Soviet armor was seen returning from the East toward the Neuhammer training area on the night of 24-25 October. No unusual activity within a 100-mile radius of Warsaw had been noted in the preceding five days. There was no confirmation of Polish-Soviet troop clashes near Legnica and Szczecin, as reported in various Western newspapers. There had been no unusual activity at major Soviet air bases in west and southwest Poland and at Polish operational air bases in the preceding three days. [] stated his belief that Khrushchev's promise that Soviet troops would be returned to their bases had been kept so far.

Received JCS 270454Z Oct 56.

26 Oct

According to a CIA report, [] rebel broadcasts from Hungary indicated that the rebel forces offered to negotiate with the Government on the basis of twelve conditions, among them withdrawal of Soviet forces, independent and free elections, religious freedom, rehabilitation of Cardinal Mindszenty, guarantee of minimum standard of living, land reform, and release of political prisoners.

() Msg, CIA to JCS.

Received

JCS 270935Z Oct 56.

26 Oct

[] According to [] President Quwwatli and other high-ranking Syrian officials were planning to leave by air for the USSR on 30 October. The Soviets, who were gaining in Syria every day, had furnished samples of weapons and promised quick and cheap delivery. Syrian officers were turning more and more toward the USSR and would continue to do so unless the Israeli matter was settled in the next six weeks. [] confirmed the continuation of arms shipments to Jordan and said the President had authorized all necessary aid. Egypt would send considerably more arms now that command unity under Gen Hakim Amer had been openly asserted.

Received JCS 270420Z Oct 56.

26 Oct

() Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 2290, 26 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 261932Z Oct 56. Received JCS 271725Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

- ~~TOP SECRET~~
- 26 Oct (u) After milder measures had failed, the Nagy-Kadar regime in Hungary ordered a general attack at dawn to put down the revolt at any cost. Belgian diplomats who had left Budapest for Austria at 1000Z reported heavy fighting in the city and said that the whole of Western Hungary was in rebel hands.
AP Wire Service, 26 Oct 56. Received JCS 261527Z Oct 56. NYT, 26 Oct 56, 1:8, (late edition). Received JCS approximately 261600Z Oct 56.
- 26 Oct US Ambassador Bohlen reported from Moscow that the Soviet press had not mentioned Nagy's demand for withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, but in general the press had treated Nagy himself favorably. The Ambassador pointed out that the tone of the press might be a cover pending reinforcement of Soviet troops in Budapest. He declined to speculate on possible shifts in Kremlin leadership but emphasized that the principle of collective leadership tended to make the entire Soviet leadership responsible for developments in Eastern Europe.
(u) Msg, Moscow (Bohlen) to SecState, 984, 26 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 291735Z Oct 56. Received JCS 301320Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.
- 26 Oct The US Legation in Budapest reported that all US diplomatic families had been moved into the Legation building and that several US citizens were due to leave by auto convoy for Vienna with other foreign nationals. Heavy fighting had been going on in the capital all day.
(u) Msg, Budapest (Barnes) to SecState, 165, 26 Oct 56, DA IN 264300 (30 Oct 56). Received State 292315Z Oct 56. Received JCS 302309Z Oct 56.
- 26 Oct The US Ambassador in London reported that the British were saying, in press background briefings, that US insistence on the Suez Canal Users Association paying canal dues to Egypt was responsible for Egypt's complete unwillingness to negotiate. The British saw no way, under the American plan, to bring pressure to bear on Egypt to force negotiation. Egypt had nothing to lose by sitting tight, since time was on her side. The UK and France would not agree to the US position.
(u) Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 2297, 26 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 262031Z Oct 56. Received JCS 291640Z Oct 56.
- 26 Oct The US Legation in Bucharest reported that reliable Western diplomatic sources confirmed that Soviet troops from the Timosoara area of western Rumania were called into Hungary in the very early hours of 24 October. A truck driver who saw them enter through Oradea (northwest Rumania) stated that very large forces were involved.
(u) Msg, Bucharest (Thayer) to SecState, 212, 26 Oct 56, DA IN 263722 (27 Oct 56). Received State 271314Z Oct 56. Received JCS 272311Z Oct 56.
- 26 Oct The US Ambassador to Yugoslavia cabled SecState that he had been unable to carry out the Secretary's instructions (DEPTEL 313) to request of Popovic or Tito a Yugoslav assessment of developments in Hungary and information on whether or not Yugoslavia planned to issue an official statement. The Ambassador had, however, given the preliminary position of the US on the developments in Hungary to the acting Foreign Secretary, Prica. Prica had stated that the Foreign Office was issuing a short statement on Hungary "today"; he doubted that his Government would go beyond this statement for the time being.

- (S) Msg, Belgrade (Riddleberger) to SecState, 546,
26 Oct 56. Received State 262016Z Oct 56. Received JCS
271727Z Oct 56.
- 26 Oct The US Legation in Budapest reported that on the morning
of 26 October the Szabad Nep had presented the program
of the trade union, the Hungarian writers, the workers of
Borsod, and the professors and university students for
forming a national and united new government. The
principal points included cessation of hostilities and
complete amnesty for all, formation of the new government
under Nagy, maintenance of order by the Hungarian Army
rather than by the AVH, and withdrawal of Soviet troops.
(S) Msg, Budapest (Barnes) to SecState, 167, 26 Oct
56, DA IN 264519 (30 Oct 56). Received State 300221Z
Oct 56. Received JCS 311133Z Oct 56.
- 26 Oct ✓ CINCUSAFE reported that observation on 24 and 25 October
seemed to indicate no withdrawal of Soviet Air Force
units from East German fields to support Soviet infantry
and armor deployment on the Polish border.
(S) Msg, CINCUSAFE to CSAF, 261754Z Oct 56, CAF IN
84599. Received JCS 301009Z Oct 56.
- 26 Oct [redacted] reported that a Soviet
armored unit observed in Budapest at 0100Z 25 October had
been definitely identified. [redacted] as
one normally stationed in Rumania.
[redacted] Received JCS 311622Z Oct 56.
- 26 Oct ✓ COMNAVACTS at Port Lyautey reported that stringent liberty
and travel restrictions were being imposed on all US
forces for the period of the Arab-world general strike
scheduled for 272000Z to 290800Z October in reaction to
the French arrest of five Algerian rebel leaders.
(S) Msg, COMNAVACTS Port Lyautey to CNO, 261925Z
Oct 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 270900Z Oct 56. SEEN
by Adm Radford.
- 26 Oct The US Ambassador in Tel Aviv confirmed the call-up of
Israeli reservists as far north as Haifa. The Ministry
of Defense and the army patrol stations, normally closed
at sundown for the beginning of the Sabbath, were still
fully operational at 1800Z. The Israeli Foreign Minister
had explained that a "very partial mobilization" had been
ordered as a result of the formation of the Egyptian-
Syrian-Jordanian unified command and the reports of Iraqi
troop movements. Ambassador Lawson, however, believed
this description of the size of the Israeli mobilization
to be an understatement, and that "the public here is
apprehensive that events are moving toward actual
hostilities."
(S) Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 419, 26 Oct
56, DA IN 263499 (27 Oct 56). Received State 262244Z Oct
56. Received JCS 270419Z Oct 56. (The copy SEEN by
Adm Radford was received JCS 271214Z Oct 56.)
- 26 Oct The US Ambassador in Paris presented to the Foreign Office
the US views on the French capture of the Algerian rebels,
as outlined in State's 1491 of 25 October.

(S) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 1998, 26 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 262121Z Oct 56. Received JCS 271724Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

26 Oct

[reporting the continued mobilization of Israeli Army personnel and vehicles, comment that this mobilization now exceeded any previous one. He estimated the total active strength of the Israeli Army as at least 105,000, with the call-up of personnel and materiel continuing at an abated pace. Most newly mobilized troops and materiel were in bivouac in areas south of Tel Aviv.]
[Unable to determine the cause or purpose of this mobilization, but still considered a move against the Straits of Tiran (the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba) a "good bet."]

Received JCS 291651Z Oct 56.

26 Oct

The US Legation reported from Budapest that the insurgents were deriving strength both from the strong popular revulsion to the Soviets and from the weapons turned over to them by the Hungarian Army. The Soviets were apparently trying to avoid bloodshed, and the Legation thought this attitude, plus the willingness of the people to risk their lives, might postpone the final settlement long enough to permit the rebels to develop an organization. Although the rebels had a printing press, there were few signs of central direction. The Soviet strategy seemed to be armored defense of strong points, with sporadic offensives in particular areas, and extensive patrolling.

(S) Msg, Budapest (Barnes) to SecState, 162, 26 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 300004Z Oct 56. Received JCS 301318Z Oct 56.

26 Oct

The US Ambassador in London was instructed to convey SecState Dulles' views on Hungary to Foreign Minister Lloyd immediately. Mr. Dulles believed the Hungarian revolt was assuming proportions that might "bring Red counter-action of major proportions." It seemed of great importance to the SecState that the attention of the UN be promptly focused on Hungary and that the Soviet delegate to the UN be approached informally with a view to alleviating the situation.

(S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy London, 3008, 26 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 291640Z Oct 56.

26 Oct (U)

According to reports reaching the Austrian border, Hungarian demonstrators in Magyarovar were fired upon by secret police and Soviet troops. An estimated 75 demonstrators were killed and 200 wounded.

AP Wire Service, 27 Oct 56. Received JCS 271420Z Oct 56.

26 Oct (U)

The Hungarian rebels in Budapest during the evening rejected the Nagy Government's third ultimatum to surrender. The Government thereupon cancelled its promises of amnesty and announced that the combined Russian and Hungarian armies would mount an all-out offensive to try to crush the rebels.

AP Wire Service, 27 Oct 56. Received JCS 271243Z Oct 56.

- 26 Oct In a conference with State Department officials, the Tunisian Ambassador in Washington said his Government had sent a note to the French Government protesting as "near aggression" certain movements of French troops in Tunisia. Moreover, the Tunisian Government had ordered its own troops to resist with force any French effort to occupy new garrisons in violation of existing agreements. (1) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Paris, 1515, 26 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 291640Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.
- 26 Oct (u) After an emergency meeting during the afternoon, the Hungarian Central Committee made a fresh appeal for peace and order. It promised a program almost identical with that of Gomulka's Polish party. The party leadership pledged it would seek withdrawal of Soviet troops from strong points as soon as order was restored, and offered unconditional amnesty to all insurrectionists. The Nagy Government would be reorganized, the Committee promised, on a broadly representative popular-front platform.
 NYT, 27 Oct 56, 1:8. Received JCS 271230Z Oct 56. (An earlier, incomplete report was received over the AP Wire Service at 261247Z Oct 56.)
- 26 Oct (u) A Yugoslav Government spokesman gave Tito's official blessing to the new Polish and Hungarian Communist Governments.
 NYT, 27 Oct 56, 4:3. Received JCS 271230Z Oct 56.
- 27 Oct _____ Estimated that three Soviet divisions were deployed in and around Budapest and another was on the border with Yugoslavia and Austria. The rebels had formed home defense committees, which _____ as an indication that an insurgent army had begun to develop. There were reports that railroads in eastern Hungary were clogged with in-bound Soviet military traffic.
 _____ Received JCS 300558Z Oct 56.
- 27 Oct The US Legation in Budapest described the dilemma faced by the Hungarian insurgents. If the rebels did not surrender, the Soviets under the legal cover of the Hungarian Communist Government would undertake ruthless suppression. On the other hand the insurgents had absolutely no confidence the government would carry out promised concessions and amnesty if they did capitulate. The Legation believed that, in view of past US statements in support of captive peoples, the US had to act decisively and quickly. A US or UN offer to mediate, now that the rebellion had grown to such proportions and the Soviets seemed undecided on what policy to pursue, might have some chance of acceptance by both sides if the following points were included: 1) immediate armistice; 2) withdrawal of Soviet troops to their garrisons; 3) surrender of insurgents to the Hungarian Army and establishment of police control by the Army; 4) acceptance of the Nagy government as an interim political power, which would cooperate with a UN commission; and 5) negotiation with the Soviets on troop removal with advice of the UN commission. The Legation urged that "immediate and highest level consideration" be given to proposing a settlement along these lines.
 (1) Msg, Budapest (Barnes) to SecState, 168, 27 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 300309Z Oct 56. Received JCS 301320Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

- TOP SECRET
- 27 Oct The US Army Attache in Cairo reported that there was no unusual military activity around Cairo on 27 October and that all was quiet in the Sinai area. The Egyptians did not appear to be "overly apprehensive" of serious Israeli retaliation for losses inflicted on Israel by Egyptian mines near Al Auja about 20 October.
- (S) Msg, USARMA Cairo to ACSI DEPTAR, MAE-CX 227-56, 271204Z Oct 56, DA IN 263766, CJCS files. Received JCS 280540Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.
- 27 Oct The US Ambassador in London reported that the British had agreed to a joint US-UK inscription of Hungary on the Security Council agenda under Article 34, to take place that day. The British requested a joint announcement as soon as action was taken, and also felt it essential that France be given a chance to join the US and UK.
- (S) Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 2316, 27 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 271309Z Oct 56. Received JCS 291640Z Oct 56.
- 27 Oct The US Ambassador in Tel Aviv cabled that the call-up of reservists and civilian vehicles previously reported had continued to the morning of 27 October, and the consensus was that partial mobilization had by then gone beyond any point reached during previous crises. A significant step not taken in other crises was the placing of the largest civilian hospital in Israel on emergency alert. The Ambassador noted that while the Israeli Foreign Minister on 26 October had spoken of a partial mobilization because of events to the east, the principal troop movements were to the south.
- (S) Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 420, 27 Oct 56, DA IN 263782 (28 Oct 56). Received State 271737Z Oct 56. Received JCS 280459Z Oct 56.
- 27 Oct (U) Soviet and Red Hungarian troops mounted an all-out offensive at dawn following rejection by the rebels of the Government's third surrender ultimatum. Bitter fighting was reported from Budapest, and rebel forces were said to be gaining ground in northern, southern, and western Hungary. At Gyor, near the Austrian frontier, rebel groups set up an independent Hungarian Government. Budapest Radio alternated threats with appeals for surrender and promises of reform. Nagy announced the formation of a new popular-front government. The new Cabinet included ex-Premier Zoltan Tildy and Bela Kovacs, leaders of the outlawed Smallholders' Party.
- AP Wire Service, 27 Oct 56. Received JCS 271237Z, 271243Z, and 271357Z Oct 56.
- 27 Oct Libyan Prime Minister Ben Halim told the American Ambassador that he was convinced the French had no intention of evacuating Fezzan by 30 November, and in fact were reinforcing the garrison and bringing in ammunition. Ben Halim had told the French that nothing short of withdrawal by 30 November would be politically acceptable to Libya. In Ben Halim's view, the Libyans could try to force the French out or to interdict their supplies, but either course would lead to shooting. Ambassador Tappin counseled strongly against resort to force and in favor of taking the matter to the UN. Tappin warned Washington, however, that Libya was surrounded by Algerians and Egyptians who would probably not be unhappy to see France and Libya engaged in hostilities.
- (S) Msg, Tripoli (Tappin) to SecState, 251, 27 Oct 56, DA IN 263907. Received State 272136Z Oct 56. Received JCS 290130Z Oct 56.

27 Oct

(S) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2003, 27 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 271721Z Oct 56. Received JCS 291316Z Oct 56.

27 Oct

From Moscow, US Ambassador Bohlen commented on possible Soviet future actions concerning Poland and Hungary. The chief lesson of the Polish events, he said, was that the USSR would not use overt force against a Communist regime, even if it pursued policies contrary to Soviet wishes. On the other hand, the Soviets were prepared to use regular Soviet troops in support of and on the request of Communist regimes, as in the case of Hungary. Discussing the possibility that the Western Powers were considering bringing Soviet use of force in Hungary before the UN, Ambassador Bohlen urged caution. He questioned whether it might not actually drive the Hungarian and Soviet regimes closer together, rather than lead to greater independence along the Polish and Yugoslav models, since Nagy and the Soviets would have a common interest in defending the request for utilization of Soviet troops. However, if it was felt that Nagy had compromised himself as a leader of the Hungarian national movement and was in effect a Soviet prisoner, then there was no harm and every advantage in bringing the case before the UN.

(S) Msg, Moscow (Bohlen) to SecState, 969, 27 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 271722Z Oct 56. Received JCS 291610Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

27 Oct

The US Legation in Budapest reported having been asked by the Hungarian writers' organization to act as an intermediary in arranging an armistice, followed by negotiations, between the Government and insurgent leaders.

(S) Msg, Budapest (Barnes) to SecState, 169, 27 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 300017Z Oct 56. Received JCS 301320Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

27 Oct (U)

Hungarian rebel broadcasts monitored in Frankfurt declared five Hungarian divisions had gone over to the rebels, and indicated that all of western Hungary, as well as some areas in the east, was in the hands of the revolutionists.

AP Wire Service, 27 Oct 56. Received JCS 271520Z Oct 56.

27 Oct (U)

A new Moroccan cabinet, headed by Premier M'barek Bekkai, was sworn in by the Sultan. The change gave predominance to the strongly nationalistic Istiqlal party. The new cabinet members were picked to deal with the latest break with France.

NYT, 27 Oct 56, 1:8 (late edition). Received JCS approximately 271600Z Oct 56.

27 Oct

The US plan for taking the Hungarian situation to the UN met with the wholehearted approval of Canada and the qualified approval of France and the UK. Both France and the UK agreed to introduction of a resolution such as the US had in mind.

On 28 October Ambassador Lodge attempted to stimulate letters from other UN members to the President of the Security Council associating their governments with the US proposal. He met with indifferent success. Syria and Egypt reflected the Arab view that what was happening in Hungary had been happening in Algeria for over a year.

(S) Msg, Ottawa (Merchant) to SecState, 190, 26 Oct 56. Received State 262251Z Oct 56. Received JCS 271727Z Oct 56. (S) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2002, 27 Oct 56. Received State 271439Z Oct 56. Received JCS 291639Z Oct 56. (Offl Use Only) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 417, 27 Oct 56. Received State 272209Z Oct 56. Received JCS 292158Z Oct 56. (S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 421, 27 Oct 56. Received State 280104Z Oct 56. Received JCS 292056Z Oct 56. (C) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 426, 28 Oct 56. Received State 290553Z Oct 56. Received JCS 292058Z Oct 56. (C) Pretoria (Byroade) to SecState, 99, 29 Oct 56. Received State 292247Z Oct 56. Received JCS 301701Z Oct 56.

27 Oct (U) SecState Dulles said the Big 3 had "agreed in principle" to take the Hungarian crisis to the UN and that there would probably be a final decision on such action later in the day.

AP Wire Service, 27 Oct 56. Received JCS 271620Z Oct 56.

27 Oct

(S) Msg, Belgrade (Riddleberger) to SecState, 549, 27 Oct 56. Received State 271915Z Oct 56. Received JCS 292058Z Oct 56.

27 Oct

At an afternoon meeting of the North Atlantic Council the idea of bringing the Hungarian situation before the UN received general support. The Council agreed that the members would recommend that their governments instruct their UN delegations in New York to consult with the US, UK, and French delegations with a view to lending them effective support.

(S) Msg, Paris (Perkins) to SecState, POLTO 930, 27 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 291634Z Oct 56. Received JCS 301320Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

27 Oct

In conversation with Secretary General Hammarskjold at the UN, Ambassador Lodge expressed US concern over the major mobilization going on in Israel. Hammarskjold said he had received no information on this matter from General Burns but would immediately question him by cable.

(S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 420, 25 Oct 56. Received State 272139Z Oct 56. Received JCS 291639Z Oct 56.

27 Oct

SecState warned the Embassies at Cairo and other Middle Eastern capitals that Israeli military action against Jordan or Egypt in the near future seemed a strong possibility, requiring a full alert of all Embassy personnel in case evacuation suddenly became necessary.

(S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Cairo, 1282, 27 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received JCS as encl to (S) Memo, Dir Exec Sect, State Dept to Radford, "Security of American Citizens in the Middle East," 29 Oct 56 (No Time). SEEN by Adm Radford.

27 Oct (U)

In a major foreign-policy speech in Dallas, SecState Dulles offered US economic aid to Soviet satellites to tide them over the period of economic adjustment that must come if they gained some independence from Moscow. Dulles assured Moscow that the US did not look on these nations as "potential military allies."


AP Wire Service, 27 Oct 56. (Advance text for release at 272300Z Oct 56.) Received JCS 271713Z Oct 56.

27 Oct


The Tunisian Ambassador in Washington called at the State Department to bring to the attention of the US the continuing movement of French troops in Tunisia. French explanations had been accepted by the Tunisian Government, but a pattern was emerging from these movements that indicated a threat to the security, sovereignty, and independence of Tunisia. French troops were moving east from Algeria, and they were active in areas where there were political objectives but no military objectives. Fighting had occurred between French troops and Tunisian civilians. The Ambassador wanted the US again to approach the French on this matter.

(S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Paris, 1532, 27 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 291640Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

27 Oct



27 Oct




27 Oct (U) Sources in London said fresh Soviet troops were pouring into Hungary from the USSR.
NYT, 28 Oct 56, 31:1. Received JCS 281330Z Oct 56.

27 Oct (U) In New York the US, UK, and France, in a letter to the President of the UN Security Council, called for action on Soviet intervention in Hungary. The letter charged the USSR with violating the 1947 Treaty of Paris, which established peace between Hungary and the World War II allies.
NYT, 28 Oct 56, 1:3. Received JCS 281330Z Oct 56.

27 Oct (U) President Eisenhower conferred with SecState Dulles during the afternoon on the continuing reports of Israeli military activity. Following the meeting the President sent a personal message to Ben Gurion expressing his grave concern and renewing a previous recommendation that Israel take no forceful action that would endanger peace in the Middle East.
NYT, 29 Oct 56, 1:3, 3:2. Received JCS 291330Z Oct 56.

28 Oct



28 Oct The US Ambassador in Rome reported that the Hungarian revolt was having a profound effect in Italy. She cautioned against emphasizing "Big Three" in any UN action on Hungary. The Italians also were vitally interested, and she had gained the impression they would be willing to play an appropriate role in bringing the question before the Security Council if the US desired. The internal political effects of the Hungarian situation seemed potentially far-reaching to Ambassador Luce, for they were tending to split the Socialists and Communists... and would probably lead to general elections in the spring of 1957.

(S) Msg, Rome (Luce) to SecState, 1772, 28 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 280945Z Oct 56. Received JCS 291640Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

28 Oct



TOP SECRET
28 Oct

[] reported intense and widespread military activity during the afternoon and night of 27 October and the morning of 28 October. Mobilization now appeared to have reached 80 per cent and all indications pointed to its becoming total. An estimated 170,000 men were on active duty. Major concentrations appeared to be in the Negba and Rehovoth areas, but the eastern and northern frontiers had also been reinforced. [] thought the Israelis might strike on the night of 28-29 October.

SEEN by Adm Radford.

28 Oct

[] estimated the mobilization of Israeli forces to be 80 per cent complete. The major deployment was to the south. There were some indications of close Israeli-French coordination, and the Israeli attitude toward the British was "suspicious." At Haifa, indications of a logistic back-up for a major effort had increased during the month, and there were many signs that a major action was possible in the next twenty-four hours.

[] reported further that only two destroyers were still in Haifa, along with three Israeli merchant ships. The local press reported that the French battleship Jean Bart and a light cruiser were en route to the Middle East. [] recommended air surveillance of off-shore naval activity to the south.

SEEN by

Adm Radford.

28 Oct

The US Legation in Budapest reported that, in the absence of rapid communications with Washington, Counselor Barnes had been compelled to make operational decisions normally referred to the Department. He had, accordingly, talked unofficially with Nagy's Deputy Foreign Minister and offered in effect, to act as intermediary in bringing the insurgent and Government together. This offer was rejected, leading Barnes to conclude that the Government had no thought of making a deal with the revolutionists. The Counselor reported that Soviet troops based in other satellites and possibly the USSR were moving into Hungary.

(C) Msg, Budapest (Barnes) to SecState, 171, 28 Oct 56, DA IN 264284 (30 Oct 56). Received State 292400Z Oct 56. Received JCS 302024Z Oct 56.

28 Oct

(C) Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 2322, 29 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 291906Z Oct 56. Received JCS 301932Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

28 Oct Austrian Foreign Minister Figl told the Big Three Ambassadors that he was appealing to Moscow to cease intervening in Hungary. He had already informed the Soviet Ambassador, who had protested that the USSR was acting pursuant to the Warsaw Pact. Figl was preparing a formal note for Moscow. He added that Austrian troops at the border would receive all refugees and soldiers of any nationality but would shoot anyone who refused to be disarmed.
(S) Msg, Vienna (Thompson) to SecState, 918, 28 Oct 56, DA IN 263980 (29 Oct 56). Received State 281837Z Oct 56. Received JCS 291307Z Oct 56.

28 Oct The US Ambassador in Cairo reported he had placed Embassy personnel on full alert and was maintaining a 24-hour communications watch but had not begun evacuation.
(S) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1190, 28 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 281653Z Oct 56. Received JCS as an encl to (S) Memo, Dir Exec Sect, State Dept to Radford, "Security of American Citizens in the Middle East," 29 Oct 56 (No Time). SEEN by Adm Radford.

28 Oct A Jordanian mob sacked and burned the French Consulate General in the Jordanian sector of Jerusalem, reportedly injuring two French guards.
(S) Msg, Jerusalem (Cole) to SecState, 124, 28 Oct 56, DA IN 263955 (29 Oct 56). Received State 281901Z Oct 56. Received JCS 290952Z Oct 56.

28 Oct

STATE

(S) Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 2329, 29 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 291909Z Oct 56. Received JCS 301932Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

28 Oct A general strike was held in Damascus to protest the French seizure on 22 October of the five Algerian rebel leaders. The demonstrations were peaceful, although the night before, bombs had exploded at the French Embassy and French Franciscan girls' school. In Aleppo, however, the French Consulate General was bombed and the French cultural center and three French schools were burned. Demonstrators began rioting and, after police failed to quell disorder, troops were called out and fired on the rioters. A military governor was installed and martial law proclaimed.
(S) Msg, Damascus (unsigned) to SecState, 945, 28 Oct 56, DA IN 263976 (29 Oct 56). Received State 282348Z Oct 56. Received JCS 291152Z Oct 56.

~~TOP SECRET~~
28 Oct The US Ambassador in Tel Aviv reported continuing strong indications that Israeli military action on a large scale would begin in the very near future, perhaps within the next 24 hours. The Ambassador had an appointment to see Ben Gurion and deliver the President's letter at 1800Z. If that interview produced nothing to dispel conviction that hostilities were soon to begin, he intended to invoke Phase 2 evacuation of US nationals.

(S) Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 422, 28 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 282133Z Oct 56. A copy, hand-carried by a JCS officer, reached JCS at about 1945 28 Oct (290045Z Oct 56) and was later stamped Received JCS 2011 28 Oct (290111Z Oct 56). "Advance Copy" received JCS 290530Z Oct 56. Regular distribution copy received JCS 292056Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

28 Oct Discussing the current Israeli mobilization with [redacted] during the afternoon, [redacted] "through involved and hypothetical series questions and answers," and "with obvious intent convey information," indicated that Israel was going to strike Jordan and drive to the west bank of the Jordan River. Iraq would then occupy the rest of Jordan. Egypt would attack Israel and Israel was ready. [redacted] would not say when the attack was to be made. Reporting this conversation to Washington, [redacted] said he had little confidence in [redacted] honesty, and he did not know whether Sinai was trying to convey information by indirection or was being deliberately deceptive. [redacted] added that Israeli mobilization was approaching 100 per cent.

SEEN by Adm Radford.

28 Oct The US Ambassador in Damascus reported that Americans outside the city were being alerted. As soon as it became evident that hostilities between Israel and either Egypt or Jordan had gone beyond reprisal raids, he intended to begin evacuating US dependents, probably overland to Beirut. (S) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 946, 28 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 282133Z Oct 56. Received JCS 292056Z Oct 56.

28 Oct The US Army Attache in Budapest reported that there now seemed to be from three to five additional Soviet armored divisions in Budapest. Unit markings on the trucks indicated that one was probably from Rumania and another from the Soviet Union. (S) Msg, USARMA Budapest to DEPTAR, B-230, 282015Z Oct 56, DA IN 264323 (30 Oct 56). Received JCS 301216Z Oct 56.

28 Oct The State Department, referring to the President's statement on Israel, instructed the Embassies in Amman, Damascus, Beirut, and Cairo to approach the governments to which accredited, express the President's concern at the situation in the Middle East, and request that these governments refrain from any action that could lead to hostilities.

(S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Amman, 444, 28 Oct 56. Received JCS 292058Z Oct 56.

- 28 Oct (U) In the UN Security Council, Sobolev charged the Western Powers, especially the US, with fomenting the Hungarian revolution. He claimed the Hungarian Government had called on the USSR to help put down the uprising, and the affair was a domestic one not subject to UN jurisdiction. The Hungarian representative echoed Sobolev's arguments.
AP Wire Service, 28 Oct 56. Received JCS 282159Z Oct 56
- 28 Oct (U) According to an AP report, there were indications that Rokossovsky was no longer in direct control of the Polish Defense Ministry and Army.
AP Wire Service, 28 Oct 56. Received JCS 282219Z Oct 56.
- 28 Oct Ambassador Lawson delivered President Eisenhower's message of 27 October to Ben Gurion at 1800Z.
- (S) Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 424, 28 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 290313Z Oct 56. Received JCS 292056Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.
- 28 Oct The State Department, referring to the mounting crisis in their area, alerted all Middle Eastern posts for evacuation of American nationals. Posts in Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Israel were instructed to contact CINCNELM and immediately begin Phase 3, urgently reducing the number of Americans in those countries. Other Near Eastern posts were to continue a 24-hour security watch and keep CINCNELM advised of the number of people to be evacuated.
(S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Amman, et al, 447, 28 Oct 56. Received JCS 282230Z Oct 56 (Advance copy). SEEN by Adm Radford.
- 28 Oct (U) The UN Security Council, by a vote of 9 to 1 (USSR), with Yugoslavia abstaining, agreed to place the Hungarian question on the agenda. In speeches following the vote Ambassador Lodge denied any US complicity in the uprising and UK representative Dixon challenged the Soviet Union to deny that strong Soviet forces were currently entering Hungary from Rumania.
AP Wire Service, 28 Oct 56. Received JCS 282253Z and 282313Z Oct 56.
- 28 Oct (U) Cardinal Wyszynski, Roman Catholic Primate of Poland, was released from house arrest by the Polish Government.
AP Wire Service, 28 Oct 56. Received JCS 282326Z Oct 56.
- 28 Oct Gen Burns reported intense Israeli military activity to UN Secretary General Hammarskjold. Burns estimated that the equivalent of a division had been added to Israeli forces on active duty. The build-up seemed to be in the area around Beersheba and toward El Auja, with elements echeloned back toward Tel Aviv. An official at the Foreign Office had explained that the mobilization had been ordered to enable Israel to man all her frontiers with forces sufficient to repel any Arab invasion. Specifically, it had been ordered because

of the renewed Fedayeen activity, the conclusion of the tripartite military alliance between Syria, Jordan, and Egypt, and the presence of Iraqi forces near the Jordanian border.

() Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 422, 28 Oct 56, DA IN 263979 (29 Oct 56). Received State 290045Z Oct 56. Received JCS 291138Z Oct 56.

28 Oct The rebel radio at Gyor, Hungary, at about 1400Z 28 October, demanded that the Nagy regime require the Soviet commander to cease fire immediately and that all fighting be ended by 1900Z, 28 October. These decisions were to be broadcast over Radio Budapest. If the conditions were not met, the population of western Hungary would march on Budapest and help the revolutionary forces there.

() Msg, [] 290003Z Oct 56, DA IN 293935. Received JCS at approximately 290330Z Oct 56.

28 Oct The initiative of the US, UK, and France in bringing "the situation in Hungary" before the UN was endorsed in the Security Council by Cuba, Peru, China, Australia, and Belgium, and denounced by the USSR as a flagrant violation of the Charter, designed to further incite reactionary counter-revolutionary elements in Hungary.

() Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 429, 29 Oct 56, DA IN 264102. Received State 290728Z Oct 56. Received JCS 300118Z Oct 56.

28 Oct (u) The White House during the afternoon issued a Presidential statement saying that further reports from the Middle East indicated that Israeli mobilization was almost complete. The President said he had sent Ben Gurion a message the previous afternoon and was now sending him a second message counseling restraint.

NYT, 29 Oct 56, 3:2. Received JCS 291330Z Oct 56.

28 Oct (u) Several hours after President Eisenhower's statement on Israeli mobilization, the State Department announced that all Americans in the Middle East "not performing essential functions" would be asked to leave "as a matter of prudence." The Department also asked all Americans planning to visit the Middle East to postpone their departure "until the situation is clear."

NYT, 29 Oct 56, 1:3. Received JCS 291330Z Oct 56. (An earlier, less complete AP version was received JCS 282301Z Oct 56.)

28 Oct (u) After a late afternoon conference with SecState Dulles in Washington, Israeli Ambassador Eban told reporters that Israel was mobilizing only because "we have reason to fear an attack on us by neighboring states." He said his country's fears had been "intensified by careful developments in Arab policy in the past few days." In a speech that night Eban said that "Israel will start no war."

NYT, 29 Oct 56, 3:2. Received JCS 291330Z Oct 56.

28 Oct (u) After an emergency cabinet meeting Nagy ordered a cease-fire for 1200Z. Radio Budapest called on all military and security forces, including the Soviets, to remain in their present positions until new orders were issued. Nagy broadcast an appeal to the

revolutionists and promised a general amnesty, withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest as soon as new Hungarian police formations were organized, and early negotiations with Moscow for removal of Soviet troops from Hungary.

NYT, 29 Oct 56, 1:6-8. Received JCS 291330Z Oct 56. (Earlier, fragmentary AP reports were received JCS 281654Z, 281753Z, 282119Z, and 282146Z Oct 56.)

28 Oct (U) The Israeli Government announced at about 1700Z that Army reserves had been mobilized and stationed along the borders of neighboring Arab states. The Government stated that the forces mobilized comprised only a "number of reserve battalions," but observers judged the mobilization the biggest since the end of the Palestine war. The announcement linked the mobilization with the renewal of Egyptian commando raids; the military alliance concluded in Amman on 24 October between Jordan, Syria, and Egypt; the stationing of Iraqi troops on Jordan's frontier; and the reported declarations of Jordanian, Egyptian, and Syrian leaders that "their principal concern is a war of destruction against Israel."

NYT, 29 Oct 56, 1:2, 3:4. Received JCS 291330Z Oct 56. (An earlier, less complete AP report stated the announcement described the mobilization as a "precautionary measure to safeguard . . . borders and border settlements." Received JCS 281758 Oct 56.)

28 Oct (U) Jordanian demonstrators, protesting the French arrest of Algerian leaders, sacked and burned the French Consulate in Jerusalem.

NYT, 29 Oct 56, 1:8. Received JCS 291330Z Oct 56.

28 Oct (U) Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski, Catholic Primate of Poland who was imprisoned by the Polish Communist regime in 1953, was released from police detention and returned to Warsaw. The official Polish news agency said that a joint Government-Church commission would be established soon to settle outstanding problems between Church and State.

NYT, 29 Oct 56, 7:1. Received JCS 291330Z Oct 56.

28 Oct (U) New York Times correspondent Gruson reported from Warsaw that Rokossovsky had left for Moscow, probably not to return to Poland. He said a special commission of inquiry a few days previously had uncovered proof that Rokossovsky was plotting a coup against Gomulka and that Rokossovsky had departed shortly thereafter.

NYT, 29 Oct 56, 1:4. Received JCS 291330Z Oct 56.

28 Oct Anti-French strikes and demonstrations were held in Amman under royal sponsorship. Mobs stoned the French Embassy, but police kept the demonstrators under control. (Offl Use Only) Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 395, 29 Oct 56, DA IN 264213 (30 Oct 56). Received State 291414Z Oct 56. Received JCS 300336Z Oct 56.

28 Oct

29 Oct (✓)

In a letter to the Hungarian Central Committee, Tito appealed to the Hungarian people to stop fighting. He said their rebellion might wreck all hopes of socialism in their country and endanger world peace.

NYT, 30 Oct 56, 20:3. Received JCS 301330Z Oct 56.

29 Oct (✓)

In Paris, France formally lodged charges of treason against the five Algerian nationalist leaders kidnapped on 22 October. The offense carries the death penalty.

NYT, 30 Oct 56, 1:7. Received JCS 301330Z Oct 56.

29 Oct

Received JCS 010350Z Nov 56.

29 Oct

The US Ambassador in Warsaw reported that the Polish press on 27 and 28 October had carried accounts of actions by Spychalski appropriate to the Minister of Defense, with no mention of Minister of Defense Rokossovsky, who was rumored to be on leave, perhaps in the USSR. The Ambassador added that the Polish press had also reported that Soviet troops, in Poland by international agreements, were stationed exclusively at the bases provided for in the agreements.

Msg, Warsaw (Jacobs) to SecState, 563, 29 Oct 56, DA IN 265112 (31 Oct 56). Received State 301414Z Oct 56. Received JCS 011540Z Nov 56.

29 Oct

According to a CIA report.

that the rebel radio at Nyiregyhaza had been calling for help to repel the 3d Soviet Army, which was crossing the Soviet-Hungarian border at 0023Z on 29 October.

Msg, CIA to JCS.

Received JCS 301518Z Oct 56.

29 Oct

Three groups of Fedayeen penetrated Israel early on the morning of 29 October, according to the Israel Foreign Liaison Office. Two groups were captured; the third escaped with some wounded personnel. The Foreign Liaison Office stated that the captured leader admitted the groups had been sent by Egypt to murder and sabotage.

The US Army Attache, Tel Aviv, commented that this event might trigger Israeli action against Egypt.

(S) Msg, USARMA Tel Aviv to DEPTAR, CX 387, 291104Z Oct 56, DA IN 264029. Received JCS 291652Z Oct 56.

29 Oct (✓) Various news media carried reports indicating that, while Soviet troops still patrolled Budapest, they had begun to evacuate the city.
AP Wire Service, 29 Oct 56. Received JCS 291349Z Oct 56. NYT, 29 Oct 56, 1:8. Received JCS approximately 291700Z Oct 56. NYT, 30 Oct 56, 1:3. Received JCS 301330Z Oct 56.

29 Oct [redacted] reported observations of [redacted] made while travelling by car from Budapest to Vienna on 29 October. Soviet troops and tanks were still in Budapest as of 290930Z October. There appeared to be no Soviet troops on the road west from Budapest to the Austrian border.
(S) Received JCS 292215Z Oct 56.

29 Oct [redacted] reported that Israel was stockpiling large quantities of aviation gas and jet fuel. There was intense activity at the air bases, and all aircraft were being serviced and armed. Air Force mobilization appeared about 40 per cent complete.

(S) Received JCS 291514Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

29 Oct [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2028, 29 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 292231Z Oct 56. Received JCS 301318Z Oct 56.

29 Oct A rebel leader who said he had visited Nagy at the head of a four-man delegation the night before called at the US Legation at 1130Z. He said Nagy had agreed to all the demands of the delegation but had insisted he be backed as head of the present legally constituted government. The same insurgent visited the Legation 2 1/2 hours later to ask what the "new government" should do and how an international forum could be brought to Hungary. During this visit he reported that Nagy had said he would do anything to keep the present governmental system in Hungary and unless opposition ceased, horrible consequences would follow.

(S) Msg, Budapest (Barnes) to SecState, 163, 26 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 292250Z Oct 56. Received JCS 301320Z Oct 56. (S) Msg, Budapest (Barnes) to SecState, 166, 26 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 300220Z Oct 56. Received JCS 301320Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

29 Oct The Israeli Foreign Ministry advised the US Embassy in Tel Aviv at 1100Z that four Egyptian naval vessels, including a destroyer and two minesweepers, had been sighted approaching Israeli waters.
 (Confidential Only) Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 434, 29 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 291451Z Oct 56. Received JCS 292056Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford. (An earlier, less complete AP report was received JCS 291602Z Oct 56.)

29 Oct The US Ambassador in Damascus reported the Embassy was proceeding with evacuation of non-essential Americans to Beirut as quickly as possible.
 (Confidential Only) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 951, 29 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 291207Z Oct 56. Received JCS 291634Z Oct 56.

29 Oct The US Embassy in Cairo informed CINCNELM that the State Department had ordered Phase 3 evacuation of the approximately 2,000 US nationals in Egypt. The Embassy requested implementation of the local emergency evacuation plan. Available commercial aircraft of TWA would be used, but the Embassy asked that the American Export Lines ship Exochorda, the only US vessel then in Alexandria, be requisitioned. The Government of Egypt was being requested to grant continuous clearance to land US military aircraft at Cairo and Alexandria airfields, as well as to permit the entry of US naval vessels into Alexandria harbor. The situation in Egypt was described as "calm."
 (Confidential Only) Msg, AMEMB Cairo to CINCNELM, 3250, 291152Z Oct 56. Received JCS 291733Z Oct 56.

29 Oct

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[Faint, illegible text]

(Confidential Only) Msg, USNMR Paris (from Gruenther) to OSD, ALO 1184, 291900Z Oct 56, DA IN 264121, CJCS files. Received JCS 292208Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

29 Oct President Quwwatli told the US Ambassador in Damascus that the Arabs could not be expected to remain passive in the face of repeated murderous Israeli raids. The recent military agreement signed in Amman, Quwwatli said, was no provocation to Israel, but was instead a self-defense measure. He stated that the Israeli mobilization must necessarily be followed by a strengthening of the Syrian Army. No Arab country, he declared, would make an aggressive move toward Israel, but all were resolved to resist an Israeli attack against any one of them. President Quwwatli said his planned trip to Moscow was for the purpose of securing arms in order to overcome the Israeli superiority over the Arabs. In his report, the US Ambassador commented that Quwwatli's stated reason for visiting Moscow was in contrast with an earlier assertion that he would carry out no important negotiations in the USSR. The Ambassador believed that in the event of an Israeli attack on Egypt or Jordan, there was a real danger that



the Syrian Army would become involved.

(C) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 966, 30 Oct 56, DA IN 264723 (31 Oct 56). Received State 301815Z Oct 56. Received JCS 310931Z Oct 56.

29 Oct [redacted] reported, as of 1300Z, no unusual military activity in the Cairo and Alexandria areas.

[redacted] Received JCS 300013Z Oct 56.

29 Oct A diplomatic report from Malta said that unusual activity among the British Air and Naval high command had been noted during the past 48 hours, and appeared to be related to the trouble between Israel and Jordan. Admiral Grantham, the British Commander in Chief in the Mediterranean, was going unexpectedly to Cyprus the next day.

(S) Msg, Valletta (Montgomery) to SecState, 49, 29 Oct 56. Received State 292157Z Oct 56. Received JCS 301933Z Oct 56.

29 Oct [redacted] that Israel's mobilization was part of the cold war and that the Israeli charge that heavy Fedayeen activity had occurred in the preceding week was a fabrication. The Egyptian official felt that Israel and France were possibly preparing to join forces against the Arab states. As far as he knew, the situation on the Egyptian border was quiet.

[redacted] Received JCS 292325Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

29 Oct A joint situation report from [redacted] described intense countrywide military activity in Israel, with the mobilization of personnel and materiel continuing. Heavy deployment to the Jordanian and Syrian borders and to the Negev continued, with extremely heavy movement southward to Beersheba and beyond. The Israeli Air Force was also being redeployed. [redacted] estimated that Israel was taking a defensive attitude on the Syrian and Jordanian borders, and an offensive one in the Negev. A French merchant vessel had unloaded tanks, half-tracks, and guns at Haifa. [redacted] Israel might use the capture of two Egyptian Fedayeen bands and the dispersal of a third on the morning of 29 October as a cause for a major action against Egypt. The likelihood of hostilities being opened in the next twenty-four hours was "grave."

[redacted] Received JCS 292305Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

29 Oct The US Ambassador to Egypt reported that he had delivered a copy of the President's statement to Nasser. He had also expressed the President's concern over the Middle East situation and the President's request that any action that could lead to hostilities be avoided. Nasser, reported the Ambassador, had been surprised by the President's statement, and "unable to understand what all the turmoil was about." The Egyptian President had asked "Could it be true that Israel really wanted war?" If this was true, Nasser "could not see why." The Ambassador had then informed Nasser of his instructions to evacuate "non-essential Americans," and expressed his hope that Egypt would facilitate the evacuation. Nasser had replied that he was still at a loss to understand

why the US felt this step was necessary, but he promised full cooperation. Concluding his message, the Ambassador stated that, if Nasser "was not genuinely puzzled, [he had] put on a good act."

() Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1193, 29 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 292151Z Oct 56. Received JCS 301932Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

29 Oct The US Ambassador in Tel Aviv informed the Foreign Office the US was preparing to evacuate its nationals from Israel, and secured Israeli agreement in principle to US military aircraft landing at Tel Aviv for this purpose.

() Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 436, 29 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 291651Z Oct 56. Received JCS 300021Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

29 Oct The senior Israeli Foreign Liaison Officer indicated a particular desire to know where the US Army Attache would be that evening (29 October) in case he wished to reach him quickly.

() Msg, USARMA Tel Aviv to DEPTAR, CX 390, 291453Z Oct 56, DA IN 264077. Received JCS 292033Z Oct 56.

29 Oct [] informed the Army Attache in Cairo of a 2-hour exchange of mortar fire in the Gaza Strip area ending at 1445Z. A UN investigation had been requested.

[] Received JCS 300815Z Oct 56.

29 Oct Reports from the [] who had driven over the Budapest-Vienna highway [] on 29 October, indicated that the road was quiet and in the hands of Hungarian nationalists. Factories along the route were in operation with reduced personnel. Budapest itself was quiet, with little if any firing and no air action; [] reported he had not seen any Soviet jets over the city since 24 October. Soviet tank troops held positions at bridgeheads and at various points in the Buda hills, and there was no indication of a Soviet troop withdrawal.

Received JCS 302018Z Oct 56.

29 Oct (u) In the UN Security Council, France formally charged Egypt with gun-running for Algerian revolutionists. The French delegate described the Athos affair for the Council, but the Council took no formal action on the French complaint.

NYT, 30 Oct 56, 10:1. Received JCS 301330Z Oct 56.

29 Oct

() Msg, Beirut (Heath) to SecState, 992, 29 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 291839Z Oct 56. Received JCS 301657Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

- 29 Oct The US Ambassador in Tel Aviv reported that he had been informed by the US Naval Attache that three French destroyers had arrived at the port of Haifa at 0900Z on 29 October.
(S) Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 440, 29 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 292055Z Oct 56. Received JCS 301319Z Oct 56.
- 29 Oct [reported that eighteen F-84's of the French Air Force 1st Squadron, 1st Fighter Group, had left on 29 October for Cyprus. Their ultimate destination was unknown, but was understood at the unit level to be Israel. At the same time, one Armagnac transport took off with an additional 100 support personnel and 500 kilos of equipment. Three Nord 2501 French Air Force transports also left, loaded with equipment. The itineraries of the transports were believed to be the same as those of the fighters. The 2d Squadron, 1st Fighter Group, was on standby status, its date of departure and destination unknown. It was probable that a squadron of Mystere IVA's from the 2d Fighter Group had left at about the same time as the F-84's for the same destination. Ten RD-84F's of the 33d Reconnaissance Group had left the preceding week, and should have reached Cyprus.
(S) Received JCS 311426Z Oct 56.
- 29 Oct [(S) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1195, 29 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 300202Z Oct 56. Received JCS 301658Z Oct 56.
- 29 Oct (U) The Hungarian Communist Party newspaper sharply denied Soviet charges that the West had instigated the Hungarian uprisings.
AP Wire Service, 29 Oct 56. Received JCS 291417Z Oct 56.
- 29 Oct (U) Radio Budapest announced that an agreement had been reached for rebels to turn in their arms and for Russian troops to quit Budapest.
AP Wire Service, 29 Oct 56. Received JCS 291646Z Oct 56.
- 29 Oct (U) The Government-controlled radio in Budapest announced that the Communist secret police had been dissolved.
AP Wire Service, 29 Oct 56. Received JCS 291707Z Oct 56.
- 29 Oct (U) Zhukov, in answer to reporters' questions at a Turkish Embassy reception, denied Soviet troops had crossed the border into Hungary in the past 24 hours.
AP Wire Service, 29 Oct 56. Received JCS 291930Z Oct 56.
- 29 Oct [reported movements of Syrian troops to the Israeli border, together with other military activity. Egyptian General Hakim Amer and Jordanian General Nuwar had departed for Cairo shortly after midnight on the 29th. Syrian morale was high as a result of the combined Syrian-Jordanian-Egyptian military talks. The Embassy had started evacuating American dependents by air and motor convoy to Beirut.
(S) JCS 300557Z Oct 56.

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29 Oct

(c) Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 2331, 29 Oct 56, DA IN 254379 (30 Oct 56). Received State 292244Z Oct 56. Received JCS 302305Z Oct 56.

29 Oct

reported no change in the estimate of the situation regarding the opposing forces in that city. Soviet troops were deployed in mobile defensive positions. No offensive action was taking place and there was no sign of any attempt to seek out or destroy nationalist elements, reportedly in control of western Hungary. Neither was there any indication of additional Soviet forces arriving in Budapest nor of any Soviet troops leaving the city.

Received JCS 292144Z Oct 56.

29 Oct ✓

CINCUSAFE forwarded various reports on the situation in East Germany. These indicated that East Germany was tense but quiet, with German and Soviet military units on an alert status and tight border controls in effect. Although the Communists were apprehensive of German unrest, there seemed little chance for an uprising as long as Soviet troops were stationed in the country.

(s) Msg, CINCUSAFE to CSAF, EIAI-IND 17159, 291750Z Oct 56, CAF IN 85452 (30 Oct 56). Received JCS 311429Z Oct 56. (s) Msg, CINCUSAFE to Hq USAF, IAI-IND 17161, 292235Z Oct 56, CAF IN 85352 (30 Oct 56). Received JCS 311427Z Oct 56.

29 Oct

Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 2333, 29 Oct 56, DA IN 264223 (30 Oct 56). Received State 292151Z Oct 56. Received JCS 301523Z Oct 56.

29 Oct

Dillon thought it probable that the French were making no effort to restrain the Israelis and, whether or not they knew Israel's intentions, they would not be loath to see Israeli dispositions that might divert Arab attention from France.

(s) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2027, 29 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 291851Z Oct 56. Received JCS 301701Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

29 Oct

The US Ambassador in Cairo reported to SecState that he had called on Foreign Minister Fawzi of Egypt, who was enjoying a semi-vacation, and delivered a copy of the President's statement concerning the Middle East. Mr. Hare had also expressed the President's concern over the situation, and passed on the President's request that the Egyptian Government refrain from any action which could lead to hostilities. Further, the Ambassador had informed Fawzi of US plans for the evacuation of Americans from Egypt, and submitted a formal note,

requesting landing rights for ships and planes. Fawzi had received the news of the proposed evacuation without indications of surprise, and assured the Ambassador that every effort would be made to facilitate the evacuation. After having "disposed almost casually of question Middle East crisis," Fawzi had discussed at considerable length the questions of Algeria and Suez. The Foreign Minister, reported the Ambassador, had given the "impression at least" that these two questions loomed larger in his mind than did the Israeli mobilization. On the question of Suez, the Foreign Minister had observed that, except for the unreasonable demands of the UK and France, he would have been meeting with those two countries "today." According to Fawzi, Hammarskjold had synthesized the varying views of interested countries, and submitted them to the three parties concerned for comment.

(S) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1197, 29 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 300422Z Oct 56. Received JCS 301932Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

29 Oct

VIA

reported Egyptian Army ground dispositions generally unchanged, with troop morale good in Sinai and considered high in the Delta Area. Combat efficiency was probably fair for infantry and supporting ground units, but questionable for armored units. An unknown quantity of all types of Soviet military aid was continuing, but an unevaluated report indicated a lack of spare parts and ammunition.

(S) Received JCS 300547Z Oct 56.

29 Oct

The US Legation in Budapest reported that the capital was under the control of three Soviet armored divisions, although there were still some pockets of rebel resistance. The Soviet units, however, had taken up defensive positions, and the Legation, believing that the Soviets had not decided whether to adopt a soft or hard policy, recommended strong pressure by Washington on Moscow.

(S) Msg, Budapest (Barnes) to SecState, 177, 29 Oct 56, DA IN 264210 (30 Oct 56). Received State 292031Z Oct 56. Received JCS 300338Z Oct 56. Another copy, received JCS 301318Z Oct 56, was SEEN by Adm Radford.

29 Oct (U)

An Egyptian military official denied Israeli reports that an Egyptian naval task force had left Alexandria and headed for Israel.

AP Wire Service, 29 Oct 56. Received JCS 291912Z Oct 56.

29 Oct (U)

Hungary's shaken Communist Government said Soviet troops would leave Budapest as soon as the rebels laid down their arms. Defiant rebel broadcasts immediately rejected this condition.

AP Wire Service, 29 Oct 56. Received JCS 291911Z Oct 56.

29 Oct (U)

The Freedom Radio at Gyor, rebel stronghold in north-west Hungary, called on revolutionists to hang on to their weapons and not surrender to Nagy, "a tool of the Communists." The rebel radio at Miskolc urged students in Budapest to pay no heed to the reported agreement for Soviet forces to pull out 24 hours after the rebels disarmed themselves. In Moscow Shepilov backed up Nagy with a declaration that Russian soldiers would not be

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pulled out of Budapest until the rebels laid down their arms.

AP Wire Service, 29 Oct 56. Received JCS 291920Z Oct 56.

29 Oct.

In the evening of 29 October the US Consulate in Munich cabled SecState that on the basis of careful analysis and full monitoring of Radio Moscow, it had concluded that the Soviet propaganda line on Hungary had "altered considerably" in the last 24 hours. This change strongly suggested that responsibility for the solution of the Hungarian problem had abruptly changed hands within the Soviet collective leadership.

(~~CONFIDENTIAL~~) Msg, Munich (Page) to SecState, 204, 29 Oct 56. Received State 300055Z Oct 56. Received JCS 301701Z Oct 56.

29 Oct

Reporting on the situation in Budapest, the US Legation said all evidence pointed to the conclusion that, despite official radio and newspaper statements to the contrary, Soviet troops were not leaving Budapest. The populace appeared to be completely unreconciled to the promises of the Nagy regime. The New York Times correspondent had said many of the Soviet troops were of Asiatic origin and that one Soviet officer had said they had been told "this place was full of American troops." Insurgents had informed the Legation that the medical supplies sent to the Austrian border were not reaching Budapest.

(~~CONFIDENTIAL~~) Msg, Budapest (Barnes) to SecState, 182, 29 Oct 56, DA IN 264205 (30 Oct 56). Received State 292153Z Oct 56. Received JCS 300359Z Oct 56.

29 Oct

The US Embassy in Cairo forwarded information that the Egyptian Government had initially assessed the Israeli mobilization as not unusual. But Egyptian officials now thought the evacuation of US civilians indicated a combined British-Israeli aggressive move to which the US was privy.

(~~CONFIDENTIAL~~) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1200, 29 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 300156Z Oct 56. Received JCS 301320Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

29 Oct

General Burns cabled Hammarskjold his evaluation of the mounting crisis in the Middle East. Israel explained its mobilization was directed against Fedayeen raids, but since the Israelis refused to permit UN investigation, there was nothing to stop them from grossly magnifying any incident to provide an occasion for retaliation. General Burns had received indications, however, that some Egyptian officials might in fact be directing the Fedayeen activity as Israel claimed. If the Israelis responded with force to further raids, actual or fabricated, the new joint Arab command would have to act or lose face. Israel could then claim Arab aggression and be free to take military action aimed at defeating Egyptian military forces and thereby toppling Nasser, and occupying strategically important parts of Jordan. General Burns thought this sequence of events possible and even probable unless the big powers took effective action in the UN Security Council.

(~~CONFIDENTIAL~~) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 432, 29 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 292300Z Oct 56. Received JCS 301321Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

29 Oct The AP reported that "Israeli military forces drove across the border into Egypt tonight and took up positions near the Egyptian town of Kuntilla, about 40 miles north of Aqaba, Israeli authorities announced."
AP Wire Service, 29 Oct 56. Received JCS 292001Z Oct 56.

29 Oct The US Ambassador in Tel Aviv transmitted the text of an announcement made by an Israeli Army spokesman, which stated that units of the Israeli Defense Force had attacked Fedayeen bases in the Kuntilla and Ras el Nageb area and had taken up positions west of Nahel road junction towards the Suez Canal. This operation was necessary, the announcement said, because of the continuous Egyptian military attacks on Israeli citizens and on land and sea communications.
(U) Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 443, 29 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 292145Z Oct 56. Received JCS 301319Z Oct 56.

29 Oct (U) In view of official statements that Israeli troops had penetrated Egyptian territory, the US Ambassador in Tel Aviv "urgently requested" maximum available military air or sealift for evacuation of about 2500 American and friendly nationals.
→ (U) Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 442, 29 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 292138Z Oct 56. Received JCS 301321Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

29 Oct [redacted] that the Israelis had paraded a force of unknown size in the desert ten miles east of Suez during the night of 29 October, ostensibly to prevent Egyptian reinforcements from crossing the Canal. There was no evidence of an Egyptian countermove, though the Egyptians admitted the Israelis had crossed the border.
Received JCS 301846Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

29 Oct During the afternoon, SecState Dulles approached the British and French Charges d'Affaires in Washington with a plan for bringing the reported Israeli aggression before the UN Security Council. A resolution would be submitted under the Tripartite Declaration calling for cessation of hostilities.

Secretary Dulles noted that the US could not take military action without reference to Congress. He said the US was still discussing the question, but was thinking of economic sanctions.

(U) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy London, Circular 328, 29 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 301700Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford;

29 Oct The US, UK, and French representatives at the UN met with Hammarskjold to discuss the Egyptian-Israeli situation. Hammarskjold was alarmed, and proposed that a meeting of the Security Council be held the morning of 30 October at the latest.

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(C) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 433, 29 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 300117Z Oct 56. Received JCS 301319Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

29 Oct. The US Army Attache in Tel Aviv reported that, according to the Israeli Foreign Liaison Officer, an Israeli patrol had been fired upon by Egyptians near Nahal Ox during the afternoon and that Nahal Ox had come under Egyptian mortar fire during the early evening.

(C) Msg, USARMA Tel Aviv (Query) to DEPTAR, CX 392, 292230Z Oct 56, DA IN 264255 (30 Oct 56). Received JCS 300545Z Oct 56.

29 Oct Counselor Barnes in Budapest warned that official Hungarian statements concerning withdrawal of Soviet troops had to be carefully evaluated, as there was no evidence in Budapest that the Soviets intended to yield. Also, the Nagy Government existed only where there was Soviet military support. The nationalist leadership was weak, isolated, and represented different programs and degrees of willingness to compromise. On the one hand, there was no central negotiating body to deal with the Government; on the other, many nationalist groups were unwilling to accept the Government's unilateral promises. Barnes feared this would lead the Soviets to decide that the only solution was absolute suppression, and he concluded that the nationalists desperately needed high-level western support, including an international commission to represent them in negotiations with Nagy and the Soviets, as well as Western military and material support to give them better bargaining strength.

(C) Msg, Budapest (Barnes) to SecState, 180, 29 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 292048Z Oct 56. Received JCS 301319Z Oct 56.

29 Oct The SecState authorized the US Embassy in Tel Aviv and the Consulate in Jerusalem to evacuate all American Foreign Service employees and their families to a place of safety, preferably to Greece or Italy.

(C) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Tel Aviv, 372, 29 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 301932Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

29 Oct (U) Top administration officials were called to an emergency meeting during the evening to discuss the Israeli-Egyptian situation. A statement issued by the White House after the meeting said the President had recalled that the US was committed to assisting any victim of aggression in the Middle East and had said the US would honor this pledge. The statement announced that the US was consulting with Britain and France under the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 and planned, "as contemplated by that declaration that the situation shall be taken to the United Nations Security Council tomorrow morning." The statement concluded that the President would decide, "in light of the unfolding situation," "whether and when" a special session of Congress would be called. Attending the meeting were the President, the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the JCS, and others.

NYT, 30 Oct 56, 1:5. Received JCS 301330Z Oct 56.

29 Oct

The Egyptian Ambassador, summoned to the State Department, was informed that the US viewed the reported Israeli invasion of Egypt with grave concern and, if the reports proved true, planned to take the matter to the UN Security Council. He was cautioned that Egypt should take no action that would jeopardize a clear-cut decision by the Security Council.

(S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Cairo, Circular 329, 29 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 301700Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

29 Oct (U)

SecState Dulles requested the President of the UN Security Council to call an immediate meeting of the Council to consider "The Palestine Question: Steps for the Immediate Cessation of the Military Action of Israel Against Egypt."


→ (U) Msg, SecState (Dulles) to USUN, 220, 29 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 301319Z Oct 56.

29 Oct

At the UN, Ambassador Lodge, after a telephone conversation with Under SecState Hoover, contacted Hammarskjold and members of the Security Council to urge calling a meeting for 30 October to consider the Israeli attack on Egypt. Hammarskjold and most of the members supported Lodge's proposal.

(S) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 443, 30 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 301907Z Oct 56. Received JCS 311719Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

29 Oct



(S) Msg, CIA to JCS, 010244Z Nov 56, DA IN 265295. Received JCS 020444Z Nov 56.

30 Oct ✓ CINCNELM directed COMSIXTHFLT to execute his evacuation plan for Israel and Egypt, using primarily sea lift insofar as was practicable.
(S) Msg, CINCNELM to COMSIXTHFLT, 300331Z Oct 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 301045Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

30 Oct Referring to Shepilov's statement that Soviet troops in Hungary were not being reinforced, the US Legation in Budapest reported that at 1000Z on 28 October a Soviet column arrived in the city. It showed signs of a long road trip, and the trucks bore unit markings not previously sighted in Hungary.
(S) Msg, Budapest (Barnes) to SecState, 186, 30 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 300046Z Oct 56. Received JCS 301319Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

30 Oct [Large redacted area]

(S) Msg, CIA to JCS.

Both received JCS 301425Z Oct 56.

30 Oct (U) The US Ambassador in Tel Aviv reported that he regarded the Embassy's evacuation flight plan as canceled because Israeli officials had not yet granted clearance to US Air Force aircraft and probably would not do so.

(S) Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 451, 30 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 301133Z Oct 56. Received JCS 310319Z Oct 56.

30 Oct Iraqi Foreign Minister Bashayan told the US Ambassador that the Cabinet had met in emergency session and had decided to inform Egypt that Iraq would "live up to her obligations." Such assurances had already been sent. Bashayan assured the Ambassador that Iraqi troops had not moved into Jordan and no such move was imminent.

(S) Msg, Baghdad (Gallman) to SecState, 709, 30 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 301156Z Oct 56. Received JCS 301657Z Oct 56.

30 Oct The US Ambassador to Jordan listed the members of that country's new cabinet, the formation of which had been completed on the evening of 29 October by

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the leader of the National Socialists and new Prime Minister, Suleiman Nabulsi.

() Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 408, 30 Oct 56, DA IN 265012 (31 Oct 56). Received State PM (hour illegible) 30 Oct 56. Received JCS 312142Z Oct 56.

30 Oct

() Msg, Amman (Mallory) to State Dept, 406, 310301Z Oct 56, DA IN 264827, CJCS files. Received JCS 311632Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

30 Oct

The US Consul General in Jerusalem reported that before the Israeli drive into Sinai the sole UN observer at El Auja had been ejected from the demilitarized zone, apparently as a prelude to the attack. General Burns, UN truce supervisor, had sent a cease-fire request to the Israeli Foreign Minister at 292400Z and a similar message to Egypt's Director of Palestinian Affairs. So far, Burns had received no answer. The Jordan frontier was reported quiet.

() Msg, Jerusalem (Cole) to SecState, 127, 30 Oct 56, DA IN 264850 (31 Oct 56). Received State 301346Z Oct 56. Received JCS 311541Z Oct 56.

30 Oct

The Naval Attache in Cairo reported that the first known invasion of Egyptian air space over the canal occurred at 300715Z. High-flying aircraft, observed in the vicinity of Port Said, were met by sporadic and ineffective AA fire.

() Msg, ALUSNA Cairo to CNO, 301304Z Oct 56. Received JCS 310835Z Oct 56.

30 Oct

Reported, after an interview at 0800Z with, that Iraqi troops would not be moved from their existing positions until it was absolutely essential.

() Received JCS 301855Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

30 Oct

The US Ambassador in Cairo reported that President Nasser had sent word to him that British Canberras had been spotted over the Suez Canal at about 0845Z. Nasser viewed this act as a deliberate attempt by the British to complicate the situation and wanted the US Ambassador to urge the British to cease trouble-making activities.

() Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1213, 30 Oct 56, DA IN 265618 (1 Nov 56). Received State 011049Z Nov 56. Received JCS 020447Z Nov 56.

30 Oct

According to a CIA report (dated 3 Nov) Attila Szigeti was elected president of the Freedom Committee for the whole of western Hungary at a meeting of 300 delegates from various western Hungarian towns. Delegates to the meeting reported that almost all of western Hungary was free. The committee in the town of Somogy, in

southwestern Hungary, was Communist controlled, and it was decided to "clean up" Somogy immediately. Szigeti telephoned Imre Nagy on the afternoon of 30 October and then told the delegates Nagy wished to consolidate the uprising throughout Hungary and advised west Hungarian workers to return to work. The delegates, however, rejected this and refused to call off the general strike. They insisted on denunciation of the Warsaw Pact, on free elections, and on a declaration of Hungarian neutrality similar to that of Austria. There was also strong feeling against the leaders of emigre groups returning to take up key positions, and the idea of Ferenc Nagy returning to power was ridiculed.

(S) Msg, [redacted] 3 Nov 56,
DA IN 266671 (4 Nov 56). Received JCS 041817Z Nov 56.

30 Oct The US Army Attache in Cairo reported on Egyptian military movements during the morning hours, particularly the departure of an estimated armored group from the Giza encampment. Egyptian Army headquarters offered no information beyond a communique claiming the Egyptians had liquidated Israeli forces in the Kuntilla-Nakhal area of the Sinai.

(S) Msg, USARMA Cairo to DEPTAR, MAE-CX 233-56, 300959Z Oct 56, DA IN 264530, CJCS files. Received JCS prior to 302030Z Oct 56.

30 Oct Trybuna confirmed that Rokossovsky was on leave. The Ministry of Defense was in the charge of General Jerzy Bordzilowski, Vice Minister of Defense and Army Chief of Staff.

(S) Msg, Warsaw (Jacobs) to SecState, 567, 30 Oct 56, DA IN 264833 (31 Oct 56). Received State 301514Z Oct 56. Received JCS 311205Z Oct 56.

30 Oct The US Ambassador reported from Paris that, [redacted] the French Cabinet met during the morning and unanimously approved French military intervention in the Suez Canal zone provided the British also participated. The Cabinet approved vetoing any Security Council resolution condemning Israel. Mollet and Pineau both left for London during the morning, although Mollet would return to address the National Assembly in the evening.

(S) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2057, 30 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 301452Z Oct 56. Received JCS 311719Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

30 Oct According to the Israeli Foreign Liaison Officer and the Foreign Ministry, the Israeli Government had ordered its Air Force into action about 1130Z hours to counter Egyptian air strikes. The Foreign Ministry said Israeli forces in Sinai had suffered some casualties from Egyptian strafing and bombing attacks.

(S) Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to State Dept, 454, 302037Z Oct 56, DA IN 264652, CJCS files. Received JCS 310054Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

30 Oct [redacted]

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[
(S) Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 405, 30 Oct 56, DA IN 264737 (31 Oct 56). Received State 301845Z Oct 56. Received JCS 310810Z Oct 56.

30 Oct The French Foreign Office requested, through the US Ambassador, that US naval vessels evacuating Americans from Egypt and Israel take on French evacuees also. The French had no transportation available for this purpose.

(S) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2050, 30 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 301446Z Oct 56. Received JCS 310320Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

30 Oct

(S) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2055, 30 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 301359Z Oct 56. Received JCS 301932Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

30 Oct ✓ COMSIXTHFLT reported the sighting at 301240Z October, from a position roughly 150 miles ESE of Crete, of two French light carriers, the Arromanches and Bois Belleau, accompanied by one destroyer and three destroyer escorts. The French force was steaming on course 350, speed 12, and planes were spotted aft on the decks of both carriers.

(S) Msg, COMSIXTHFLT to CINCNELM/CNO, 301310Z Oct 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 301829Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

30 Oct (✓) Egyptians and Israeli troops were reported locked in combat on the Sinai peninsula. Egypt claimed her army had halted a drive by "major" Israeli forces some 70 miles short of the Suez Canal. The latest reports from military sources in Tel Aviv placed the Israeli forces between 30 and 60 miles from the canal.

AP Wire Service, 30 Oct 56. Received JCS 301335Z Oct 56.

30 Oct A member of the French Foreign Office told a US Embassy officer in Paris that Mollet would make a policy speech before the National Assembly on his return from London that night. The official could make no statement until after the speech, but he warned that the possibility of Franco-British armed intervention in the Middle East should not be excluded.

(S) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2076, 30 Oct 56, DA IN 264743 (31 Oct 56). Received State 301928Z Oct 56. Received JCS 310520Z Oct 56.

30 Oct CIA forwarded a report that at about 1345Z, 30 October, Radio Budapest broadcast a joint statement by Imre Nagy and Zoltan Tildy that a new government would be set up, led by Bela Kovacs and Tildy, with a number of Social Democrats. The announcement said the new government would bring about free elections, the replacement of the Hungarian representation at the UN by a new group, the withdrawal of Soviet troops to garrisons, and negotiations for their complete withdrawal from Hungary.

(S) Msg, 302343Z Oct 56, DA IN 264701 (31 Oct 56). Received JCS approximately 310520Z Oct 56. A partial report was received over AP Wire Service at 301528Z Oct 56.

30 Oct The number of refugees crossing into Austria in the preceding twenty-four hours was 265. Prior to that period, only two had crossed since the insurrection began.

(S) Msg, USARMA Vienna to DEPTAR, CX 168, 301419Z Oct 56, DA IN 264862 (31 Oct 56). Received JCS 311604Z Oct 56.

30 Oct A joint situation report from the US Attaches in Tel Aviv stated that the Israeli Army had imposed a complete blackout on operations information. At last report, however, the Israeli Army had driven to a point 30 kilometers from Suez City. Mobilization was estimated to be 90-95 per cent complete. The Attaches expected a major attack on the Gaza Strip and a large enveloping movement to trap Egyptian forces in Sinai. The Egyptian Air Force had strafed an Israeli column, inflicting casualties. Two Mysteres with markings believed to be French were seen on an Israeli airfield, and eighteen French jet pilots had arrived. A complete country-wide blackout had been ordered to begin in the evening. Embassy dependents were leaving Israel that afternoon or evening.

(S) Msg, USARMA, USAIRA, ALUSNA Tel Aviv to DEPTAR, CX 393, 301431Z Oct 56, DA IN 264624. Received JCS 302309Z Oct 56.

30 Oct The US Ambassador in Paris reported the early public reaction to the Israeli invasion of Egypt: 1) There was unquestioned satisfaction at this direct blow at Nasser. 2) There were widespread rumors of imminent Anglo-French landings in Egypt, which public opinion would support. 3) There was a feeling that the US had prevented an effective Western policy, forcing France and the UK to go it alone. It was generally believed the US would adopt a strong anti-Israel policy. 4) There was no interest in what action the UN might take, but it was generally felt that France would refuse to accept any anti-Israel motion. 5) Some sources thought the entire affair, probably with Anglo-French participation, would be over in four days. It seemed to be accepted that France had been actively planning with Israel and Britain for some weeks. 6) There was some concern over repercussions in North Africa. 7) There was the conclusion that France should make her own decisions and, in view of her disappointment over Suez, not defer to US wishes.

(S) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2069, 30 Oct 56, DA IN 264837 (31 Oct 56). Received State 301831Z Oct 56. Received JCS 310527Z Oct 56.

30 Oct [] reported on the situation at 1300Z. There was sporadic rifle and tank-machinegun fire in various parts of the city, mainly in Pest. After two days of comparative lull, the situation was becoming tense, with crowds gathering and demonstrating in direct violation of an order prohibiting gatherings of more than three persons on penalty of death. Fifty more Soviet tanks were reliably reported having arrived in Budapest on the morning of 30 October from the East. The major mission of Soviet forces still appeared to be defensive, but tanks were being released from static defense positions for a more aggressive mobile defense. Most HPA units appeared either to have remained in, or to have returned to, barracks, and they seemed to be playing a neutral role. Their only function, apparently, was to man roadblocks on main roads about twenty-five kilometers from Budapest.

[Commented that a statement by Shepilov, supported by local evidence, suggested that the USSR would settle for nothing less than the complete crushing of the revolt, continued Communist political control of the government, and the continued occupation of Hungary by Soviet military forces. The Hungarian people of both sides, he said, were looking to the UN for action.

JCS 011002Z Nov 56.

Received

30 Oct The US Legation in Budapest reported that the populace there had been working itself into a frenzy all day and large crowds of unarmed demonstrators were even then moving on Parliament and demanding that: 1) Mindszenty be made Prime Minister. 2) Colonel P. Malater, heading troops in Ulloi Street barracks, be made Minister of Defense. 3) Soviet troops return to their garrisons by midnight. 4) Soviet troops withdraw from Hungary by 15 November. The crowds called for Western intervention if these demands were not met.
Msg, Budapest (Barnes) to SecState, 191,
30 Oct 56, DA IN 264606. Received State 301625Z Oct 56. Received JCS 310052Z Oct 56.

30 Oct

Msg, Jidda (Wadsworth) to SecState, 213,
30 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 301732Z Oct 56.
Received JCS 310320Z Oct 56.

30 Oct

The US Ambassador to the UN forwarded the text of a draft of a substantive resolution sponsored by France and UK

The draft resolution called on the USSR to halt immediately any form of intervention, particularly armed intervention, in the internal affairs of Hungary.

Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 444,
30 Oct 56, DA IN 264731 (31 Oct 56). Received State 302046Z Oct 56. Received JCS 311945Z Oct 56.

30 Oct

The US Ambassador in Cairo reported that, despite the Israeli invasion, the attitude of Egyptian Government officials remained "complacent." They seemed to feel that the Israeli attack was "not serious" and had only limited objectives. However, the Ambassador reported that there had been a considerable movement of military forces through Cairo

Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1223,
30 Oct 56, DA IN 264939 (31 Oct 56). Received State 310356Z Oct 56. Received JCS 311735Z Oct 56.

30 Oct

The US Army Attache in Cairo reported on the Egyptian response to the Israeli attack, which included the movement of various artillery and

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armored elements toward the east and the closing of Egypt to all international air traffic, not excepting the Egyptian national airline.

(S) Msg, USARMA Cairo to DEPTAR, MAE-CX 234-56, 301825Z Oct 56, DA IN 265021 (31 Oct 56). Received JCS 312014Z Oct 56.

30 Oct

The US Ambassador in Paris cabled his estimate of French intentions in the Middle East crisis. The French goal was still to overthrow or at least humiliate Nasser. If this could be accomplished by the Israelis alone, the French probably would not intervene overtly. Nevertheless, Franco-British occupation of the canal zone, "to ensure free transit," seemed likely. If the Israelis proved unable to knock out Egypt quickly, or if French nationals became involved in civil disorders, the French would probably intervene promptly and on a large scale, and would not withdraw until their objectives were achieved. The only hope of forestalling or limiting French action would be the "strongest and most solemn U.S. representations on highest level within next few hours."

(S) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2059, 30 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 301540Z Oct 56. Received JCS 311719Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

30 Oct

At 1630Z the British and French Governments delivered joint declarations to Egypt and Israel. The US Ambassador received copies at 1645Z. The declarations, similar but not identical, stated that the UK and France were determined to do all in their power to bring about an early end to Israeli-Egyptian hostilities and to safeguard the free passage of the Suez Canal. They called on both Egypt and Israel to cease "all warlike action" and to withdraw their forces to a distance of ten miles from the Canal. Egypt was also asked to allow the "temporary occupation" by Anglo-French forces of key points at Port Said, Ismailia, and Suez in order to guarantee freedom of transit through the Canal and to separate the belligerents. Egypt and Israel were given twelve hours to answer the Anglo-French declarations; if by then one or both governments had not taken steps to comply with the stated requirements, British and French forces would intervene in whatever strength might be necessary to insure compliance.

(S) Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 2359, 30 Oct 56, DA IN 264873 (31 Oct 56). Received State 301900Z Oct 56. Received JCS 311633Z Oct 56. (Offl Use Only) Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 2360, 30 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 301901Z Oct 56. Received JCS 310318Z Oct 56. (U) Msg, USARMA London to DEPTAR, UX 100, 301730Z Oct 56, DA IN 694045, CJCS files. Received JCS 301922Z Oct 56. A brief initial notice of the ultimatum was received over the AP Wire Service at 301647Z Oct 56.

30 Oct (U)

The following item, a memorandum from Capt W. C. Mott to Adm Radford, is included pursuant to the desire of Adm Radford:

"Yesterday you asked me to try and determine whether or not the British and French had notice of the President's 'warning' of 29 October before issuing their 12-hour ultimatum. By the President's

'warning' I assume you mean the statement which was issued right after you came out of conference at the White House about 9 PM the evening of October 29. Actually the statement issued at the White House at 9 PM that night contained the words 'we shall honor our pledge' to assist any victim of aggression in the Middle East as well as our pledge to act in concert with Britain and France within and outside the United Nations against an aggressor in the Middle East. Our pledge was of course tied in with the Tripartite Agreement of 1950.

"The President's statement of 9 PM, October 29, also said that the United States was 'in consultation' with the United Kingdom and France as parties to the 1950 Tripartite Declaration. Mr. Murray Snyder informs me that Mr. Dulles saw the President at 7 o'clock the night of the 29th presumably to report on the results of such 'consultation.'

"The British-French ultimatum was announced by Prime Minister Eden in Parliament at 11:30 AM Washington time, Tuesday the 30th of October. While one cannot say with certainty that Eden himself had notice of the President's 'warning' the probabilities are very great that he did. There was an elapsed time of over 15 [actually over 14] hours before the ultimatum was issued.

The President's statement made the first announcement that the United States intended to call for an emergency session of the Security Council for purposes of introducing a resolution of any kind. Therefore, it seems certain that all of official London knew of the President's statement.

"As a matter of fact when Mr. Dulles summoned the British and French Ambassadors [Mr. Dulles spoke to the British and French Charges, the Ambassadors being absent] the afternoon of October 29th to get their cooperation in calling an early emergency meeting of the Security Council

(U) Memo, Capt Wm C. Mott, USN, to Adm Radford, 27 Nov 56.

30 Oct

The US Ambassador in Damascus reported that Syrian Prime Minister Asali had denounced the Anglo-French ultimatum as a violation of the UN Charter. He stated that Syria was bound by treaties to Egypt and Jordan, that Arab emotions were aroused, and that a grave situation had been created. The Ambassador added that throughout the day the Syrian Radio had been telling listeners that the evacuation of US nationals from certain Arab countries and Israel prior to the Israeli attack made it obvious the US was behind that attack.

(C) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 982, 30 Oct 56, DA IN 264938 (31 Oct 56). Received State 310227Z Oct 56. Received JCS 311713Z Oct 56.

30 Oct

The INS in Rome received a report from Athens that British and French troops from Cyprus had begun landing in Egypt. The Greek Ambassador in Rome had called to say that he believed British intervention to be imminent.

(C) Msg, USARMA Rome to CNO, 301655Z Oct 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 302137Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

30 Oct The US Ambassador reported from Belgrade the Yugoslav public position on events in Hungary as indicated in editorial comment in the local press. This position was that the only satisfactory outcome of the existing conflict would be the stabilization of Hungary under the control of the Nagy-Kadar Communist government, which represented the true interests of all the people even though they might not realize it. The position further held that UN mediation would not help in the situation and might create new complications; however, because of the intervention of Soviet troops in Hungary--a move "deeply regretted" by the Yugoslav Government--Yugoslavia had been unable to vote against the Security Council action proposed by the Western powers and had abstained from voting as the only consistent course.

(U) Msg, Belgrade (Riddleberger) to SecState, 571, 30 Oct 56, DA IN 265130 (31 Oct 56). Received State 310843Z Oct 56. Received JCS 010835Z Nov 56.

30 Oct Syrian President Quwwatli and other officials, accompanied by the Soviet Ambassador and reportedly by the Soviet Military Attache and others, left for Moscow in two Soviet military aircraft. The visit was undertaken despite a parliamentary resolution by the Foreign Affairs Committee urging the President to postpone the trip in view of the critical Middle East situation.

(U) Received JCS 310009Z Oct 56. (C) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 974, 30 Oct 56, DA IN 264748 (31 Oct 56). Received State 302003Z Oct 56. Received JCS 311207Z Oct 56.

30 Oct (U) President Eisenhower learned of the British-French ultimatum from press reports and immediately sent "urgent and personal messages" to Eden and Mollet. According to the White House, these messages stated the President's belief that an armistice could be secured by peaceful means and expressed his earnest hope that the UN would be given full opportunity to settle the controversy. The New York Times reported that the Administration had also accepted in principle a policy of stopping economic aid to Israel until that state withdrew its troops from Egypt.

NYT, 31 Oct 56, 1:4, 15:1-5. Received JCS 311330Z Oct 56. Brief notice of the Presidential messages was received over AP Wire Service at 302150Z Oct 56.

30 Oct (U) Cairo Radio announced Egypt's rejection of the Anglo-French ultimatum to stop fighting with Israel. Nasser had told the British Ambassador that the ultimatum was "unacceptable under any circumstances."

AP Wire Service, 30 Oct 56. Received JCS 302244Z Oct 56.

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30 Oct

During the evening Nasser summoned Ambassador Hare and read the Anglo-French ultimatum. He said he had told the British the Egyptian Government refused to accept the ultimatum and Egyptian territory would be defended. The Government had also sent a complaint to the UN Security Council. Nasser, on prompting from Foreign Minister Fawzi, asked that President Eisenhower be informed that Egypt was facing a threat of force and would of course defend itself.

() Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1226, 31 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 310817Z Oct 56. Received JCS 311713Z Oct 56. (An earlier, less complete, report from CIA was received JCS 310447Z Oct 56.)

30 Oct

() Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 409, 30 Oct 56, DA IN 265110 (31 Oct 56). Received State 310322Z Oct 56. Received JCS 010800Z Nov 56.

30 Oct

Damascus reported no activity on the Syrian-Israeli frontier. However, there was a considerable call-up of Syrian personnel, affecting possibly 3,000 individuals.

()
310009Z Oct 56.

Received JCS

30 Oct

In a discussion of the situation in Budapest, Marshal Zhukov told the US Ambassador in Moscow that "The order has been given for Soviet forces to leave the city."

() Msg, Moscow (Bohlen) to SecState, 1003, 30 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 301954Z Oct 56. Received JCS 311719Z Oct 56.

30 Oct

The US Ambassador in Tel Aviv reported that Israel had broken a ten-hour news blackout to report:
1) Egyptians, with MIG's and Meteors, were bombing Israeli territory near the southern Sinai frontier as well as Israeli columns deep in Sinai. 2) Egyptian forces had been observed crossing the Suez Canal in great numbers, apparently to meet Israeli columns now thirty miles from Suez. 3) The Israelis had taken Quesima, a few miles inside the border in northern Sinai. 4) The Israelis had suffered a "few" casualties. The Ambassador commented that Egyptian air activity might be the excuse the Israelis had been looking for to introduce their own air arm. More than twenty jet fighters were seen by Embassy officials at Lydda Airport being armed with two half-ton bombs each.

() Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 453, 301851Z Oct 56, DA IN 264671. Received JCS 310410Z Oct 56.

- TOP SECRET
- 30 Oct The US Ambassador in Cairo reported that he had been unable to obtain Egyptian consent to open Cairo airport to military aircraft for evacuation purposes. He had, however, obtained permission for the daylight visit of military transport vessels to Alexandria on 31 October for evacuation.
() Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1222, 30 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 310258Z Oct 56. Received JCS 310720Z Oct 56.
- 30 Oct. At a morning session of the UN Security Council, Ambassador Lodge stated that General Burns had issued a cease-fire in the Middle East crisis, but it had been ignored by Israel. The Security Council, said Lodge, must take immediate action to restore peace and effect the withdrawal of Israeli troops. At the afternoon session, Lodge introduced a resolution calling on Israel to withdraw its forces behind the established armistice line. It further called upon the members of the UN to refrain from the use or threat of force in the area, and to refrain from giving military, economic, or financial assistance to Israel as long as it failed to comply with the resolution. In his supporting speech, Lodge alluded to the Anglo-French ultimatum. It was unjustified, he said, and in any event the basis for it would be removed by passage of the Security Council resolution.
() Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 452, 30 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 310449Z Oct 56. Received JCS 311149Z Oct 56.
- 30 Oct () Britain's UN delegation, opposing the US resolution, told the UN Security Council that British and French troops would intervene in whatever strength was necessary to occupy key positions in the vital Suez Canal area.
AP Wire Service, 30 Oct 56. Received JCS 302306Z Oct 56.
- 30 Oct () In the UN Security Council the US and USSR submitted two separate resolutions calling for an immediate cease-fire between Israel and Egypt. Britain and France vetoed both resolutions, arguing that the Security Council could not move fast enough to deal with the crisis. Egypt requested a special Council meeting to deal with the threatened Anglo-French invasion but the Council adjourned without taking action.
NYT, 31 Oct 56, 1:2-3, 6:3-5. Received JCS 311330Z Oct 56.
- 30 Oct The Polish and Indian delegates to the UN offered Ambassador Lodge support and congratulation for his firm stand against Israeli aggression at the morning session of the Security Council. The Lebanese delegate assured Lodge the entire Arab world fully supported President Eisenhower's initiative, and the US Government and the American people had the blessing of the Arabs.
() Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 453, 30 Oct 56. Received State 310816Z Oct 56. Received JCS 311722Z Oct 56.
- 30 Oct The US Legation in Budapest reported that beginning at about 2000Z the free Kossuth radio had been jammed for about 10 minutes. Then the radio announced that the Budapest revolutionary military council wanted officers

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to appear at a certain building at 0100Z, 31 October, to present letters of commission and prepare for a certain mechanized unit to take over Budapest from the withdrawing Soviet troops. The Legation could not tell whether this was a trick or genuine, but commented that, if the latter, it could be highly important.

(S) Msg, Budapest (Barnes) to SecState, 196, 30 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 310226Z Oct 56. Received JCS 310935Z Oct 56.

30 Oct In a conversation with the US Ambassador in Moscow, Molotov indicated his conviction that the US was involved with the UK and France in instigating the Israeli attack on Egypt. Molotov also said Britain and France were standing behind Israel to punish Nasser for nationalizing the Suez Canal. Ambassador Bohlen denied both accusations, pointing to the President's message urging restraint on Ben Gurion and to the position taken by the US in the UN Security Council. He then called Molotov's attention to the fact that SecState Dulles had warned the Soviets a year before of the consequences of supplying arms to Egypt.

(S) Msg, Moscow (Bohlen) to SecState, 1004, 30 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 302112Z Oct 56. Received JCS 311719Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm. Radford.

30 Oct (U) Prime Minister Eden announced that British-French "token" forces would move into the Suez Canal zone even if Egypt and Israel accepted the 12-hour ultimatum to quit fighting. AP Wire Service, 30 Oct 56. Received JCS 302056Z Oct 56.

30 Oct (U) Egypt called for emergency UN action to halt the threatened British-French move to send troops into the Suez Canal area. AP Wire Service, 30 Oct 56. Received JCS 302201Z Oct 56.

30 Oct The State Dept instructed the US Embassies at Cairo and Tel Aviv to "use all possible persuasion" to bring about a simultaneous cessation of hostilities in the vicinity of the airports at Cairo and Tel Aviv long enough to permit essential American evacuation in one operation. (S) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Cairo, 1328, 30 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 310935Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

30 Oct

(S) Msg, CIA to JCS, Received JCS 011044Z Nov 56.

30 Oct (U) The official Hungarian news agency announced that Cardinal Mindszenty had been liberated by Hungarian revolutionary troops and was on his way to Budapest. AP Wire Service, 30 Oct 56. Received JCS 302334Z Oct 56.

30 Oct (U) The USSR announced in the evening a willingness to examine the whole matter of Soviet troops stationed in satellite countries. As a first step Moscow said it

had ordered withdrawal of its military forces from Budapest, "as soon as this is recognized by the Hungarian Government to be necessary." The Soviet statement said the new policy applied to Poland, Hungary, and Rumania, but that it was a matter for all the nations of the Warsaw Pact. "In other states of the People's Democracies there are no Soviet military forces," the Government said.

NYT, 31 Oct 56, 1:1. Received JCS 311330Z Oct 56.

30 Oct

30 Oct

(S) Msg, Ottawa (Merchant) to SecState, 196, 31 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 312249Z Oct 56. Received JCS 011713Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

30 Oct

30 Oct (U)

The British House of Commans debated the Anglo-French declaration on the Suez Canal. The Government was criticized for bypassing the UN, but won a vote of confidence, 270-218. Eden provided little further information concerning Anglo-French intentions. Foreign Secretary Lloyd stated that the British Government was in close communication with the US Government, but reserved the right to take independent action. Eden refused to promise to refrain from the use of force pending a Security Council decision.

(U) Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 2372, 31 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 310121Z Oct 56. Received JCS 310729Z Oct 56.

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31 Oct

31 Oct (U) The US Ambassador in Cairo reported the initiation of a plan for the immediate evacuation of all American private and Government dependents and non-essential personnel by road from Cairo to Alexandria, where five transports--capable of carrying 2500 persons normally, or 4000 for a 72-hour emergency-- had arrived on the morning of 31 October.

(U) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1229, 31 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 311126Z Oct 56. Received JCS 311713Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

31 Oct COMSIXTHFLT forwarded a report from the US Naval Attache in Tel Aviv that a surface action was taking place there and that he advised against approaching the port until the situation was clarified. Another surface action had been witnessed in waters well to the west of Israel at 310350Z October.

(U) Msg, COMSIXTHFLT to CNO, 310508Z Oct 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 311358Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

31 Oct The US Army Attache in London reported word received early 31 October from a reliable British 3d Infantry Division source that the division's alert status had been changed from 7 days to 24 hours but no movement orders had been received.

(S) Msg, USARMA London to DEPTAR, CX 176, 311105Z Oct 56, DA IN 265017. Received JCS 010348Z Nov 56.

31 Oct

31 Oct The US Ambassador in Damascus reported that martial law had been declared for all Syria at 2030Z on 30 October, with Prime Minister Asali as military governor, and that roads to Mezze Airfield and to the Syrian frontier in the direction of Amman had been closed. A later report by the Army and Air Attaches added that the Defense Ministry had called for full mobilization, all airports had been closed at 302330Z October, and air passage over Syria had been prohibited since 302400Z October.

(U) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 987, 31 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 311443Z Oct 56. Received JCS 311928Z Oct 56. (S) Msg, USARMA and USAIRA Damascus to DEPTAR, CX 280, 311707Z Oct 56, DA IN 265175 (1 Nov 56), CJCS files. Received JCS 010205Z Nov 56. Both SEEN by Adm Radford.

31 Oct (U) The three US Service Attaches in Tel Aviv reported an engagement off Haifa Bay between Israeli and Egyptian surface and air units at about 0145Z on 31 October. Israeli newspapers, they said, were reporting that

French and British surface and air units had engaged an Egyptian force in Haifa Bay at the same time. In the early morning two Egyptian Vampires had been shot down by the Israeli Air Force in the western Sinai, and during the night of 30-31 October Israeli naval units had captured an Egyptian destroyer that had ineffectually shelled Haifa.

(U) Msg, USARMA, USAIRA and ALUSNA Tel Aviv to ACSI DEPTAR, UX 49, 310644Z Oct '56, DA IN 694463. Received JCS 311137Z Oct 56.

31 Oct CIA reported that it was believed that all free cities in western Hungary acknowledged the leadership of Gyor and would respond to Gyor's call to send delegations from resistance councils in the entire trans-Danubian area. Only one city in the West, Szalaegerszeg, wanted to negotiate with Imre Nagy. Resistance councils agreed in general to a moratorium on Hungarian politics until the Soviets left the country. The Hungarian Army would fight if the Soviets "made a move," but in general had no arms larger than machine guns.

(S) Msg,

Received JCS 010147Z Nov 56.

31 Oct The US Ambassador in Amman forwarded the text of a Jordanian cable to the UN Security Council that called on the Council to end "the Israeli aggression on Egypt." The cable drew attention to Jordan's obligations under its defense pact with Syria and Egypt and announced that Jordan would implement them in full.

(S) Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 413, 31 Oct 56. Received State 312349Z Oct 56. Received JCS 010610Z Nov 56.

31 Oct The US Army Attache in Baghdad reported information from Iraqi Army sources that the situation on the Syrian and Jordanian fronts was quiet. There had been no change in the location of Iraqi Army units.

(S) Msg, USARMA Bagdad to DEPTAR, AB 192, 310935Z Oct 56, DA IN 265049, CJCS files. Received JCS 311915Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

31 Oct The US Legation in Budapest reported that no major troop movements had been observed by Legation personnel while travelling along the road from Budapest to the Austrian border at Hegyeshalom. The insurgents were in control of towns along the route as far east as Piliscsaba, despite the presence of Russian troops and tanks west of that town.

(S) Msg, USARMA Budapest to DEPTAR C-126, 310920Z Oct 56, DA IN 265340 (1 Nov 56), CJCS files. Received JCS 012144Z Nov 56.

31 Oct The US Ambassador in Vienna reported that Foreign Minister Figl had requested the US, British, and French Ambassadors to ask their governments to make clear to Ferenc Nagy and other such leaders that their presence in Austria was undesirable.

(S) Msg, Vienna (Thompson) to SecState, 1000, 31 Oct 56, DA IN 265245 (1 Nov 56). Received State 311238Z Oct 56. Received JCS 012247Z Nov 56.

31 Oct Commenting on the Soviet policy declaration of 30 October and particularly on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest, the US Ambassador in Moscow called the moves an important expansion of the decisions taken at the 20th Party Congress. The Soviets were evidently

preparing to cut their losses in Hungary and accept partial if not complete independence of satellites. Ambassador Bohlen warned, however, that Soviet policy was shifting constantly in response to fast-breaking events outside the USSR, and the new position might be reversed. If it became evident, for example, that Nagy had completely lost control in Hungary, the Soviets might resort to all-out repression.

(S) Msg, Moscow (Bohlen) to SecState, 1006, 31 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 311235Z Oct 56. Received JCS 011713Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

31 Oct The US Ambassador in Tripoli reported that the British Embassy was burning files and British dependents had been placed on a one-hour alert for evacuation. He assumed these steps were connected with contemplated action in the Suez Canal situation but had only radio news to base the assumption on.

(S) Msg, Tripoli (Tappin) to SecState, 260, 31 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 311113Z Oct 56. Received JCS 311519Z Oct 56.

31 Oct The US Ambassador in Cairo reported receipt of information from the Egyptian Foreign Minister that the Cairo airport could be used, effective immediately, for evacuation purposes by aircraft.

(S) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1230, 31 Oct 56, DA IN 265098. Received State 311232Z Oct 56. Received JCS 311524Z Oct 56.

31 Oct

(S) NATO Msg, SACEUR to SGN, SH 31477, 311110Z Oct 56, DA IN 265032, CJCS files. Received JCS 012137Z Nov 56.

31 Oct The Israeli Foreign Office confirmed an earlier report by General Burns that an Israeli paratroop unit had been dropped during the night 30 kilometers east of the Suez Canal and west of El Naktel. The unit was now dug in awaiting the arrival of an Israeli column. An Egyptian column had crossed the canal and was approaching the paratroopers from the opposite direction. Meanwhile, the Israeli unit that had reportedly taken Quesima had moved east to Abu Uwaygital.

(S) Msg, Tel Aviv (Lawson) to SecState, 464, 31 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 311549Z Oct 56. Received JCS 311927Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

31 Oct

(S) Msg, [redacted] to SecState, 2387, 31 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 311747Z Oct 56. Received JCS 010115Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

31 Oct

The US Ambassador in Cairo cabled that there was no evidence of British or French military action, although their ultimatum had expired six hours previously. The evacuation of Americans by motor convoy to Alexandria, for embarkation on Sixth Fleet transports, had gotten under way.

(S) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1232, 31 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 311510Z Oct 56. Received JCS 311927Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

31 Oct According to a CIA report based on information Lebanon appeared calm. However, a state of emergency had been declared during the morning and martial law was in effect. The number of security units guarding western installations had sharply increased. President Chamoun appeared determined to prevent any internal unrest.

(S) Msg, CIA to JCS,

Received JCS 030736Z Nov 56.

31 Oct The US Ambassador in Tripoli reported, after a three-day trip to Fezzan and a survey of the situation there, that the French had absolutely no intention of withdrawing their troops by the 30 November deadline, but were digging in. The situation remained calm on the surface, he said, because both France and Libya wanted to avoid incidents; but unless the situation changed, Libya would soon be unable to take an objective position alongside the US regarding major crises developing elsewhere.

(S) Msg, Tripoli (Tappin) to SecState, 263, 31 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 020309Z Nov 56. Received JCS 021127Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

31 Oct The US Army Attache in Budapest reported that Soviet tanks had begun leaving the center of that city the night of 30-31 October and had completed their withdrawal by 1330Z on the 31st. As of 1400Z on the 31st no Soviet troops were visible in downtown Budapest and all bridges were clear. At 0945Z on 31 October, he continued, Radio Free Kossuth had announced the election of "The Revolutionary Military Committee" by 250 delegates of the armed forces, the police, the frontier guard, and the revolutionary youth. Though to outward appearances the insurgents had control of the city, he commented, it was probable that government forces had control of governmental machinery, communications, and food supply sources.

(S) Msg, USARMA Budapest to DEPTAR, B-232, 311640Z Oct 56, DA IN 265092. Received JCS 311534Z Oct 56.
(S) Msg, USARMA Budapest to DEPTAR, B-233, 311850Z Oct 56, DA IN 265150. Received JCS 010117Z Nov 56.

31 Oct The US Service Attaches reported from Tel Aviv that they considered a major IDF effort to destroy Egyptian forces in the northern Sinai Peninsula likely within 24 hours but that Israeli forces would comply with the British-French ultimatum not to advance to the Suez Canal. IDF strength in the central Sinai included two armored divisions with certain additional elements.

(S) Msg, USARMA, USAIRA and ALUSNA Tel Aviv to DEPTAR, CX 396, 311353Z Oct 56, DA IN 265090. Received JCS 312333Z Oct 56.

31 Oct The US Ambassador in Amman reported an interview with the new Jordanian Prime Minister, who was in a "troubled and anxious" state as a result of the Israeli-Egyptian crisis.

Ambassador Mallory strongly cautioned prudence, pointing out that any overt action by Jordan would only worsen the situation. The Prime Minister

also indicated his gratitude for the US stand in the UN and for the President's statement.

Mallory promised the Prime Minister to secure an audience with King Hussein and urge prudence on him, too.

(U) Msg, Amman (Mallory) to SecState, 415, 31 Oct 56, DA IN 265473 (1 Nov 56). Received State 010335Z Nov 56. Received JCS 011504Z Nov 56.

31 Oct (U) The State Department notified US ambassadors and military commanders concerned with Middle East evacuation that once the needs of US nationals had been met, assistance could be extended to UN employees and their dependents, French, and other friendly nationals.

(U) Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy Cairo, 1342, 31 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 010628Z Nov 56.

31 Oct - The US Embassy in Vienna reported that information received from western Hungary indicated that Soviet forces had not gone into action against the new local authorities there. A high Austrian official had said that Soviet troops had encircled rebel-held Sopron but had not intervened or interfered with movement in and out of the city. There was no confirmation of Soviet defections, but reports had been received that in the early days of the uprising individual Soviet soldiers had turned arms over to the rebels.

(S) Msg, Vienna (Thompson) to SecState, 1008, 31 Oct 56. Received State 311714Z Oct 56. Received JCS 010610 Nov 56.

31 Oct SECRET The US Ambassador in Moscow reported that so far the Soviet reaction to events in Hungary had not been clear-cut, and he had seen no evidence of change in personnel or relative influence within the Kremlin's collective leadership. He stressed that there had so far been no backtracking on the line laid down at the 20th Party Congress regarding relations between the Soviet Union and the Communist Parties and governments in the satellites.

(U) Msg, Moscow (Bohlen) to SecState, 1011, 31 Oct 56, DA IN 265251 (1 Nov 56). Received State 311532Z Oct 56. Received JCS 011405Z Nov 56.

31 Oct SECRET Eden opened a two-day debate in Commons by defending his Suez policy. US Ambassador Aldrich reported that Eden's speech revealed a stubborn determination to use force if necessary to protect British lives and property in Suez, to maintain the international character of the canal, and to terminate the Egyptian-Israeli conflict by interposing Anglo-French troops between the contenders. When pressed by Gaitskell, Eden refused to say whether the British had already begun hostilities, or whether the US and the Commonwealth had been informed of the ultimatum before its delivery. Ambassador Aldrich and other foreign diplomats believed Eden's presentation had been ineffective.

(U) Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 2402, 31 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 010925Z Nov 56. Received JCS 011716Z Nov 56.

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31 Oct (U) Eden said that Britain must protect her vital interests in the Middle East, with or without prior agreement of the US. Hence, Britain and France would move into the Suez Canal zone, whether the US approved or not.

AP Wire Service, 31 Oct 56. Received JCS 311611Z and 311716Z Oct 56.

31 Oct The British Foreign Office issued a statement that the US Ambassador in London had not been informed of the British intentions in the Middle East until shortly after Prime Minister Eden rose to make his speech announcing them. This corrected earlier Foreign Office statements that the US Ambassador had been informed before the speech.

(S) Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 2423, 1 Nov 56, DA IN 265633 (2 Nov 56). Received State 011856Z Nov 56. Received JCS 020917Z Nov 56.

31 Oct Prime Minister Nehru, in a conversation with the US Counselor of Embassy: 1) Expressed India's profound concern over the Israeli attack on Egypt and the report that British troops had landed on Egyptian territory. 2) Labeled the Israeli action "clearly an aggression," and said that the US resolution, vetoed in the UN, was a "good" one. 3) Stated his strong belief that Israel had acted with the support of the UK and France. 4) Declared that India must look to the US to stop military action in the Middle East.

(S) Msg, New Delhi (Bartlett) to SecState, 1109, 31 Oct 56, DA IN 265381 (1 Nov 56). Received State 010252Z Nov 56. Received JCS 011454Z Nov 56.

31 Oct The US Naval Attache in Athens forwarded a report by the US Air Attache that French aircraft had staged through Athens on 31 October en route to Israel and that more were expected on 1 November. The Naval Attache also reported that,

(S) Msg, ALUSNA Athens to CNO, 311455Z [corrected to 311415Z] Oct 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 011719Z Nov 56.

31 Oct (U) The White House announced the US was still standing by its pledge to assist any victim of aggression in the Middle East.

AP Wire Service, 31 Oct 56. Received JCS 311613Z Oct 56.

31 Oct The US Army Attache in Vienna forwarded information on Soviet troop movements

out of Győr and other Hungarian cities, and other indications that the Soviets were evacuating. It stated there were more than 3,000 Soviet dead in Budapest alone.

(S) Msg, USARMA Vienna to DEPTAR, CX 173, 311705Z Oct 56, DA IN 265209 (1 Nov 56). Received JCS 011331Z Nov 56.

31 Oct The US Ambassador in Tripoli reported that the Libyan Government had announced at 1400Z the decision of the Council of Ministers to employ all means in its power to prevent the use of British forces in Libya against any Arab power. The Libyan Government had expressed shock at the attitude revealed by the British and French in their ultimatum, and gratitude at the stand taken by the US for a peaceful settlement. In a later report the Ambassador said the Libyan Prime Minister had summoned the British Ambassador and asked for a written guarantee that British bases would not be used in any attack on Egypt.

(S) Msg, Tripoli (Tappin) to SecState, 264, 31 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 311745Z Oct 56. Received JCS 010113Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford. (S) Msg, Tripoli (Tappin) to SecState, 265, 1 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 011240Z Nov 56. Received JCS 020118Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

31 Oct The US Ambassador in Paris reported that Mollet believed a rapid and spectacular success in Egypt would have a salutary effect throughout North Africa. The French still expected the operation to be concluded very rapidly.

(S) Msg, Paris (Dillon) to SecState, 2098, 31 Oct 56, DA IN 265257 (1 Nov 56). Received State 311821Z Oct 56. Received JCS 012010Z Nov 56.

31 Oct (U) Mollet won a vote of support in the National Assembly for his policy in the Suez crisis, but with a lower majority than he had obtained in favor of strong measures against Egypt in August.

NYT, 31 Oct 56, 1:7. Received JCS 311330Z Oct 56.

31 Oct Commenting on a proposal to hold a meeting of the signatories of the Baghdad Pact, less the UK, the US Ambassador to Turkey pointed out that such a meeting would only emphasize Britain's absence and the reasons therefor. Moreover, the Pact had grown out of the "northern tier" concept and was directed against the Soviets. A meeting during the current crisis might involve the Pact in the Arab-Israeli conflict and thereby vitiate its basic purpose.

(S) Msg, Ankara (Warren) to SecState, 959, 31 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 312111Z Oct 56. Received JCS 010630Z Nov 56.

31 Oct The US Ambassador to the UN reported highly favorable reactions to the US stand in the Security Council on the Israeli invasion of Egypt from representatives of Lebanon, Syria, the USSR, Switzerland, India, Latin America in general, the Netherlands, Egypt, Pakistan, Iraq, Norway, and Denmark. Typical Arab

reactions: The Lebanese delegate said, "The United States Government and the people of the United States have the blessing of the entire Arab world." The former Secretary General of the Arab League echoed this and went further with, "You have won a place in the heart of all Arabs which they will never forget." The Iraqi delegate said, "God be with you in this; you have the praise of the entire world."

(U) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 456, 31 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 311906Z Oct 56. Received JCS 311927Z Oct 56.

31 Oct

In a fuller comment on the Soviet statement of 30 October regarding bases for cooperation between the Soviet Union and "other socialist states," the US Ambassador in Moscow said the declaration indicated Soviet acceptance of the concepts of "national Communism" and "different paths to socialism," in a logical extension of the 20th Congress pronouncements. The fact that the declaration spoke of negotiations on "recall" of Soviet specialists and on the stationing of Soviet forces in Hungary, Poland, and Rumania, supported this interpretation. Ambassador Bohlen felt such negotiations were designed to head off repetition in Rumania and Poland of the events in Hungary, which were threatening the maintenance of even a "national Communist" regime in Budapest. He noted that the declaration cited the agreements under which Soviet troops were stationed in Hungary, Poland, and Rumania and then flatly asserted that there were no Soviet units "in other countries of people's democracy." The Ambassador believed the failure to mention East Germany was intentional, to emphasize that Soviet forces there were not subject to the Warsaw Pact. Accordingly, line of communications troops in Poland would not be affected by the projected negotiations.

(U) Msg, Moscow (Bohlen) to SecState, 1016, 31 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 312034Z Oct 56. Received JCS 012000Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

31 Oct (v)

The French Defense Ministry announced that combined British-French operations against points in the Suez Canal area had begun at 1640Z. Shortly afterward the British Defense Ministry said British aircraft were bombing military targets in Egypt.

AP Wire Service, 31 Oct 56. Received JCS 311802Z and 311846Z Oct 56.

31 Oct ✓

COMSIXTHFLT reported that Cairo's International Airport had come under air attack at 311840Z October, but there was no information on the identity of the attackers or the damage inflicted.

(U) Msg, COMSIXTHFLT to CINCNELM, 312340Z Oct 56. Received JCS 011038Z Nov 56.

31 Oct

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(S) ~~TS~~ Msg, Received JCS 021116Z Nov 56.

31 Oct

(TS) ~~TS~~ Msg, SecState to AmEmbassy London, 3100, 30 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received JCS 311719Z Oct 56. SEEN by Adm Radford. (TS) Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 2403, 31 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 312211Z Oct 56. Received JCS 010924Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

31 Oct (U) In New Delhi, Nehru issued a sharply worded statement denouncing Israel, Britain, and France and calling for UN action to end "the aggression against Egypt." The Indian Government had as yet made no statement on Soviet actions in Hungary.
NYT, 1 Nov 56, 14:4. Received JCS 011330Z Nov 56.

31 Oct The US Consul at Nicosia reported that strong British and French forces were apparently leaving Cyprus sea-ports that evening, and that intense activity from Nicosia airport could be observed. No official information, other than brief news bulletin broadcasts, had been obtained.
(S) ~~TS~~ Msg, Nicosia (Courtney) to SecState, 173, 31 Oct 56, DA IN 265215 (1 Nov 56). Received State 312129Z Oct 56. Received JCS 010714Z Nov 56.

31 Oct In an interview with US Ambassador Hare, Nasser dictated a message for dispatch to President Eisenhower asking for "United States support against Anglo-French aggression." Nasser explained this meant military support if the British and French resorted to military action. Hare expressed the personal opinion that, although the President was doing everything he could to meet the crisis, the US would not find it possible to go as far as Nasser desired. He also persuaded Nasser not to publish the message. Hare then, with diplomatically veiled frankness, cautioned Nasser against using a US rejection as an excuse for turning to the USSR for help. Nasser replied that there had been no such thought. Although Khrushchev had offered

volunteers, Egypt had not replied. Concluding the discussion, Nasser vowed not to surrender or run away.

(S) Msg, Cairo (Hare) to SecState, 1240, 31 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 311625Z Oct 56. Received JCS 011716Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

31 Oct

(S) Msg, USARMA Rome to DNI, 312345Z Oct 56. Received JCS 011718Z Nov 56.

31 Oct

(S) Msg, London (Aldrich) to SecState, 2420, 1 Nov 56, DA IN 265714 (2 Oct [Nov] 56). Received State 011856Z Nov 56. Received JCS 020822Z Nov 56.

31 Oct (U)

Moscow accused Britain, France, and Israel of aggression against Egypt and demanded that the UN Security Council take prompt steps to halt the attack and to arrange "immediate withdrawal of the interventionist troops." The Soviet position was broadcast by Moscow radio in the evening. Earlier in the day the French and British Ambassadors were summoned to the Soviet Foreign Office but were kept waiting.

NYT, 1 Nov 56, 6:2. Received JCS 011330Z Nov 56.

31 Oct

The US Ambassador in Moscow reported the official Soviet position on Middle East developments as contained in the declaration issued the night of 31 October. The declaration strongly condemned Israel, England, and France, with the US mentioned only incidentally or by insinuation. In essence it stated a policy of non-involvement at that stage, but the Ambassador felt the statement did not preclude clandestine assistance to

Egypt and would of course be no guide to Soviet action if hostilities should spread.

(S) Msg, Moscow (Bohlen) to SecState, 1027, 1 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 012125Z Nov 56. Received JCS 021126Z Nov 56. SEEN by Adm Radford.

31 Oct (U) After a nine-hour cabinet meeting attended by King Hussein, Jordan declared a state of emergency. Jordan and Syria continued preparations to go to Egypt's aid, if requested, under the terms of the three-power alliance concluded in Amman on 24 October.

NYT, 1 Nov 56, 11:1. Received JCS 011330Z Nov 56.

31 Oct (U) Canada suspended all shipments of arms to Israel "for the time being." Twenty-four Saber jets were scheduled for export to Israel.

NYT, 1 Nov 56, 10:8. Received JCS 011330Z Nov 56.


31 Oct (U) In an evening television address, President Eisenhower condemned the use of force in the Middle East but sought to explain why Britain and France felt compelled to use it. He said the US intended to bring the matter before the UN General Assembly, where no veto operated. The President also disclosed that the US was already in contact with Poland on the question of possible economic aid.

NYT, 1 Nov 56, 1:8. Received JCS 011330Z Nov 56.

31 Oct The UN Security Council adopted a Yugoslav resolution calling for a special emergency session of the General Assembly on 1 November to consider the Israeli invasion of Egypt. The vote was 7-2, with France and the UK opposing and Australia and Belgium abstaining. The British and French representatives justified the action taken by their governments as necessary, in the absence of effective machinery to restore peace, to safeguard the canal and stop the fighting.

(Offl Use Only) Msg, New York (Lodge) to SecState, 461, 31 Oct 56, CJCS files. Received State 010832Z Nov 56. Received JCS 011716Z Nov 56.

31 Oct



(S) Msg, Athens (Allen) to SecState, 1486, 1 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 030408Z Nov 56. Received JCS 031630Z Nov 56. (S) Msg, Athens (Allen) to SecState, 1509, 1 Nov 56, CJCS files. Received State 011742Z Nov 56. Received JCS 040259Z Nov 56.

31 Oct

(U) Msg, Damascus (Moose) to SecState, 999, 1 Nov 56, DA IN 265709 (2 Nov 56). Received State 011743Z Nov 56. Received JCS 020915Z Nov 56.

31 Oct The UK Defense Ministry announced that General Keightley had been appointed commander-in-chief of the Anglo-French forces to intervene in Egypt. (The London Times on 1 November said General Stockwell would lead the invasion forces while Keightley exercised general command from Cyprus.)

(U) Msg, USARMA London to DEPTAR, CX 177, 011025Z Nov 56, DA IN 265501. Received JCS 020027Z Nov 56.

31 Oct

31 Oct